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Abstract 
 
This thesis posits that the advent of the internet has resulted in qualitative and quantitative changes 
to antisemitism, particularly in the period since web 2.0. Comparing online antisemitism with other 
forms of online abuse, this thesis demonstrates limits in the research on broader manifestations of 
online discrimination due to inconsistent methodologies and quantities of research. A key 
consideration is how online antisemitism both differs and intersects with broader manifestations, 
including cyberbullying, cyber-racism, and abusive conspiracy movements. Through 
consideration of these intersections, the broader history of antisemitism, and the functions of 
internet technology, profiles of major online sources for antisemitism are presented. Beyond 
illustrating how the internet has changed antisemitism alongside other manifestations of abuse and 
discrimination, this thesis also develops and tests a research model that can be adapted to different 
fields and disciplines. Simulated online conversations between young adults and a Holocaust 
denier evaluate how effective young adult web users are at recognising, researching, responding 
to and refuting antisemitism online, and what tools can be designed to assist them. Antisemitism 
has undergone significant qualitative and quantitative change due to the internet and now reaches 
more young people who are ill-equipped to resist its online manifestations. While expertise in the 
specific nature of antisemitism is needed to tackle this problem, the response can involve adaptable 
methodologies of benefit to the study of online hate more broadly. There is benefit in collaboration 
across researchers, fields, and disciplines to provide holistic explanations and solutions to some 
common aspects of online hate, abuse, and misinformation.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Approaching an Ancient Hatred in the Information Age 
 
On May 19th 2016, journalist Rebecca Shabad tweeted about her experience of online antisemitic 
harassment: “Another reporter and I received a photo on Twitter recently of Jews at a concentration 
camp, telling us to move to Israel.”1 In response to her tweet, pseudonymous user 
@HelloRaspberry tweeted a picture of a Jewish caricature drinking a water tank of red liquid 
labelled “Goyim Blood” (appendix A, figure 1.1).2 This picture originally depicted a man drinking 
a large tank of water (appendix A, figure 1.2), crudely altered to allude to the antisemitic ‘blood 
libel’ trope, which accuses Jews of drinking the blood of Christians. The alterations included a 
grotesquely extended nose, kippah, and payot, along with colouring and labelling the water. The 
modified image was sent in the context of a wave of antisemitic harassment towards Jewish 
journalists on social media during the 2016 election in the United States.3 This antisemitic image 
makes use of long-running historical antisemitic tropes that some may assume are no longer 
relevant in today’s society. Nonetheless, this particular image, as part of the larger antisemitic 
harassment campaign, is indicative of the large qualitative and quantitative changes to 
antisemitism brought about by the medium of the internet. 
 
1 Rebecca Shabad (@Rebecca Shabad, 19 May 2016), ‘@jonathanweisman Another reporter and I received a photo 
on Twitter recently of Jews at a concentration camp, telling us to move to Israel’ (tweet), 
<https://twitter.com/rebeccashabad/status/733294420628504576> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
2 Naughty Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet). 
ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential 
Campaign (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016) 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-
Force_v2.pdf> [accessed 8 December 2019] (p. 11). 
3 Anti-Defamation League, <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/ 
CR_4862_Journalism-Task-Force_v2.pdf>. 
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Despite debates about possible precursors, the blood libel trope is generally understood to 
have originated with the death of a boy, William of Norwich, in 1144. The Jewish community of 
Norwich were accused of ritually murdering the boy to fulfil a prophecy that would allow them to 
return to Israel.4 Similar accusations spread elsewhere in England and across Europe, eventually 
manifesting into a general myth accusing Jews of using the blood of Christian children in various 
rituals.5 This antisemitic myth can be described as ‘chimeric antisemitism’, a term coined by Gavin 
Langmuir that describes a fantastical manifestation of antisemitism not rooted in any observable 
fact or truth.6 The blood libel trope has regularly resurfaced throughout history, with over 150 
recorded cases resulting in the persecution and killing of Jews. The majority of these cases 
occurred in the Middle Ages,7 however instances have extended into the 19th century and 
accusations continue even today in majority Muslim societies.8 The pervasive use of this 
fantastical myth, even beyond the relevance of its original Medieval Christian context, represents 
a unique quality of antisemitism as a form of discrimination, as opposed to discriminatory beliefs 
typically born from more relevant contemporary contexts (e.g. immigration or employment 
issues). 
It is vital to understand manifestations such as the altered image used by @HelloRaspberry 
to understand how antisemitism presents itself in the Information Age. The image used by 
@HelloRaspberry is an example of an internet ‘meme’, a term referring to online content such as 
jokes, videos, images, texts, websites, and ideas that are propagated from person to person via the 
 
4 Gavin Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), p. 216. 
5 Darren O’Brien, The Pinnacle of Hatred: The Blood Libel and the Jews (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University 
Magnes Press, 2011), pp. 183-195. 
6 Langmuir, p. 306. 
7 Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Antisemitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 56 
8 David Lev, ‘Blood Libel Alive and Well in the Muslim World’, Arutz Sheva, 25 March 2013. 
<http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/166544#.Vd3d5zZRFhF> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
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internet, often featuring user-created derivations through parodies, remixes, mashups or 
photoshops.9 Limor Shifman describes the cultural role of internet memes as “(post)modern 
folklore, in which shared norms and values are constructed through cultural artifacts such as 
Photoshopped images or urban legends.”10 The original template of @HelloRaspberry’s meme 
was intended to represent gleeful celebration of an ideological opponent’s distress through the 
“drinking of tears” (appendix A, figure 1.3), and has been co-opted for a range of antisemitic 
purposes (appendix A, figure 1.4).  
The internet has provided the broader population with tools to easily edit, modify, save and 
upload images in this way, allowing them to be very easily weaponised in a campaign of 
harassment, like that perpetrated against Jewish journalists in 2016. Furthermore, the ability to act 
anonymously online and/or hide one’s identity behind a pseudonym provides unprecedented ease 
for the harassment of public figures online, while drawing no risk upon harassers’ offline social 
capital. This ease of modifying and sharing content, combined with the anonymity and 
pseudonymity of online spaces, has led to changes in the online manifestation of bullying 
(‘cyberbullying’), and challenges in stemming the tide of broader cyber-discrimination. While the 
“goyim blood” manifestation is typical of an internet meme in that it modifies an existing template, 
its modification goes further than other examples, which typically are associated with tears (as in 
the original). Instead, it also relies on the pre-existing memetic idea of blood libel, understanding 
that it will be recognised by Jewish targets, thereby both antagonising these Jews and fulfilling the 
typical purpose of internet memes of entertaining other like-minded users. 
 
9 Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2014), p. 2. 
10 Ibid., p. 14. 
 4 
 
 The use of the historical blood libel trope in this targeted cyberbullying context represents 
a concerning intersection of existing antisemitism with new communicative features of the 
internet, cyberbullying, and cyber-discrimination. In addition, the fantastical and bygone nature of 
this trope indicates a further unique quality to antisemitism brought about by the internet. Its 
jocular use in a targeted campaign of harassment by sardonically named pseudonymous social 
media accounts towards recognisable Jews represents an evolution of strategy by dedicated 
antisemites. This strategy serves to broaden the appeal of antisemitism online with little to no risk 
or cost to its perpetrators. 
 
Purpose and Intent 
This thesis explores the impact of the internet on the manifestation and distribution of 
antisemitism,11 while concurrently investigating solutions for diminishing its impact online. 
Specifically, the aim is to understand the extent of quantitative change to antisemitism brought 
about by the internet, and whether and how the internet has resulted in qualitative changes to 
antisemitism more broadly. Beyond this main purpose, this thesis also explores how antisemitism 
online compares to, contrasts with, and intersects with other forms of online abuse and 
discrimination. This additional step determines whether any qualitative changes to antisemitism 
brought about by the internet are shared with other forms of abuse and discrimination, or how they 
 
11 The use of the unhyphenated version of antisemitism is explained in an April 2015 memo from the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance entitled Spelling of Antisemitism. It explains that an unhyphenated version 
indicates there is thing called ‘Semitism’ which ‘anti-Semitism’ is opposed to. This opposition to ‘Semitism’ was 
the purpose of Wilhelm Marr’s original definition of ‘anti-Semitism’ and was grounded in racialist nineteenth 
century pseudo-science. However, ‘antisemitism’ is a still well-recognised generic term for Jew-hatred. The use of 
an unhyphenated version of antisemitism is because of this recognition, but also to avoid legitimising the idea of an 
entity of ‘Semitism’.  
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Spelling of Antisemitism (2018), 
<https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/spelling-antisemitism> [accessed 2 December 2019] (para. 3 of 4). 
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are further distinguished from one another, providing extra scope to the qualitative analysis of 
antisemitism online. Furthermore, by exploring how these forms of online abuse relate and 
contribute to each other, this thesis reaffirms the need for interdisciplinary and inter-field 
approaches to online racism and abuse.12 For the purpose of this thesis, ‘interdisciplinary and inter-
field approaches’ refers to two practices: firstly, combining methodologies from different major 
disciplines such as sociology, statistics and law; and secondly, creating research approaches 
applicable to fields similar to online antisemitism, such as online racism, online sexism, and 
cyberbullying. The promotion of interdisciplinary approaches is also supported by a research study 
into reducing the impact of antisemitism online, as the study’s design serves to be easily adaptable 
to research on other forms of online abuse and discrimination. Ultimately, this thesis’ original 
contributions go beyond identifying and analysing the issue of online antisemitism and will also 
contribute towards finding solutions and aiding broader research into analogous phenomena. 
 
Overview of Thesis 
The purpose of this introduction is to lay out this research project and to provide a justification for 
the focus on the issue of antisemitism online. It provides an outline of each major chapter, a 
description of its content, aims, and importance to the thesis, and major sections within. Following 
these outlines, this introduction affords justification for the research by providing an overall 
background to the current understanding of antisemitism, discrimination, and public health. 
The second chapter identifies and explores key sociological concepts relevant to this thesis, 
and then critically examines research on relevant forms of cyber abuse and discrimination. This 
 
12 Andrew Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race 
Hate (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
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comparative approach highlights the impact of the internet on the spread of broader cyber abuse 
and discrimination, including the ease of distribution and reproduction of existing material, 
accessibility to new audiences, and the inability to apply existing countermeasures. The 
examination of intersecting fields of research covers methods of quantifying abuse and 
discrimination online, problems with defining online manifestations of abuse and discrimination, 
and other issues that have arisen in research in these areas. The main forms of cyber abuse explored 
in the chapter are cyberbullying and online racism, as they are the two largest and most relevant 
analogous fields of research. However, online sexism is also examined through a case example of 
the GamerGate movement, which explores the intersection of cyberbullying and cyber-
discrimination in the form of target-based harassment. By critically examining the research into 
these phenomena, this chapter identifies key lessons and issues that can be applied to research into 
online antisemitism. 
The third chapter features a literature review into the scholarship on antisemitism, 
presenting a brief historiography of the field since World War II. This historiography serves to 
provide a ‘big picture’ overview of the field, tracing the evolution of scholarship on antisemitism 
throughout the twentieth century, which contextualises the major questions central in current 
antisemitism scholarship. The review also analyses the qualitative changes in antisemitism made 
in reaction to this scholarship. The review traces the considerable growth of the field following the 
Holocaust, including some of its major debates surrounding Nazi antisemitism, through to 
subsequent manifestations of antisemitism that evolved in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
namely ‘new’ antisemitism and Holocaust denial. ‘New’ antisemitism serves as a nexus for the 
debate over what qualifies as qualitative change to antisemitism, and so this section serves the 
overall thesis by examining these qualifications while also identifying the issues that complicate 
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the debate. Beyond Holocaust denial’s importance as a recent manifestation of antisemitism that 
bridges the pre-internet and internet spheres, it illuminates the fundamental adaptability of 
antisemitism, suggestive of qualitative change. This adaptability includes the growth of Holocaust 
denial as a reaction to the growth of scholarship on both the Holocaust and broader antisemitism. 
The breadth of the historiographical review is justified, as it highlights what makes Holocaust 
denial a qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism and how the historical record of 
antisemitism contributed to this particular manifestation. In identifying adaptability as a key 
quality of modern antisemitism, the thesis demonstrates the need for continued research.  
The fourth chapter provides a design for a methodological approach for research on online 
antisemitism. This design draws upon the key sociological concepts of the internet and applies 
lessons from the fields of cyberbullying and cyber-racism research and the preceding literature 
review. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the GamerGate case study with antisemitism, 
and then a detailed construction of research frameworks to be applied to antisemitic websites and 
social media platforms in chapter five. Comparative analysis of antisemitism online with other 
forms of online abuse addresses the purposes of this thesis in two ways. Firstly, it allows for 
analysis of which changes to antisemitism seen in online spaces are shared with other types of 
online abuse (and can thereby be attributed to the medium of the internet), and which are distinct 
qualitative changes particular to antisemitism. Secondly, it serves to inform and justify the creation 
of interdisciplinary approaches to abuse and discrimination online, including facilitating the design 
of standard methodologies that will allow for more accurate comparison and cooperation across 
fields. The construction of research frameworks in the final section of this chapter is informed by 
both the critical analysis of analogous fields, as well as the literature review of antisemitism. 
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The fifth chapter applies the frameworks constructed in chapter four to a specific selection 
of antisemitic websites and social media platforms, creating profiles that represent archetypes of 
antisemitic spaces online. The frameworks facilitate analyses of these spaces by providing criteria 
for which websites to analyse, streamlining the analyses, and making it possible to compare the 
websites and their content. In addition, the frameworks enable a comparison of pre-internet or 
offline manifestations of antisemitism, thereby more clearly contrasting the qualitative and 
quantitative changes between these different manifestations. While this chapter primarily serves 
to create profiles for these different websites and platforms, it also identifies key trends and 
qualities, thereby indicating how certain websites influence each other and why. This analysis 
paves the way for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of antisemitism in these spaces, 
including how they compare with or influence antisemitism offline. This suggests a more nuanced 
approach to the main question of this thesis, extending beyond how existing manifestations of 
antisemitism are qualitatively distinct when expressed online, to whether and how the internet 
changed the nature of antisemitism more broadly. 
The sixth chapter features a research study conducted to measure young peoples’ abilities 
to recognise, research, respond to, and refute antisemitism encountered in online spaces. The study 
serves to advance the main purposes of the thesis: determining quantitative and qualitative changes 
to antisemitism due to the internet (in observing its effects on participant reaction) and promoting 
interdisciplinary approaches to online abuse and discrimination. The chapter details and justifies 
the design for the study, particularly in how it simulates an online encounter with an antisemite. 
The design uses deception to simulate the key aspects of online interaction that are overviewed in 
the second chapter. By providing existing resources refuting antisemitism, the study helps 
determine the usefulness of existing resources to young people. Both the conversations with the 
 9 
 
antisemites and participant survey responses are analysed, thereby helping identify how the 
participants’ emotional response, prior knowledge of antisemitism, and general attitudes towards 
antisemitism affected their responses. Through this study, the chapter illustrates the qualities of 
the online medium that affect antisemitism’s portrayal, reception and understanding from others 
in shared spaces. Holocaust denial was chosen as the main antisemitic trope presented to 
participants in the study, as it is a qualitatively distinct pre-online manifestation of antisemitism 
that nonetheless can be commonly encountered online. By presenting this trope in an online 
medium, this study allows for analysis of whether qualitative changes to antisemitism are caused 
by the medium of the internet. The chapter also details and evaluates the adaptive design of the 
study for other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and even for other forms of pseudo-
intellectualism and misinformation online. Ultimately, this chapter furthers the purpose and 
arguments of this thesis by putting them into practice, while also providing additional contributions 
to combat antisemitism online in the form of valuable data.  
The seventh and final chapter takes the form of a combined discussion and conclusion. 
This chapter compares the findings of each chapter to provide an expanded answer to the main 
question of the thesis: the degree of change to antisemitism as it manifests online. Through this 
discussion, this chapter can evaluate antisemitism’s qualitative change compared to pre-internet 
forms of antisemitism. Comparing these qualitative changes with those observed within other 
forms of online abuse and cyber-discrimination determines online antisemitism’s qualitative 
distinctiveness in a broader context. The analyses of antisemitic websites and antisemitism on 
social media platforms in chapter five is compared with the data from chapter six’s study, further 
contextualising this distinctiveness and informing recommendations to combat antisemitism. 
These recommendations include tools, resources, and strategies for the digital age, both online and 
 10 
 
offline. In conclusion, these tools, resources, and strategies are considered within the scope of an 
interdisciplinary approach to online abuse, discrimination, and misinformation, recommending 
methods of collaboration between fields and disciplines and to tackle these overlapping problems 
despite their differences. Taken together, these findings deepen our knowledge of contemporary 
antisemitism, discrimination, and broader internet studies. 
 
Justification for Research 
Racism and Public Health 
An overarching justification for this thesis is that it helps improve public health in modern societies 
by contributing to the body of scholarship on the spread, levels, and removal of discrimination, 
particularly racism. Over the last century, racist forms of governance have been dismantled all 
over the globe, leaving few nations officially promoting racism. The removal of systemic and 
institutional racism is a boon for not only the victims of racist policy, but also for the public health 
of the broader society.13 For example, in the United States, segregation has long been proven to be 
a factor associated with increases in inter-racial violence and crime,14 as well as higher poverty 
rates and their related health risks.15 However, research into this phenomenon has shown that while 
segregation is no longer institutionally enforced, it persists in myriad forms,16 indicating that 
 
13 Michael T. Light and Julia T Thomas, ‘Segregation and Violence Reconsidered: Do Whites Benefit from 
Residential Segregation?’, American Sociological Review, 84.4 (2019), 690-725 (pp. 712-713). 
14 Ben Feldmeyer, ‘The Effects of Racial/Ethnic Segregation on Latino and Black Homicide’, The Sociological 
Quarterly, 51.4 (Fall 2010), 600-623. 
15 Douglas S. Massey, ‘Getting away with murder: Segregation and violent crime in urban America’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 143 (1995), 1203-1232. 
16 Renee Mehra, Lisa M. Boyd, Jeannette R. Ickovics, ‘Racial residential segregation and adverse birth outcomes: A 
systematic review and meta-analysis, Social Science & Medicine, 191 (2017), 237-250 (pp. 237-238, 248). 
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ending the negative impacts of racism requires action beyond the removal of racist policy and 
institutions. 
Although crime rates declined in the English-speaking ‘West’17 at the end of the twentieth 
century,18 crime nonetheless remains a major public health concern.19 One area of particular 
concern is hate crime, which is crime motivated by prejudice against a member of a perceived 
social group or race.20 While overall crime rates continued to drop throughout the early twenty-
first century,21 hate crime rates have remained stable, and in recent years have begun to rise. In the 
United States, data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) between 2003 and 
2012 showed a slight rise in violent hate crime but at the same time featured a decrease in the 
reporting of violent hate crime to the police.22 In addition, there was no significant change in 
property hate crime victimisation between 2005 and 2012.23 These statistics indicate a rise in 
violent hate crime and suggest a lack of faith in law enforcement’s ability to halt its escalation and 
perpetration. Separately, the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) has been collecting data on 
reported hate crime since 1996 (appendix A, figures 3-5), which shows a drop in reported hate 
crime incidents in the late 1990s.24 However, these data have not significantly changed since the 
 
17 The term ‘West’ has a fraught and inconsistent history and can even be used for idealistic purposes. Nonetheless, 
the term does serve a heuristic purpose to refer to the interwoven history of Christianity, imperialism, and the 
Enlightenment within Western and Central Europe. For this thesis, the English-speaking ‘West’ refers to the 
countries of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, and the United States. 
18 Michael Tonry, ‘Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World’, Crime & Justice, 43.1 (2014), 
<https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/511> [accessed 3 October 2018] (p. 4). 
19 Megan Comfort, ‘Public Health and Crime,’ in The Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment, ed. by W. G. 
Jennings, (London: Thousand Oaks, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118519639.wbecpx277>. 
20 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide (Warsaw: 
OSCE 2009), p. 11. 
21 Tonry, p. 4. 
22 Gloria Thompson, Hate Crime Data Collection: Guidelines, Identification Assistance and Selected Statistics (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2015), p. 70. 
23 Ibid., p. 71. 
24 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996 Hate Crime Statistics (1996), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/1996> 
[accessed 2 December 2019] (p. 7). 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000 Hate Crime Statistics (2000), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2000> [accessed 
2 December 2019] (p. 7). 
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late-2000s,25 and these drops are far smaller compared to the overall violent and property crime 
rates.26 In Australia, there is a lack of clear hate crime statistics,27 despite the problems of hate 
crime being identified as a significant issue as early as 1989.28 The persistence of hate crimes 
signifies a persistence of racism within ‘Western’ societies, a problem that has been identified as 
a major public health issue by academics,29 including the American College of Physicians.30  
Research of hate crimes has found additional problems and concerns beyond the disparity 
between overall crime and hate crimes rates. Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland identify that racist 
hate crimes are the most numerically common form of hate crime (as opposed to sexist or 
homophobic hate crimes, for example), while also being the most familiar to political, public, and 
academic groups.31 Despite this attention, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) argues that most 
countries are significantly falling short in fighting hate crimes,32 with insufficiently aggregated 
data and a lack of significant penalties for discriminatory motivations in crime. However, 
Chakraborti and Garland argue that the data that does exist on racism suffer from an over-reliance 
on “incidents”, which “detaches the lived experience from its wider context of racist exclusion and 
 
25 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010 Hate Crime Statistics (2010), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/ 
hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016 Hate Crime Statistics (2016), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/ 
topic-pages/incidentsandoffenses> [accessed 3 October 2018]. 
26 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants 1997-
2016, <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-1> [accessed 3 
October 2018]. 
27 Davide Shiappapietra, ‘Australia has no national hate crime database, but here’s how to build one’, SBS, 19 March 
2019. <https://www.sbs.com.au/language/english/australia-has-no-national-hate-crime-database-but-here-s-how-to-
build-one> [accessed 21 October 2019] (para. 2 of 17). 
28 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Racist Violence: Report of the National Inquiry into Racist 
Violence in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991), pp. 7, 160. 
29 Jakubowicz and others, p. 31. 
30 American College of Physicians, ‘American College of Physicians says hate crimes are public health issue’, Law 
& Health Weekly, 2 September 2017, p. 144. 
31 Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland, Hate Crime: Impact, Causes & Responses, (London: SAGE Publications, 
2015), p. 16. 
32 Anti-Defamation League, ‘Most Countries Still Fall Short in Fighting Hate Crimes’, in Hate Crimes, ed. by 
Barbara Krasner (New York: Greenhaving Publishing, 2017), pp. 19-31 (p. 19). 
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fails to appreciate the impact of racism on victims’ lives beyond the actual incident itself”.33 This 
is especially important when considering high profile hate crimes, such as notorious mass 
shootings against minorities, with recent examples being African-American churchgoers in 
Charleston in 2015, LGBT people at Pulse Nightclub Orlando in 2016, Jews at the 2018 Pittsburgh 
Synagogue of Life shooting, and Muslims at the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooting. The 
cumulative effect of racism can significantly affect minorities’ overall quality of life, and is 
recognised to have a significant impact on mental and physical health.34 High profile hate crimes 
exacerbate this effect among the broader population, indicating that quantification by incidents 
alone does not capture the full picture of the effects of racism on public health. Therefore, racism 
clearly has a problematic impact on public health, and despite the attention raised to it thus far, it 
is still persistently causing problems in terms of crime and broader health concerns. This warrants 
further research into racism, especially beyond that of hate crime incidents, which are often a result 
of underlying racist sentiment. The internet, particularly social media, represents new, efficient 
avenues for the propagation of these underlying sentiments.  
 
Antisemitism Rising Across the Spectrum 
Considering the ongoing link between racism and public health, it is necessary for this thesis to 
consider the broader context in which antisemitism is increasing in the English-speaking West. 
This thesis focuses largely on the English-speaking West, predominately Australia and the United 
States, for two reasons. Firstly, there is more than enough English-language antisemitic content 
 
33 Chakraborti and Garland, p. 26. 
34 Y.C. Paradies and D.R. Williams, ‘Racism and Health’ in International Encyclopedia of Public Health, ed. by Kris 
Heggenhougen and Stella R. Quah (Oxford: Academic Press, 2008), pp. 474-483 (p. 480). 
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online to justify such a scope. Secondly, while antisemitism is particularly noteworthy in other 
languages and countries, such as those in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, expanding the scope 
to include them would come at the expense of other in-depth analysis. Nonetheless, this thesis does 
not completely ignore these regions, and explores how the internet contributes to antisemitism’s 
‘globalisation’. Another key aspect of antisemitism’s ‘globalisation’ is its rise across the political 
spectrum, permeating through a wide range of ideologies in a variety of nations.  
One factor behind increased antisemitic activity has been the global rise of far-right parties 
and politicians, which have given oxygen to racist ideologies and groups that harbour antisemitic 
views. Most notable have been groups and individuals who achieved various levels of electoral 
success, which represents both approval within the broader populaces as well as greater potential 
for the spread of antisemitism. One of the earliest post-war European far-right groups with 
antisemitic links to achieve electoral success was the French Front National (now known as 
Rassemblement National), who, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, achieved electoral 
breakthrough in the 1983 municipal elections, and shortly afterwards won 10 seats in the 1984 
European Parliament election.35 Le Pen earned notoriety for statements promoting Holocaust 
denial and trivialisation, for which he was prosecuted under the Gayssot Act.36 In the United States, 
former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke won 38.8% of the vote in the 1991 Louisiana 
Gubernatorial election run in the United States.37 While Duke did not win the election, he managed 
to become the Republican Party candidate for the election, and still won over 671,000 votes. In 
 
35 James Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 195 
36 ‘Jean-Marie Le Pen renvoyé devant la justice pour ses propos sur l'Occupation’, Le Monde, 13 July 2006. 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/07/13/ 
jean-marie-le-pen-renvoye-devant-la-justice-pour-ses-propos-sur-l-occupation_794895_3224.html> [accessed 2 
October 2018]. 
37 Louisiana Secretary of State, Official Election Results: Results for Election Date: 11/16/1991, 16 November 1991 
<https://voterportal.sos.la.gov/static/#!/1991-11-16/resultsRace/Statewide> [accessed 2 October 2018]. 
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the United Kingdom, The British National Party (founded 198238) won seats in the European 
Parliament in 2009, including the party chairman, Nick Griffin.39 Nick Griffin was even more 
explicit in his Holocaust denial than Le Pen, referring to it as a “Holohoax”.40 In Greece, the 
Golden Dawn, (founded 1980) uses extensive Nazi symbolism, and in 2012 succeeded in winning 
twenty-one seats of the Hellenic Parliament, which they used as a platform to praise figures of 
Nazi Germany and to promote Holocaust denial.41 In 2016, right-wing antisemites were 
emboldened by the election of Donald Trump as US President, who has repeatedly promoted 
antisemitic tropes42 and ‘dog-whistles’.43 The rise in prominent far-right political parties and 
politicians with antisemitic ties suggests that antisemitism is resurging despite the assumed post-
WWII discrediting of antisemitism and dismantling of institutional racist structures in these 
countries (appendix A, figure 2). 
 While it is important to consider both left- and right-wing antisemitism, a distinction must 
be made between them regarding the use of violence. There has been a noticeable increase in 
deadly violence used by the far-right against Jews and Jewish property, particularly since the 
mobilisation of the alt-right following the 2016 US election. The high-profile attacks on the 
 
38 Nigel Copsey, Contemporary British Fascism: The British National Party and its Quest for Legitimacy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 25. 
39 ‘European Election 2009: North West’, BBC News, 8 June 2009. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/elections/euro/09/html/ukregion_34.stm> [accessed 2 October 2018].  
40 BNP: Under the Skin, BBC News, 2001, online video recording, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/programmes/2001/bnp_special/the_leader/beliefs.stm> [accessed 2 
October 2018]. 
41 Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism, New Holocaust denial from Golden Dawn MP (2013), 
<http://antisemitism.org.il/article/80006/new-holocaust-denial-golden-dawn-mp> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 
2 of 5). 
42 Susan Ingram and Halie Soifer, ‘Trump’s Weaponization of Anti-Semitism’, Baltimore Jewish Times, 20 March 
2019. <https://jewishtimes.com/91518/trumps-weaponization-of-anti-semitism/opinion> [accessed 1 January 2020] 
(para. 3 of 8). 
43 The term ‘dog-whistle’ refers to coded language that has a specific, targeted meaning for a particular group. It is 
often used to advance discrimination while maintaining plausible deniability.  
Grant Barrett, The Official Dictionary of Unofficial English (United States: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2006), p. 90. 
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Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue in 2018,44 and the San Diego Poway synagogue45 and Halle 
synagogue in 201946 were all perpetrated by far-right terrorists. These occurred in the same context 
as far-right attacks against other targets, such as the 2018 Christchurch mosque shooting by 
Brenton Tarrant. While antisemitism was not a significant factor in the ideology or attack by 
Tarrant, his modus operandi was adopted by the suspects in both 2019 attacks.47 In a letter posted 
to the website 8chan, John Earnest (the Poway Synagogue attacker) cited both Tarrant and Robert 
Bowers (the Tree of Life synagogue shooter). Earnest’s manifesto was similarly structured to 
Tarrant’s,48 which was also posted on 8chan. Stephan Balliet, the Halle shooter, livestreamed his 
attack on the video game streaming website Twitch, emulating Tarrant’s Facebook livestream and 
use of gamer-culture slang and references.49 In addition to significantly higher prominence of 
violence in right-wing antisemitism, these attacks demonstrate an intersection between far-right 
movements and aspects of internet culture, even with seemingly unrelated subcultures like online 
gaming. These intentional and often sardonic intersections are an important aspect of the new 
strategy of antisemites in online spaces. 
 
44 Jarret Renshaw, ‘Who is Robert Bowers, the Pittsburgh synagogue, shooting suspect’, Reuters, 28 October 2018. 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pennsylvania-shooting-suspect/ 
who-is-robert-bowers-the-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-suspect-idUSKCN1N10S6> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
45 John Gage, ‘California police investigate hate-filled 8chan manifesto that could link synagogue shooting to 
mosque attack’, Washington Examiner, 28 April 2019. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/ 
california-police-investigate-hate-filled-8chan-manifesto-that-could-link-synagogue-shooting-to-mosque-attack> 
[accessed 21 October 2019]. 
46 ‘German synagogue shooting on Yom Kippur was far-right terrorism, authorities say’, ABC News, 12 October 
2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-11/ 
german-synagogue-shooting-confirmed-as-far-right-terrorism/11594016> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
47 Andre Oboler, William Allington and Patrick Scolyer-Gray, Hate and Violent Extremism from an Online Sub-
Culture: The Yom Kippur Terrorist Attack in Halle, Germany (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2019). 
48 Ibid. 
Gage, Washington Examiner. 
49 Marvin Ziegele, ‘Zwei Tote bei Schießerei in Halle - Video des Täters bestätigt rechtsextremistisches Motiv’, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 October 2019. <https://www.fr.de/panorama/halle-zwei-tote-schiesserei-verdacht-
rechtsextremes-motiv-zr-13083592.html> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
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 While the topics, themes, and trajectories of right-wing antisemitism are relatively 
straightforward, the concurrent rise of antisemitism in left-wing groups needs to be considered 
more carefully to fully understand the broad picture of antisemitism in the twenty-first century, 
particularly surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) draws the line between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of 
Israel where criticism engages in double standards not demanded of other democratic nations, uses 
classically antisemitic symbols and images, compares Israeli policy to that of the Nazis, and denies 
Israel’s right to exist.50 While these distinctions might seem straightforward, controversy arises 
when categorising specific statements and activities as antisemitic, due to the ambiguity of 
language and complex history of antisemitism. Furthermore, this definition of antisemitism is 
either contested or ignored by a portion of the left that maintains opposition to the existence of 
Israel itself. This split in the left, and the antisemitic portions of it, are rooted in the recasting of 
Jews from oppressed to oppressors.  
The exclusion of Jews from the framework of intersectionality – the framework used to 
identify and understand how connected and interlocking power systems are established and affect 
a broad range of marginalised groups51 – is emblematic of the problem of antisemitism in the West. 
Through a conception of Israel as a colonial oppressor, intersectionality is distorted to cast the 
Jews in a lens of ‘whiteness’, connecting them (especially Ashkenazi Jews) within an interlinked 
system of dominance headed by whites in the United States exhibiting imperialism and 
 
50 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism (Bucharest: IHRA Plenary, 
2016) <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism> [accessed 10 December 2019] 
(para. 13-16 of 20). 
Werner Bergman, ‘Anti-Semitism‘, in Handbook of Prejudice, ed. by Anton Pelinka, Karin Bischof and Karin 
Stogner (New York: Caminbria Press, 2009), pp. 37-76 (p. 57). 
51 Brittney Cooper, ‘Intersectionality’, in The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, ed. by Lisa Disch and Mary 
Hawkesworth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 385-406 (pp. 385-387), Oxford Handbooks Online.  
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capitalism.52 When intersectionality was adopted into feminist thought in the late 1980s and 
1990s,53 Jewish women faced resistance when trying to participate in intersectional discourse of 
“gender, race, and class”.54 This resistance and the ensuing recasting of Jews as an oppressor is 
rooted in a Manichean approach to anti-racism that arose in left-wing thought in the 1980s, framed 
as the category of ‘black’, or ‘colour’, against ‘whiteness’.55 This trend created, as David Hirsh 
describes, “fertile conditions for the splitting off of Israel and Jews from the community of the 
oppressed and for conceiving of them as white, imperialist and the enemy of the oppressed.”56 This 
led to Israel being associated with the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s, 
their policies being branded as an outcome of being a ‘white’ colonial settler-state.57 The anti-
apartheid movement against South Africa being replicated against Israel is an extension of this 
Manichean anti-racism.58 It is important to remember that with the creation of Israel, Jews became 
cast as white European colonisers by Arab nationalists and some international left-wing 
movements a mere three years after the conclusion of the Holocaust.59 This rapid recasting from 
oppressed to oppressor still persists within left-wing circles today, excluding Jews from 
intersectional and anti-racist discourse, thereby laying the groundwork for left-wing antisemitism. 
 
52 Balázs Berkovits, ‘Critical Whiteness Studies and the “Jewish Problem”’, Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie 
und Philosophie, 5.1 (2018), 86-102 (pp. 87-88). 
53 One of the key papers introducing this theory was Kimberle Crenshaw’s critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, 
feminist theory and antiracist politics from 1989. 
Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989.1 
(1989), 139-167. 
54 Jessica Greenebaum, ‘Placing Jewish Women into the Intersectionality of Race, Class and Gender’, Race, Class & 
Gender, 6.4 (1999), 41-60 (p. 44). 
55 David Hirsh, Contemporary Left Antisemitism (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 151. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Robert S. Wistrich, From Ambivalence to Betrayal: The Left, the Jews, and Israel (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2012), p. 510. 
58 Hirsch, p. 125. 
59 Ibid., p. 3. 
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 It is important to examine why recently liberated Jews were so swiftly cast as oppressors, 
and why this perception persists today, so that the historical roots of left-wing antisemitism after 
the Holocaust may be understood. Much of the post-war left-wing antisemitism, and the anti-
Zionist flair it adopts, was established by Stalin’s antisemitic campaigns, exacerbated by Israel’s 
alignment with the West in the escalating Cold War. The Stalinist regime feared Jewish nationalists 
as a potential fifth column within the Soviet Union and had begun to portray Zionists as “rootless 
cosmopolitans”, a variance on the antisemitic trope of the ‘wandering Jew’.60 As Israel shifted 
towards the West, the regime’s antisemitic campaign escalated, resulting in a wave of persecution 
against Jewish intellectuals in the Soviet Union under the charge of “bourgeois nationalism”.61 
Due to the contexts of the Cold War and Israel’s alignment towards the West after 1948, this 
antisemitism became integrated with a broad anti-Western campaign,62 laying the groundwork for 
the association of Israel with other typical Marxist enemies of Western capitalism and imperialism. 
This would go so far as being codified in a pseudo-academic doctrine called ‘Zionology’; 
ideological propaganda posing as a study of Zionism.63  
One key example of left-wing antisemitism takes the form of associating Zionism with 
Nazism, casting Israel as a genocidal state like the Third Reich.64 Robert Wistrich claims that this 
concept was fabricated by Stalin, and was linked again with imperialism and international 
financiers,65 thus still maintaining an anti-Western angle. Yet while this explains the historical 
roots of Soviet antisemitism, it does not explain its persistence following the fall of the Soviet 
 
60 Orlando Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia (New York: Picador, 2008), p. 493. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Konstantin Azadovskii and Boris Egorovo, ‘From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism: Stalin and the Impact of 
the “Anti-Cosmopolitan” Campaigns on Soviet Culture’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 4.1 (Winter 2002), 66-80 (p. 
80). 
63 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, The Soviet Union and Arab nationalism, 1917-1966 (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 69. 
64 Wistrich, p. 448. 
65 Ibid. 
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Union. Wistrich argues that the fall of the Soviet Union and the “bankruptcy of Marxism” in 1989 
left an “ideological vacuum” in the left, thereby allowing various leftist ideas to be co-opted and 
distorted by other ideologies and leaving the post-Cold War left vulnerable to antisemitic 
influences.66 Even though the Soviet Union fell, aspects of its legacy were still preserved through 
institutions such as the United Nations. Soviet propaganda culminated in the United Nations 
General Assembly passing Resolution 3379 in 1975, which defined Zionism as a form of racism. 
While it was repealed in 1991, the influence of the decision remained, leading to a push to define 
Zionism as a form of racism again at the UN World Conference against Racism held in Durban in 
2001.67 In addition, the relative exclusion of Jews from intersectionality and the ‘whiteness’ versus 
‘blackness’ framework of anti-racist movements laid the groundwork for the preservation of neo-
Stalinist antisemitic ideas within left-wing circles. It is important to mention that not all leftist and 
Marxist opposition to Israel is antisemitic, just that this context explains the historical roots of 
post-World War II left-wing antisemitism. 
 The rise of antisemitism on the left and right occurs at a time where knowledge and memory 
of the Holocaust is fading, and Holocaust survivor populations are dwindling. A survey carried 
out in 2018 on behalf of The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany found that 
increasing numbers of Americans had particularly poor knowledge of basic facts about the 
Holocaust, with higher proportions of errors and lack of knowledge among millennials.68 66% of 
 
66 Robert S. Wistrich, ‘The Anti-Zionist Mythology of the Left’, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 9.2 (2015), 189-
199 (pp. 196-197). 
67 Andre Oboler, ‘Zionism through the Internet’s looking glass’ in From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism: 
The Past & Present of a Lethal Ideology, ed. by Eunice G. Pollack (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2017) 
Chapter 12. <http://oboler.com/papers/Zionism_through_the_Internets_looking_glass.pdf> [accessed 9 October 
2018] (p. 2). 
68 Shoen Consulting, The Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness Study Executive Summary 2018 (New York: The 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, 2018) <http://www.claimscon.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Holocaust-Knowledge-Awareness-Study_Executive-Summary-2018.pdf> [accessed 21 
October 2019]. 
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millennials were unable to identify what Auschwitz was,69 25% higher than all US adults overall, 
and 41% of millennials believe two million Jews or fewer were killed in the Holocaust, 10% higher 
than all US adults overall.70 This was despite millennials’ very positive attitudes towards 
Holocaust education, although with an indication that pedagogy could have been improved.71 
Hence, even with positive attitudes towards Holocaust education and commemoration, these 
statistics portray a population increasingly vulnerable to racist misinformation, especially that of 
Holocaust denial, which often cloaks itself within pseudo-academic language. The intersection of 
this fading knowledge with rising rates of antisemitism is not necessarily causational, but still 
represents an opportunity for dedicated antisemites to normalise and spread antisemitic beliefs 
among young people, especially online. Considering the adaptability of antisemitism, it is 
important to examine how antisemitic beliefs and movements might spread on the internet, which 
has dramatically shifted the nature of human communication and the exchange of ideas. 
 
Antisemitism and the Social Internet 
The adaptability of antisemitism has been a common factor throughout history, changing and 
evolving to align with contemporary viewpoints, societal structures, and technologies. The rise of 
the internet and social media has proven no exception to this precedent, as antisemites face a reality 
where their discrimination can be spread with unparalleled ease under the protection of anonymity, 
here defined as a continuum ranging from “the totally anonymous to the thoroughly named”.72 The 
latter end of this range includes pseudonymity, the practise of obscuring one’s identity behind 
 
69 Ibid., p. 4. 
70 Ibid., p. 2 
71 Ibid., p.6. 
72 Judith Donath, ‘Identity and deception in the virtual community,’ in Communities in Cyberspace, ed. by Marc A. 
Smith and Peter Kollock (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 27-58 (p. 33). 
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pseudonyms. Online pseudonymous identities have greater durability and connectedness 
compared to total anonymity, as users can be recognised within communities and formulate 
followings while still obscuring offline identities.73 The anonymity continuum has played a central 
role in the development of online antisemitism as a new phenomenon. Nonetheless, online 
antisemitism is only relatively new to the extent that the internet itself is a relatively new 
phenomenon and has evolved parallel to the internet’s own development. 
What has popularly become known as ‘web 2.0’, a concept popularised by Tim O’Reilly 
and Dale Dougherty in 2004,74 introduced platforms that emphasised user-generated content and 
co-development, ease of usability, and broad participation.75 This differed from the retronym ‘web 
1.0’, which was distinguished by its largely static websites, lack of user interactivity and limited 
number of content creators.76 Social interaction underwent a significant change through some of 
these web 2.0 platforms, referred to as social media. Facebook, Myspace, and Friendster moulded 
casual social interaction into an accessible and efficient digital format, while Twitter streamlined 
the communication of ideas so efficiently that it changed the way ideas are exchanged in the public 
sphere, even within less likely forums such as higher education.77 Platforms such as Reddit have 
gone a step further to act as aggregate websites for information produced elsewhere online, serving 
as hubs for trending ideas. The educational and ideological potential of these changes requires 
researchers to re-examine every assumption made about the nature and spread of discrimination 
 
73 Alfred Moore, ‘Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Deliberation: Why Not Everything Should Be Connected’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 26.2 (2018) 169-192 (pp. 173-174). 
74 Specifically, at the Web 2.0 Conference, 5-7 October 2004. 
75 Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, (30 
September 2005), <https://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html?page=1> [accessed 1 October 
2018]. 
76 Balachander Krishnamurthy and Graham Cormode, ‘Key differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0’, First 
Monday, 13.6, (2 June 2008) <https://firstmonday.org/article/view/2125/1972> [accessed 21 October 2019]. 
77 María-Carmen Ricoy and Tiberio Feliz, ‘Twitter as a Learning Community in Higher Education’, Journal of 
Educational Technology & Society, 19.1 (2016), 237-48 (p. 237). 
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and misinformation. Published content and social interactions can now have a permanent record: 
digital imprints of virtually all online content and interactions will not get lost in archives, nor 
destroyed unless intentionally done so, and even if intentionally destroyed, the internet has 
streamlined and automated the mass replication of content, continuously republishing material to 
further prevent loss of content.78 Through these technologies, antisemitism cannot be erased on the 
internet – web 2.0 will not lose or forget it. 
There have been difficulties trying to clearly quantify antisemitism in the transition 
between the 20th and 21st centuries, which can be partially attributed to the rise of the social 
internet. On one hand, some studies clearly point to a discrediting of antisemitism in the West 
since the fall of Nazism, partially contributing to a decline in antisemitic views. Werner Bergmann 
and Rainer Erb use data from the American Jewish Committee to show that antisemitic prejudice 
in Germany was in a long-term decline from the 1950s through to German reunification, and that 
despite spikes in antisemitic activity in the 1990s, there was no “positive echo” towards these 
attacks in the broader population.79 In the United States, a regular series of Anti-Defamation 
League (ADL) surveys demonstrated that population harbouring antisemitic views had declined to 
a low of 12% in 1998, from a high of 29% in 1964 and 20% in 1992.80 Since 1998 and 2016, this 
number has hovered between 12% and 17%. Nonetheless, despite the apparent decline in the 
popularity of antisemitic views, this had been contrasted by an increase in antisemitic activity. 
While it is difficult to compare accurate rates of antisemitism in Australia between the 20th and 
 
78 Swaminathan Sivasubramanian and others, ‘Replication for web hosting systems’, ACM computing surveys, 36.3 
(September 2004), 291-334. 
79 Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany: The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 9. 
80 Anti-Defamation League and Martilla Strategies, A Survey of American Attitudes Towards Jews in America 
(2013), <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/adl-survey-attitudes-towards-
jews-in-us-2013.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019], (p. 4). 
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21st centuries, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry have collected data on rates of 
antisemitism since 2013.81 These reports show that antisemitic attack rates have stayed stable at 
around approximately 150 attacks per year, while rates of antisemitic threats are more varied, 
typically tied to flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since 2015, however, the quantity of 
antisemitic threats has exponentially increased despite the lack of any flare-up comparable to the 
2014 Gaza war,82 with a notable 364% increase in online and email threats in 2018 compared to 
2017.83 A Kantor centre report on major antisemitic incidents worldwide between 1989-2018 
shows that antisemitic violence is significantly higher in the 21st century compared to the last 
decade of the 20th century.84 Within America, the ADL reported that the number of antisemitic 
incidents rose 57% from 2016 to 2017, the largest single-year jump on record, and second highest 
number since 1979,85 indicating both a rapid rise and large quantity of antisemitism in the age of 
social media.  
While the perceived contrast between antisemitism’s popularity and activity might appear 
contradictory, evidence suggests otherwise. The historical record shows that small groups can 
conduct extensive antisemitic activity that broadly affects Jewish communities. For example, the 
Nazi Einsatzgruppen numbered 3000 men during the invasion of the Soviet Union,86 and were the 
 
81 Julie Nathan, Report on Antisemitism in Australia 2018: 1 October 2017 – 30 September 2018 (Sydney, Executive 
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82 Ibid., p. 24. 
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key force in the execution of over a million Soviet Jews.87 While antisemites on the internet are 
not threatening populations with guns, ammunition, and the backing of a major state, they have 
previously unparalleled networks of communication. These technological advancements in 
communication can be used to target large numbers of Jews with antisemitic rhetoric and cyber-
attacks with unprecedented ease.  
 It is difficult to determine the extent the internet has played in the rise of antisemitic activity 
in the twenty-first century. Regardless, the relationship needs to be examined, as the rise of social 
media and increased internet participation has provided new avenues for the distribution of 
antisemitic material and recruitment into antisemitic movements, especially towards younger 
populations with diminishing Holocaust knowledge. In 2017, a survey of the Australian Jewish 
community found that younger generations were encountering a significantly higher proportion of 
antisemitism, particularly online. Of the 18-29 age bracket, 80% had seen antisemitic content on 
Facebook and 56% on other online discussion and comment forums, compared to 53% and 43% 
respectively for the 50-59 age bracket.88 This younger exposure of antisemitism is also reflected 
in real world experiences, as 14% of the 18-39 age bracket reported experiencing verbal 
antisemitism insults or harassment compared to 10% among the 40-59 age bracket, and 5% among 
the 60-79 age bracket.89 The higher exposure to antisemitism among young people may be linked 
to their higher internet usage and even targeting by antisemitic movements, but there are other 
factors to consider as well. While older generations have lower rates of internet use, they are also 
 
87 The Einsatzgruppen was primarily made up of the SS, as well as some others from auxiliary units and police. 
While they worked closely with the Wehrmacht and other groups in their murder of Jews, they did form the key 
apparatus of this extermination, and were able to carry out much of their activities on their own. Gerry van Tonder, 
SS Einsatzgruppen: Nazi Death Squads, 1939-1945 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, an imprint 
of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2018), p. i. 
88 David Graham and Andrew Markus, Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey: Preliminary Findings 
(Clayton: Monash University, 2018), p. 70. 
89 Ibid., p. 71. 
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likely to limit their connections to their families and a few friends, thereby reducing the chance of 
exposure to antisemitism. This behaviour also carries over to real world experiences, as younger 
people are more able to engage with broader society.  
The disparity between age and antisemitism exposure raises the question of how online and 
offline manifestations of antisemitism affect one another. Does one tend to inspire the other, do 
they feed off each other, or are they largely separate realms? The rising levels of antisemitic 
activity and high levels of young people’s exposure to antisemitism stresses the need to investigate 
these questions, thereby helping determine whether the internet has caused significant quantitative 
and qualitative changes to antisemitism. 
 
Need for Interdisciplinary Approaches and Inter-Field Research 
The final major justification for the foci of this thesis is its contribution to interdisciplinary 
approaches to the study of online discrimination. This thesis answers the call made by Jakubowicz 
and colleagues to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the study of online antisemitism as one 
example of ‘cyber-racism’.90 In Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for 
Combating Online Race Hate, Jakubowicz et al. provide an overview of how individual disciplines 
such as sociology, political science, psychology, cultural studies, and information technology 
apply overlapping but ultimately differing methodologies towards questions regarding cyber-
racism.91 The research study in chapter six builds upon these efforts by using an integrated 
 
90 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 60-61. 
91 Ibid., pp. 50-51, 58. 
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methodology that combines approaches of statistic, thematic, and content analyses extracted from 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders.92  
The research study in chapter six incorporates a combined methodology, both to provide 
valuable data on how to combat antisemitism online, but also to serve as a potential template for 
the study of other forms of abuse and discrimination online. The study consisted of groups of 
participants engaging in online discussion with a researcher posing as a holocaust denier (who is 
then revealed as fake at the conclusion). Statistical analyses of survey responses identify ranges 
and averages of emotional responses to the discussion, and a thematic analysis points out major 
common factors between participants and how they handled the circumstance of the study. These 
surveys are complemented with thematic and content analyses of the online conversations, 
examining the efficacy, quantity, and content of participants’ research whilst in the conversation, 
common themes between different groups, and how participants express their responses to the 
pseudo-intellectual discourse of Holocaust denial. While the study is small and qualitatively 
focused, its key components can potentially be expanded into larger scale quantitative research 
projects as well.  
The research study is also designed to be adapted to research on other forms of cyber-
discrimination, abuse and even misinformation. The study’s design can be adjusted to any 
analogous field by having the discussion regard any other notion of cyber-discrimination, abuse, 
or misinformation and have a researcher pose as a proponent of that belief or practice. The survey 
questions and data analysis are designed to measure the resistance of real participants to whatever 
discriminatory or problematic claim is the focus of the study, particularly their ability to recognise, 
 
92 Ibid., p. 46 
 28 
 
research, respond to, and refute the claim. With this adaptable design, future research can evaluate 
different groups’ capability to resist different forms of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation 
online. The results of such research can inform what areas are more difficult for particular groups.  
Outside of this research study, the research of this thesis is primarily qualitative; however, 
it does include some quantitative considerations. Chapter four examines existing studies that 
attempt to quantify antisemitism online, and the issues faced in attempts to quantify cyberbullying 
and other forms of online discrimination. The difficulties in quantifying hate online are 
acknowledged by scholars,93 and so this thesis takes a cautious approach in its use of statistics, 
critically examining the methodologies previously used. This approach supports the promotion of 
an interdisciplinary approach to online hate, avoiding the issues already exhibited and identifying 
the best existing methods for statistical analyses. This thesis extends even further than merely 
implementing an interdisciplinary methodology by promoting an ‘inter-field’ approach to online 
abuse and discrimination, broadening the focus on cyber-racism analysed by Jakubowicz et al. The 
comparison with other forms of online abuse and discrimination and their intersections, as well as 
the adaptable design of the research study, promotes a broad-focus style of research, applicable to 
scholars from different disciplines and fields. This thesis thus aims to provide pathways to compare 
data on all forms of online abuse, discrimination, and potentially even misinformation. 
 Ultimately, this thesis is a comprehensive examination of online antisemitism using an 
integrated approach that goes beyond simply identifying problems, providing data that can be used 
in the construction and implementation of solutions. The highly adaptable nature of antisemitism 
and its rise over the turn of the century highlights the urgent need for this research, especially 
 
93 P. B. Gerstenfeld, D. R. Grant and C.-P. Chiang, ‘Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites’, 
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 3.1 (2003), 29-44 (p. 31). 
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considering the significant effect the internet has had on human communication and the exchange 
of ideas. The problems presented by antisemitism online are also represented by other forms of 
abuse and discrimination, which continue to pose significant risks to public health globally. This 
thesis’ combined methodology and broad analyses therefore provides data and methodological 
approaches that can contribute to efforts combating all forms of abuse, discrimination, and 
misinformation, particularly as they spread further on the internet.   
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Chapter 2 
Parallel Revolutions: Information and Abuse 
 
There is a need to examine how the internet itself shapes abuse, including manifestations of abuse 
which are overlapping, intersecting, or analogous with antisemitism. This chapter first provides an 
overview of the key aspects of the internet mediums that shape user engagement, then considers 
how this shapes online discrimination. For the purpose of this chapter, ‘media’1 refers to the 
collective content produced by a particular ‘medium’, while medium refers to the means by which 
content is spread. A central aspect is the changing relationship between the production and 
consumption of content, which is significantly affected by differences in cost and ease of 
distribution and reproduction of content. Further considerations towards the structure of online 
space include manifestations of online identity and the design and spread of content online, both 
which relate to the production and consumption of content. Following this overview, the chapter 
moves on to critically examine the ways in which the medium is taken up by individuals and groups 
as a platform for hate speech. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the GamerGate 
phenomenon – a widespread misogynistic cyberbullying campaign – which serves to illustrate how 
online prejudice works in practice. Exploring the relationship between internet technologies and 
social prejudice provides a broad background for the more specific studies of antisemitism offline 
and online in chapters three and four. This chapter intends to demonstrate the value of 
 
1 For the purpose of this thesis, media’ is used in the singular form, as this thesis compares multiple ‘medias’, such 
as traditional and social media. 
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implementing an interdisciplinary research methodology that is able both to pose the kinds of 
questions that need to be asked, and to answer them.2 
 
‘Prosumption’ and the Dynamics of Online Communication 
As information has shifted from print media to online spaces, the means and modes of 
communication have broadened correspondingly. Print media was and is primarily restricted in the 
public sphere to news outlets, published books, pamphlets, and journals. Some of these empower 
the reader – for example, ‘letters to the editor’ printed in newspapers and journals – but these have 
limited visibility and are subject to editorial selection. Comparatively, online media – especially 
since the rise of ‘web 2.0’ and social media – is increasingly focused around dialogues between 
publisher and reader, and between readers themselves. Social media websites provide an intangible 
space where any number of participants can comment on an issue, each participant can see the 
contributions of the other, and non-participants can view others’ contributions without making 
their presence known. Furthermore, the role of information consumers has broadened, now 
involving them in the production of information. This principle is known as ‘prosumption’, or 
production by consumers, coined by futurist Alvin Toffler,3 and can been increasingly used to 
describe the nature of social media websites. For websites such as Facebook and Twitter, which 
rely on user-generated content, it is necessary for the consumer to provide information for others 
to consume, with these consumers in turn producing information of their own. This shift in 
information sharing has resulted in a corresponding shift in the spread of antisemitic content, which 
 
2 Andrew Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race 
Hate (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 60. 
3 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow (New York: Bantam, 1980), p. 11. 
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can make it difficult to recognise and respond to the sources of such material. These issues present 
a new imperative for researchers to observe the reactions of antisemites to antisemitic material, as 
these reactions provide insight into the both popularity of the material and the motivations of 
antisemites themselves. 
 
Cost, Distribution, and Reproduction 
The internet’s technological capability to streamline and minimise costs of content creation and 
distribution speaks for itself. The digital distribution of written content via electronic signals 
eliminates the need for regular supplies of printing materials and large-scale manual labour for the 
physical distribution of offline written content, such as newspapers. Even visual and auditory 
content, which was distributed through electronic signals before the internet in the form of 
television and radio, are streamlined to the point where individuals can produce content that 
previously required dedicated studios. The advancement of personal computing technology, 
including smartphone technology, enables individuals to participate in the distribution of all types 
of content virtually anywhere, with the costs largely being limited to devices and data. Widespread 
access to personal computer technologies, such as cameras, recording devices and editing software, 
also encourages digital literacy. With the collective engagement of the broader global population 
in the participatory web 2.0, there is communal pressure to engage in the creation and distribution 
of this content, including a pressure to learn and use the capabilities of these technologies. This 
interconnected population means there is unprecedented audience accessibility for individual 
content creators. With the cost of content distribution online being marginal and the processes of 
distribution being streamlined due to personal computing technology, the internet – and more 
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specifically, web 2.0 – has led to a significant change in the sharing of content and information 
between a global interconnected audience of ‘prosumers’.  
Beyond low cost and ease of distributing original content, information communication 
technology has also significantly streamlined the reproduction of content. Reproduction is a key 
factor in maximising the distribution of content; a key example of technology affecting the world 
is through streamlining content reproduction, and the capabilities of the internet represent the next 
major step in this process. Reproduction of content online is as easy as right clicking an image, 
piece of text, audio, or video, saving or copying it, and pressing a few buttons to reproduce it in 
another space online. On some social media platforms, this is streamlined even further through the 
implementation of ‘share’ buttons, allowing users to share content within and between social 
media platforms with as few as two clicks. This represents a significant decrease in time and effort 
involved in the reproduction of content between platforms. Virtual reproduction also eliminates 
the need for materials, significantly reducing both cost and time. The efficiency of reproduction 
has a flow-on effect to content creators; if the content they create is popular enough, they can rely 
on the broader online audience to reproduce elsewhere online, thereby further reducing the cost, 
time, and effort required to distribute their content. This gives rise to the phenomenon of internet 
‘virality’, which refers to content that spreads like a virus as individual users continuously share it 
to more online spaces.  
This thesis argues that the shifts in content production, consumption, and distribution 
brought about by social networking and media sites have caused antisemitism to undergo the most 
significant qualitative and quantitative changes since the rise of Holocaust denial. These changes 
have occurred not as a result of recent events in Jewish history or the creation of new antisemitic 
ideas but are primarily due to the transformation of communication and information sharing 
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introduced by the internet. If prosumption, as George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson suggest, is the 
basic model for contemporary modes of internet sociality,4 then it also underpins the manifestation 
of abuse and discrimination online. The ease of production, reception, and reproduction of content 
between prosumers affects both the quantity and quality of online antisemitism.  
Aside from its patterns of production and reproduction, there are other distinctive features 
of the internet that also contribute to the expression and distribution of antisemitism. These include 
‘cyberspace’, the online spaces provided by the infrastructure of websites, social media platforms, 
and other electronic communications. Next is online anonymity, introduced in chapter one, 
referring to the internet’s enablement of pseudonymised identities and complete anonymity as 
forms of identity protection. Additionally, the attention economy (the competition for online 
attention as a commodity) results in more confronting, quickly consumed manifestations of 
content. The combination of these phenomena can result in manifestations of content unique to the 
internet. One example of these forms is the internet meme, which is designed to be produced with 
minimal cost and time, and to be consumed quickly. Online anonymity protects the user from 
public exposure and censure for sharing memes that may be abusive or discriminatory, and thus 
facilitates the use of more controversial and dark humour. Another minor concept to consider, 
although it does not have a dedicated section here, is ‘trolling’, the popular practice of deliberately 
antagonising someone on the internet for entertainment. With the use of dark internet humour and 
trolling, abusive and discriminatory memes can potentially appeal to a broader crowd than just 
those with similar discriminatory beliefs. 
 
 
4 George Ritzer and Nathan Jurgenson, ‘Production, Consumption, Prosumption: The Nature of Capitalism in the 
Age of the Digital “Prosumer”’, Journal of Consumer Culture, (2010), 13–36. 
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Cyberspace 
‘Cyberspace’ here refers to the intangible shared electronic space in which online communication 
occurs. The word has evolved from the term ‘cybernetics’, penned by Norbert Wiener in 1948, 
which referred to the scientific study of ‘control and communication in the animal and the 
machine’.5 The technology of the internet allows individuals from all over the world to 
communicate instantaneously in a shared space, where all messages from all participants can 
potentially be read by anyone with access to them. A good example of this is a Facebook post: 
‘friends’ of the poster can see the post and comment on it, with each ‘friend’ able to see other 
people’s comments. This has resulted in a massive increase in the efficiency of communication 
between like-minded individuals. The sharing of images and video footage now occurs in a matter 
of seconds when, prior to the internet, it would have taken hours, or even days, depending on the 
financial reach of an organisation. Robert Lifton and Joseph A. Paradiso distinguish cyberspace 
from other communicative technologies on the basis of its role in enabling the sharing of content, 
in contrast to television and radio, which are primarily geared towards mass consumption.6 Where 
radio and television are largely passive media technologies requiring minimal action on the part of 
the viewer, whereas the internet allows the active sharing of content with the click of a button.. In 
their 2009 article, Lifton and Paradiso suggested that the creation of media was difficult, 
specialised and limited to a small population.7 However, in the time since that article was 
published, mobile and information technology has advanced significantly to allow ordinary users 
to create photo, video, and text content with ease. The practice of creating and distributing media 
 
5 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1948), p. 29. 
6 Robert Lifton and Joseph A. Paradiso, Dual Reality: Merging the Real and Virtual (Cambridge MA: MIT Media 
Lab, 2009) <http://resenv.media.mit.edu/pubs/papers/2009-07-fave2009.pdf> [accessed 4 December 2019] (p. 14). 
7 Ibid. 
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is no longer limited to a specialist population, although it should be mentioned that expert skills 
can still make a considerable difference in the quality of the content (for example, in graphics or 
animations). These capabilities have contributed to a merging of ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ realities as the 
immediacy of textual communication in digital spaces replicates the immediacy of personal 
conversation in physical space.8 
 
Online Anonymity 
The online anonymity continuum is propagated in two main ways: first, through the specific 
feature of certain websites that keep the identities of contributors anonymous (e.g. Reddit, 4chan), 
and second, through the ability of contributors to stay unknown in additional online spaces (e.g. 
the ability to make a Facebook profile with a false identity). These two features allow contributors 
to reach a far broader audience than with print media, and for a fraction of the cost, while keeping 
their identities secret. The dominant models of online anonymity identified by Ya-Ching Lee are 
libertarian and private enterprise; both of which advocate that online communities and anonymity 
are better self-managed than government controlled.9 However, since information technology 
allows content creators to create their own online spaces with relative ease, communities will self-
regulate based on their own standards rather than any general broad standard, often in ways that 
frustrate national laws.10 In this manner, the internet is an extension of globalisation, where spaces 
can be created where distance and national boundaries matter little, and identity is fluid. However, 
 
8 Thomas Holtgraves, ‘Texting versus talking: An exploration in telecommunication language’, Telematics and 
Informatics, 30 (November 2013), 289-295 (pp. 289-294). 
9 Ya-Ching Lee, ‘Internet and Anonymity’, Society, 43.4 (2007), 5-7 (p. 5). 
10 A key example of this is Facebook’s reluctance to ban Holocaust denial on its platform, despite banning other 
forms of hate speech, and Holocaust denial being contrary to the laws of many nations with a heavy Facebook 
population, e.g. Germany, Australia, Israel and France. This will be further explored in chapter five. 
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this feature furthers the attitude of the internet being immune to or outside of the law due to the 
breadth of its reach, potentially resulting in the establishment of echo chambers that significantly 
diverge from public standards established offline. This soloing of communities and diminished 
risk to social capital from anonymity can potentially lead to the normalisation of abusive, 
discriminatory, or misinforming content within isolated cyberspaces. The views expressed in this 
content are then reinforced by a cycle of prosumption, which circulates the same views in similar 
content. 
 
Internet Memes 
The term memetics, or ‘meme’, was coined by biologist Richard Dawkins in the final chapter of 
his 1976 book, The Selfish Gene, to describe a “unit of cultural transmission”, a behaviour or idea 
that was replicated and reproduced in the minds of individuals, comparable to (but explicitly not) 
a gene in biological evolution.11 The concept of an internet meme is somewhat different in that it 
refers to what is often a short-lived fad, but fundamentally follows the same evolutionary concept. 
In an offline space, a cultural greeting would only be met by members of the local culture and 
possibly visitors, but in virtual space, behaviours and ideas can be shared across borders, languages 
and cultures. Limor Shifman writes that the “scale, scope, and global visibility in contemporary 
digital environments are unprecedented” for internet memes,12 which represent a major part of 
communicative and social currency in cyberspace.  
 
11 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 203. 
12 Limor Shifman, ‘Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual Troublemaker’, J Comput-Mediat 
Comm, 18.3 (2013), 362-377 (p. 377). 
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Internet memes can take the form of a single piece of content shared under particular 
circumstances. This is well demonstrated by the early phenomenon of ‘Rickrolling’, where users 
are baited to click an internet link portrayed as something relevant or interesting, only to be 
directed to the YouTube video of Rick Astley’s pop song Never Gonna Give You Up.13 Another 
example is a unit that is replicated and adapted for a different purpose, such as the anachronistic 
‘Hitler Downfall Parodies’, where a scene featuring Hitler yelling at his generals from the 2004 
German film Der Untergang is given new subtitles to depict Hitler’s distress about topical events.14 
While memes can take the form of videos or audio shared online, they predominantly take shape 
in ‘image macros’, an easily shareable image with text superimposed over it. Often the chosen 
image signifies a sentiment such as patronising sarcasm, realisation, anger, or glee. Internet memes 
are an efficient way to spread ideas and claims, and engage attention within the constraints of the 
‘attention economy’.15 The attention economy refers to human attention as a scarcity, and 
considering the enormity of information on the internet, content that can be quickly consumed is 
often most successful, or ‘viral’, online.  
Just like audio, video, and images, text can also manifest as an internet meme, either as a 
singular instance, or a modified reproduction. Text memes can come in the form of ‘copypasta’; 
copypasta refers to blocks of text that are copied and pasted repeatedly in different spaces, with 
occasional modifications that change the subject but retain an overall recognisable text pattern for 
online audiences.16 Aside from copypasta, smaller text-based ideas like sentences, short-phrases 
 
13 Know Your Meme, Rickroll (2009), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/rickroll> [accessed 24 April 2017]. 
14 Know Your Meme, Downfall/Hitler Reacts (2009), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/ 
downfall-hitler-reacts> [accessed 24 April 2017]. 
15 Thomas Davenport and J.C. Beck, The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), p. 20. 
16 Know Your Meme, Copypasta (2009), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/copypasta> [accessed 22 October 
2019]. 
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or even singular words can also become ‘memeified’, allowing them to be more seamlessly 
implemented in regular conversation compared to image macros or audio and visual links that take 
one out of the discussion space. This is particularly relevant to considerations of online abuse, 
especially antisemitism, as it potentially enables the development of new ‘dog-whistles’ and coded 
discriminatory signals that users outside of discriminatory spaces are unaware of. 
Internet memes show how several crucial elements in online communication – low cost 
and high distribution, ease of sharing, online anonymity, and the attention economy – contribute 
to the relational dynamics of prosumption. The minimal cost and effort required to create memes 
makes them ideal for sustaining prosumption-dependent cyberspaces, ensuring a self-iterating 
flow of content that encourages users to return and participate. Unlike other forms of media 
creation, creators and replicators of memes often do not expect recognition, credit, or fame for 
their meme creations, resulting in an expectation that users create memes solely for their own and 
others’ enjoyment. The benefits of online anonymity support the benefits of memes in promoting 
the creation and sharing of controversial content; users do not need to risk social capital by 
attaching their reputation to abusive or offensive material designed to be easily consumed and 
shared in online spaces. Online users also have ready access to meme generators (dedicated 
websites that streamline the modification of widely recognised templates),17 which make it easy 
to reproduce and alter digital content. Ultimately, internet memes represent a key qualitative 
change to communication and information sharing brought about by the internet and are therefore 
used as key objects of analysis throughout this thesis. 
 
17 Angela Watercutter and Emma Grey Ellisby, ‘The WIRED Guide to Memes’, WIRED, 1 April 2018, 
<https://www.wired.com/story/guide-memes> [accessed 22 October 2019] (para. 5 of 23). 
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 The way the internet has changed the production and consumption of content informs how 
the internet shapes abuse and discrimination. The following sections engage with scholarly 
research on cyberbullying and cyber-racism in order to situate antisemitism in the context of other 
forms of abuse and discrimination online. This approach draws on disciplinary insights from 
communications studies to outline the generic features of discriminatory speech online and reveal 
the specificities of contemporary antisemitism. This critical examination of cyberbullying and 
cyber-racism contributes to the overarching objective of the thesis to show how antisemitism today 
is qualitatively distinct from both other forms of online discrimination and pre-internet 
antisemitism. The following sections draw on literature from other areas of online discrimination 
to support a case for increased research into structural discrimination against Jewish people online.  
 
Cyberbullying 
An examination of cyberbullying is helpful in determining whether qualitative changes to 
antisemitism online are shared with this phenomenon. This will indicate whether these qualitative 
changes are determined by the change in technology, or if there are aspects unique to each 
phenomenon to consider. Due to the expansive nature of cyberbullying, which touches on all forms 
of discrimination, it serves as a central focal point to answer this question before examining other 
comparable forms of online discrimination.  
The study of cyberbullying has grown considerably in the last fifteen years to become a 
major field of social research, even though online social networking itself is a relatively recent 
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development. Cyberbullying was not the first aspect of online harassment to be studied;18 work 
into online antisemitism was taking place as early as 1985 by the Anti-Defamation League,19 
followed in 1995 by the Simon Wiesenthal Center.20 According to Waqas et al., online hate 
research spiked dramatically from 2005, coinciding with “the proliferation of social media 
platforms and the Internet becoming a central arena for public and private discourse”;21 This spike 
is supported by findings from Kowalski et al.22 This may suggest a link between growth in 
cyberbullying and growth in cyberbullying research.23 However, much of the growth of research 
interest is largely due to increased public concern over cyberbullying in schools, driving funding 
for research and initiatives for the prevention of cyberbullying by government departments and 
other bodies with a civic interest in keeping children safe. This is particularly the case in relation 
to a rise in incidents of youth suicide resulting from cyberbullying; some of the early studies of 
cyberbullying came from researchers at the Crimes Against Children Research Center.24 The 
heightened social awareness towards cyberbullying and online abuse of children has since served 
as a gateway to research into further forms of online abuse. For example, on 9 October 2015, the 
 
18 Culture of the Internet contained a variety of early cultural and social perspectives on the internet from social 
science academics, marking a shift from the domination of the field by STEM (science, technology, engineering, 
mathematics). 
Culture of the Internet, ed. by Sara Kiesler (Lawrence Erlbaum: Hillsdale, 1997).  
19 Anti-Defamation League, Computerised Networks of Hate: An ADL Fact-Finding Report (New York: Anti-
Defamation League, 1985) <https://archive.org/details/ComputerizedNetworksOfHate> [accessed 4 December 
2019]. 
20 Simon Wiesenthal Center, Racism, mayhem, & terrorism: a special review of online web sites (Los Angeles: The 
Center, 1997) [on CD]. 
21 Ahmed Waqas and others, ‘Mapping online hate: A scientometric analysis on research trends and hotspots in 
research on online hate’, PLoS One, 14.9 (2019), 1-21 (p. 17) <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222194>. 
22 Robin M. Kowalski, Susan P. Limber and Patricia W. Agatston, Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age 
(Blackwell Publishing: Sussex, 2012), p. 58. 
23 Keith Terrell, The History of Social media: From the First Online Network to Today (16 June 2015), 
<http://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media> [accessed 4 December 2019] (para. 29, 33 of 40). 
24 The Crimes Against Children Research Center, Online Victimization: A Report on the Nation’s Youth. A report by 
David Finkelhor, Kimerbly J. Mitchell and Janis Wolak, (Alexandria VA: National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, 2002) <http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/ 
Victimization_Online_Survey.pdf> [accessed 1 August 2017]. 
 42 
 
Australian government launched the Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner25 (renamed 
the Office of eSafety Commissioner on 23 June 201726) as the office broadened its approach to 
online safety. The significant rise of interest in cyberbullying and resulting research has also 
prompted legislative action, most recently in March 2018 with an inquiry into the adequacy of 
existing laws to combat cyberbullying. This inquiry recommended broadening the services offered 
by the eSafety Commissioner to be used by adults.27 While this broadening trend is a recent 
development, it provides an imperative for researchers into online antisemitism to produce more 
research, collaborate with interdisciplinary researchers and to help formulate legislation to combat 
online antisemitism. 
 
Defining Cyberbullying 
The popularisation of the term ‘cyberbullying’ is attributed to Bill Belsey, who started a website 
in 1999 in response to young people’s experiences of being bullied online.28 From its origins, 
research into cyberbullying has consistently derived from an interest in school bullying. For this 
reason, the most commonly used definitions of cyberbullying in present research have been 
gleaned from three elements of schoolyard bullying: intention to harm, repetition, and power 
 
25 ‘Launch of Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner’, Department of Communications and the Arts, 9 
October 2015. <https://www.communications.gov.au/departmental-news/launch-office-children%E2%80%99s-
esafety-commissioner> [accessed 4 December 2019] (para. 1 of 4). 
26 Australian Communications and Media Authority and Office of the eSafety Commissioner, Annual Reports 2016-
17, (Canberra: ACMA 2016-2017) <https://www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-
07/ACMA_OeSC_AR2016_17.pdf> [accessed 4 December 2019] (p. 31). 
27 Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Adequacy of existing offences in the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code and of state and territory criminal laws to capture cyberbullying (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 
2018), p. viii. 
28 Bill Belsey, The World’s First Definition of “Cyberbullying” (1999), <http://www.cyberbullying.ca>  
[accessed 31 December 2019]. 
Bill Belsey, Cyberbullying: An Emerging Threat To The “Always On” Generation (2019),  
<http://www.billbelsey.com/?cat=13> [accessed 31 December 2019]. 
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imbalance.29 However, Elizabeth Englander et al. explain that there is “no general consensus on a 
definition, although different versions usually include the use of digital technology to inflict harm 
repeatedly or to bully.”30 Peter K. Smith et al. have acknowledged a “growing consensus” that 
“[traditional] bullying is defined as repeated aggressive acts against a specific target … who cannot 
easily defend him- or her- self.”31 However, not all researchers agree that repetition ought to be a 
necessary component of cyberbullying; some definitions exclude actions and materials that could 
still have a bullying effect on the victim. Nancy Willard from the Center for Safe and Responsible 
Use of the Internet sought to rectify this oversight, proposing that “cyberbullying is being cruel to 
others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other forms of social aggression using 
the Internet or other digital technologies”.32 Willard then applies her definition to several specific 
forms of cyberbullying, such as ‘flaming’, ‘outing’, and ‘cyberstalking’.33 She further 
distinguishes between cyberbullying activities that do utilise repetition (e.g. harassment and 
cyberstalking) and those that can occur in a single instance (e.g. impersonation, outing, and 
denigration).34 Some of these single instance examples are significant because they can only 
happen once but can result in an atmosphere similar to bullying, and result in subsequent bullying 
from other perpetrators. For example, one singular act of making private information public, aka 
‘doxxing’ a target, can invite further cyberbullying. 
 
29 Hannah Gaffney and others, ‘Are cyberbullying intervention and prevention programs effective? A 
systematic and meta-analytical review’, Aggression and Violent Behavior, 45 (2019), 134-153 (p. 135). 
30 Elizabeth Englander and others, ‘Defining Cyberbullying’, Pediatrics, 140.Supplement 2 (2017), S148-S151 (p. 
S149). 
31 Peter K. Smith, Cristina Del Barrio and Robert S. Tokunaga, ‘Definitions of Bullying and Cyberbullying: How 
Useful Are the Terms’, in Principles of Cyberbullying Research: Definitions, Measures and Methodology, ed. by 
Sheri Bauman, Donna Cross and Jenny L. Walker (Routledge: New York, 2013), pp. 26-30 (p. 27). 
32 Nancy Willard, Educator’s Guide to Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats (Center for Safe and Responsible Internet 
Use, 2004) <https://www.wcs.k12.va.us/users/honaker/cyberbullying-for-teachers.pdf> [accessed 5 September 
2017] (p. 2). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Willard, p. 2.  
 44 
 
 In their attempts to describe the general form of cyberbullying, researchers have sought to 
map out key differences and overlaps between traditional bullying and cyberbullying. The main 
aspects of cyberbullying that distinguish it from traditional bullying include: potential 
anonymity/pseudonymity; the potential increased range and scope of a single bullying incident 
(e.g. a single email being read by a much larger cohort, or an embarrassing video being shared 
continuously); diminished empathy from being unable to see the perpetrator/victim as clearly as 
in offline space; and, continuing from the last point, the increased difficulty to judge what activities 
count as bullying.35 Additionally, research has been done into the phenomenon of disinhibition, 
referring to the way in which anonymity/pseudonymity encourages people to do and say things 
they would not otherwise.36 One study noted anonymity as a criterion unique to cyberbullying: 
while traditional bullying could potentially be done in secret, it generally could not be done 
anonymously.37 
Unlike most of the definitions for traditional bullying, cyberbullying research is noticeably 
split over the issue of repetition. Australian legislation, primarily the Enhancing Online Safety Act 
(2015), does not require repetition for material to be considered cyberbullying of a child.38 In a 
cross-cultural study spanning six European countries analysing adolescent opinions on 
cyberbullying, most of the adolescent participants agreed that the definition of traditional bullying 
applied to cyberbullying, with the notable exception of repetition.39 The problem with the 
insistence on repetition is that it implies an active and intentional desire to harm through repeated 
 
35 Robin M. Kowalski and Susan P. Limber, ‘Psychological, Physical, and Academic Correlates of Cyberbullying 
and Traditional Bullying’ Journal of Adolescent Health, 53.1 (2013), S13-S20 (p. S14). 
36 Kowalski and others, p. 86. 
37 Ibid., p. 460. 
38 Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015 (C2018C00356, No. 96) [Online] 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00356> [accessed 5 December 2019] (p. 8). 
39 E. Menesini and others, ‘Cyberbullying Definition Among Adolescents: A Comparison Across Six European 
Countries’, Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 15.9, 455-463 (p. 459). 
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targeting of a victim by the same perpetrator. However, targeted bullying in the online space is 
produced less by repeated acts than by the scale of the abuse: the internet offers far more 
opportunity for complicity in bullying – whether intentional or not – by large numbers of people. 
As opposed to traditional bullying, a single (non-repetitive) cyberbullying incident can be 
exacerbated by passive viewing of the harmful electronic content, even if there is no intention to 
bully, or even to cause harm at all. One example of a non-repetitive incident could be 1,000 people 
each sending a different hateful message to a target. This cannot occur in traditional bullying, as 
the technology allows large numbers people to engage in the same space without necessarily being 
aware of similar messages. Collusive bullying online may also extend traditional forms of bullying 
that rely on exclusion and isolation through, for example, the sharing of material in group messages 
that embarrasses the victim, who may also be excluded from the messaging itself. Again, the 
element of harm is not found in repetition, but in the capacity of a group to exclude and isolate an 
individual.  
Technology has also enabled greater access to personal information that may be used to 
humiliate a victim publicly and made it easier to circulate harmful material. A cyberbully’s ability 
to steal and share harmful information about a person, as well as utilise a large following to 
perpetrate abuse, can significantly increase the impact of cyberbullying. These abilities can 
manifest through technical skills or through social pressure and influence seen in traditional 
bullying. Some authors such as Daniele Law suggest that the internet has radically changed the 
power dynamics between victims and perpetrators by allowing room for reciprocal bullying, or 
reactive aggression, in which the victim of cyberbullying strikes back at the perpetrator (e.g. 
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through humiliating the perpetrator anonymously).40 Others offer suggestions for making sense of 
new expressions of power imbalance that are made available by internet technology. Dooley et al. 
propose that distinguishing features may include advanced technological skills (e.g. the ability to 
manipulate and modify images) and greater access to technology (e.g. using multiple mobile 
phones).41  
This exploration of debates on the definition of cyberbullying demonstrates a need to 
reconsider the main criteria of traditional bullying – intentionality, repetition, and power imbalance 
– given some of the qualitative differences between traditional and cyberbullying. Evidently, a 
‘gold standard’ definition of cyberbullying, or at least working definition accepted by the majority 
of researchers is required. Without such a definition, countermeasures against cyberbullying will 
be limited, as their development will suffer from the same methodological issues as cyberbullying 
research. The later comparison in chapter four explores how the issues in defining and 
understanding cyberbullying apply to antisemitism, even though efforts to establish a common 
definition of antisemitism are more advanced. Issues of definition and understanding are especially 
necessary to consider regarding how non-researchers, particularly adolescents and young adults, 
may struggle to understand antisemitism due to it being a highly adaptable and insidious form of 
hate used for varying purposes. Comparison of cyberbullying and online antisemitism also 
provides opportunities for antisemitism scholars to adapt their own work according to the insights 
gleaned from cyberbullying research. The development of this interdisciplinary research strategy 
 
40 Daniele M. Law and others, ‘Are Cyberbullies really bullies? An investigation of reactive and proactive online 
aggression’, Computers in Human Behaviour, 28.2 (2012), 664-672 (p. 670). 
41 Julian J. Dooley, Jacek Pyzalski and Donna Cross, ‘Cyberbullying Versus Face-to-Face Bullying: A Theoretical 
and Conceptual Review’, Journal of Psychology, 217.4 (2009), 182-188 (p. 184). 
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is necessary for intervening in existing cyberbullying research, so to encourage urgently needed 
action to counter antisemitic forms (and other discriminatory forms) of cyberbullying. 
 
Media Attention, Public Concern, and the Rise of Cyberbullying Research 
According to the state-of-the-field literature, cyberbullying research rose significantly in the mid-
2000s. Robin Kowalski, Susan Limber, and Patricia Agatston carried out a search of cyberbullying 
mentions in global media between 2003 and 2010, which showed that the number of mentions 
hovered between ten and twenty-five between 2003 and 2005, before jumping to over eighty in 
2006, over 180 in 2007, and finally over 3500 in 2010.42 Kowalski, Limber, and Agatston attribute 
this rapid growth to several prominent youth suicides linked to cyberbullying. Data on 
cyberbullying media-mentions using Google News’ search function roughly follows this 
trajectory, with a steadier rise up until 2010, at which the number plateaus over the next eight years 
(appendix B, figure 3). Factors behind the disparity in raw numbers may be the algorithm used by 
Google News, the focus on exclusively online newspaper mentions, and whether duplicates were 
included or not (they are not included in the Google News search). Nonetheless, both methods do 
demonstrate a significant rise in public attention and concern over cyberbullying. 
 A key driver of increased public concern over cyberbullying – and the concomitant rise in 
media coverage and scholarly interest – is its reported connection to youth suicide. In an analysis 
of reporting of cyberbullying-associated suicides in the media,43 Rachel Young and others indicate 
the breadth of media coverage on these deaths. They searched the media coverage between 2009 
 
42 Kowalski, Limber and Agatston, p. 58. 
43 Rachel Young and others, ‘Social Representation of Cyberbullying and Adolescent Suicide: A Mixed-Method 
Analysis of News Stories’, Health communication, 32.9 (2017), 1082-1092 (p. 1083). 
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and 2013 of six cases of youths who died by suicide due to cyberbullying, and their search yielded 
818 US newspaper articles, an average of over 136 articles per child.44 If media coverage loosely 
reflects public concern towards cyberbullying, then these data suggest that there is an awareness, 
in the public sphere, of a connection between cyberbullying and child mortality. This awareness 
can partially explain why a December 2017 survey of parents in Australia ranked social media and 
technology as a greater concern (43%) to parents than other potential threats to youth mortality 
such as drugs, alcohol and smoking (25%).45 Importantly, the same survey saw parents rank 
cyberbullying as the biggest negative issue associated with social media use.46 
A key reason for public concern over cyberbullying is that its public visibility on social 
media complements its attention by traditional media. One major case that attracted widespread 
public interest was that of Canadian student Amanda Todd, who committed suicide on 10 October 
2012, shortly after posting a video on YouTube about her experiences of being cyberbullied.47 
Todd’s case demonstrated the inescapability of cyberbullying, as she continued to be stalked, 
harassed, and mocked for her previous suicide attempt despite moving schools multiple times. 
Todd’s death received global media attention, even motivating tips to the police about her harassers 
to the Canadian police from all around the globe.48 One key reason for the high public profile of 
this case was the video she made shortly before her death, which was able to be easily spread via 
traditional and social media. The attention from Todd’s suicide motivated several anti-
 
44 Ibid., p. 1085 
45 ‘Parents rank social media and technology worse than drugs, alcohol, smoking’, Reach Out, 11 March 2018. 
<https://about.au.reachout.com/mrparentssocialmedia> [accessed 4 December 2019] (para. 5 of 13). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Amanda Todd (TheSomebodytoknow, 7 September 2012), ‘My story: Struggling, bullying, suicide, self harm’, 
(YouTube video), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOHXGNx-E7E>, [accessed 27 February 2019]. 
48 ‘Tormenters target Amanda Todd’s online memorials amid police probe’, CTV News, 14 October 2012. 
<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/tormenters-target-amanda-todd-s-online-memorials-amid-police-probe-1.994594> 
[accessed 27 February 2019] (para. 2 of 27). 
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cyberbullying measures in Canadian legislature, directly instigating an anti-bullying motion in 
201249 and the creation and passage of Bill C-13 in 2013.50 Amanda Todd’s case captures both 
how cyberbullying-related youth suicide is represented in the global media, and the enhanced 
virality of the news due to the online spaces within which the harassment and reaction take place. 
It also demonstrates the motivating factor of cyberbullying-related youth suicide on official action, 
including both legislation and research on cyberbullying. 
In Australia, public awareness of the suicide of fourteen-year-old Dolly Everett in 2018 
was also driven by social media in addition to coverage in online media sources such as ABC News, 
The Guardian, The Australian, and The Sydney Morning Herald, as well as non-traditional news 
sites like feminist website Mamamia.51 Dolly Everett, known for being the face of Australian hat 
company Akubra, committed suicide on 3 January 2018 after being cyberbullied.52 Following her 
death, Everett’s parents started a social media campaign to fight bullying, launching a foundation 
 
49 ‘In wake of Amanda Todd suicide, MPs to debate anti-bullying motion’, CTV News, 14 October 2012. 
<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/in-wake-of-amanda-todd-suicide-mps-to-debate-anti-bullying-motion-1.995254> 
[accessed 27 February 2019] (para. 2 of 19). 
50 Sonja Puzic, ‘Anti-cyberbullying law, Bill C-13, now in effect’, CTV News, 9 March 2015. 
<https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/anti-cyberbullying-law-bill-c-13-now-in-effect-1.2270460> [accessed 27 February 
2019] (para. 9 of 13). 
51 Kate Ashton, ‘Living Dolly's Dream: How a Territory teen tragedy captured the nation's attention’, ABC News, 29 
March 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-25/ 
territorians-australians-of-the-year-dolly-everett-baker-boy/10751442> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
Christopher Knaus, ‘Bullying as damaging as child abuse – and needs same resources, expert says’, Guardian, 12 
January 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/12/ 
bullying-as-damaging-as-child-abuse-and-needs-same-resources-expert-says> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
Caroline Overington, ‘Dolly Everett: She Was Only 14’, Australian, 12 January 2018. 
<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/inquirer/dolly-everett-she-was-only-14/ 
news-story/2ef4b694f0ac79ecfebcbd8e54d379df> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
Julie Power, ‘Activists for life: Tragedy made Peter and Natalie realise ordinary people can change laws’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 24 November 2019. <https://www.smh.com.au/national/activists-for-life-tragedy-made-peter-and-
natalie-realise-ordinary-people-can-change-laws-20191123-p53ddp.html> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
Clare Stephens, ‘Dolly Everett's mum shares the “terrible” email she received in the lead up to Dolly's death’, 
Mamamia, 1 May 2018. <https://www.mamamia.com.au/dolly-everett-email> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
52 ‘Akubra girl Dolly's bullying suicide shocks Australia’, BBC News, 10 January 2018. 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-42631208> [accessed 1 March 2019] (para. 1 of 23). 
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called the Dolly’s Dream Foundation and promoting it using the hashtag #DoItForDolly.53 The 
hashtag prompted a nationwide conversation in Australia, and an online GoFundMe page created 
for the foundation raised over $106,000 in three months, with a total of $177,125 by the 
campaign’s completion.54 The complementing influence of traditional and social media was also 
demonstrated by the former helping circulate grassroots activism on social media. A 2019 short 
film about the dangers of cyberbullying directed by then 15-year-old Charlotte McLaverty and 
posted on YouTube55 was prominently shared by traditional media.56 Social media therefore 
allowed for the effective distribution of grassroots activism against cyberbullying, while traditional 
media enhanced this distribution by directing public attention towards it. 
These cases demonstrate how public concern over cyberbullying and its perceived threat 
to youth wellbeing are enhanced by the complementing mediums of traditional and social media. 
It is important to note that matters of public concern are determined by an unequal political context. 
While members of some groups may be seen as vulnerable and their welfare intrinsically valuable, 
attracting significant public concern, those on the margins may not have the same access to public 
outrage and demands for social reform. For instance, as Gerry Georgatos has shown, the role of 
social inequity in shaping public concern can be seen in the disparity between the heightened 
attention towards Everett’s death and the indifference towards the high youth-suicide rates among 
Aboriginal Australians,57 particularly in the Northern Territory, where Everett was from. This 
 
53 Kristy O’Brien, ‘Cyber-bullying campaign launched after suicide of Akubra face Amy 'Dolly' Everett’, ABC 
News, 10 January 2018. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-10/dolly-everett-nt-suicide-cyber-bullying-
campaign-launched/9317056> [accessed 1 March 2019] (para. 7 of 25). 
54 Helen Groves, Dolly’s Dream (2018), <https://www.gofundme.com/DollysDream> [accessed 1 March 2019]. 
55 (Dolly’s Dream, 17 September 2019), ‘Are your words doing damage?’ (YouTube video), 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7UPYE8grP7o> [accessed 31 December 2019]. 
56 ‘Dolly Everett's suicide leads teen to create 'powerful and relevant' cyberbullying ad’, ABC News, 19 September 
2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-19/teen-suicide-of-dolly-everett-sparks-new-ad-on-
cyberbullying/11523028> [accessed 31 December 2019]. 
57 Gerry Georgatos, ‘The death of a child by suicide’, Stringer, 18 January 2018. <https://thestringer.com.au/the-
death-of-a-child-by-suicide-12738#.XHflt4gzbZt> [accessed 1 March 2019] (para. 6 of 22). 
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disparity demonstrates that concern over cyberbullying is not necessarily driven by an actual 
statistical rise in incidence but may be due instead to the perception of cyberbullying as a new 
prominent threat. That is, the media framing of cyberbullying enhances a prominent social concern 
that the phenomenon presents a mortality crisis for children, thus eliciting a ‘sense of priority’, or 
duty, to protect them. 
Public concern about youth online safety following the rapid rise of social media and the 
almost universal access to the internet certainly appears to be a strong driver of increased 
cyberbullying research. As mobile technology becomes more accessible, cyberbullying is no 
longer limited to computer use at home but can be perpetrated at any time during the day. Around 
the emergence of cyberbullying research in 2006–2007, a Pew Internet Project study demonstrated 
that the proportion of active online users in the United States had increased from 66 per cent in 
2005 to 73 per cent in 2006, with 42 per cent of users having broadband internet at home.58 Then 
another Pew study in 2008 revealed that 94 per cent of American teenagers were internet users, 66 
per cent had broadband access, 71 per cent owned mobile phones and 58 per cent had a social 
media profile.59 It is worth noting that the teenager classification ranges from ages twelve to 
seventeen, and that social media use was concentrated in the higher ages of that bracket. Statistics 
presented by the Australian Communications and Media Authority demonstrate a correlating 
increase of internet use in Australia, with the proportion of heavy or medium internet use among 
fourteen to seventeen-year-olds rising from 56 per cent in 2005 to 73 per cent in 2010.60 A 2016 
 
58 Mary Madden, Internet Penetration and Impact (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2006) 
<http://www.pewinternet.org/2006/04/26/internet-penetration-and-impact> [accessed 4 December 2019] (p. 1). 
59 Amanda Lenhart and others, Writing, Technology and Teens (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2008) 
<https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2008/04/24/writing-technology-and-teens> [accessed 4 December 2019] (pp. 
1, 4, 6). 
60 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2009-10 Communications report series Report 1- Australia in 
the digital economy: the shift to the online environment (Canberra: ACMA, 2010) <https://docplayer.net/14368615-
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report titled Cyberbullying of Children presented by the New South Wales Research Service drew 
a direct link between the rising use of mobile technology among millennial and Generation Z youth 
and the risk of being cyberbullied.61 The rise of access to the internet and mobile communications 
technology can also impact the power imbalance in cyberbullying compared to traditional bullying. 
While some power imbalances can still exist, technology changes the power levels for different 
people, potentially providing an outlet for retribution by victims (e.g. through anonymous 
messaging and social media profile creation), encouraging cycles of reciprocal bullying. 
The statistics linking mobile technology and internet use with cyberbullying are consistent 
across developed nations, which has pushed international growth of cyberbullying research. 
Across Europe in 2008, three-quarters of parents indicated their children aged 6-17 were frequently 
online, with internet use more common in the older children.62 A 2015 study by Brian O’Neill and 
Thuy Dinh compared the rates of online and offline bullying in European Union nations, and 
showed that while overall bullying rates had risen marginally from 21 per cent to 23 per cent 
between 2010 and 2014, cyberbullying had nearly doubled from 7 per cent to 12 per cent.63 O’Neill 
and Dinh demonstrate that youth cyberbullying rates in Europe have risen rapidly in conjunction 
with youth access to mobile technology. The explosive growth in internet and mobile technology 
growth among children correlates with both a comparatively dramatic rise in cyberbullying among 
children, and the growth of societal concern over the impact of this new technology. The visibility 
 
Communications-report-2009-10-series-report-1-australia-in-the-digital-economy-the-shift-to-the-online-
environment.html> [accessed 27 February 2019] (p. 14). 
61 Chris Angus, Cyberbullying of Children (Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016) 
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/cyberbullying-of-
children/Cyberbullying%20of%20Children.pdf> [accessed 1 March 2019] (pp. 4-5). 
62 Qing Li, Peter K. Smith and Donna Cross, ‘Research into Cyberbullying’, in Cyberbullying in the Global 
Playground: Research from International Perspectives, ed. by Qing Li, Peter K. Smith and Donna Cross (New 
Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), pp. 3-12 (p. 5). 
63 Brian O’Neill and Thuy Dinh, ‘Mobile Technologies and Incidence of Cyberbullying in Seven European 
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 53 
 
and virality of cyberbullying on social and traditional media also contribute to the sense of a youth 
crisis, and the push to prioritise cyberbullying research.  
The research emphasis on the effects of online harassment on youth can be contrasted with 
the comparative lack of research on online antisemitism, especially considering the diminishing 
rates of Holocaust knowledge. Where research does consider structural discrimination, it is usually 
subsumed under the broader, universalising, ‘youth’ category. Since public concern is a significant 
driver of research quantity, diminished concern over online antisemitism indicates the acute need 
for effective research, aiming to both provide crucial support for youth vulnerable to antisemitism 
and enhance public awareness of online antisemitism’s dangers. 
 
Cyberbullying Prevalence 
While cyberbullying rates are represented somewhat inconsistently, the consensus is that it is 
increasing.64 An ongoing meta-analysis by the Cyberbullying Research Center provides evidence 
of increasing cyberbullying rates over the last five years,65 although the rates it cites vary erratically 
from study to study. This points towards an inconsistent methodology between cyberbullying 
studies, which is not entirely unexpected considering the youth of the field. The most successful 
studies are those which compare cyberbullying rates over periods of time, such as the EU study 
based on Net Children Go Mobile66 and the replicated studies in the US carried out by the 
Cyberbullying Research Center.67 While an academic consensus on cyberbullying research 
 
64 Cook, para. 1 of 27.  
65 Justin W. Patchin, Summary of Our Cyberbullying Research (2007-2019) (2019), 
<https://cyberbullying.org/summary-of-our-cyberbullying-research> [accessed 16 January 2020] (para. 3 of 3). 
66 Brian O’Neill and Thuy Dinh, p. 390. 
67 Justin W. Patchin, School Bullying Rates Increase by 35% from 2016 to 2019 (2019), 
<https://cyberbullying.org/school-bullying-rates-increase-by-35-from-2016-to-2019> [accessed 16 January 2020]. 
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methodology has not been reached, these longitudinal studies still have the advantage of using 
standard methodologies over a period of time, acquiring a far more accurate picture of 
cyberbullying trends than individual studies that capture only a single point in time. 
 One of the key questions posed by researchers is how the rate of cyberbullying compares 
to the rates of traditional bullying and overall bullying. Research into this question has sought to 
determine whether cyberbullying is simply replacing traditional ‘schoolyard’ bullying, whether 
cyberbullying exists alongside traditional bullying (allowing the abuse to continue at home), or 
whether it is a largely independent phenomenon.68 Research on traditional bullying provides a 
clearer picture of bullying rates over time due to the longitudinal use of standard methodologies. 
According to research conducted in twenty-one countries in 1997–1998 and twenty-seven 
countries in 1997–1998, 2001–2002, and 2005–2006, there has been an overall decrease in 
reported bullying rates in the majority of the participating countries.69 When taken with research 
indicating increasing cyberbullying rates, this may indicate a stark difference or pattern of 
replacement between traditional bullying and cyberbullying. However, the overall decrease was 
reported in a majority of the countries in the study, not all countries,70 whereas research on 
cyberbullying has found increased rates of victimisation in all reporting countries (although the 
data is not as substantial). Therefore, the compared rates of traditional bullying and cyberbullying 
suggest, but do not prove, a degree of distinction between the forms of bullying.  
Even with a distinction between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, studies that directly 
compare rates of both traditional bullying and cyberbullying in the same data group have shown 
 
68 Kowalski and Limber, p. S18. 
69 M. Molcho and others, ‘Cross-national time trends in bullying behaviour 1994-2006: Findings from Europe and 
North America’, International Journal of Public Health, 53 (2009), 225-234 (p. 231).  
70 Kowalski and others, pp. 24-25. 
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there is a degree of overlap in terms of involvement. A study by Kowalski and Limber 
demonstrates that nearly half of all cyberbullying victims are also victimised by traditional 
bullying. However, in comparison, the vast majority of traditional bullying victims are not victims 
of cyberbullying.71 The overlap in bullying behaviours was corroborated by a study by Tracy E. 
Waasdorp and Catherine P. Bradshaw, who found that ‘most victims of cyberbullying also reported 
that they experienced at least one form of traditional bullying. A small minority (<5%) only 
experienced cyberbullying’.72 The data indicates that while traditional bullying is decreasing, 
cyberbullying is rising, but cyberbullying without a traditional counterpart is relatively rare. Since 
cyberbullying rates have consistently been lower overall than traditional bullying, this indicates 
that while fewer adolescents are being bullied, existing victims are increasingly targeted through 
cyberbullying. 
Many of cyberbullying’s distinguishing factors are linked to the ‘invisibility’ of both its 
victims and perpetrators, which explains both its increase and the inefficacy of traditional anti-
bullying measures to counter it. Waasdorp and Bradshaw found that most cyberbullied youth did 
not report the bullying to an adult further contributed to this perception of ‘invisibility’. Reasons 
for low rates of reporting to an adult (as opposed to traditional bullying) included fear of a device 
being confiscated, the fear of infringement of the bullies’ privacy, and the perception that adults 
are less technologically adept and could not help.73 The phenomenon of ‘invisibility’ makes it 
evident why traditional bullying countermeasures are not as effective against cyberbullying, as 
traditional ‘schoolyard’ bullying is far more likely to be perceived and therefore countered. This 
also explains why victims of traditional bullying are being increasingly cyberbullied, as 
 
71 Kowalski and Limber, p. S15. 
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cyberbullying allows an avenue to continue bullying the victim outside of the gaze of bullying 
countermeasures.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from the overlap and differences between traditional 
bullying and cyberbullying, both regarding bullying itself and broader discrimination and abuse 
online. First, while countermeasures to traditional bullying have achieved a degree of success, they 
appear to have less impact on the rates of cyberbullying. Second, since a significant proportion of 
cyberbullying victims are also victims of traditional bullying, this suggests that bullies are adapting 
to technology to continue bullying outside of traditional spaces. Third, cyberbullying 
manifestations are often linked to traditional, or offline, manifestations. Fourth, while traditional 
bullying and cyberbullying are often concurrent, this does not necessarily mean that cyberbullying 
is simply an extension of traditional bullying, as it has several qualitatively distinct features. 
Therefore, cyberbullying and traditional bullying overlap, and while this overlap is not 
comprehensive, it demonstrates that an accurate picture of bullying cannot be captured by a narrow 
focus on just one variant. The existence of qualitative distinctions between online and offline 
variants of bullying suggests similar qualitative distinctions exist between online and offline 
variants of other forms of online abuse, including antisemitism. Nonetheless consideration must 
be made to whether these distinctions are commonly derived from the new technology or from 
unique aspects of the abuse.  
 
Race and Racism in Early Internet Studies 
Of the major areas of online abuse and discrimination, research into online racism is the most 
relevant to the study of online antisemitism. While there have been inquiries into race and racism 
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in online communication and culture, this scholarship is comparatively scarce compared to that on 
cyberbullying,74 even though both fields emerged at around the same time. This section introduces 
research on online racism to show how structural discrimination has shaped the field of knowledge 
on cyberbullying itself, creating a ‘colour-blind’ theoretical framework. Examinations of racism 
and sexism online serve to correct the lack of attention to structural discrimination in existing 
cyberbullying research75 through showing how forms of discrimination and cyberbullying 
intersect. The example of GamerGate, a phenomenon that has become synonymous with sexist 
cyberbullying, demonstrates how the intersection of varying forms of online abuse and 
discrimination can further distinguish their manifestations from offline variants. The comparative 
approach in this chapter, showing how the basic elements of cyberbullying are manifested in online 
discrimination, serves to contextualise the analyses of online antisemitism in chapters four and 
five.  
 
State of Research 
Studies exploring race and racism online started appearing shortly before the rise of cyberbullying 
research, during the late 1990s and early 2000s.76 This was several years after internet access 
 
74 Ana-Maria Bliuc and others, ‘Online networks of racial hate: A systematic review of 10 years of research on 
cyber-racism’, Computers in Human Behavior, 87 (2018), 75-86 (p. 75). 
75 Vincent J. Llorent, Rosario Ortega-Ruiz and Izabela Zych, ‘Bullying and Cyberbullying in Minorities: Are They 
More Vulnerable than the Majority Group?’ Frontiers in Psychology, 7 (2016), 1-9 (p. 3) 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5067466/pdf/fpsyg-07-01507.pdf> [accessed 22 January 2020]. 
76 S. Zickmund, ‘Approaching the radical other: the discursive culture of cyberhate’, in Virtual Culture: Identity and 
Communication in Cyberspace, ed. by S.G. Jones (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1997), pp. 185–205. 
C.E. Sharpe, ‘Racialized fantasies on the Internet’, Signs, 24.4 (1999), 1089–1096. 
B. Burkhalter, ‘Reading race online: discovering racial identity in UseNet discussions’, in Communities in 
Cyberspace, ed. by M.Smith and P. Kollock (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 60–75. 
V. Burris, E. Smith and A. Strahm, ‘White supremacist networks on the Internet’, Sociological Focus, 33.2 (2000), 
215–234. 
Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura and Gilbert Rodman, Race in Cyberspace (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
 
 58 
 
entered the mainstream markets in Western countries such as America and Australia, shifting from 
an early pioneering phase around 1995.77 The term ‘cyber-racism’ itself was coined in 2002 by 
Les Back,78 and is primarily rooted in the study of the white power movement, and how white 
power narratives positioned whites against Jews, blacks, and other “mongrelised races”.79 Thus, 
even in the early stages, studies into broader cyber-racism were relevant to research into 
antisemitism and were able to situate online abuse as a problem of structural inequality, rather than 
the product of a generic relationship between perpetrators and victims unmarked by social identity.  
Unlike the research on cyberbullying, research on online discrimination explicitly 
addressed the question of how social identities are constructed and negotiated online. For example, 
human-technology research pioneer Sherry Turkle explored how cyberspace allows users to 
explore new perspectives on gender and race, due to the ability to “pose” as multiple identities.80 
Similarly, Lisa Nakamura explained how the dissociation from the body allowed by cyberspace 
led to a form of “identity tourism”, through which users in online spaces can adopt racial personas, 
often based on stereotypes when role-played by someone not of that race.81 Many of these studies 
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provided early warning signs, pointing towards the increased organisation of white supremacist 
networks82 and the targeting of adolescents by hate groups online.83 Conversely, some early studies 
suggested that cyberspace could avoid most iterations of real-world racism.84 This was not to say 
that racism would not be a factor in online communities, but rather that text-based forms of 
communications would lead to ‘racial anonymity’. However, even these optimistic predictions 
came with the anticipation of that some technology would allow racial distinction, as well as 
observations that race may still be identifiable through speech patterns and other factors.85  
In the years since these studies, race and racism have fallen to an auxiliary role in broader 
internet studies, and the internet has failed to provide the anticipated escape from race and racism. 
Jessie Daniels has suggested that the lack of research may be due to research into race online being 
a burden that often falls exclusively on researchers of colour: 
 
…the excellent work on racial identity is marked as outside the central theoretical concerns 
of the field, and it is left to ‘minority participants’ to give voice to their experience of racial 
identity in cyberspace. In other words, they are asked to perform the spectacle of the 
Other86 about the experience of people of color online and off.87  
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However, there are indications that the tide is shifting in internet studies to recognise the 
importance of research on cyber-racism and broader discrimination. Some of the most relevant 
research for this thesis appears in the book by Andrew Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and 
Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race Hate, published in 2017 as part of 
the Palgrave hate studies series.88 The book analyses how users respond to racism online, how the 
internet benefits racists, and the formulation of racist narratives online. By providing 
comprehensive context for the problem of cyber-racism in the early chapters, the authors establish 
the need and ability to address cyber-racism through enhancing community resilience.89 This thesis 
is similarly invested in using an interdisciplinary approach to study user responses to cyber-racism 
and develop community resilience to antisemitism. To this end, chapter six aims to develop a 
standard research methodology to evaluate the ability of young people to recognise, research, 
respond to, and refute discrimination and misinformation when encountered online.90 
 
The ‘Colour-Blind’ Internet and Capacity for Research 
It is necessary to reflect on the history of research into cyber-racism in order to anticipate the 
problems and obstacles faced by researchers in intersecting and analogous fields (as done with 
cyberbullying earlier in this chapter). While the importance of race and racism online are yet to be 
fully examined in internet studies research (counter to the expectations of early researchers into 
virtual communities),91 early researchers made some notable observations regarding race and the 
internet prior to social media. The first, which has been touched on, was the expectation that the 
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depersonalised qualities of online communications could be an important tool for reducing racial 
discrimination. While this view had some support, it still garnered controversy even before the rise 
of social media. During the late 1990s, MIT media professor Henry Jenkins placed a slogan on an 
advertisement for an MIT public forum that read: ‘In Cyberspace, nobody knows your race unless 
you tell them. Do you tell?’92 Jenkins later admitted in 2002 that he had shared this hope of 
achieving a truly colour-blind society because online anonymity, along with a predominantly text-
based form of communication, appeared to offer freedom from the racial indicators that were 
present in real-life interaction. Following a public forum and controversy, Jenkins later re-
evaluated his initial views, which he attributed to a mix of naivety and discomfort of white 
‘Netizens’ to discuss race: 
 
Perhaps when early white Netizens were arguing that cyberspace was ‘color-blind’, what 
they really meant was that they desperately wanted a place where they didn’t have to think 
about, look at or talk about racial differences.93 
 
This early research provided valuable lessons for the developing field of online race and racism 
research. Firstly, in order to determine the qualitative changes the internet has on race and racism, 
researchers need to consider its effects not just on obvious perpetrators and victims, but also on 
bystanders – the assumed majority who do not explicitly engage in racist rhetoric or behaviour, 
but wish for it to become a non-issue. Secondly, it is important to be critical of how utopian views 
of the internet as an equal space would remove the capacity to effectively discuss the operation of 
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race and racism online. It is this utopian vision of a colour-blind internet that harms research into 
cyber-racism, as it pushes scholarship on race and racism online to the margins (compared to the 
centrality of cyberbullying), delegitimising and burdening researchers of colour.94  
Sociologists such as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Gianpaolo Baiocchi have noted that 
sociology researchers often limit the significance of racism in their writings or avoid discussion of 
it.95 This has resulted in the persistent reluctance, on the part of researchers and the broader 
population, to consider racism as a fundamental social problem. Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi remark 
that this attitude has been growing since the 1960s, especially regarding racism against African 
Americans.96 They point to the post-civil rights era as a climate in which racially based discussions 
have been delegitimised:  
 
Because the normative climate in [the] post-civil rights era has delegitimized the public 
expression of racially based feelings and viewpoints, … surveys on racial attitudes have 
become less meaningful to assess racial practices and have become like multiple choice 
exams where respondents work hard to choose the ‘right’ answers.97 
 
Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi link post-civil rights attitudes to a reluctance to consider institutional 
problems of racism. These attitudes also apply to discourse, both in how people discuss racism and 
how racist discourse is recognised by researchers and the broader population. The use of outdated 
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models based on measuring self-perception and personal beliefs around race has erroneously 
suggested that racism (especially against African Americans) decreased in the white American 
population.98 In actuality, the declining significance of these issues in research, alongside the 
public expression of racially based viewpoints being denormalised, has resulted in a large 
proportion of white people viewing issues of race and racism as unimportant. This has happened 
despite long-standing structural obstacles to equality continuing to exist, and newer racist ideas 
evolving as others have fallen out of vogue.99 These methodological issues have resulted in an 
artificial vision of progress, especially for those white researchers and ‘Netizens’ who envisioned 
a raceless society,100 and have even been attributed as a partial reason for the limited state of 
research into cyber-racism.101 Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi explained that due to bias in self-
perception, researchers must instead look to ‘communicative interaction’ to identify racial 
ideology, because that is the place where racism is ‘produced and reproduced’.102 
While Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi’s thesis applies largely to offline racism and efforts to 
ignore institutional aspects of racism, it still applies to online communicative interaction, 
especially in how interactions can affect the racial viewpoints of bystanders. Their thesis explains 
why online users can exhibit behaviours such as resistance to recognising racism in online posts, 
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 64 
 
giving racist users benefit of the doubt, and avoiding discussions of racism online. Kevin 
Durrheim, Ross Greener, and Kevin A. Whitehead’s analysis of an online discussion regarding 
violent student protests over the ‘Africanisation’ of a South African university, in which students 
were described as ‘savages’, demonstrated the lengths to which posters went to avoid accusations 
or direct discussions of racism.103 The authors observed that participants avoided making 
accusations of racism and criticised other accusations of racism, due to the perception that such 
racialised dialogue would shut down discussion.104 This extended to denying racism on behalf of 
others and carefully formulating language to be deracialised, despite the context. Durrheim, 
Greener, and Whitehead suggest that future research should analyse ‘race trouble’, referring not to 
racist dialogue itself, but to how the issues of race and racism ‘trouble’ people, concurrently 
informing dialogue about race and racism.105 This example demonstrates how an ‘anything but 
racism’ mentality can be reinforced through online communication. Aspects like online anonymity 
can remove key contextual cues, such as association with racist groups or prior racist comments, 
thereby making it easier for majority bystanders to excuse the actions of racists. Online 
communication thus pushes these bystanders more towards defending racists than their victims, 
which can make both them and others more likely to adopt the racist viewpoints of those they 
defend. This demonstrates that the ‘anything but racism’ mentality can be more of a contributor to 
racism, than a tool against it, and that bystanders must be considered in the research of racism 
online. 
This pattern of downplaying and ignoring racism is also present in research into race and 
racism online and is attributed as a partial reason for the limited state of research in this field, 
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reflecting poor conceptualisations of online racism in research. Daniels even critiques Jenkins’ 
own admission of ignorance about the ‘colour-blind’ internet in 2002. In his article, Jenkins uses 
an example of an Asian American being sent a racist email by a white colleague (who did not 
know the recipient’s race) to represent “misstep[s]” that can occur in the internet’s “multiracial 
context”.106 Daniels remarks how Jenkins handwaves a racist email as a “misstep” resulting from 
“obliviousness”, rather than “overt racism”, and comments that this response is an example of the 
pattern of downplaying and reluctance explored by Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi.107 Even self-
reflective white researchers such as Jenkins, who were coming to terms with their own naivety, 
were still subject to the habit of diminishing racism and race. This downplaying suggests a 
conceptual distinction being made between this “misstep” and explicit racists online, which risks 
limiting the picture of racism online. 
The credibility of a ‘colour-blind’ internet has been further diminished by the rise of social 
media, where people interact with others as themselves and post profile pictures. Virtual and real 
identities became intertwined on social media, and personal identifiers allowed web users to be 
targeted on the basis of race or other discriminating factors. Alternatively, these identifies allow 
perpetrators to implement racism in cyberbullying campaigns while hiding behind anonymity. 
What this means is that the naivety of this ‘anything but racism’ attitude has persisted as the 
internet has changed, creating an online environment where both researchers and regular users 
may be ignorant of real issues of discrimination in an environment that can actively facilitate them. 
This ignorance highlights the need to broaden the conceptualisation of racism online, as research 
measuring online racism only through tracking hate groups and surveying self-identifying racist 
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viewpoints will miss the breadth and nuance of the phenomenon. Racism online must be 
considered in everyday communicative interactions, including how bystanders may excuse racist 
viewpoints, and how racists may abuse the ‘anything but racism’ mentality of many bystanders 
online, specifically targeting them with covert racist viewpoints hidden behind online anonymity. 
 
Race and Racism in the Social Media Era 
Despite controversy surrounding the belief that the internet could lead to a decrease in racism, this 
belief did have some traction leading into the social media era, resulting in observations worth 
considering for research into online antisemitism. Kahn et al. hypothesised in 2005 that the internet 
‘had the possibility to increase prejudice (or at least expressions of it) but decrease 
discrimination’.108 In 2013, they claimed that their research had upheld their thesis. They argued 
that the social media trends to reduce anonymity could increase the risk of a user being targeted 
for discrimination as racial cues become more visible, but reduce expressions of prejudice due to 
the risk of perpetrators being recognised and tied to their comments.109 This hypothetical model 
ties in appropriately with the phenomenon of disinhibition and disassociation within the context 
of cyberbullying, representing a qualitative change where bullying can risk being further 
normalised and spread due to the qualities of online communication. Importantly, Kahn et al. 
suggest that if the current trend of reducing anonymity continues (particularly on social media 
platforms, where user profiles feature names, photographs, and other identifying information), 
online forms of racism may more closely resemble offline variants. In this way, real and virtual 
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identities can become intertwined. However, Kahn et al. concede that even with diminished 
anonymity, users can still ‘strategically’ seek out and utilise anonymity (on Twitter, for example, 
anyone can make an anonymous profile with the click of a button).110  
Kahn et al.’s theory calls attention to real-world parallels like the Ku Klux Klan obscuring 
their faces, anonymous vandalism, and sending of hate mail, yet the technological qualities of the 
internet make online anonymity far more accessible and pervasive with lower risk and time 
commitments than such offline variants. Furthermore, reduced anonymity does not necessarily 
result in reduced disassociation that comes with the predominantly text-based communications 
online. The technological qualities of online discussion contribute to the pervasiveness of heated 
exchanges online, colloquially known as ‘flame wars’ or ‘flaming’,111 in which insulting and 
offensive messages can be easily and hastily posted in a protected space dissociated from the 
recipient’s reactions. Decreased anonymity may reduce disinhibition caused by a lack of social 
risks, which would otherwise lead to increases of racist rhetoric or abusive behaviour; however, 
diminished social risk is not the only factor involved in an increase of these behaviours online.  
The main question to consider, in relation to reduced anonymity online, is whether the 
effects of easier identification of victims are outweighed by fear of consequences for perpetrators. 
There are reasons to doubt this, as it is unlikely that degrees of anonymity are the sole contributor 
to disinhibition online. Indeed, online anonymity has likely contributed to an environment where 
lack of consequences for expressing discrimination is considered normal, even among those 
publicly identifiable online. The success of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign supports 
a perceived lack of consequences online, particularly due to Trump’s heavy Twitter presence and 
 
110 Ibid., p. 216. 
111 P.J. Moor, A. Heuvelman and R. Verleur, ‘Flaming on YouTube’, Computers in Human Behaviour, 26.6 
(November 2010), 1536-1546 (p. 1536). 
 68 
 
his (and broader conservatives’) opposition to ‘political correctness’. While discriminatory 
individuals may still be successfully shamed online, the success of public figures such as Trump 
dissuades inhibition. While it could be hypothesised that online anonymity created an environment 
in which figures like Trump can thrive, this environment has been normalised to an extent that it 
seems unlikely that reducing anonymity alone will have a significant effect on inhibiting 
expressions of discrimination on social media. The enabling of ‘consequence-free’ speech through 
figures such as Trump can even create powerful peripheral spaces in which attempts to call out 
discrimination are more likely silenced than vice versa. The impact of these spaces on disinhibiting 
expressions of discrimination is then exacerbated by the accompanied disassociation that comes 
from online communication. 
In concluding her 2012 review of race and racism in Internet Studies, Daniels comments 
that while 8 per cent of the United States population use Twitter (which, at the time, was more 
popular among blacks and Latinos than whites),112 there was no peer-reviewed literature about 
race and racism on Twitter. She did predict that this would change, and while it did, a significant 
factor to that change can be linked to the prominent racist behaviour, rhetoric and racial tensions 
surrounding the 2016 United States election. Most notable of this peer-reviewed literature is a 
themed section of the Ethnic and Racial Studies journal focusing on the evolution of 
#BlackLivesMatter on Twitter, published in mid-2017.113 This issue drew attention to the 
evolution of black identity and intersectionality on Twitter in the wake of high profile killings of 
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blacks by American police and others, and also looked at the critical response to 
#BlackLivesMatter on Twitter.  
One of the articles in this issue focused on the way social media users responded to the rise 
of the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag and found that as the hashtag increased its reach, it led to the 
rise of counter-movement hashtags, which attempted to shift the focus away from the events 
motivating #BlackLivesMatter (the Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown shootings), to the tactics 
used by the Black Lives Matter movement.114 The authors suggested that future research could 
investigate how racial grievances are framed using social media, and how these framings impact 
the evolution of counter-movements, which may be influenced by feelings of ‘race trouble’ and 
general discomfort about racial issues. This research can further inform understanding of how 
racists and their enablers continue the normalisation of structural racism through use of social 
media, which can be compared to the offline tactics of racists and their enablers.  
In their article, Ray et al. examined the rise of counter-movement hashtags, including 
#AllLivesMatter and #TCOT (Top Conservatives on Twitter).115 The authors found that it was 
#TCOT and not #AllLivesMatter that evolved to be the primary counter-narrative to 
#BlackLivesMatter, especially during events linked to the Brown shooting. Although #TCOT did 
not receive significant media attention, it did generate a large following on Twitter. The authors 
hypothesised that because #TCOT was linked to an existing infrastructure of conservative 
commentary, it was more effectively ingrained in the conservative echo chambers that pushed 
 
114 Jelani Ince, Fabio Rojas and Clayton A. Davis, ‘The social media response to Black Lives Matter: How Twitter 
users interact with Black Lives Matter through hashtag use’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40.11 (2017), 1814-1830 (p. 
1827). 
115 Rashawn Ray and others, ‘Ferguson and the death of Michael Brown on Twitter: #BlackLivesMatter, #TCOT, 
and the evolution of collective identities’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40.11 (2017), 1797-1813. 
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‘anything but racism’ narratives in the wake of #BlackLivesMatter.116 This research provides 
insight into how social media platforms like Twitter can allow groups to create their own narratives 
on racism, shifting Overton’s ‘window of discourse’ (which refers to the range of ideas that may 
be regarded as politically acceptable to the mainstream) within these groups and the broader 
platform.117 The research also provides insight into how such platforms can be effectively used to 
counter action against racism, through methods such as repainting activists as thugs and 
terrorists,118 and downplaying white-on-black violence by publicising black-on-white violence.119 
These methods work to normalise racism by presenting a different set of ‘facts’, which are used to 
justify racist violence and to invalidate the testimonies and reality of racial inequality.  
Counter-narrative hashtags like #TCOT embedded themselves in the American Republican 
Party through the Tea Party, the alt-right, and President Trump’s administration.120 The term alt-
right refers to a loose far-right movement known for its younger membership, irreverent use of 
online culture, and centrality of white identity.121 However, the loose movement is better defined 
by that which it opposes, including multiculturalism, feminism, ‘establishment’ politics, a vague 
concept of ‘globalism’, and ‘political correctness’.122 It is this last aspect that most significantly 
links the movement to Trump, who himself served as a vehicle for normalising racism on Twitter 
 
116 Ibid., p. 1807. 
117 Overton’s ‘window of discourse, or ‘Overton’s Window’, refers to the window of discourse that can be deemed 
to be acceptable by the audience, and efforts to shift that window. The term was coined in 2003 by Joseph P. 
Overton, former VP of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy.  
Joseph Lehman, A Brief Explanation of the Overton Window (Michigan: Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 2019) 
<https://www.mackinac.org/overtonwindow> [accessed 18 December 2018]. 
118 Rashawn Ray and others., p. 1807. 
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121 Southern Poverty Law Centre, Alt-Right (2016), <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/alt-right> [accessed 13 January 2020] (para. 1 of 28). 
122 Tom Pollard, ‘Alt-Right Transgressions in the Age of Trump’, Perspectives on Global Development and 
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through his promotion of ‘political incorrectness’.123 Jessica Gantt Shafer has argued that Trump’s 
‘political incorrectness’ “became a signifier allowing for backstage, or overt, racist sentiments to 
become steadily normalised as logical in the public frontstage of political discourse and social 
media.”124 Shafer explains that ‘political incorrectness’ as “truth-telling” allows racist discourse 
to flourish, particularly in relation to issues such as immigration and counter-terrorism, and works 
to silence dissent by suggesting that ‘political correctness’ jeopardises national security.125 It 
follows that such an ideology being endorsed by a national leader reduces the social risk (both 
perceived and real) associated with promoting ideas that could be construed as racist. Due to the 
design of Twitter, Trump and his followers collectively share a virtual space together, in which 
they can reinforce and consolidate their rhetorical sway. Twitter allows voters to express their 
support for Trump publicly and provides a sense of direct engagement with him, closing the 
traditional distance between citizens and the head of state. Users can also see the evidence of 
political consensus by scrolling through tweets that express the same views. 126 
These phenomena illuminate how organised antisemites online can strategise to bring other 
users into these virtual spaces that promote a parallel reality in which antisemitism seems normal, 
while using anonymity to both protect their own identity and encourage the participation of new 
users. Once these communities are well established, they can use the structure of social media to 
reinforce their ideas and can appear to link ideas to public figures to further support their parallel 
 
123 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump, 8 August 2015) ‘So many “politically correct” fools in our country. We 
have to all get back to work and stop wasting time and energy on nonsense!’ (tweet) 
<https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/629992743788523520> [accessed 5 December 2019].  
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump, 5 July 2016) ‘With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get 
worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is - RADICAL ISLAM!’ (tweet) 
<https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/749989709275885568> [accessed 14 December 2018]. 
124 Jessica Gantt Shafer, ‘Donald Trump’s “Political Incorrectness”: Neoliberalism as Frontstage Racism on Social 
Media’, Social Media + Society, 3.3 (2017), 1-10 (p. 1). 
125 Ibid., p. 5. 
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realities. Ultimately, the adaptability of discriminatory movements is enhanced by social media 
functionality, which is especially concerning when considering the historical adaptability and 
varied manifestations of antisemitism. 
 
Likes, Dislikes, and the Positivity Bias 
There are technological aspects of platforms like Twitter that can reinforce ideological isolation 
and the formation of echo chambers. Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández carried out a study on how 
the social media platforms of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube affected the mediation and 
circulation of the racial controversy surrounding the booing of Australian Football League 
Indigenous player Adam Goodes.127 In her study, Matamoros-Fernández identified how the 
presence or absence of ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ buttons between platforms contributes to the distribution 
of racism. She explained that Facebook and Twitter have a “bias towards positivity”, which 
includes not providing an explicit dislike button that can be used to express distaste towards racist 
views online (this is no longer the case for Facebook, which now has a range of emoji reactions).128 
Comparatively, YouTube does have a dislike button, but the mere inclusion of such a button may 
not be effective in inhibiting racist remarks. In fact, M. Laeeq Khan notes that YouTube has 
virtually no control over user-generated content in the form of comments (beyond turning them 
off completely), resulting in a high frequency of ‘flaming’ and extreme content, such as explicit 
discrimination and abuse.129 While Facebook and Twitter are not inclined towards the expression 
of distaste due to the positivity bias, YouTube’s contrasting negativity bias actively enables 
 
127 Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández, ‘Platformed racism: the mediation and circulation of an Australian race-based 
controversy on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube’, Information, Communication & Society, 20.6 (2017), 930-946. 
128 Ibid., p. 935. 
129 M. Laeeq Khan, ‘Social media engagement: What motivates user participation and consumption on YouTube?’, 
Computers in Human Behaviour, 66 (2017), 236-247 (p. 244).  
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abusive and discriminatory content with few user controls for moderation. This can result in 
aggressive behaviours ranging from cyberbullying individual users with abusive comments and 
dislikes, to full-fledged campaigns to delegitimise videos through mass dislikes.130 Hypothetically, 
a platform without a strict positivity bias, combined with less anonymity and more stringent 
comment controls and moderation, could result in less abusive and discriminatory content, and the 
means to counter it more easily when it does appear. 
Matamoros-Fernández’s analysis of the Adam Goodes incident preceded the introduction 
of Facebook emoji ‘reactions’, which dislodged the positivity bias. Reactions allow users to react 
differently to posts, rather than just liking them, with examples such as the ‘crying face’ emoji for 
reactions to sad news, or the ‘laughing face’ for reacting to funny or ridiculous things. This feature 
could hypothetically be used like a dislike button, as abusive or discriminatory comments could 
be responded to with ‘angry face’ or ‘laughing face’ emojis, expressing a user’s distaste, dislike, 
or disdain. However, the current Facebook algorithm weighs reactions of any kind higher than 
likes, enhancing the visibility of potentially controversial comments that draw a large quantity of 
reactions.131 While such buttons could hypothetically be used on social media platforms to combat 
racism, poor implementation can lead to greater visibility of racist content, contributing to the 
normalisation or promotion of racist views. In addition, Matamoros-Fernández has demonstrated 
that emojis are also commonly used to amplify racism along with likes and dislikes,132 thereby 
 
130 For example, a trailer for a 2019 movie, Cuck, which specifically relates to far-right radicalisation online, 
received massive amounts of dislikes, with over 10,000 dislikes versus 1,400 likes as of 23 October 2019. The 
official movie channel was able to mitigate this effect on its own video of the trailer by disabling like counters.  
(Movie Trailers Source, 5 September 2019), ‘Cuck Official Trailer (2019) Crime, Drama Movie’, (YouTube video) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpOWaT31wKY> [accessed 23 October 2019]. 
131 Karissa Bell, ‘You might want to rethink what you’re ‘liking on Facebook now’, Mashable, 28 February 2017. 
<https://mashable.com/2017/02/27/facebook-reactions-news-feed/#jJI4DQt33kq3> [accessed 14 December 2018]. 
132 Ariadna Matamoros-Fernández, ‘Inciting anger through Facebook reactions in Belgium: The use of emoji and 
related vernacular expressions in racist discourse’, First Monday, 2.9 (2018), 
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indicating that poor implementation does not just give visibility to racist content, it can actively 
support it.  
Technological features of social media platforms such as like buttons can also function to 
exacerbate ideological division over racial issues in online spaces and further entrench virtual echo 
chambers. Such entrenchment encourages users to participate more commonly in spaces with like-
minded individuals that reinforce extreme views. By manipulating like counts, groups can attempt 
to promote certain views. Alternatively, they can create networks that reinforce analogous spaces 
through reliably liking each other’s content. This strategy can potentially normalise abusive or 
discriminatory content within these spaces and even normalise the existence of these spaces to the 
users of the broader platforms.  
This phenomenon of like manipulation also plays into a theory unique to the internet called 
‘information laundering’, coined by Adam Klein in his 2017 book Fanaticism, Racism, and Rage 
Online: Corrupting the Digital Sphere.133 Klein shows how one source of information can 
inadvertently or directly lend its credibility to another by being linked to websites through the 
network of search engines, news outlets, blogs and social media platforms.134 This is 
complemented by the overwhelming scope of information provided by the internet, thereby 
resulting in users having a greater willingness to accept information provided on websites, even 
those previously unvisited. By using likes in social media echo chambers, users can take advantage 
of ideological isolation to promote a more radical website that may now fall within the echo 
chamber’s shifted Overton window, thereby leading to normalisation and indoctrination. These 
 
133 Adam Klein, Fanaticism, Racism, and Rage Online: Corrupting the Digital Sphere (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017). 
134 Ibid., p. 26. 
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technological aspects of social media platforms and their effects represent one of the clearest 
examples of qualitative change to abusive, discriminatory, and misinformative content online.  
Finally, Matamoros-Fernández also remarks how inconsistent rule implementation and 
monitoring of standards by the platform operators can benefit users promoting racist views. 
Matamoros-Fernández argues that the previously mentioned ‘bias towards positivity’ often results 
in a pass being given to racism in the form of humour, which is protected by the policies of 
Facebook without an appropriate definition of what quantifies humour.135 Further, the policies that 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter have in place to identify and respond to offensive material 
may often not be flexible enough to accommodate hate-speech complaints. For instance, Twitter’s 
policy forbids harassment, but when users sent through screenshots of racist content directed 
towards Adam Goodes as evidence, Twitter ignored them, as its policy dictated that only links 
would be accepted as proof of harassment.136 Going even further, black activists have claimed that 
Facebook’s moderation policies have been repeatedly used on the accounts of black people who 
call out racism, thereby stifling voices attempting to challenge discrimination online.137 At worst, 
social media platforms’ policing of community standards may even do more harm to vulnerable 
communities than good.  
The poor implementation of rules, and apparent ignorance of platform operators as to how 
racists take advantage of their policies and technology highlights how social media can lead to a 
quantitative increase in racism, including antisemitism. The normalisation of discrimination 
 
135 Matamoros-Fernández, ‘Platformed racism’, p. 936. 
136 Ibid., p. 940. 
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through information laundering is a key qualitative change of concern, especially considering the 
varied manifestations of antisemitism, which can provide multiple avenues of entry into the hatred. 
Nonetheless, further investigation is required to evaluate whether information laundering of 
antisemitic views online is distinct from the laundering of other discriminatory and abusive 
content. Combining well-informed moderation policies with elements balancing inhibition and 
positivity/negativity biases may help discourage the online distribution of both explicit and 
discreet forms of discriminatory and abusive content. 
 
Quantifying Racism Online and Interdisciplinary Methodologies 
Another lesson to be learned from research into online racism is how researchers quantify 
expressions of racism online, and what the statistics indicate about the relationship between racism 
and the internet. Researchers have historically had difficulty with quantifying racism, a difficulty 
Phillip Atiba Goff links to the ‘measurement problem’, understood through the two separate 
components of causality and data.138 The causality problem refers to the difficulty in determining 
whether racial disparities stem from racial discrimination, or vice versa. In other words: does 
socio-economic inequality cause minorities to be discriminated against (e.g. a stereotype of a 
‘dumb’ minority due to lack of access to quality education), or does discrimination of minorities 
cause socio-economic inequality (e.g. people charging higher prices to minorities they do not like). 
In the case of the latter, it can be difficult to determine the root of the original discriminatory trope 
that causes inequality (e.g. why does the person charging higher prices to a certain minority group 
 
138 Phillip Atiba Goff, ‘A Measure of Justice: What Policing Racial Bias Research Reveals’, in Beyond 
Discrimination: Racial Inequality in a Post-Racist Era, ed. by Frederick C. Harris and Robert C. Lieberman (New 
York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2013), pp. 157-185 (p. 157). 
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not like this group?). The data component refers to the difficulty in procuring data that 
demonstrates racism, as it often must be mined from sources that may be responsible for said 
racism, and therefore are reluctant to make it available (for example, a police agency wanting to 
hide the fact they are racially profiling could impede access to the demographic information of 
people stopped by police). In comparison, quantitative approaches to bullying have been more 
effective, even if definitional or methodological issues continue to cause inconsistent statistics 
between studies.  
This difference between cyberbullying and racism quantification can be partially explained 
by the ecological problems caused by carrying out surveys for racism. While bullying perpetrators 
may be willing to admit to their bullying in an anonymous survey, perpetrators of racism may not, 
due to their unwillingness to consider themselves as racist.139 Out of a sample of 2,141 Australians 
who had posted about race, culture, or religion online, 38 respondents indicated that the content 
they had posted was considered racist by themselves or by others, with 24 out of the 38 considering 
the content racist themselves.140 This result suggests a noticeable proportion (approximately 37%) 
of cyber-racism posters did not consider themselves as racist, or the material they shared as racist, 
even after being called out. This issue is further complicated in situations where users (especially 
online) promote racist views while not necessarily believing in them – such as engaging in 
controversial humour.141 Attempting to quantify racism by examining perpetrators can therefore 
 
139 This may be due to admitting to a racist incident may be seen as admitting to one have a racist nature, which is a 
significant social faux pas. Comparatively, admitting to participating in a bullying incident(s) might not encourage 
survey respondents to identify themselves as having a bullying ‘nature’. 
140 Jakubowicz and others, p. 81. 
141 For example, cartoonist Ben Garrison has had a number of his cartoons edited to contain explicit racist and 
antisemitic tropes by internet trolls. The Online Hate Prevention institute reported on a Facebook page that 
distributed these images, wherein the page described its purpose as ‘just for fun’. Nonetheless, this would lead to a 
normalisation of antisemitism.  
Andre Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2014) 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/205092520/ 
The-Antisemitic-Meme-of-the-Jew#fullscreen&from_embed> [accessed 12 December 2018] (p. 27). 
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be problematic, though it also provides opportunity to approach the matter of individual belief 
systems differently; researchers may revise their methodological tools to examine factors such as 
intent and awareness of discriminatory discourse. 
There can also be issues in quantifying racism through examining victims. One common 
method for quantifying racism has been the surveying of victims, which led to the development of 
tools that attempt to measure perceptions of racism. One example of these tools is the Perception 
of Racism Scale, developed by M. McNeilly and validated by various studies during the 1990s,142 
and later adapted by Sandra Moody-Ayers et al.143 The relative success of this scale resulted in its 
later evolution online in 2016–2017 by Brian TaeHyuk Keum and Matthew J. Miller as the 
Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS v1.0).144 The PORS was successfully developed to measure 
more blatant examples of online racism, however, and Keum and Miller acknowledge its 
limitations in its ability to measure examples of subtle racism.145  
As suggested by Keum and Miller’s results, subtle racism may be harder to detect in 
quantitative research. For social media, anonymity is often limited, and moderation may be stricter, 
so subtle racism is used to give users plausible deniability (for example, saying they were ‘only 
joking’), to provide signals to others, and to get around platform regulations. Another issue with 
the perception of blatant racism online is Poe’s Law, which states that without an obvious indicator 
of authorial intent, a joke or parody of extreme views may be viewed as serious, especially online, 
 
142 Nancy L. Green, 'Development of the Perceptions of Racism Scale’, Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 27.2 
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due to a lack of direct personal interaction.146 On one level, this creates a legitimate problem of 
false positives for the PORS system, but also opens a larger debate: how should misinterpretations 
of parodies of racism be treated by researchers into cyber-racism? The PORS system would also 
have limited value for spaces in which racism is highly normalised: in such cases, it would be 
difficult to find participants who would not already be originators or promoters, rather than 
victims, of racist discourses (given that PORS measures people’s experiences of racism). PORS 
faces limitations in accurately quantifying levels of racism online alone. However, by 
acknowledging its issues, researchers can investigate other factors relating to cyber-racism online, 
such as participation and withdrawal from spaces, and the locales of more blatant expressions of 
racism online. 
Prior to PORS there were few other attempts to quantify racism online; however, one 
attempt is worth considering here. Most notably, Brendesha Tynes and Eleanor Seaton examined 
perceived levels of racial discrimination among a population of adolescents of colour between 
2010 and 2013.147 While the study was conducted prior to PORS and therefore without a standard 
methodology used in other quantitative studies of online racism, the practice of analysing the same 
population over three years with a standard methodology provides an important element of 
consistency.148 Tynes and Seaton found that direct racial discrimination (in which the participant 
was targeted for their race) was rarer than indirect racial discrimination (in which the participant 
 
146 Scott F. Aikin, ‘Poe’s Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse’, 
Social Semiotics, 23.3 (01 June 2013), 301-317 (p. 301). 
147 Brendesha Tynes, ‘Online racial discrimination: A growing problem for adolescents’, Psychological Science 
Agenda, December 2015. <http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2015/12/ 
online-racial-discrimination.aspx> [accessed 5 December 2019] (para. 4 of 13). 
148 It is worth considering that despite the comparatively broader research on cyberbullying, the lack of standard 
methodologies resulted in highly variable rates of victimisation and perpetration, with longitudinal studies producing 
the most reliable data on cyberbullying rates and trends. 
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was not personally targeted, but witnessed examples of racism).149 However, over the three years, 
the rates of indirect racial discrimination stayed largely stable, while the rates of direct racial 
discrimination increased.150 While this is only a single study, and conducted only over three years, 
it may serve as a warning to keep watch for rising rates of more antagonistic racial discrimination. 
While the adoption of PORS as a standard methodology is an important step for research into 
online racism, Tynes and Seaton’s research notably does attempt to record the subtler examples of 
racism that Keum and Miller acknowledge are limited by PORS.151 Tynes and Seaton’s study also 
provides further indication that the culture of anonymity as well as a growing lack of accountability 
in online spaces is enabling and normalising more direct manifestations of racism.  
 Jakubowicz et al. include a much-needed analysis of methodologies studying cyber-racism 
across multiple disciplines.152 They examine approaches in sociology, political science, 
criminology, cultural studies and anthropology, communication science, psychology, and 
information science, demonstrating the breadth of fields that examine the phenomenon. They also 
suggest that cross-disciplinary incoherence results in ‘complex, but often fragmented 
conceptualisations’ of cyber-racism, leading to ‘difficulties in integrating the research findings 
from those various disciplines’.153 They propose a framework in which individual disciplines can 
still offer conceptualisations unique to their fields, but also allow them to integrate results more 
broadly.154 Compared to cyberbullying, which still struggles with methodological inconsistencies 
despite being limited to a singular field, this is a significant research development that would 
benefit all tangential fields if adopted. As established in this chapter, phenomena like cyber-racism, 
 
149 Ibid., para. 5 of 13. 
150 Ibid., para 6 of 13. 
151 Keum and Miller, p. 312. 
152 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64. 
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cyberbullying, and antisemitism online do not exist in a vacuum, and because of the internet, 
increasingly overlap with each other and broader discriminatory and abusive behaviour.  
While Daniels lamented in 2012 that the study of race and racism online was 
“undertheorized”,155 more studies have appeared since that have assessed racism online in political 
context. These studies link the racial tensions following high-profile white-on-black shootings in 
the United States to the rise of right-wing populism and violence in various Western nations. While 
the new consideration of this political context has brought greater sophistication to research into 
online racism, the frameworks, tools, methodologies, and observations made by this research are 
still new and underutilised. Therefore, when applying this to research on online antisemitism, it is 
important utilise these lessons and tools with a level of caution. Nonetheless, as the examination 
of cyberbullying literature demonstrated, it is especially important to develop common 
methodologies to produce a consistent picture of racism online across the research. Furthermore, 
while antisemitism has distinguishing factors that are different to the racism examined in this 
research, there are enough overlaps to warrant its consideration and application within this thesis. 
 
Group-based Cyberbullying: #Gamergate 
One of the key arguments of this thesis is for research to acknowledge how different forms of 
abuse and discrimination online intersect. To focus exclusively on one form of online abuse and 
discrimination is to limit our understanding of the broader field. One way to carry out research 
with an inter-field approach is to examine a particular online phenomenon or movement with a 
view to how it manifests intersecting and analogous forms of abuse and discrimination. GamerGate 
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has been selected as an example of this kind of approach, as it demonstrates a key intersection of 
cyberbullying and online discrimination. However, it has also been chosen because it is more 
widely associated with misogyny rather than cyber-racism. An examination of this movement thus 
further demonstrates how types of discrimination online relate to one another. This examination 
of GamerGate primarily concerns the intersection of cyberbullying and discrimination in the form 
of misogyny. The broader implications of this intersection are considered later, in chapter four, 
when the movement is compared more directly with antisemitism. 
The GamerGate movement purportedly advocated for “ethics in video game 
journalism”,156 but was functionally a harassment campaign conducted in reaction to feminist 
critiques of sexism in video games and the video game industry. The dishonesty of its claim to be 
calling for journalistic integrity is evident from the clear debunking of many GamerGate press 
criticisms,157 most particularly the founding myth of the movement itself. The movement (and, 
tangentially, the hashtag #GamerGate158) originated in August 2014 with an online harassment 
campaign against independent female game developer Zoe Quinn, after her ex-boyfriend, Eron 
Gjoni, wrote a blog post accusing her of having sex with game reviewers in exchange for positive 
reviews of her game, Depression Quest.159 The blog post was distributed among the Something 
Awful forums and 4chan imageboard,160 resulting in an intense cyberbullying campaign against 
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Quinn. Despite none of these reviews existing, and Gjoni’s accusations proven to be unfounded,161 
the movement grew and manifested as a broad cyberbullying and harassment campaign against 
those seen to be threatening the gaming industry as part of a broader ‘culture war’ between 
progressive intersectional feminists and traditional spaces.162  
Beyond being one of the most prominent discriminatory and abusive movements in the 
history of the internet, the GamerGate movement also warrants study due to its manifestations of 
cyberbullying, which shifted from harassment of specific individual targets on a personal basis, to 
a broader campaign of harassment on the basis of (female) group membership. The inciting act of 
the GamerGate movement, Gjoni’s defamatory blog post against his ex-girlfriend, resembles a 
straightforward example of cyberbullying an individual on a personally motivated basis. Yet, as 
the movement grew, it steadily shifted away from this individually targeted cyberbullying to a 
broader cyberbullying campaign, mobilising against individuals associated with the target group, 
as well as promoting a more general misogyny. The initial cyberbullying campaign perpetrated 
against Quinn, which manifested largely through doxing163 and rape/death threats, spread to other 
analogous targets such as game developer Brianna Wu and feminist critic Anita Sarkeesian.164  
As the online aggression digressed from the personal relationship between Gjoni and 
Quinn, the broadening of harassment targets set the stage for group-based cyberbullying. The 
evolution to group-based cyberbullying manifested in the increase in hate messages against 
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163 The act of sharing personal information (such as phone numbers, personal email addresses and home addressed) 
of another person publicly on the internet. 
164 Anita Sarkeesian had been a target of online misogyny and cyberbullying as early as 2012 (before GamerGate), 
but the volume of abuse against increased once targeted by the GamerGate membership.  
Torill Elvira Mortensen, ‘Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of #GamerGate’, Games and Culture, 13.8 
(2018), 787-806 (p. 793).  
Todd, p. 65. 
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journalists behind a series of articles questioning ‘gamer’ identity and declaring that ‘gamers are 
dead’.165 The ‘death of the gamer’ implied that the traditional ‘gamer’ identity – which was 
inseparable from normative masculine gender and sexuality – had become a misogynistic 
anachronism as videogame culture became more progressive. The ensuing outrage facilitated the 
growth of membership and activity in the GamerGate movement, and in turn drew the attention of 
journalists and researchers critiquing the movement. This resulted in the drawing of perceived 
virtual battle lines in the imagined ‘culture war’ by the movement’s proponents. This invocation 
of a ‘culture war’ shares significant characteristics with antisemitism, as similar ideas are key in 
the conceptualisation of antisemitic conspiracy theories, as explored in chapters three and four. 
Beyond journalists, GamerGate also targeted the video gaming research community with 
accusations of conspiracy, surprising many researchers,166 and, ironically, attracting greater 
scholarly analysis of the movement.167 The ‘us versus them’ framing of the GamerGate movement 
expressed a paranoid conspiracy theory mentality which exaggerating the unity between targets of 
harassment. In order to validate coordinated harassment, the GamerGate movement depicted their 
victims as a coordinated, aggressive unit, rather than a series of individual, loosely connected 
journalists, critics, and researchers with broadly overlapping aims and perspectives. These aims 
ranged from publishing feminist criticism on video games (particularly Anita Sarkeesian), to 
exposing harassment in the video game industry, to pushing for more gender, sexual, racial, and 
bodily diversity in video games and the video game industry, and even to broadening market share 
by game developers. GamerGate therefore positioned a swarm of anonymous online users, all 
 
165 Mortensen, p. 790. 
166 Ibid., p. 788. 
167 Carl Straumsheim, ‘#Gamergate and Games Research’, Inside Higher Ed, 11 November 2014, 
<https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/11/11/gamergate-supporters-attack-digital-games-research-
association> [accessed 5 December 2019] (para. 2 of 29). 
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perceiving a common enemy, against identifiable and recognisable public targets who themselves 
had comparatively few methods to identify their harassers. The phenomenon of GamerGate 
therefore represents an example of proactive, rather than reactive, cyberbullying.  
The transition from individual to group-based cyberbullying represents its intersection with 
discrimination, namely misogyny, in the GamerGate movement. More broadly, this has raised 
questions as to why such an outpouring of misogyny happened over the video game industry. As 
Cherie Todd suggests, male-dominated institutions, like that of the gaming industry, are also 
inherently sexist:  
 
Women experience sexism and misogyny in various cultural arenas, especially in fields 
where the majority of participants are men, such as sports. Yet, in comparison, the level of 
hatred and abuse that is being directed at women like Sarkeesian and Wu from certain 
people in the gaming community is unparalleled.168  
 
Some researchers have argued that the discrimination has long been rooted in the culture 
surrounding video games. Todd points towards the #1reasonwhy phenomenon in 2012, which 
asked women on Twitter why there were so few female game developers. Thousands of women 
tweeted about shared experiences of sexism, exclusion and harassment within the industry. Many 
of these tweets faced cold, unsupportive and misogynistic responses from male gamers.169 Michael 
 
168 Todd, p. 65. 
169 Ibid. 
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Salter draws on Herbert Marcuse’s theory of technological rationality170 to explain how social 
relations and hierarchies participate in the development and implementation of technology. Salter 
argues that the long-held association of masculinity with technology, and video games as an 
extension of ‘technological culture’, resulted in the embedding of misogyny and sexism within the 
video game industry.171 This can be considered alongside Adrienne Massanari’s conception of 
‘toxic technocultures’, toxic cultures enabled and spread by technological social networks such as 
social media or video gaming.172 The association of technology with masculinity thus embeds 
misogyny in video game industry and culture and within cultures surrounding the technological 
marvel of the internet itself. This latter aspect is demonstrated by the meme ‘There are No Girls 
on the Internet’, assuming women do not participate significantly on the internet due to its 
technological nature.173 This may also lead to further forms of discrimination being embedded in 
these communities, such as racism against minorities, as these communities tend to react against 
perceived invasions by groups that the internet previously enabled them to ignore.174  
GamerGate represented a transition from individual/personal-based bullying to group-
based bullying and continued to perpetrate their harassment and discrimination on the basis of a 
perceived threat, rather than reacting to a prior attack. In a sense, GamerGate constructed a fictional 
enemy to stabilise a deeply insecure identity felt to be under attack. Hence, the theory of reactivity 
elaborated in the cyberbullying literature is unable to account for more complex dynamics of 
 
170 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (London: 
Routledge, 1964). 
171 Salter, p. 259. 
172 Massanari, p. 342. 
173 This assumption is also reinforced by online anonymity, which can enable the illusion that only men are 
participating in anonymous/pseudonymous online cultures. 
Know Your Meme, There Are No Girls on the Internet (2018), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/there-are-no-
girls-on-the-internet> [accessed 31 December 2019]. 
174 For example, how online anonymity allowed majority users to ignore issues of race and racism in online spaces, 
giving rise to the idea of the ‘colour-blind’ internet. 
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online aggression that arise from the broader politics of identity. GamerGate represents a 
qualitative change in bullying, discrimination, and misinformation enabled by the technology of 
the internet and social media. A study by Despoina Chatzakou et al. of 1.6 million tweets 
demonstrated that the success of various online harassment campaigns was enabled by GamerGate 
members’ savvy use of Twitter and Reddit.175 This savvy platform use, combined with widespread 
anonymity and the ability to easily organise176 via the #GamerGate hashtag and /r/kotakuinaction 
‘subreddit’, enabled a ‘swarm-like’ behaviour of harassment, often manifesting in a stream of 
messages sent by many different aggressors. This behaviour allowed the movement to cyberbully 
targets en masse, despite the lack of a leader and despite any varying views and motivations by 
movement proponents.177 In addition, the reluctance of website administrators to intervene in their 
anonymous spaces further supported the entrenchment of the GamerGate movement alongside 
other toxic ‘technocultures’.178 The GamerGate movement therefore serves as an example of how 
the internet has caused qualitative changes to bullying, how isolated incidents of cyberbullying 
can become mobilised in much larger campaigns of discrimination against target groups, and how 
misogyny intersects with cyberbullying and other forms of abuse.  
 
Conclusion 
As seen with GamerGate, various forms of cyber abuse and discrimination intersect, and such 
intersections cannot be ignored when applying research to any individual example of online abuse 
 
175 Despoina Chatzakou and others, ‘Measuring #GamerGate: A Tale of Hate, Sexism, and Bullying’, 2017 [pre-
print] <https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.07784> [accessed 5 December 2019], p. 5. 
176 Ibid. 
177 This may include views about the main goals of the movement, who the enemies of the movement were, etc.  
Mortensen, pp. 793-94. 
178 Massanari, pp. 340-342. 
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or discrimination. Furthermore, the ways in which types of abuse and discrimination intersect can 
result in qualitative changes. In the case of GamerGate, the movement’s reactionary misogyny 
resulted in a shift from individual cyberbullying to group-based cyberbullying, a manifestation 
significantly distinct from traditional bullying. This intersection justifies this chapter’s focus on 
the phenomena of cyberbullying and cyber-racism, as they, and the fields that research them, are 
key to contextualising other discriminatory phenomena on the internet, such as antisemitism. 
 Aspects of the internet and social media have fundamentally shifted the distribution, 
consumption and redistribution of content, warranting a significant re-examination of the impacts 
of communication on online phenomena. These shifts highlight the need to further examine 
discrimination through communicative interactions, rather than through the traditional approach 
of surveying viewpoints and beliefs. The inability of majority groups to recognise issues of 
structural inequality can be further exacerbated online, as features like online anonymity enable 
further ignorance towards issues of race and racism, even to the point of defending racists over 
their victims. This opposition to engaging in ‘race trouble’ is one of the key factors to consider in 
future research on online discrimination. The potential manipulation of these bystanders by racists 
reflects the relative ease for discriminatory actors, even individuals, to propagate savvy 
propaganda. 
 The changes to distribution, consumption, and redistribution of content online reflect 
fundamental temporal and spatial changes to abuse online, particularly cyberbullying. The internet 
has created new spatial relations that mean victims can no longer easily escape cyberbullying and 
feel the immediacy of communication. This represents a potential ‘weaponisation’ of abuse online, 
supporting savvy propaganda efforts of online racists who hide behind anonymity. This can give 
rise to a new form of structural inequality online, as minorities can be abused and forced offline 
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while perpetrators face no significant costs or dangers, and other members of majority groups can 
remain unaware of this public online abuse faced by minorities. This emphasises the demand for 
broader research and efforts to counter abuse and discrimination online, but also highlights the 
need to consider structural inequality in online abuse and discrimination. This applies even in well-
researched fields like cyberbullying, which already suffers from a narrow focus on children, and 
struggles to identify the link between structural inequality and online abuse. This new structural 
inequality and weaponisation of abuse potentially represents a common set of qualitative and 
quantitative changes to all forms of discrimination online. It is in-depth examinations of specific 
forms of online discrimination, like antisemitism in this thesis, that can evaluate what quantitative 
and qualitative changes are unique, so long that such examinations properly consider any 
intersections with broader discrimination and abuse. 
The size of cyberbullying research reflects a heightened public awareness of the threat of 
online abuse and the need to re-evaluate strategies to it. Efforts to re-evaluate these strategies have 
been aided by the complementing efforts of traditional and social medias: raising awareness and 
running campaigns to educate and encourage legislative action and research. However, the 
heightened public awareness of cyberbullying further highlights the comparative lack of awareness 
of cyber-discrimination and its dangers. Ultimately, both research and public awareness need to 
be broadened to consider all forms of abuse and discrimination online, including structural 
discrimination, in order to properly counter these phenomena. 
 Anonymity, dissociation, and disinhibition are key factors to consider in research on online 
abuse and discrimination. Views on the relation of anonymity to discrimination online have ranged 
from predicting a utopian ‘colour-blind’ society, to hypothesising increasing expressions of racist 
viewpoints. Ultimately the relationship between these factors and discrimination online is more 
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complex and cannot be distanced from contemporary events, particularly the election and 
prominent social media use of Donald Trump. While these factors are key in any qualitative and 
quantitative changes to discrimination online, they themselves may result in the creation and 
influence of cultures and realities that no longer rely on anonymity to normalise and spread 
discrimination. Further consideration must be applied to ‘anonymity gaps’ (i.e. where victims are 
visible online and perpetrators are anonymous) as this phenomenon can contribute to changes in 
abusive behaviours online, such as the shift in cyberbullying behaviours demonstrated by the 
GamerGate movement. This shift further emphasises the need to consider how broader forms of 
online abuse and discrimination intersect, even when focusing on a singular phenomenon, such as 
antisemitism.  
Ultimately, research into online antisemitism needs to consider its intersections with other 
forms of abuse and discrimination, while avoiding the issues already present in research on these 
intersecting phenomena. Most important is the development of standard research methodologies 
that can capture broader trends of antisemitism online, and potentially other forms of 
discrimination and abuse. However, in doing so, issues relating to defining phenomena must also 
be considered in order to effectively develop these methodologies while also evaluating qualitative 
and quantitative changes. In order to apply the lessons learned from this chapter to online 
antisemitism, a review of the literature on antisemitism itself is also required to ensure this thesis 
is well placed to carry out a comprehensive analysis of antisemitism online and its intersections 
with other forms of abuse and discrimination online. 
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Chapter 3 
Antisemitism Scholarship Literature Review: Reacting to Reactionaryism  
  
A careful consideration of the history and current state of research on antisemitism is essential to 
understanding the nature and scope of antisemitism online. As seen in chapter two with 
sociological research on racism against African Americans, researchers lacking familiarity with 
the forms of discrimination they research can cause systemic problems within their fields. The 
following review covers both the seminal and most recent academic work on the history of 
antisemitism, from its ancient manifestations up to the twenty-first century. Through examining 
the historiography of antisemitism, this review demonstrates the changing natures of both 
antisemitism and the scholarship on antisemitism. This review demonstrates a reactive relationship 
between antisemitism and scholarship following the Holocaust, especially in the manifestation of 
Holocaust denial. This reactive relationship is key to this thesis’ examination of online 
antisemitism, as it highlights both the increasingly adaptive nature of antisemitism and the ongoing 
need for scholarship to adapt. An overview of research on broader antisemitism after World War 
II is provided, ranging from religious to state manifestations, so as to contrast the later 
manifestation of Holocaust denial and trace the adaptive nature of antisemitism. Finally, the review 
concludes with an overview of the research on ‘new’ antisemitism, particularly regarding the 
debate on whether ‘new’ antisemitism is qualitatively distinct from past antisemitism, thereby 
enabling this thesis to appropriately consider whether antisemitism has undergone qualitative 
changes due to the internet. 
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The reactive relationship between antisemitism and research thereof is contextualised by a 
focus on the post-World War II historiography of antisemitism. This review begins by covering 
post-war scholarship on state-based antisemitism, which predominately focuses on German state 
antisemitism. State antisemitism here refers to manifestations of antisemitism that are promoted 
or caused by the ‘state’ – the governments of various nations – and/or are linked to the broader 
nationalisms of these nations. The broader historiography of antisemitism following World War II 
then highlights common causes and manifestations of antisemitism between nations, pointing 
towards antisemitism’s ‘globalisation’, which is later exacerbated by the globalising forces of the 
internet. Early and contemporary efforts to globalise antisemitism are further considered in the 
following section on religious antisemitism, covering both pre-World War II Christian 
antisemitism and recent manifestations of Islamic antisemitism. Following these analyses, the 
review covers the literature on several specific manifestations of antisemitism that have risen since 
the conclusion of World War II, namely Holocaust denial and ‘new’ antisemitism. This review 
thus provides both a broad overview of the research into antisemitism itself, along with 
investigating specific qualitative changes in antisemitism that are relevant to any qualitative 
changes to antisemitism on the internet. 
The section on religious antisemitism investigates how manifestations of Christian 
antisemitism and Islamic antisemitism interplay, providing insight into how older manifestations 
influence contemporary manifestations linked to the state of Israel. For this purpose, the term 
Islamic antisemitism is used to refer to both that which is promoted by Muslim nations, and 
traditional religious, Islam-inspired antisemitism.1 In addition, this section explores the concept of 
 
1 Esther Webman writes that the antisemitism expressed by Arabs and Arab states has a significant “Islamic 
character”, but notes that antisemitism is not static and “metamorphoses in accordance with issues and 
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‘anti-Judaism’, distinguished from antisemitism by specific opposition to ‘Jewishness’. The 
religious antisemitism section therefore covers Christian antisemitism, Islamic antisemitism, and 
anti-Judaism in order to compare qualitative distinctions between these and other manifestations 
of antisemitism. In addition, this section highlights the adaptability, globalisation, and interplay of 
antisemitic manifestations, all of which are enhanced by the internet. 
Distinct from other manifestations of antisemitism, this review highlights the role of 
Holocaust denial in the shifting landscape of post-war antisemitism, and the ensuing scholarly 
response to it. The section on Holocaust denial is a core focus of this review, as Holocaust denial 
exhibits a significantly qualitatively distinct form of antisemitism. Holocaust denial also represents 
the most recent pre-internet example of antisemitism’s adaptability, demonstrating the reciprocal 
need for antisemitism research to adapt. When considering the changes to academic discourse on 
antisemitism post-World War II, Holocaust denial demonstrates how antisemitism responded to 
these new discourses through adopting a veneer of academic discourse itself. This pseudo-
academic discourse was weaponised to counter the moral discrediting of antisemitism after the 
Holocaust, charging academics, such as Deborah Lipstadt, to defend antisemitism research itself. 
Holocaust denial emphasises the need for antisemitism research to adapt to changes in the field, as 
it represents antisemitism’s reactive relationship with both academia and other efforts to combat 
antisemitism. If academia does not adapt as antisemitism has, then efforts to combat antisemitism 
will be outpaced. This adaptability is also relevant when determining how antisemitism has 
changed on the internet, as the height of the Holocaust denial movement coincided with the rise of 
the internet, with Holocaust deniers quickly adapting to the new technology. While Holocaust 
 
circumstances”. For this reason, this review is including Arab, majority Muslim State, and Islamic religious 
antisemitism under a single banner, as the religious character interweaves each manifestation.  
Esther Webman, ‘The Challenge of Assessing Arab/Islamic Antisemitism’, Middle Eastern Studies, 46.5 (2010), 
677-697 (p. 680). 
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denial on the internet is covered in greater depth in chapters four and five, the section in this review 
focuses on the evolution of Holocaust denial as a pseudo-academic movement, the major texts 
published by Holocaust deniers, the works on Holocaust denial published by historians, and the 
interplay between historians and deniers. 
While Holocaust denial represents a qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism, 
the qualitative changes to antisemitism caused by the internet cannot be fully contextualised solely 
through analysis of holocaust denial. For this reason, this review dedicates a section to the 
scholarship and debates surrounding ‘new’ antisemitism.2 The development of the post-World War 
II historiography of antisemitism coincided with the appearance of forms of antisemitism 
specifically focusing on the state of Israel, which some academics theorised as a ‘new’ 
antisemitism. Proponents of the theory of ‘new’ antisemitism argue that it represents a significantly 
qualitatively distinct manifestation of antisemitism compared to pre-Holocaust forms, which were 
typically more concerned with Jewish assimilation into nation-states. This debate provides context 
with which to determine whether online manifestations of antisemitism are distinct from offline 
forms, or whether the internet has caused qualitative changes to antisemitism more broadly. 
This review demonstrates that while the size of the body of literature on antisemitism is 
extensive, further study is still warranted, for if antisemitism can adapt to this scholarship and 
grow, scholarship too must grow to counter antisemitism’s adaptability. While antisemitism is a 
phenomenon stretching back millennia, research on antisemitism has significantly increased since 
the events of World War II and the Holocaust. This was supported by the broader study of minority 
groups and racism that grew out of the history of the twentieth century, as discrimination issues 
 
2 References to the defined ‘new’ antisemitism will be distinguished by ‘new’ within inverted commas, as opposed 
to broader new manifestations of antisemitism, which shall not feature inverted commas. 
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became prominent political matters. World War II and the Holocaust were key events in this 
history, which shook the foundations of ‘Western’ liberalism and resulted in the establishment of 
a new international moral order. This moral order, represented by the Allies’ adoption of the Four 
Freedoms,3 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the study of human rights, was rooted 
in the discovery of Nazi Germany’s atrocities. But while scholarship reacts to this history, so does 
discrimination, especially significantly adaptable forms of discrimination like antisemitism. This 
is particularly demonstrated by the interactions between Holocaust deniers and Holocaust 
historians, especially the evolution of methods used by deniers to try and outmanoeuvre 
mainstream historians. Furthermore, as antisemitism has manifested in a broad variety of ways 
throughout history, research also needs to consider the interlinking causes and relationships 
between different manifestations, so to understand how antisemitism adapts and to develop 
effective efforts to combat antisemitism. Since the internet serves as a vehicle for the interplay 
between different manifestations of antisemitism, and is even responsible for newer 
manifestations, this review justifies further study of online antisemitism and provides the necessary 
scholarly background for such study. 
 
Historiography of Antisemitism following World War II 
Origins of the Field 
While the history of antisemitism goes back as far as the Hellenistic era,4 during which a distinct 
Jewish Diaspora emerged outside of ancient Israel, historiography of antisemitism as it is known 
 
3 The ‘Four Freedoms’ included Freedom of speech, Freedom of worship, Freedom from want and Freedom from 
fear, and were articulated by US President Franklin in an address on 6 January 1941. 
4 Robert Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Schocken books, 1991), p. xvii. 
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today5 grew out of the events of World War II and Nazi Germany, particularly the Holocaust. This 
is the first reason to base a review of the historiography of antisemitism in the period after World 
War II. The second reason is because the period of history following the Holocaust saw the rise of 
brand-new manifestations of antisemitism, such as Holocaust denial and arguably ‘new’ 
antisemitism, parallel to the evolution of antisemitism scholarship. As scholars began to examine 
and compare different manifestations of antisemitism, both historical and contemporary, the 
scholarly understanding of antisemitism became more sophisticated. The study of antisemitism 
categorised different manifestations, such as state antisemitism and religious antisemitism (both 
Christian and Islamic), and then in turn some scholars defined a category of ‘new’ antisemitism. 
scholarship should focus on exploring the different manifestations of antisemitism, how they 
compare and interplay, and how antisemitism continuously undergoes qualitative changes. This 
broader exploration will further the sophistication of the field and facilitate the development of 
strategies to effectively combat continuously new and adapting manifestations of antisemitism. 
Gavin Langmuir provides a justification for focusing on the historiography of antisemitism 
after World War II in his work on defining antisemitism,6 explaining why the field was only 
organised post-War. Through two chapters, Langmuir explains the lack of worthy material on the 
history of Jews in Europe from non-Jewish authors preceding World War II: “the root of the 
distortion of the history of the Jews at the hand of the majority goes back to the Christian 
appropriation and reinterpretation of Hebrew scripture in the first century”.7 Langmuir takes the 
reader through the path of hypothetical students interested in the postbiblical history of the Jewish 
People. He notes examples such as David Hume’s 18th century History of England, which criticised 
 
5 That is research and writing on antisemitism outside of exclusively Jewish scholarship. 
6 Gavin I. Langmuir, Towards a Definition of Antisemitism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 
311-352. 
7 Ibid., p. 25. 
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the majority’s treatment of the Jews, but comments on how these did not mark a change in Jewish 
historiography.8 Langmuir also comments on the difficulty of finding references to the Jews in 
historiography, compounding this problem further when attempting to understand the trends in 
Jewish historiography prior to World War II. He gives an example as recent as 1950, where 
Heinrich von Srbik, one of Austria’s most influential 20th century historians, demonstrates no 
awareness of the historiography of Jews and Germanic history outside racist ideologies.9 Langmuir 
demonstrates the lack of a general academic canon on antisemitism before World War II. It can be 
stated that the impact of the Holocaust, an event that occurred in the cultural centre of Europe and 
threatened the destruction of European Jewish society,10 emphasised a need to re-examine the 
assumptions of Western scholarship on assimilation, minorities and discrimination. This re-
examination was required for broader society, provoking a desire for intellectual introspection on 
these issues so to prevent the rise of similar circumstances surrounding World War II and the 
Holocaust. This re-examination was a key reason why scholarship on antisemitism (and other 
human rights issues) grew after World War II, and why this review starts its analysis at this point. 
Most pre-World War II writings on antisemitism came predominately from Jewish authors 
facing contemporary issues. The Wissenschaft des Judentums was an intellectual movement 
headed by German Jews in the nineteenth century, which sought to introduce critical examination 
to Jewish literature to put it on par with Western scholarship.11 Amon Elon identifies the context 
of this movement within antisemitic riots in Germany in 1819, thereby painting it as an intellectual 
examination of, and response to, antisemitism.12 However much of this intellectual work could be 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 24. 
10 This refers to both assimilated communities, as well as the established shtetl culture. 
11 Nahum Glatzer, ‘The beginnings of modern Jewish studies’, in Studies in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Intellectual 
History, ed. by Alexander Altmann (Cambridge MA: Havard University Press, 1964), 27-45 (pp. 33-34, 41-42). 
12 Amos Elon, The Pity of It All, (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 110. 
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described as ‘thinking for the sake of thinking’, which contrasts with the writings of Jewish 
communities trying to survive.13 Michael Marrus wrote in 1971 about how the Jewish community 
in France reacted to the Dreyfus affair, which was divided over the effectiveness of Jewish 
assimilation to counter to French antisemitism.14 Bundism was a Jewish socialist movement that 
evolved partially due to the antisemitic pogroms of Tsarist Russia, and its members wrote about 
the Kishinev pogrom in the light of the contemporary intellectualism of early twentieth century 
Europe.15 When considered alongside Langmuir’s analysis, these examples demonstrate how the 
study of antisemitism evolved following World War II from being predominately bound to Jewish 
intellectuals or communities trying to survive, into an interdisciplinary field of study within global 
academia. The goals of the Wissenschaft movement were potentially fulfilled, as in 1966 Hebrew 
scholar Arnold Band identified the “spread of Jewish studies as an accepted academic discipline 
in the American liberal arts colleges and universities since the Second World War”.16 This shift 
into global academia represents the impact the Holocaust and World War II had on Western 
scholarship, especially the perceived need to adapt scholarship to inform how the West could avoid 
similar atrocities in the future. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to base this literature review on antisemitism scholarship on the 
period following World War II and the Holocaust. The shift of the field into global academia at 
this time accounts for the intense focus following World War II on the history of German 
 
13 Examples of this can be seen in the descriptions of activities of the Jewish Bund. 
Grigorii Aronson, Revoliutsionnaia iunost’: vospominaniia, 1903–1917 (New York: InterUniversity Project on the 
History of the Menshevik Movement 1961). 
14 Michael R. Marrus, The politics of assimilation: a study of the French Jewish community at the time of the 
Dreyfus Affair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
15 Monty Noam Penkower, ‘The Kishinev Pogrom of 1903: A Turning Point in Jewish History’, in Modern Judaism, 
24.3 (October 2004), 187-225 p. 215. 
16 Arnold Band, ‘Jewish Studies in American Liberal-Arts Colleges and Universities’, The American Jewish Year 
Book, 67 (1966), 1-30 (p.30). 
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antisemitism, starting with Léon Poliakov’s 1951 text, Bréviaire de la haine: Le IIIe Reich et les 
Juifs,17 translated to Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of Jews in Europe in 
1954.18 The focus on German antisemitism was so intense that as early as 1972 historian Geoffrey 
Barraclough expressed in The New York Review of Books: “[regarding the vast] output on writing 
on recent German history… we have gotten about as far as we are likely to reach along the road 
most historians have trodden since 1945, and that the time has come for new directions and new 
goals.”19 Nonetheless, historians continue to write and publish material on German antisemitism, 
which is unsurprising as Nazi Germany utilised a broad range of antisemitic tropes and ideas, 
demonstrating the interplay between manifestations of antisemitism. Ismar Schorsch identified in 
1974 that early twentieth century Germany provided a nexus between the traditional European 
Christian expression of antisemitism, and the racist and state manifestations of antisemitism in the 
Holocaust.20 While this context also connected many more manifestations of antisemitism than 
just religious and state, Schorsch’s identification of this nexus was an important step towards 
illuminating the broad picture of antisemitism.  
Two of the most renowned scholars of antisemitism in the period following the war, Léon 
Poliakov and Raul Hilberg, focused on a far broader area than merely Germany. Léon Poliakov 
was the first historian to write a comprehensive history of the Holocaust (as mentioned above),21 
and then followed up with a multi-volume history of post-biblical antisemitism.22 Poliakov broke 
 
17 Léon Poliakov, Bréviaire de la haine: Le IIIe Reich et les Juifs (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1951). 
18 Léon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1954). 
19 Geoffrey Barraclough, ‘Mandarin’s and Nazis: Part 1’, New York Review, 19 October 1972. 
<https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1972/10/19/mandarins-and-nazis-part-i> [accessed 6 December 2019] (para. 1 
of 4). 
20 Ismar Schorsch, ‘German Antisemitism in the Light of Post-War Historiography’, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook, 
19.1 (1974), 257-271 (pp. 257-258). 
21 Poliakov, Bréviaire de la haine. 
22 Léon Poliakov, History of Anti-semitism, 4 vols (Paris: 1955-1977).  
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new ground in the historiography of antisemitism, firstly by arguing that the genocide of 5-6 
million Jews was logistically possible, in contrast to lower contemporary estimates (such as Gerald 
Reitlinger’s figure of 4.2-4.5 million Jews23), and secondly by critically analysing Pope Pius XII’s 
attitude and connections to the Holocaust.24 By doing so, Poliakov set the stage for critically 
examining the relationship between historical Christian and Nazi-era antisemitism. In a broader 
sense, Poliakov’s efforts also demonstrated how antisemitism scholarship after the Holocaust 
began to focus on the interplay and comparisons between different manifestations of antisemitism, 
an evolution that would eventually produce studies on the varied manifestations of antisemitism 
in other nations around the world. 
Raul Hilberg’s magnum opus on the Holocaust, The Destruction of the European Jews,25 
was released a decade after Poliakov’s history, and eight years after Gerald Reitlinger’s The Final 
Solution (a more comprehensive and objective analysis of the Holocaust than Poliakov’s26). The 
Destruction of the European Jews partially set a trend for dealing with the historical lead up to and 
causes of the Final Solution in two chapters called “precedents” and “antecedents”.27 However, 
Hilberg chose to ignore the changes in antisemitism in interwar Germany and the Weimar 
Republic, focusing primarily on antecedents to Jewish destruction that occurred during the early 
reign of Nazism. Nonetheless, he does acknowledge the role Christian and European state-based 
antisemitism played in the Final Solution, arguing that “The German Nazis, then, did not discard 
 
23 Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (New York: 
Beechhurst press, 1953), p. 189. 
24 Léon Poliakov, ‘The Vatican and the ‘Jewish-Question’ – The Record of the Hitler Period – And After’, 
Commentary, 1 November 1950. <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-vatican-and-the-jewish-
questionthe-record-of-the-hitler-period-and-after> [accessed 20 January 2020]. 
25 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).  
26 David Luck, ‘Use and Abuse of Holocaust Documents: Reitlinger and ‘How Many?’’, Jewish Social Studies, 1.2 
(1979), 95-122 (p. 95). 
27 Hilberg, pp. 3-50. 
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the past; they built upon it. They did not begin a development; they completed it.”28 While this 
stance helps recognise the important link between Christian and modern antisemitism, Schorsch 
expresses concerns over its simplicity, arguing that the history of religious and modern state-based 
antisemitism should not be reduced to a dualistic evolution. Schorsch argues that Christian 
prejudice was not the root cause of Nazi antisemitism, but “one component of a complex matrix.”29 
This demonstrates how the study of antisemitism changed in reaction to the adaption of 
antisemitism. The energy once dedicated by antisemites to Christian manifestations of 
antisemitism was redirected into state antisemitism, and again into post-Holocaust manifestations 
of antisemitism, intermixing historical antisemitic tropes and ideas with contemporary causes for 
discrimination. In response, the picture of antisemitism presented by scholarship grew more 
complex over time, leading to divides in scholarship over how earlier manifestations of 
antisemitism affected later manifestations. 
These dual evolutions demonstrate that the qualitative changes to antisemitism over the 
early twentieth century are linked with changes in antisemitism scholarship. There was limited 
mainstream scholarship on antisemitism prior to the Second World War, with most of it primarily 
dedicated to understanding the “biblical distortion” of the Jews and the contemporary relationship 
between Jewish and majority populations,30 without examining the broader causes of antisemitism. 
The long-term impact of the Holocaust on modern antisemitism scholarship is represented by the 
increasingly nuanced exploration of Christianity’s role in modern antisemitism alongside other 
causes.31 Furthermore, the commitment to the idea of ‘never again’, preventing any replication of 
the causes behind the Holocaust today, motivated scholarship on antisemitism to focus on the 
 
28 Ibid., p.4. 
29 Schorsch, pp. 258-259. 
30 Langmuir, p. 25. 
31 As opposed to Christian antisemitism being simply designated as the key forerunner to Nazi antisemitism. 
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broader precedents and antecedents behind the Holocaust. While it may seem obvious that changes 
in antisemitism impact the study of antisemitism, it is important to critically examine these changes 
to inform the future direction of the field. Over-simplifications, such as a binary evolution between 
Christian and Nazi antisemitism, can result in a narrow picture of antisemitism’s adaptability, 
thereby impairing the ability to understand the full picture of antisemitism. Scholarship has 
avoided this by reacting to the remanifesting of antisemitism over the twentieth century, producing 
a more nuanced and complex picture of antisemitism that has informed efforts to combat the 
hatred. When applied to the subject of this thesis, this review therefore argues for the need for 
scholarship to adapt to online antisemitism, as the field did in response to antisemitism in the early 
twentieth century, but to also be aware of the issues present in the origins and history of the field. 
 
German Antisemitism, the Holocaust and Beyond 
Over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, numerous dedicated studies were published on 
antisemitism’s significance in Germany immediately prior to Nazism. One of the most famous 
studies from this period is Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners, published in 1996.32 
Goldhagen argued that German antisemitism was unique, derived from centuries of antisemitism 
within German history, inspiring an ‘eliminationist’ attitude towards the Jews among ordinary 
Germans. Goldhagen received significant public attention for his thesis, but also attracted 
widespread academic criticism. Goldhagen partially wrote Hitler’s Willing Executioners as a 
response to British historian Christopher Browning’s 1992 book, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police 
 
32 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996). 
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Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland,33 leading to a debate between the two historians.34 
Browning’s central thesis opposes Goldhagen’s one-dimensional belief in a distinct German 
‘eliminationist’ antisemitism by exploring the structure of autocratic Nazi society and the various 
pressures and motivations outside of antisemitism that motivated “ordinary men” such as those in 
Reserve Police Battalion 101.35 While Goldhagen received a mostly negative scholarly reaction, 
his book was recognised for helping spark a debate that heightened public and scholarly attention 
towards the nature of German antisemitism,36 thereby laying the groundwork for comparative 
analyses between antisemitism in Germany and other European countries. 
Dirk Moses comprehensively analysed the broad academic criticism of the Browning-
Goldhagen debate in his 1998 paper “Structure and Agency in the Holocaust”.37 Moses contributes 
to the criticism of Goldhagen, particularly for his “zeal” and for conflating too many significant 
groups involved in the Holocaust as “ordinary Germans”.38 However, Moses also criticised 
Goldhagen’s critics, as he claims their reaction against Goldhagen limited the discussion to a 
binary debate between the role of agency or structure in the Holocaust:  
 
 
33 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1992). 
34 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Christopher R. Browning and Leon Wieseltier, The “Willing Executioners”/ “Ordinary 
Men” Debate (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001). 
35 Ibid., p. 23. 
36 ‘Goldhagen Wins Prestigious German Award’, Harvard Crimson, 9 January 1997. 
<https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1997/1/8/goldhagen-wins-prestigious-german-award-passistant> [accessed 6 
December 2019] (para. 6 of 9). 
37 Dirk Moses, ‘Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics’, in History and 
Theory, 37.2 (May 1998), 194-219. 
38 Ibid., p. 219. 
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The paradoxes and processes at work in the Holocaust cannot be captured by a one-sided 
reliance on structure or agency, circumstances or ideology. Such are its enormity and 
multidimensionality that no aspect of it can be singled out at the expense of others.39 
 
Moses’ criticism alludes to the complexity of antisemitism; antisemitism’s long history means that 
any analysis needs to consider structure, agency, circumstances, ideology, and further aspects in 
conjunction with one another. This is important when considering antisemitism’s rise on the 
internet and social media, as such a shift can affect a multitude of these aspects, thereby requiring 
a full consideration of online antisemitism’s “multidimensionality”. From Moses’ criticism, it is 
important to use broad – not purely binary – frameworks in the study of antisemitism online, that 
interweave this multidimensionality of structure, agency, circumstances and ideology. The internet 
represents new structures and modes of agency for those engaging in antisemitism, while 
technological aspects of the internet can also obfuscate antisemites’ circumstances or ideology 
(e.g. with online anonymity). Such obfuscation can aid antisemitic efforts to collaborate with and 
recruit others, even with those of contrasting circumstances and ideologies (as seen with 
GamerGate). Even though Goldhagen’s thesis is rejected by most scholars, critically examining 
the debate demonstrates the need to be cautious about potentially over-simplifying the nature of 
antisemitism in academic discourse.  
Timothy Snyder’s 2015 book Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning,40 
received significant attention for a “radically new explanation” of the Holocaust,41 representing an 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015). 
41 Jennifer Schuessler, ‘Timothy Snyder’s ‘Black Earth’ Puts Holocaust, and Himself, in Spotlight’, The New York 
Times, 7 September 2015, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/books/timothy-snyders-black-earth-puts-
holocaust-and-himself-in-spotlight.html> [accessed 20 February 2019]. 
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evolution of ‘binary’ debates about the Holocaust, such as intentionalism versus functionalism. It 
does not aim to conclusively explain the role of German-specific antisemitism leading to the 
Holocaust, but rather it attempts to challenge the idea that the Holocaust was ever a ‘modern’ 
genocide, or that it served as the personification of the modern state. In contrast to these existing 
views, Snyder illustrates a correlation between the dismantling of pre-war state apparatuses and 
the number of Jews killed in Nazi satellite states. He compares Denmark, which had little of its 
state dismantled and a relatively low number of its Jewish population killed, and the Baltic states, 
which already had their state institutions destroyed by Stalin prior to Nazi occupation. Snyder 
argues that it was this “statelessness” that allowed the German occupiers to encourage antisemitism 
among the population, often over reasons as simple as greed.42 Richard S. Levy states that Snyder 
successfully challenges a “fragile” consensus of Holocaust history by devaluing the importance of 
state planning and bureaucracy in favour of more simple ecological concerns over food, land, and 
water.43 Snyder’s theory evolves past the binary intentionalist versus functionalist debate, 
indirectly challenging the functionalist assumption that the Holocaust primarily evolved from the 
lower ranks of Nazi state bureaucracy, while not making a case for intentionalism. Rather than 
pinning the Holocaust primarily on German-specific antisemitism, Snyder posits that the 
manipulation of populations in “stateless zones” was relied upon to efficiently destroy local Jewish 
populations.44 This is a historical example of German antisemitism motivating the creation of 
temporary ‘new’ manifestations of antisemitism to carry out the Holocaust;45 Snyder’s research 
 
42 This even occurred in places with previously insignificant levels of antisemitism, such as in Salonika, Greece. 
Snyder, pp. 244-245. 
43 Richard S. Levy, review of Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning, by Timothy Snyder, Choice, 
53.6 (Feb 2016), 917. 
44 Snyder, pp. 220-222. 
45 In some cases, institutions that served tolerance and acceptance of Jews were transformed into temporary means 
to facilitate the Holocaust, as seen by legal Jewish councils in 1930s Poland morphing under German pressure into 
the Judenräte.  
Ibid., p. 243. 
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shows that without these new manifestations, the Holocaust would have been far less effective. 
This is not to say that local populations did not have their own histories of antisemitism, but the 
nature of the antisemitism that rose from the exploitation of stateless populations was distinct from 
its historical iterations. Snyder thus demonstrates how research should consider the broader 
conditions and populations through which antisemitism grows and adapts, rather than solely on a 
single central force and ideology. In this vein, online antisemitism is just as much a product of the 
conditions of online spaces as the beliefs and motivations of antisemites. 
The extensive body of literature on Nazi antisemitism has provided useful 
conceptualisations of antisemitism for the discussions in this thesis, particularly the concepts of 
‘redemptive’ antisemitism and ‘chimeric’ antisemitism. Friedländer discussed the concept of 
redemptive antisemitism in his 1997 book, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 
1933-1939.46 In particular he defines redemptive antisemitism as when “the struggle against the 
Jews is the dominant aspect of a worldview in which other racist themes are but secondary 
appendages”.47 The term redemptive refers to the view that through antisemitism the world will be 
‘redeemed’, by identifying all that is wrong in the world, and folding it into a single antisemitic 
worldview. Examples of this include the palingenetic ultranationalism – the ideas of national 
rebirth – inherent in fascism.48 The concept of chimeric antisemitism can provide a path to this 
redemptive antisemitism. Langmuir specifically chooses the word chimeric to describe a 
manifestation of antisemitism not based on any “kernel of truth”, but rather completely fantastical 
conceptualisations of Jews without any basis in reality.49 Examples of this include the blood libel 
 
46 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).  
47 Ibid., p. 87. 
48 Roger Griffin, ‘Staging the Nation's Rebirth: The Politics and Aesthetics of Performance in the Context of Fascist 
Studies’, in Fascism and Theatre: The Politics and Aesthetics of Performance in the Era of Fascism, ed. by Günter 
Berghaus (Oxford, 1994), pp. 11-29 (p. 11).  
49 Langmiur, p. 306. 
 107 
 
of Jews ritualistically killing Christian children, and The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. 
The historical entrenchment of baseless antisemitic ideas proves that antisemitic ideas can be and 
are fabricated in order to support broader antisemitic worldviews. It can be expected that both 
chimeric and redemptive antisemitism benefit from new methods of information manipulations 
and propaganda online. This thesis also examines how redemptive antisemitism co-opts other 
forms of discrimination online such as misogyny, as seen in the comparison between GamerGate 
and antisemitism in chapter four. 
The central focus of the Holocaust and German antisemitism has caused issues in the 
scholarship on antisemitism, such as binary debates, which become even more apparent in the later 
section on ‘new’ antisemitism. Future research should take a cautious approach toward new 
manifestations of antisemitism, noting the difficulties in establishing an academic consensus on 
the nature of German antisemitism and the Holocaust, and the broader complexity of antisemitism. 
Just as it is not enough to study German antisemitism alone to account for the Holocaust, simply 
examining antisemitism online in isolation is insufficient to determine the extent of the quantitative 
and qualitative changes to antisemitism caused by the internet. It must be considered alongside 
other forms of discrimination and abuse online, such as cyberbullying and cyber-racism, and other 
manifestations of antisemitism, just as Holocaust scholars did by comparing German antisemitism 
with antisemitism in other nations. 
 
Broadening of Antisemitism Scholarship 
While the Holocaust and German antisemitism were central in the evolution of antisemitism 
scholarship over the latter part of the twentieth century, there were also significant efforts to 
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broaden the focus of research on antisemitism. Saul Friedländer noted in his 1984 paper, From 
Anti-Semitism to Extermination, that an understanding of German antisemitism required analysis 
of the growing studies on French antisemitism, indicating a turning point against the 
disproportionate focus on German antisemitism.50 While Friedländer did not directly inspire this 
change, and Germany did not stop being the most focused subject of studies on modern 
antisemitism, the ensuing decades marked a growth in studies of antisemitism in nations besides 
Germany. One text worth mentioning from this period is Leonard Dinnerstein’s Antisemitism in 
America, published in 1994.51 The reason why this text is of note is because, as Dinnerstein points 
out in the preface, it is the “first comprehensive scholarly survey of antisemitism in the United 
States”.52 Dinnerstein’s analysis of the contemporary body of literature demonstrated the 
disproportionate focus of American scholars studying antisemitism outside of America. While this 
does not mean that antisemitism within America was not being studied, it took nearly fifty years 
after the Holocaust to produce a comprehensive scholarly study on antisemitism in the United 
States, despite it being the birthplace of the Anti-Defamation League and the location of the Leo 
Frank trial. Antisemitism is ultimately a global phenomenon that cannot be understood without 
continuously globalising the research of it as well. 
 The emergence of histories on antisemitism in various nations serves as a globalisation of 
the study of antisemitism, demonstrating both an expanding scope and body of literature, as well 
as a shift towards more practically useful histories of antisemitism. Regarding this latter point, 
histories focusing on antisemitism within a certain societal context, whether state-based or 
religious, can provide insight into antecedents of present antisemitism, facilitating anticipation of 
 
50 Saul Friedlander, From Anti-Semitism to Extermination: A Historiographical Study of Nazi Policies Towards the 
Jews and an Essay in Interpretation (Yad Vashem, 1984), p. 5. 
51 Leonard Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
52 Ibid., p. i. 
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future antisemitism’s growth. This utility is not as immediately present in literature on the 
Holocaust, as the specific circumstances and contexts around the Holocaust (the rise of explicitly 
anti-democratic fascism, global-scale warfare, pre-war German society) are not especially relevant 
in many modern contexts today. Comparatively, a broad study of antisemitism throughout a 
nation’s history allows researchers to identify which of the many causes of antisemitism are 
present in the current national context, consequently informing methods to combat antisemitism 
in the present.  
A parallel globalisation of antisemitism itself in the late twentieth century has led to 
complex shifting of the causes of antisemitism. An example of this complexity is the prominence 
of Holocaust denial and trivialisation in Iran despite the perceived distance between Iran and the 
Holocaust. On one hand, Liora Hendelman-Baavur identifies that Iranian antisemitism is rooted in 
the “anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli” propaganda that makes up a prominent component of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s legacy,53 a reason bound to the history of the Islamic Revolution. However, one of the 
most renowned manifestations of Iranian Holocaust denial and trivialisation is the International 
Holocaust Cartoon Competition, which Andre Oboler identifies as being reactively tied to the 
controversy over Danish cartoons of Muhammed.54 The newspaper that ran the competition, 
Hamshahri, argued “it wanted to test whether the West would apply the same principles of freedom 
of speech that were invoked in defence of the Danish cartoons of Muhammad when it came to 
 
53 Liora Hendelman-Baavur, ‘Online Antisemitic Propaganda and Negationism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Ahmadinejad and his Enduring Legacy’, in Antisemitism Today and Tomorrow: Global Perspectives on the Many 
Faces of Contemporary Antisemitism, ed. by Mikael Shainkman (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018), pp. 184-
204 (p. 185). 
54 Scott Benjamin, ‘Holocaust Cartoon Contest in Iran,’ CBS, February 7, 2006. 
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/holocaust-cartoon-contest-in-iran> [accessed 6 December 2019] (para. 2 of 12). 
Andre Oboler, ‘After the Charlie Hebdo Attack: The Line between Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech’, in 
Shainkman, pp. 178-179. 
 110 
 
cartoons about the Holocaust”.55 This multitude of causes behind manifestations of antisemitism 
demonstrate the need for nuanced studies on the globalisation of antisemitism to go further than 
individual national studies, examining how certain antisemitic trends and ideas can take root in a 
wide range of societies.  
One text that focuses specifically on the globalisation of antisemitism is Globalising 
Hatred: The New Antisemitism by former British Labour Party politician Denis MacShane.56 
However, Globalising Hatred is too short to be more than an introduction to the phenomenon, 
which deserves a comprehensive academic study. Indeed, the short length of Globalising Hatred 
leaves MacShane prone to generalisations, oversimplifications and a tendency to overstate its 
conclusions without the necessary analysis.57 Brian Klug’s review also points out MacShane’s 
overreliance on focusing on “Islamism” and anti-Zionism as the driving forces behind this 
globalised antisemitism.58 This overreliance limits any analysis of how antisemitism truly 
globalises – how it permeates spaces beyond any particular ideology. This thesis fills this gap in 
the field by demonstrating how the internet serves as a medium for globalising antisemitism, also 
justifying the internet as an appropriate focus for academic study on antisemitism. The effects of 
the internet on content production, consumption and reproduction indicate how antisemitism can 
spread into a wide variety of spaces and groups, thereby representing a broader extent of 
antisemitism’s globalisation than MacShane’s book. 
 
 
55 Oboler, pp. 178-179. 
56 Denis MacShane, Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism (London: Phoenix, 2008). 
57 Brian Klug, ‘Antisemitism in the Hall of Mirrors’, review of Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism, by Denis 
MacShane, The Political Quarterly, 8.4 (October 2009), 597-599 (p. 599). 
58 Ibid. 
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Religious Antisemitism & Anti-Judaism 
Antisemitism in Faith and Worldview 
While state and modern forms of antisemitism have already been examined, it is also important to 
analyse scholarship on religious antisemitism, which remains a continuously relevant form of 
antisemitism despite its age. There is also a considerable overlap between the debate on ‘new’ 
antisemitism and the study of religious antisemitism, due to the influence of religiously motivated 
antisemitism as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, due to academia’s disproportionate 
focus on the history of Western antisemitism, and the interplay between Christian antisemitic 
theology with modern Islamic antisemitism, an overview of this area requires starting with 
Christianity.  
Medieval Christianity has a highly significant role in the rise of modern antisemitism. One 
of the most in-depth explorations of this topic is James Carroll’s 2001 book Constantine’s Sword: 
The Church and the Jews: A History.59 Although Carroll himself is not a historian, Constantine’s 
Sword features numerous interviews with academics and broadly covers Christian antisemitism, 
from passages in the Gospels to Papal politics. Carroll’s text marked an important development in 
the history of antisemitism as an in-depth analysis of a specific brand of religious antisemitism. 
While only one building block for a broad understanding of religious antisemitism, Carroll’s text 
demonstrates how one strain of religious antisemitism grew and shifted throughout history, from 
antiquity to modernity. This evolution demonstrates the adaptability and versatility of 
antisemitism, informing approaches to research on online manifestations and contextualising why 
researchers from other disciplines may struggle to understand antisemitism. 
 
59 James Carroll, Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History (New York: First Mariner Books, 
2002). 
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In 2013, David Nirenberg published Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition, a ground-
breaking study on the discrimination against the concept of ‘Judaism’, particularly how opposition 
to Judaism shaped other worldviews.60 While Nirenberg’s text does engage with historical 
prejudice against the Jewish religion, he takes the concept of his study further. Nirenberg indicates 
that opposition to Judaism is not limited to theological disputes, exploring manifestations of anti-
Judaism in works of non-religious thinkers such as Kant and Shakespeare (e.g. the characterisation 
of Shylock in The Merchant of Venice).61 He also takes care to distinguish his text from studies on 
antisemitism, which he claims, “captures only a small portion, historically and conceptually” of 
the historic prejudice towards Judaism.62 In the broadest sense, Nirenberg engages with what the 
world conceives as ‘Jewishness’, ranging from religious stereotypes to the conceptualisation of 
capitalism and moneylending as Jewish practices throughout history. Ultimately, Nirenberg goes 
beyond the theological grounds for anti-Jewish prejudice and explores how these prejudices 
influence the conceptualisation of and opposition to ‘Judaism’ between societies. Nirenberg argues 
that anti-Judaism was often fundamental to the formation of worldviews in the “Western tradition”, 
and explores the centrality of this anti-Judaism in the manifestations of these worldviews.63 This 
helps explain the growth of redemptive antisemitism worldviews, merging the ancient antisemitic 
ideas embedded in Western traditions with modern concerns. Nirenberg’s framework provides 
insight into how religious justification for anti-Jewish prejudice fell out of vogue and was 
supplanted by different forms of prejudice – allowing a path to be drawn between traditional anti-
 
60 David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
61 Ibid., pp. 269-299, 387-422. 
62 Ibid., p. 3. 
63 For example, as early Christianity distinguished itself from Judaism, and struggled to rationalise the place of 
Judaism and the Jews after Christ, Saint Augustine associated them with Cain after the slaying of Abel with the 
proclamation “Slay them not”, arguing for them to serve as “relics… inert witnesses… of a transformation in man’s 
understanding the cosmos”. This theology contributed to the separateness between the Jews and the Christians in 
Medieval Europe, which over history was manifested in ghettoization, church art and other various laws.  
Ibid., p. 246 
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Judaism and modern antisemitism, even though Nirenberg avoids using the latter term. This path 
illustrates how ancient chimeric antisemitic ideas like blood libel are still being used in modern 
contexts, such as in the harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter. 
 
Islamic Antisemitism and Politicising Research 
While anti-Judaism has a long history with Christianity and European history, Islamic 
manifestations of antisemitism are also highly relevant due to their prominence surrounding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The study of Islamic antisemitism originated on a comparative level 
between Christian theological antisemitism, and modern racial antisemitism with Islamic 
treatment of Jewish peoples. Poliakov broke ground again in this field with the second volume of 
The History of Antisemitism: From Mohammed to the Marranos in 1961.64 This was the earliest 
complete history of early Islamic antisemitism, and by bookending this volume between the rise 
of Mohammed and the treatment of Jewish people in post-Reconquista Iberia, Poliakov set a 
precedent of comparing Islamic antisemitism to Christian European antisemitism. This precedent 
evolved into numerous threads of research, one being historical comparisons of the treatment of 
Jews between Islamic and Christian society. The most influential text to follow this thread of 
research is Mark R. Cohen’s 1994 book Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages.65 
Cohen comprehensively argued that Islamic-Jewish relations in the Middle Ages, while imperfect, 
were far less violent than those in Christian Europe. There are two reasons behind the growth of 
comparisons between Christian and Islamic antisemitism, the first being the influence of Nazism 
 
64 Léon Poliakov, History of Anti-semitism: From Mohammed to the Marranos, 4 vols (orig. 1961; Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), II. 
65 Mark R. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
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on the historiography of antisemitism. The events of World War II and the Holocaust inspired a 
surge of historical research on antisemitism, aiming to understand what led to the Final Solution, 
naturally resulting in a disproportionate focus on Christian antisemitism. Scholars focusing on 
Islamic antisemitism would then naturally refer to this large body of literature to contextualise 
their own research. The second reason was the establishment of the state of Israel, and the ensuing 
anti-Zionism which inspired the theory of ‘new’ antisemitism. Despite a strong link to Islamic 
opposition to Israel, anti-Zionism often draws upon Christian and Western antisemitic ideas, 
including blood libel, racial antisemitism and Holocaust denial. This link between Anti-Zionism 
and other manifestations of antisemitism results in an inability to separate the study of ‘Western 
antisemitism’66 and post-WWII Islamic antisemitism. Furthermore, this link represents the 
interplay of antisemitic manifestations that is key to understanding broader antisemitism and its 
globalisation. 
The link between the study of Western and Islamic antisemitism has arguably led to a series 
of assumptions among scholars, firstly that modern hostility to the Jews is non-theological, being 
primarily motivated by the political affairs surrounding Palestine, and secondly that Jews 
prospered under Muslim rule.67 Andrew Bostom, a professor of medicine, argues that these 
assumptions are false in his 2008 book The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to 
Solemn History.68 While Bostom lacks training in the field of history, which critics have claimed 
leads to inconsistency and analytical problems,69 his text provides the most comprehensive 
 
66 ‘Western’ in this context refers to the broader encompassing of Christian and non-religious antisemitic ideas 
popularised in Europe, but also heavily present in other anglosphere nations, such as the United States. 
67 Mark Durie, review of The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History, by Andrew G. 
Bostom, First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Vol, 191 (2009), 59. 
68 Andrew G. Bostom, The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2008). 
69 Benny Morris, review of The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History, by Andrew 
G. Bostom, New Republic, 10 September 2008, 35-39. 
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collection of antisemitic documents throughout the history of Islam. His collection and 
organisation of these documents, ranging between Hadiths, Islamic law and modern speeches, 
make a strong case for Islamic antisemitism being inherently Islamic and having a theological 
tradition behind it (as Christian antisemitism does). Nonetheless, by propping up these 
assumptions as pillars to knock down, Bostom misrepresents the academic consensus and the 
nature of the debate itself. Furthermore, by providing only a limited context and no alternative 
explanations,70 Bostom’s coverage of this issue appears to be unbalanced and politically 
motivated.71  
The problems that lie within Bostom’s work are symptomatic of a larger problem within 
the discourse on Islamic antisemitism. The political divisiveness of the Arab-Israeli conflict can 
both decontextualise scholarship on Islamic antisemitism and leads to its use in apologetics (both 
defending Israel and Islam). Islamic historian Gudrun Krämer concisely extrapolates this problem 
in a critical review of antisemitism in the Muslim world.72 Krämer draws upon European history 
for context when commenting on pre-modern dress codes for social inferiors, justifying her 
criticism of those who compare the Nazi yellow badge and Islamic dress codes, of which Bostom 
is guilty.73 Yet Krämer also criticises those who use contextualisation to defend Islam, attempting 
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to divorce the historical examples of antisemitism from present realities so as to downplay links 
between Muslims and antisemitism: 
 
One core issue is contextualization which places individual statements and occurrences 
within a wider political context (first and foremost colonialism and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict), and the extent to which contextualization is used, or can be used, to downplay 
the phenomenon rather than to face it and fight against it at all levels.74 
 
Such abuses of context serve to distract academic discourse from the broader picture of 
antisemitism, as it risks bogging the field down in debates on Islamic antisemitism. This represents 
the problem similar to the disproportionate focus on binary debates in research on German 
antisemitism. 
Misuse of the contexts of Islamic antisemitism demonstrates how caution needs to be 
applied in analyses of more recent manifestations of antisemitism. For example, with regards to 
the importation of European and Christian antisemitic stereotypes, Krämer points out how blood 
libel in the Muslim world predated the birth of Zionism by over fifty years in the form of the 1840 
Damascus affair,75 but also points out how antisemitic conspiracies took root primarily after al-
naqba, with the first Arabic translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Egypt in 1951.76 
In doing so, Krämer points out that Islamic antisemitism was not uniform across history, but that 
the contextualisation of each example could be used in misrepresentative apologetics to either 
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diminish or exaggerate Islamic antisemitism. This is not a problem limited to Bostom, but across 
scholarship and other resource archives. For example, the Middle-East Media Research Institute 
(MEMRI), a non-profit organisation dedicated to archiving and translating Middle-Eastern media, 
has been criticised for selectively focusing on extremist elements in chosen media outlets.77 This 
does not at all diminish the value in using such resources, but the abuses of context in the study of 
Islamic antisemitism demand extra scrutiny even when drawing upon manifestations of Islamic 
antisemitism in broader research. Researchers should apply extra caution when studying 
manifestations of antisemitism relevant to contemporary politics, as a careless approach can bog 
the field down in the sorts of political disputes that inspire misleading apologetics. This is 
especially relevant when approaching recent manifestations of antisemitism online, as some 
prominent manifestations are linked to the alt-right and President Trump. Research on online 
antisemitism should not exist merely as a cudgel against right-wing politics or it will risk entering 
similar quagmires that have developed surrounding the discourse on Islamic antisemitism. 
 
Similar Tropes between the Secular and Sacred 
The role of specific antisemitic tropes, such as blood libel, or specific texts, such as The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion (hereafter the Protocols), represent the unique evolution of Islamic 
antisemitism post-WWII, and the broader interplay of various forms of antisemitism. Their 
reinvigorated role can either be interpreted as qualitative change, such as shifting between the 
secular and sacred, or as old tropes simply remanifesting in a new context. Ultimately, it is case 
studies, focusing specifically on a particular antisemitic trope or text, that are most helpful in 
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understanding these manifestations. Hadassa Ben-Itto’s book The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion is the most comprehensive text on the Protocols. While it does not 
dedicate a significant portion to the Islamic use of the text, Ben-Itto’s comparison between the 
initial debates regarding the forgery and the later appropriation of it for Islamic antisemitism 
highlights a significant change in the Protocols’ use as an antisemitic tool. In the conclusion of her 
book she lists specific high profile uses of the Protocols in Islamic media, and describes a 2003 
Syrian broadcast that displayed the Protocols alongside scenes depicting blood libel.78 This 
explicit mixing of the secular and the sacred using two largely unrelated antisemitic tropes 
represents the adaptability of both the Protocols and blood libel. This example is also listed 
alongside instances where copies of the Protocols appeared during peace accords between Israel 
and the Palestinians in 1993, demonstrating their elevated use to sabotage political processes.79 
Indeed, Ben-Itto concludes the book by bemoaning that the Protocols have advanced away from 
the fringe in the twenty-first century, becoming a “major item in the public political discourse 
concerning the conduct of world affairs”80, representing how different contexts can draw different 
antisemitic tropes to the forefront, even after decades of relative irrelevancy.  
The most comprehensive analysis of the Jewish blood libel is Darren O’Brien’s The 
Pinnacle of Hatred: The Blood Libel and the Jews.81 Similarly to Ben-Itto, the book 
comprehensively traces the history and spread of the idea, leaving commentary on Islamic use to 
the end of book. Nonetheless, O’Brien signals significant change in the Islamic use of blood libel, 
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firstly by the recent assertion that Palestinian blood is required,82 and more definitively by the 
assertion that the blood of an entire nation is required. Furthermore, O’Brien argues that blood 
libel has advanced in rhetoric to justify “the necessity for their [Jews’] annihilation”.83 The 
integration of the blood libel trope with secular antisemitic texts, like the Protocols, represents 
how interplaying antisemitic tropes can strengthen each other, even when coming from different 
contexts. The religious interplay of various antisemitic tropes continues online, demonstrated by 
the Radio Islam website, which provides digital access to both the Protocols and broader 
antisemitic tropes. This interplay represents how religious antisemitism can act as a vehicle to 
bring historic antisemitic tropes into cyberspace.84 Ultimately, religious antisemitism demonstrates 
two key ways in which antisemitism adapts, firstly by fabricating entire antisemitic tropes like 
‘blood libel’, and secondly by adapting historical antisemitic tropes to modern contexts. 
Nonetheless, the development of new antisemitic tropes is not limited to religious antisemitism, 
also representing a key aspect of how antisemitism evolved following the Holocaust. 
 
Holocaust denial 
Of all the new antisemitic trends that have evolved since World War II, one that deserves special 
attention is Holocaust denial. Providing an extensive background on other manifestations of 
antisemitism serves to highlight the distinct nature of Holocaust denial, emphasising the adaptive, 
changing nature of antisemitism. The Holocaust represents a major shift in the history and 
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historiography of antisemitism and the Jewish people, and rejecting its existence constitutes an 
antisemitic backlash and adaption to that shift. This adaption takes the form of Holocaust denial’s 
self-presentation as an alternative, yet legitimate historical theory in the form of ‘Holocaust 
Revisionism’. This presentation is especially significant, as no other form of antisemitism has 
made a comparable attempt to adopt an academic façade, representing a major evolution of 
antisemitism more broadly. Unlike other forms of antisemitism, Holocaust denial’s pseudo-
academic presentation allows its material to be examined in a similar manner to that of legitimate 
scholarship, partially due to the academic backgrounds of many major figures in the movement. 
In addition, Holocaust denial requires specific attention in this review due to the focus of this thesis 
on online antisemitism. As part of their pseudo-academic façade, Holocaust deniers showed 
initiative in establishing their views on the internet with dedicated platforms and archives, a 
strategy which is explored further in chapters four and five. It is important to mention that 
Holocaust denial can also include the Holocaust relativisation and obfuscation perpetrated by 
Eastern European Nationalistic agendas. However, this section focuses primarily on the pseudo-
academic evolution of the organised Holocaust denial movement due to its unique strategy, 
evolution, and relationship with mainstream academia. For these reasons, this review examines 
both the history and historiography of Holocaust denial itself, as well as the mainstream academic 
literature that has covered the evolution of these ideas into a pseudo-academic movement.  
While Holocaust denial is renowned for being a masquerade of legitimate scholarship, its 
origins were not dissimilar to that of other antisemitic movements. This can be a cause for 
confusion, as the histories of Holocaust denial attempt to pin down the ‘father’ of the movement, 
as though it is a school of thought or field with founders, such as Karl Marx and Marxism, or Noam 
Chomsky and linguistics. Two significant figures from this Holocaust denial ‘pre-history’ are 
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Alexander Ratcliffe and Paul Rassinier. Ratcliffe was the leader of the Scottish Protestant League, 
a fascist and Teutophile who has been identified by Alex Grobman and Michael Shermer as 
potentially the “first person to deny the Holocaust,” from his writings for Vanguard magazine in 
1945 and 1946.85 Yet casting Ratcliffe this way is somewhat disingenuous, as the first people to 
deny the Holocaust were its perpetrators, who kept the Final Solution secret and later denied their 
complicity. In the same vein, French socialist Paul Rassinier is sometimes described as the ‘father’ 
of Holocaust denial by scholarly sources.86 This epithet likely arose due to his relatively early 
writings in the 1960s, notably The Drama of the European Jews in which he criticises the academic 
work of Raul Hilberg.87 While Rassinier can be distinguished from Ratcliffe by his (pre-war) 
academic credentials and influence as a writer, Rassinier’s writings themselves did not spark a 
significant growth or formation of Holocaust denial thought (at least when compared to the next 
generation of deniers). His writings are also not largely circulated today, and were only brought to 
English-speaking audiences posthumously by Harry Elmer Barnes. Therefore, it seems the basis 
for naming Rassinier the ‘father’ of Holocaust denial is solely based on him being the earliest 
‘academic’ figure to deny the Holocaust, which overstates his influence.  
If any figure might deserve to be described as the ‘father’ of Holocaust denial, it would be 
Arthur Butz, who in 1976 published The Hoax of the Twentieth Century.88 Butz came to the scene 
with an academic background (although in electrical engineering), and his well-sourced and 
academically written text established the commonly accepted definition of Holocaust denial – the 
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denial of gas chamber existence, the denial of six million dead, and the denial of a ‘Final Solution 
to the Jewish Problem.’89 Furthermore, Butz’s text is still in circulation, being republished in 2003 
and 2015, demonstrating the popularity of his text in the field of ‘Holocaust Revisionism’. Yet 
describing Butz as the ‘father’ of the movement purely on the basis of his academic style and 
influence may still be problematic. While it is important to highlight the similarities between 
Holocaust denial and mainstream academia, they must remain clearly distinct, so to not 
inadvertently lend credibility to Holocaust deniers. One of these major distinctions is Holocaust 
denial’s origin as a form of antisemitism: conspiratorial, reactionary, and discriminatory in nature 
and purpose.  
Nonetheless, there is still value in highlighting Ratcliffe, Rassinier and Butz’s roles in the 
Holocaust denial movement, as all helped globalise Holocaust denial to largely non-perpetrator 
nations such as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. This marks one key step in the 
transition of Holocaust denial to a pseudo-academic movement, as well as distinguishing 
Holocaust denial from other forms of genocide denial. Comparatively, other genocide denial 
movements such as Armenian genocide denialism and Nanking massacre denial are based in 
nationalistic intent. The Turkish and Azerbaijani governments, and aspects of the Japanese 
government deny their complicity in genocide to try and preserve their image, while Holocaust 
denial is largely propagated in countries that were not complicit in the Holocaust, and even fought 
against the genocide’s perpetrators. This distinction indicates a key aspect of the academic façade 
of Holocaust denial; by not being propagated by nationalistic elements, Holocaust deniers can 
portray themselves as ‘impartial’ observers of history. 
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The evolution of the term ‘revisionism’ serves as an example of how the Holocaust denial 
movement painted itself as an extension of academia. Following Butz’s publication of The Hoax 
of the Twentieth Century, moves were made by the Holocaust denial community to formally 
organise themselves into presentable organisations. The main product of this effort was the 
Institute for Historical Review and its journal, the Journal of Historical Review. The namesake for 
this institution can be assumed to be inspired by the works of Harry Elmer Barnes, a prominent 
American historian whose teutophilia eventually led to his claims that the Holocaust never 
happened. Barnes was part of the school of thought in the 1920s and 1930s that argued Germany 
was wrongly blamed for the great war, using the term “revisionist” to describe this school in his 
works on World War I, such as his 1927 Genesis of the World War.90 During and following World 
War II, Barnes was part of the isolationist movement, and became a defender of the Third Reich. 
He began to repeatedly use the word “revisionism” to frame his argument that the Holocaust was 
exaggerated or fabricated, especially in regard to the use of gas chambers.91 The use of the term 
“revisionism” helped establish an air of legitimacy for the movement and its later writings, which, 
following the example set by Barnes and Butz, were formally presented and sourced.92  
The evolution of Holocaust denial into a pseudo-academic movement presents an 
opportunity to directly compare how an antisemitic movement has interacted with the 
historiography of antisemitism. The interactions between Holocaust denial and its critics moulded 
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the way Holocaust denial evolved, and in turn, led to a plan to limit direct academic response to 
the movement. Prior to the establishment of the Institute of Historical Review, this interaction was 
limited to primarily national spheres, notably within France with the publications of Paul Rassinier 
and later Robert Faurisson. Robert Faurisson’s entrance to the scene marked a significant advance 
in the development of Holocaust denial due to his background as an accredited humanities scholar, 
filling the void after Barnes and Rassinier passed away in the late 1960s. Faurisson went further 
in his denial than Barnes, who was primarily focused with the clearing of German war guilt and 
portrayed the Holocaust as anti-German propaganda. Faurisson instead attempted to engage the 
international historical community, directly contacting Yad Vashem in 1974 with a treatise 
claiming to demonstrate the non-existence of the Holocaust.93 This differed also from Rassinier, 
whose international contact was limited largely to Barnes, his main works not being translated 
until a decade after his death. Faurisson propelled Holocaust denial into the mainstream French 
public sphere by publishing two letters in Le Monde in 197894 and 1979.95 This finally resulted in 
an academic reaction to Holocaust denial in France in the form of a 1980 essay by Pierre Vidal-
Naquet called ‘A Paper Eichmann – Anatomy of a Lie’.96 Vidal-Naquet makes a point to avoid 
elevating the legitimacy of Holocaust denial when addressing it, one of the purposes of his text 
being to demonstrate the need to understand the ‘why’ behind Holocaust denial, rather than just 
providing a mere refutation.97 Vidal-Naquet indicates the reasons behind mainstream scholarship’s 
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delay and reluctance to address Holocaust denial; engaging the movement could be falling into the 
trap of implying a degree of legitimacy to the idea of ‘Holocaust revisionism’.  
 Faurisson’s Le Monde letters coincided with the publication of more pseudo-academic 
works, further globalising the Holocaust denial movement. Another prominent text is David 
Irving’s 1977 book Hitler’s War,98 which serves as an additional example of teutophilia shifting 
towards Holocaust denial, similar to Barnes. Hitler’s War is an interesting text on the history of 
antisemitism, as its premise is not explicitly antisemitic, being a biography describing World War 
II from the viewpoint of Hitler. Irving, while never obtaining a PhD, had acquired a reputation as 
an historian from publications focusing on the V-weapons program99 and Dresden bombing 
campaign.100 Regarding the latter, Irving used inflated death figures that were later republished in 
standard reference works.101 Hitler’s War was received by a high-profile audience that included 
accredited historians and scholars, leading to a broad negative reaction from the academic 
community. Irving attempted to whitewash Hitler, placing the blame of the Holocaust at the feet 
of Heydrich and Himmler,102 justified by the lack of a written order by Hitler to exterminate the 
Jews. Hitler’s War also laid the groundwork for another antisemitic theory, claiming Chaim 
Weizmann’s103 promise of support to the allied war effort constituted a “Jewish declaration of war” 
against Germany, justifying the use of concentration camps against European Jews.104 This idea 
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went on to become used by Ernst Nolte in the German Historikerstreit, which some in the 
international community saw as almost justifying the Holocaust.105  
 Irving’s attempted justification of German antisemitism and whitewashing of Adolf Hitler 
securely defines Hitler’s War as an antisemitic text, and clearly marks his shift towards becoming 
one of the forefront advocates of Holocaust denial. Yet Hitler’s War is also significant due to its 
widespread condemnation by historians, including experts on antisemitism such as Walter 
Laqueur106 and Lucy Dawidowicz.107 Ian Kershaw even argued that Hitler’s War serves as a 
motivation to expand biographical history on Hitler for the purpose of refuting Irving’s claims.108 
This contrasts with the limited academic response to other Holocaust denial texts, such as towards 
The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, to which its strongest academic reaction came only thirty years 
after its publication, from Butz’s own institution.109 While it could be argued that the reaction to 
Irving was motivated by his already high profile among the historian community, this argument 
does not stand up when compared to Robert Faurisson, who was already an academic, but whose 
texts claiming Anne Frank’s diary was a forgery did not receive so strong an academic reaction. 
Alternatively, it could be claimed that the difference lies in the different national and linguistic 
contexts of the publications (with Irving’s being the United Kingdom and Faurisson’s being 
France), especially due to France’s stronger legal restrictions of Holocaust denial. Yet due to the 
close temporal proximity of the texts, and Faurisson’s proven willingness to engage with 
international scholarship, this argument is not especially strong. It stands to reason that there is a 
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notable difference in mainstream academic responses to antisemitism depending on the specific 
antisemitic ideas involved.  
 Another chain of events triggered by Faurisson’s foray into Holocaust denial is the larger 
focus dedicated to the forensic history of the Holocaust by both Holocaust deniers and, in reaction, 
mainstream Holocaust scholars. Faurisson’s colleague and fellow Holocaust denier Jean-Claude 
Pressac went to Auschwitz in 1979, attempting to disprove the depiction of select concentration 
camps as extermination camps, a claim he states Faurisson was “forced to stake everything on”.110 
However, on examination of the site’s archives, Pressac became convinced of the authenticity of 
the site.111 The apparent imperative to disprove the authenticity of the gas chambers increased over 
the 1980s as Faurisson, the Institute for Historical Review, and German-Canadian Ernst Zündel 
became subject to expensive legal trials over their views. One of the most significant texts to arise 
from the Holocaust during this period was execution technician Fred Leuchter’s 1988 report 
rejecting the technical feasibility of death camp gas chambers – also known as the Leuchter 
Report.112 The report was created when Ernst Zündel was on trial in Canada for violating false 
news laws, and Robert Faurisson advised that they recruit an execution equipment technician to 
examine the gas chambers directly. The public attention generated by the Zündel trial played a key 
part in the attention focused towards this text, but the importance of the text itself in the history of 
Holocaust denying and antisemitic literature goes beyond this reason.  
The Leuchter Report represented a further evolution in the ‘intellectualisation’ of 
Holocaust denial by expanding into the field of forensic science; Leuchter collected samples from 
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the Auschwitz-Birkenau gas chambers himself and attempted to conduct scientific research. While 
Leuchter was easily dismissed in the trial due to his lack of qualifications, this was not so easy 
when this trend was continued by German chemist Germar Rudolf from the prestigious Max 
Planck Institute. Germar Rudolf published his own analysis of the Auschwitz gas chambers in 
1993 called The Rudolf Report,113 which attracted less attention than the Leuchter Report, but was 
more extensive in scope and methodology due to his background in chemistry. Outside of the 
context of a legal battle, and backed up by Rudolf’s appropriate credentials, the Rudolf Report 
represented an antisemitic text heavily based in forensic science. Ultimately, the record left by 
Pressac, Leuchter, and Rudolf paint a picture of how an antisemitic movement or idea can attempt 
to expand and evolve its narrative, shifting its focus to entirely new disciplines.  
The publications of forensic Holocaust denial texts did result in a response from academics, 
but primarily those with a scientific background. Firstly, Pressac ended up publishing his findings 
from his Auschwitz investigations in 1989, named Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the 
Gas Chambers.114 Pressac’s background as a chemist resulted in a dense, thorough tome which 
comprehensively established the forensic evidence for Auschwitz’s role as an extermination camp. 
There is an irony in that this publication would never have arisen without Faurisson tasking him 
to prove the denial argument against extermination. Beyond Pressac, there have been other 
scientific refutations of the works of Leuchter and Rudolf, most prolifically by Richard Green, 
who wrote three essays on the “chemistry of Auschwitz” between 1998 and 2000.115 These essays, 
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among other academic works that directly refute claims of Holocaust denial, have been compiled 
online as part of the Holocaust History Project as a free archive. The Holocaust History Project 
produced a body of literature comparable to an informal journal between the years of 1998 to 2003, 
but since then the membership became inactive and the site eventually became inaccessible online, 
only being restored in April 2016 by the French NGO Pratique de l’histoire et dévoiements 
négationnistes.116  
The establishment of the Holocaust-History archive and publication of essays represents a 
significant change in the body of literature on antisemitism, where scientists and engineers can 
now contribute in a field that is traditionally covered by history and sociology. Green and Jamie 
McCarthy comment on the intersection of these fields and how they relate to Holocaust deniers’ 
use of the concepts of evidence and proof. 
 
Historians and (real) scientists share a concept called the convergence of evidence. 
Absolute proof exists only with the postulates of pure math or logic. In the physical world, 
the most that we can hope for is a convergence of evidence: to borrow a phrase from the 
legal world, we might seek proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”117 
 
It cannot be forgotten that this shift in the academic study of antisemitism was directly caused by 
the evolution of antisemitism itself into new fields and disciplines, firstly into pseudo-historical 
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scholarship, and then into forensic science. This emphasises the need for antisemitism scholarship 
to rapidly adapt to evolving manifestations of antisemitism through collaborating with different 
disciplines and fields, especially those online. Holocaust denial has demonstrated that antisemitism 
shifts and adapts in reaction to heightened academic and public attention, and the ease of 
distribution and redistribution of information online makes it easier for antisemitism to receive 
attention. Therefore, hard academic stances of avoidance and ignorance towards antisemitism, as 
seen with Holocaust denial, cannot be maintained in the digital age. 
Examining the key historical academic texts that focus on Holocaust denial further 
emphasises the need for scholarship to continuously adapt in order to effectively counter 
antisemitism. As previously mentioned, French academia was early to the scene with Pierre Vidal-
Naquet’s A Paper Eichmann and other essays published between 1980 and 1987.118 Vidal-Naquet 
was joined by Alain Finkelkraut, who was responsible for the first scholarly book on Holocaust 
denial in his 1982 The Future of Negation.119 Gill Seidel was the first to publish a book on 
Holocaust denial in English, The Holocaust Denial in 1986.120 Seidel’s text covered Holocaust 
denial in an internationalist scope, representing the increasing globalisation of Holocaust denial. 
The most significant text in the history of Holocaust denial scholarship is Deborah Lipstadt’s 1993 
book Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory.121 Lipstadt argued that 
the ultimate purpose of Holocaust denial was to ensure “the revival of National Socialism could 
be a feasible option”.122 Another key argument from Lipstadt was that the wider academic 
community had unwisely ignored Holocaust denial in the hope that the movement would go 
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away;123 however she still clarified that direct engagement on public platforms was important to 
avoid. Ultimately this latter argument was turned against her, as Holocaust denier David Irving 
sued Lipstadt for libel in a high-profile case that was covered significantly in both academia124 and 
the popular press. The Irving-Lipstadt trial further discredits stances of ignorance and avoidance 
towards antisemitism. Lipstadt was largely alone in her examination of Holocaust denial, and so 
when targeted by deniers themselves, she became a virtually isolated figure, solely charged with 
the defence of Holocaust scholarship. Attempting to ignore Holocaust denial therefore left 
academia on the back foot as antisemites attacked scholarship itself.  
While engaging with antisemitism must be done strategically, as Lipstadt encouraged, 
antisemitism’s continuing adaptability warrants continuous adaption by scholarship as well. The 
rise of the internet will continue to globalise Holocaust denial, as well as other forms of 
antisemitism. In order to respond to this, research should move away from a piecemeal approach 
of in-depth studies on antisemitic activities in individual countries, and instead explore more 
comprehensive studies of online antisemitism. As mentioned in the previous section on German 
antisemitism and the Holocaust, this former approach is no longer an appropriate comparative 
avenue to examine antisemitism in such a globalised condition. Just as forms of discrimination and 
abuse intersect online, so too can particular manifestations of antisemitism intersect with and 
influence each other. This has been seen with Holocaust denial’s role alongside older religious 
tropes in Islamic antisemitism, united by a ‘newer’ motivation: opposition to the state of Israel. 
 
 
123 Ibid., p. 24. 
124 Deborah Lipstadt, History on Trial: My Day in Court with David Irving (New York: Ecco, 2005).  
Richard Evans, Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (New York: Basic Books, 2002).  
Guttenplan. 
 132 
 
The ‘New’ Antisemitism 
Despite the growing amount of literature on the history of antisemitism, ranging from the ancient 
Greco-Roman world to Holocaust denial, there is considerable contention about present and future 
trends of antisemitism; this can be seen in the debate about the existence of ‘new’ antisemitism. 
The conceptualisation of this ‘new’ antisemitism appears to be plagued by many of the same 
problems that have affected the historic study of antisemitism, such as the prominence of binary 
debates. These debates, often prioritising a dichotomous view of an aspect of antisemitism rather 
than considering its broader complexities, provide lessons to consider when approaching online 
antisemitism, and evaluating any qualitative and quantitative changes caused by the internet. While 
this thesis is concerned with new online manifestations, it is not enough to answer a binary question 
of whether the online antisemitism is qualitatively new or not. Any qualitative changes must be 
evaluated within a broader context, taking into consideration the ways in which online 
antisemitism intersects with other forms of antisemitism, and with other forms of abuse and 
discrimination. This approach will avoid simplistic compartmentalisations and generalisations 
represented by the concept of ‘new’ antisemitism. 
In May 1974, the magazine Commentary published an article by Earl Raab, titled “Is there 
a New Anti-Semitism?”125 This question was asked following the publication of The New Anti-
Semitism by Anti-Defamation League members Arnold Foster and Benjamin R. Epstein,126 and 
projected the question to prominence within the academic community. ‘New’ antisemitism was 
defined as the postmodern evolution of antisemitism that manifested in the form of opposition to 
Israel, or anti-Zionism, to the level of demonisation. It also was distinguished from other forms of 
 
125 Earl Raab, ‘Is There a New Anti-Semitism?’, Commentary, 1 May 1974. 
<https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/is-there-a-new-anti-semitism> [accessed 25 November 2019]. 
126 Arnold Foster and Benjamin R. Epstein, The New Anti-Semitism (United States: McGraw-Hill, 1974). 
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antisemitism by its simultaneous emanation from radical Islam, the far-right, and the far-left. The 
question of whether there was a ‘new’ antisemitism became one of the most prominent issues in 
the study of antisemitism over the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Even Raab’s 
article, which was one of the first responses to Foster and Epstein’s book, criticised the pair for 
conflating any anti-Israel bias, or even a lack of pro-Israel sentiment, as antisemitic. This criticism 
has been echoed over the decades, with Thomas Weber’s criticism of Wistrich’s stance in A Lethal 
Obsession, arguing that disproportionate criticism of Israel can also be motivated by the left-
wing’s disproportionate distaste for ‘hard power’, or against what appear to be legacies of 
colonialism.127 It is important to mention that the criticisms by both Raab and Weber come despite 
them both agreeing on the existence of a ‘new’ antisemitism, and on its manifestation as the 
demonisation and double standards applied to the state of Israel. Instead, their disagreement 
indicates that debate exists about what exactly qualifies as ‘new’ antisemitism, even among those 
who agree on its existence. 
The split in scholarship regarding the existence of a ‘new’ antisemitism provides the basis 
for a major argument in this section of this literature review – that the antisemitism scholarship 
risks limiting itself over binary arguments. This section demonstrates that ‘new’ antisemitism 
already groups multiple forms of antisemitic content under a singular umbrella, including forms 
which come from historical origins (such as religious antisemitism) and relatively new 
manifestations, such as Holocaust Denial. It also runs into problems when trying to generalise anti-
Zionism as the main aim of ‘new’ antisemitism. This is because new manifestations of 
antisemitism that are exploited by anti-Zionism, such as Holocaust denial, are also promoted for 
 
127 Thomas Weber, review of A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad, by Robert S. 
Wistrich, The Journal of Modern History, 84.3 (September 2012), pp. 699-701. 
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reasons other than demonising the state of Israel (e.g. the legitimisation of National Socialism as 
a form of governance, or the promotion of white nationalism). Nonetheless, it is not necessary to 
entirely dismiss the concept of a ‘new’ antisemitism, as the quantity of research still demonstrates 
a willingness to explore how antisemitism is continuing to evolve in the post-Holocaust world. 
Yehuda Bauer is one of the most prominent scholars disputing the existence of ‘new’ 
antisemitism. Rather than seeing the growth in antisemitism in response to Israel as a qualitative 
change, Bauer argues that “[it] is the old pre-Hitler antisemitism that utilises occasions to come to 
the fore when something triggers [it].”128 Bauer argues that the link between classical antisemitism 
and anti-Zionism demonstrate the falseness of ‘new’ antisemitism. The shared use of content, such 
as blood libel, caricatures of Jews as moneylenders, and controllers of governments as per the 
Protocols, demonstrate that modern anti-Zionism is not a qualitatively ‘new’ antisemitism. The 
internet provides evidence to support Bauer’s criticism, as a corpus study covering over 2,000 
social media posts during the 2014 Gaza conflict found classical antisemitic stereotypes in 40% of 
the posts.129 Bauer’s criticism serves as a warning when analysing the link between the internet 
and qualitative changes to antisemitism, warranting a different approach than a simple binary 
question over whether online antisemitism is merely another ‘new’ antisemitism. Caution must be 
applied when evaluating the changing role of older antisemitic tropes, especially since the mere 
appearance of them in new contexts and motivations does not necessarily qualify as qualitative 
 
128 Yehonatan Tommer and Tzvi Fleischer, ‘Hate’s Revival’, Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council, 1 May 
2007. <https://aijac.org.au/australia-israel-review/hate-s-revival> [accessed 6 December 2019] (para. 27 of 39). 
129 Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate: Hostility towards Jews as a cultural 
constant and collective emotional value in the digital age (short version) (Berlin: Technische Universität 
Berlin, 2018) <https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg72/Antisemitism_2.0_short_version_final.pdf> 
[accessed 18 May 2020] (p. 9). 
Monika Schwarz-Friesel, ‘“Antisemitism 2.0”—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide 
Web’, in Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach, ed. by Armin Lange and others 
(Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), pp. 311-338 (p. 331). 
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change. Rather, scholarship on online antisemitism should consider how older tropes are used, 
such as how blood libel was used in memes on Twitter to intimidate Jews journalists in 2016.130 
Geography is also used to justify the concept of ‘new’ antisemitism, although attempts to 
do so further emphasise how binary debates over antisemitism limit the field. Dina Porat argues 
that ‘new’ antisemitism is also defined not only by the geographical shift of antisemitism (rising 
in Western Europe since 2000, after a previous locus in the USSR and Arab states), but also 
through its increasing reliance on violence.131 However, Porat’s position contradicts Earl Raab’s 
definition of new antisemitism from the mid-1970s, splitting the definition further by diminishing 
the role of the radical left-wing in fostering ‘new’ antisemitism. These differences make it appear 
that Porat and Raab are describing different iterations of antisemitism entirely, with Porat 
attempting to outmanoeuvre Bauer’s criticism of Raab and others by focusing less on content and 
more on geography and expression. While Porat does argue that ‘new’ antisemitism exists, her 
departure from other academics’ views on the phenomenon actually weakens the already limited 
support for ‘new’ antisemitism’s existence by further splitting the field. Nonetheless, Porat still 
demonstrates noteworthy changes in antisemitism, particularly its continual globalisation. Instead 
of limiting these observed changes to the narrow debate on ‘new’ antisemitism’s existence and 
definition, scholarship would benefit from expanding the conversation to how a broader range of 
old and new manifestations of antisemitism spread and adapt in different global contexts. This 
conversation can concern specific geographical, expressive, and other smaller qualitative and 
 
130 ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 
Presidential Campaign (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016) 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-
Force_v2.pdf> [accessed 8 December 2019] (p. 11). 
131 Ibid., para. 4 of 39. 
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quantitative changes, as well as examining how newer manifestations of antisemitism, such as 
Holocaust denial, intersect with antisemitism more broadly.  
An example of a newer manifestation of antisemitism that intersects with perceived ‘new’ 
antisemitism is David Hirsh’s identification of the “Livingstone Formulation”. The key elements 
of the Livingstone Formulation involve refusing to discuss the content of an accusation of 
antisemitism, instead shifting the focus towards a hidden, purposeful motive behind the accusation. 
This conspiratorial motive allegedly attempts to coalesce everything in the discussion into 
antisemitism, and makes accusations of antisemitism in order to shield Israel.132 The formulation 
serves two purposes for antisemites: firstly, as a shield against accusations of antisemitism relating 
to the state of Israel, and secondly, by promoting a conspiracy theory that associates accusations 
of antisemitism with a conspiracy to protect Israel from fair criticism.133 Hirsh identifies that this 
formulation can be used both intentionally as a shield by dedicated antisemites, but also by 
antiracists on the left who fail to consider themselves as antisemitic at all. This latter aspect in 
particular represents a qualitatively new manifestation of antisemitism, as its permutation from the 
left is built upon a naivety stemming from the evolution of left-wing antisemitism into the twenty-
first century. Hirsh also provides examples that intersect with older manifestations of antisemitism 
such as Soviet ‘Zionology’, particularly in the Soviet fabrication of a ‘confession’ from Rudolph 
Slansky alleging he shielded Zionism through accusations of antisemitism.134 Hirsh also shows 
how the Livingstone Formulation intersects the debate over ‘new’ antisemitism, further 
demonstrating the reactive relationship between antisemitism and antisemitism scholarship, this 
 
132 Ibid., p. 8. 
133 David Hirsh, ‘How raising the issue of antisemitism puts you outside the community of the progressive: The 
Livingstone Formulation’, in From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism: The Past & Present of a Lethal Ideology, ed. by 
Eunice G. Pollack (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2017), pp. 1-21. 
134 Ibid. 
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time from the left. Hirsh provides examples of the formulation in criticisms of scholars promoting 
the ‘new’ antisemitism theory, accusing these scholars of a conspiracy to shield Israel from 
criticism through promotion of this theory.135 Close examinations of antisemitic tropes such as the 
Livingstone Formulation are a better example of how to examine chronologically new 
manifestations of antisemitism, focusing on the manifestation specifically while drawing on how 
it intersects other historical and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism.  
The lack of consensus over new antisemitism cannot be solved merely by introducing new 
definitional issues into the debate. Attempting to define online antisemitism as simply a ‘new’ 
antisemitism risks narrowing scholarship to another binary debate. To avoid this issue, this thesis 
explores online antisemitism not as a new category of qualitatively distinct antisemitism, but 
instead considers how the internet affects antisemitism as a whole by both affecting old, and 
creating new, manifestations. Thus, the question this thesis answers is not whether or not online 
antisemitism is qualitatively distinct from other forms of antisemitism. Instead, this thesis analyses 
the extent to which the internet impacts antisemitism overall, including offline manifestations, and 
if it has played a significant part in the creation of new manifestations themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
In January 2015, French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy addressed the United Nations General 
Assembly on the rise of antisemitic violence worldwide, in which he identified the formulations 
depended on by modern antisemitism.136 These formulations include Jewish support for the 
 
135 Ibid., p. 6. 
136 Bernard-Henri Lévy, Statement by Mr. Bernard-Henri Lévy, French philosopher and writer (New York: United 
Nations, 22 January 2015) <https://www.un.org/pga/69/220115_statement-bhl/> [accessed 6 December 2019]. 
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“murderous” state of Israel,137 with Jews basing their support on the “imaginary” suffering of the 
Holocaust,138 so as to overshadow others’ suffering with their own. In identifying these 
formulations Lévy does not address the issues of ‘new’ antisemitism by suggesting a new 
qualitative change in antisemitism. Rather, he points these formulations out as key ingredients for 
the large-scale, globalised return of antisemitism, through the popularisation of this “portrait of the 
modern Jew”.139 Lévy identifies the intersections of key manifestations of antisemitism – anti-
Zionism, Holocaust denial, the Livingstone Formulation – and how they coalesce into broader 
antisemitism today. He also relates modern antisemitism to past manifestations, using historical 
examples of worldviews inspired by anti-Judaism as a measuring stick for antisemitism’s rise. 
Lévy sets an example for how to consider antisemitism today in light of newer manifestations. 
These newer manifestations cannot be separated from their historical or contemporary 
counterparts, even if they are qualitatively distinct on their own. Instead, it must be considered 
how they intersect with older manifestations and affect antisemitism more broadly. This is a key 
consideration for any analysis of online antisemitism, demonstrating the value of this literature 
review’s breadth. 
This literature review provides an overview of the various manifestations of antisemitism 
in the twentieth century that, along with the analyses in chapter two, presents the necessary 
information to determine the levels of quantitative and qualitative change exhibited by online 
manifestations of antisemitism. By examining the debates over quantitative and qualitative 
changes to antisemitism represented by other manifestations, this review serves this thesis’ overall 
aim to contextualise online antisemitism within the history and scholarship of modern 
 
137 Ibid., para. 25 of 49. 
138 Ibid., para. 26 of 49. 
139 Ibid., para. 33 of 49. 
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antisemitism. Modern antisemitism’s varied manifestations necessitate incorporating analyses of 
broader fields and disciplines, so as to provide a more complex and nuanced picture of 
antisemitism. These fields also present key lessons for the broader study of online abuse and 
discrimination. For example, cyberbullying research has shown the significant qualitative and 
quantitative changes to bullying brought about by online communication, and also how, despite 
the quantity of research, definitional and methodological issues can still exist. This also echoes the 
issues faced by research into racism as a lack of awareness of how discrimination has changed can 
result in systemic and ongoing issues in research. The long and complex history of antisemitism 
can be daunting to approach, especially for researchers without a background in the field. 
However, demonstrating how to do deal with this complexity in research on online antisemitism 
sets the stage for more holistic and sounder research on broader forms of discrimination and abuse 
online. 
While the size of the field of antisemitism has prevented this review from covering every 
major topic of antisemitism, this size is not a reason against further research. In fact, the 
interconnected history and historiography of antisemitism itself is a key reason for further research. 
The period prior to World War II saw limited study of antisemitism, despite the ancient roots of 
the prejudice. This prejudice may have discouraged researchers from exploring antisemitism and 
anti-Judaism. Assimilationist attitudes towards and by Jews in early modern Europe may also have 
diminished the perception of antisemitism’s significance (excluding notable exceptions, such as 
the Dreyfus affair). The growth in literature on antisemitism developed out of the history of 
Holocaust, but naturally much of that literature focused primarily on the Holocaust – an important, 
yet short period in the long history of antisemitism. The impact of the Holocaust on antisemitism 
scholarship, both serving as a focus of research and precipitating major growth in the field, in turn 
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impacted the evolution of antisemitism itself, contributing to the pseudo-academic structure of the 
Holocaust denial movement. Additionally, the relatively recent growth in scholarship on 
antisemitism has resulted in many scholarly divides, such as those over the impact of religious 
antisemitism on modern antisemitism and the Holocaust, the adoption of the concept of ‘new’ 
antisemitism, and the link between Western and Islamic antisemitism. Therefore, it can be seen 
that despite the size of the field, its growth both creates divides in the field, and influences the 
evolution of antisemitism itself. This means that there is no determinable ‘end goal’ for the study 
of antisemitism; the more that is written about the subject, the more the subject will warrant 
attention. Until antisemitism is diminished worldwide, these circumstances will continue to impact 
the growth of scholarship on the hatred. 
This review identifies the issues in the field to be avoided in an analysis of online 
antisemitism, and lessons to be applied in said analysis, both of which can be considered in 
conjunction with the lessons provided in chapter two. Most significantly, this literature review 
demonstrates that the Holocaust denial movement represents a qualitative change in antisemitism 
through its pseudo-academic representation, its evolving relationship with mainstream 
scholarship, and its adaptability for different goals by various movements and ideologies. This 
adaptability is an extension of the reinvigorated role of antisemitic tropes, as seen in their reuse by 
religious antisemitism and the ambiguously defined ‘new’ antisemitism. In addition, Holocaust 
denial goes further by inventing new antisemitic arguments and being established as a prominent 
and recognisable trope itself. These attributes are especially important to consider in future 
examinations of online antisemitism. Increasingly, the rapid nature of communication and 
information exchange will streamline the sharing of antisemitic concepts between analogous, 
overlapping and allied discriminatory movements. In addition, online communication will 
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strengthen the reactive relationship between antisemitism and those who combat it, resulting in 
swifter adaption by antisemites, including the potential development of new antisemitic ideas and 
tropes. 
Holocaust denial’s most significant qualitative changes to antisemitism are reflected in this 
closer relationship between antisemites and academics, demonstrating the growing adaptability of 
antisemitism for various goals and different movements. Holocaust denial can serve both to 
delegitimise Israel by appearing to remove the need for a Jewish homeland, and to whitewash and 
re-legitimise National Socialism and fascism as post-war political views. The globalisation of 
antisemitism means that various antisemitic ideas and movements can be easily co-opted for 
various purposes according to the needs of the discriminating group. For this reason, this literature 
review argues that scholarship should focus on both the distinct rise of new manifestations of 
antisemitism (including chimeric manifestations), and changes in the use of older manifestations, 
while resisting the temptation to compartmentalise these developments under umbrella terms such 
as ‘new’ antisemitism. This focus should instead be directed towards how manifestations interact, 
how they are distinguished from each other qualitatively and quantitatively, and the continuous 
reactions between antisemitism and antisemitism scholarship. 
 The debate over ‘new’ antisemitism is one of the key sources of literature on antisemitism 
following World War II. This focus is understandable, considering it concerns the establishment 
and survival of the state of Israel, a central event in twentieth century Jewish history. However, a 
significant amount of literature has been dedicated to the debate over whether there is a ‘new’ 
antisemitism. In using the term ‘new’, ‘new’ antisemitism attempts to establish itself as one of the 
three main incarnations of anti-Jewish prejudice, alongside what constitutes ‘old’ manifestations 
of religious antisemitism, and state-based antisemitism. While aspects of ‘new’ antisemitism are 
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certainly significant, attempting to group all the major qualitative developments to antisemitism 
under a single umbrella term has resulted in a divisive debate over its existence, which risked 
diminishing the scope of scholarship. In a similar vein, Moses also criticised the reaction to 
Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners for focusing the debate on a dichotomy between agency 
and structure, rather than expanding and exploring different frameworks, as Timothy Snyder did 
in Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning. It is necessary to explore new frameworks 
as antisemitism shifts to online spaces, for the aspects of the new medium may limit the ability to 
apply the lessons and paradigms of earlier scholarship, as was seen in the case of cyberbullying. 
 Ultimately, this review points towards the value of a study on online antisemitism. The 
internet’s role in the preservation of old and creation of new forms of antisemitism has been 
subject to limited research. This small body of literature is covered in chapter four alongside 
comparisons between online antisemitism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination. 
The internet has triggered a new age of international communication, especially on a casual and 
social level. This means the internet is a significant tool in the globalisation of antisemitism, 
allowing for the sharing and intersection of various antisemitic and other ideas with 
unprecedented ease. Finally, since Holocaust denial has demonstrated the reactive relationship 
between antisemitism itself and the scholarship thereof, new methods for responding to 
antisemitism need to be continuously investigated. The internet serves as both a space for this 
increasingly close relationship and as a potential medium to test new strategies for responding to 
antisemitism. For these reasons, this thesis offers both a comprehensive analysis of antisemitism 
on the internet and suggests new online-based methodologies to aid efforts combating 
antisemitism. Combining these two purposes is the best way to utilise the extensive 
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historiography of antisemitism, aspiring to find solutions to contemporary issues, rather than 
continuing to observe problems from a distance.   
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Chapter 4 
Methodology: Integrating Broader Fields into Antisemitism Research 
 
By building upon the previous two chapters, this methodology chapter provides a holistic approach 
to the field of online antisemitism. This is achieved by directly applying the concepts and issues 
of online discourse explored in chapter two, while simultaneously considering the lessons and 
issues in antisemitism research explored in chapter three. This chapter begins by applying the key 
sociological concepts relevant to online abuse and discrimination to antisemitism. The first section 
of this chapter describes the broader trends represented by the antisemitic spaces analysed in 
chapter five. The next section critically examines the most relevant research on online 
antisemitism, predominantly the theory of antisemitism 2.0. Following this examination, the issues 
identified in cyberbullying and cyber-racism research are applied to research on antisemitism and 
are further explored through a comparison between the GamerGate movement and online 
antisemitism. Coalescing the lessons of the chapter, the final section details the construction and 
evaluation of frameworks, which can be applied to instances of antisemitism seen in the various 
websites and social media platforms explored in chapter five. 
 
Antisemitism’s Shift Online 
Cost and Distribution: Antisemitism 
The shift of antisemitism onto the internet echoes the rapid rise of Holocaust denial and modern 
anti-Jewish worldviews. From the 1960s, antisemitic propaganda was primarily spread through 
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print media, such as through the pseudo-academic Journal of Historical Review and the multiple 
reprintings of the Protocols. While the distribution of these text-based materials continues more 
efficiently online, they have been joined by new manifestations of antisemitism that take advantage 
of features unique to online communication. In the pre and early modern eras, antisemitism would 
be spread via imagery, such as blood libel in church art and sculptures1 and antisemitic motifs in 
passion plays.2 Online antisemitism is shifting back towards image-based manifestations through 
the recognition of antisemitic imagery and symbolism. Reduced geographic barriers and extremely 
reduced costs of publishing are the main features that distinguish online antisemitism from the 
distribution of these previous manifestations. Historic image-based antisemitism would overcome 
language and literacy barriers, but also required high cost to create and would typically be visible 
only to those who either lived nearby or who could afford to travel. Any broader distribution of 
pre-internet antisemitism (both text and image) required expensive quantities of paper, printing, 
and the creation of infrastructure to promote the ideology globally, such as through groups 
including the Institute for Historical Review (IHR). On the internet, however, attention is a 
strongly contested commodity, resulting in lengthy text-based manifestations such as arguments 
of Holocaust denial being supplanted by simpler image-based antisemitism. This shift represents 
antisemitism’s adaptability online, which also takes advantage of the elimination of geographic 
and language-based barriers. In addition, due to reduced distribution costs, there is less immediate 
need for dedicated infrastructure to promote antisemitism (e.g. international organisations and 
publishers), as virtually anyone can become a content creator.  
 
1 Toni L. Kamins, ‘From Notre Dame to Prague, Europe’s anti-Semitism is literally carved in stone’, Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, 20 March 2015. <https://www.jta.org/2015/03/20/archive/from-notre-dame-to-prague-europes-
anti-semitism-is-literally-carved-in-stone> [accessed 20 January 2020] (para. 6-9 of 12). 
2 Joan Young Gregg, Devils, Women, and Jews: Reflects of the Other in Medieval Sermon Stories (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 169-236. 
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The internet’s changes to the cost and distribution of content mark a change in 
antisemitism’s tone and strategy. Antisemitic content online can be far more personal and direct, 
marking a shift from the distant, pseudo-intellectual content of Holocaust deniers. This aggressive 
content was and is possible offline, such as harassment via mail, but differs online through having 
a potentially large audience (with harasser potentially trying to influence this audience). The 
diminished time, cost, and social risk of engaging in this harassment are also potential factors in 
these manifestations, as are the reactions of harassment targets before this online audience. Older 
manifestations of antisemitism still exist alongside online antisemitism, but it is important to 
consider their relationship with the internet. For example, the offline distribution of an antisemitic 
poster may recommend an antisemitic website, which can contain far more information.3 The 
poster’s new primary use in this context is to increase awareness of antisemitic content in spaces 
where it would otherwise be unseen (e.g. on university campuses), relying on the website to 
provide the actual information. 
 
Cyberspace: Antisemitism 
Antisemites further adapt to the internet by creating and controlling online spaces. In these spaces, 
less dedicated antisemites can also engage in the creation of antisemitic content that they enjoy, as 
per the principle of prosumption. This represents both a significant quantitative change to 
antisemitism that goes beyond the streamlining of existing distribution methods, and a qualitative 
change through the actual purpose, use and design of these spaces and content. The creation of 
 
3 This is a common feature of Antipodean Resistance posters, representing a Neo-Nazi movement in Australia. 
These posters feature images and rhetoric associated with online culture, and despite distributing their posters in 
public spaces, the movement is extremely protective of their offline identities. 
Julie Nathan, Report on Antisemitism in Australia 2018: 1 October 2017 – 30 September 2018 (Sydney, Executive 
Council of Australian Jewry 2018), pp. 52-61 
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shared virtual cyberspaces has led to an almost territorial attitude towards online communication. 
Cyberspaces that promote antisemitic content can be defended by its users, both content producers 
and consumers. Large groups of these users can be directed to harass Jews and other minorities 
with ease both inside and outside cyberspace. Within cyberspace, this behaviour is also known as 
‘brigading’, an internet colloquialism that refers to the coordinated mass interference of an online 
space by users of another.4 This can take the form of sending a barrage of harassing messages or 
directing users to manipulate a poll with mass amounts of votes. Users can be directed to engage 
in pre-internet antisemitic activity outside cyberspace, such as distributing posters, however 
participants can more effectively hide their identities if organising online. Cyberspace represents 
both new opportunities for coordinating antisemitic activity, such as target-based antisemitic 
cyberbullying, and a shift in the content and presentation of antisemitism.  
 
Online Anonymity: Antisemitism 
Regarding antisemitism, online anonymity means that antisemites can form their own cyberspaces 
where everyone is protected by degrees of anonymity, and so self-regulation cannot stop those 
spaces from generating and sharing antisemitic material. Furthermore, some social media websites 
like Facebook and Reddit allow users to create their own subspaces within the fabric of the website 
– Facebook groups and ‘subreddits’. If the libertarian model of anonymity5 is followed too closely 
in these instances, or the website administrators do not have the resources to fully self-regulate all 
spaces, antisemites can create propaganda sub-platforms that are easily accessible and promotable 
 
4 Know Your Meme, Vote Brigading (2015), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/vote-brigading> [accessed 1 
March 2019]. 
5 Ya-Ching Lee, ‘Internet and Anonymity’, Society, 43.4 (2007), 5-7. 
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to millions of other social media users. Research at the University of Stockholm has found that 
online anonymity is creating freer communication, albeit with less accountability.6 Less 
accountability means that antisemites have less risk of losing social capital when spreading 
bigotry, and do not risk their reputation making dubious claims. This latter aspect may even 
encourage the fabrication of new ‘chimeric’ manifestations of antisemitism. Furthermore, users 
can create additional accounts to spread and repeat the same content, promoting an illusion of 
broader support. Internet technology even enables users to create ‘bot’ accounts (short for robot) 
that engage in scripted activities, such as retweeting another account, or ‘liking’ a page on 
Facebook. Since social media spaces often base the visibility of information on its popularity (e.g. 
likes or retweets), this allows antisemites to artificially promote content with relative ease.7 
 
Internet Memes: Antisemitism 
Internet memes serve as vehicles to make antisemitic ideas and claims accessible to a broader 
audience.8 Internet memes can also be used as crude but effective tools for bullying or intimidating 
Jews on the internet. This use can discourage prominent, and potentially all, Jews from 
participating in certain online spaces, or may provoke emotional responses in attempts to 
embarrass victims. This behaviour demonstrates how ‘trolling’9 can be weaponised by antisemites. 
 
6 Jacob Palme and Mikael Berglund, Anonymity on the Internet, 2 July 2007 [pre-print] 
<https://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/anonymity.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019] (p. 10). 
7 It is worth mentioning here that while it is possible to spread print antisemitism anonymously, it is more difficult 
and expensive to do so. There is always the risk of being recognised when handing out pamphlets or putting up 
posters. One of the reasons why these features are singled out is how they work together; they allow both an 
inexpensive and risk-free spreading of antisemitism. 
8 Andre Oboler, Recognizing Hate Speech: Antisemitism on Facebook (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 
2013) <http://ohpi.org.au/reports/IR13-1_Recognizing_hate_speech_antisemitism_on_Facebook.pdf> [accessed 14 
November 2018] (p. 1). 
9 Know Your Meme, Trolling (2010), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/subcultures/trolling> [accessed 24 April 
2017]. 
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Internet memes are very accessible, in terms of both producing and consuming content. This 
accessible nature has facilitated the creation of online spaces where regular users (many of whom 
create content) actively encourage the distribution of antisemitic content. These spaces can also 
encourage the proliferation of antisemitic memes online, either by leading more users back to the 
antisemitic spaces (who are encouraged to make spread memes themselves), or through the 
coordinated promotion of the discussion of antisemitic content elsewhere online. Internet memes 
are considerably important when considering quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism, 
as they represent both increased efficiency in spreading antisemitism, and significant shifts in 
intent and style. Rather than attempting to legitimise the antisemitic movement with pseudo-
intellectual material, as per Holocaust denial, they are appealing to crassness and direct 
provocation. 
One key example of provocative religious antisemitism is the blood libel sculpturing 
incorporated into church architecture.10 This use of blood libel can be directly compared to the 
internet meme manifestation presented in this thesis’ opening, demonstrating the impact of 
prosumption, and cost and distribution factors, to the design and spread of historic antisemitic 
tropes. In medieval Europe, the incorporation of blood libel into church architecture would have 
effectively exposed as large a population as possible to the antisemitic trope. With the majority of 
the population being non-literate, the sculpture maximises its accessibility, while also enduring 
due its construction material. These factors maximise its exposure, thereby allowing the population 
nearby to be continuously exposed to the trope over centuries. However, this manifestation can 
only exist with the structure itself, is extremely costly, and requires skill to be carved. Furthermore, 
this manifestation will generally only be found relatable by the population that lives nearby to the 
 
10 Kamins, para. 6-9 of 12. 
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structure. The blood libel internet meme promotes accessibility by adapting a pre-existing 
template, particularly one already used within alt-right circles. While using text, the colouration of 
the blood in the meme and additions of Jewish stereotypical features make the text non-essential 
in communicating the idea, and so the meme represents a primarily image-based example of blood 
libel. The main differences represented by the meme’s manifestation are easier creation and 
distribution (being made in a matter of minutes with little expertise and no cost) and being 
distributed globally rather than within a small geographical area. Another key difference is 
purpose; while the historical example serves to frighten and inform the broader population, the 
meme serves to intimidate Jews and humour like-minded users. Therefore, while online 
antisemitism uses historical manifestations, differing design, distribution and purpose all represent 
qualitative changes. 
While the blood libel meme represents how existing antisemitic ideas and tropes are 
changed by the internet, it is not an especially prominent antisemitic meme. Antisemitic memes 
that become embedded within broader intent culture must also be considered. These memes 
represent a broader qualitative change to antisemitism itself, distinct from other forms of online 
discrimination. A key example of these memes is the colloquially known ‘Happy Merchant’ 
meme,11 arguably the most prominent antisemitic meme online.12 The meme manifests as a 
“cartoon picture depicting a negative stereotype of a Jewish man with a black beard, long hooked 
nose, a hunched back, crooked teeth, and hands being wrung in glee,” (appendix C, figure 7.1) 
created by a white supremacist pseudonymously known as A. Wyatt Mann in 2004.13 Since then, 
the meme has appeared in multiple ‘flavours’ that each promote a certain negative stereotype of 
 
11 Know Your Meme, Happy Merchant (2011), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant> [accessed 1 
March 2019]. 
12 Andre Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2014), p. 6.  
13 Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew, p. 6. 
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Jews, including: unappealing appearance (appendix C, figure 7.2), comparisons to vermin 
(appendix C, figure 7.3), conspiracy theories of controlling feminist and LGBT movements 
(appendix C, figure 7.4), conspiracy theories of controlling the media (appendix C, figure 7.5), an 
obsession with money (appendix C, figure 7.6), conspiracy theories of controlling banks (appendix 
C, figure 7.7), conspiracy theories of controlling and destroying other countries (appendix C, figure 
7.8), and an association with Satan (appendix C, figure 7.9).  
The Merchant meme is directly inspired by historical antisemitic imagery,14 taking visual 
cues from Nazi stereotypes that were similarly reproduced into different ‘flavours’ of 
antisemitism.15 However, a key distinction is how the meme itself acts as a common antisemitic 
template – a unit of cultural transmission – resulting in a culture surrounding the cartoon. This 
culture encourages further replication and distribution of the meme to promote a broad variety of 
antisemitic ideas. This is distinct from the blood libel meme, which represents an antisemitic 
modification of an existing template, rather than being an antisemitic template itself. The broad 
applicability of the Merchant template allows it to promote ‘redemptive’ antisemitic worldviews, 
associating Judaism with broader social movements and phenomena (e.g. LGBT movements and 
mainstream media) in order to support broader Jewish conspiracy theories. While historical 
manifestations of redemptive antisemitism would promote broad worldviews through extensive 
texts, like the Protocols, these memes instead promote it piecemeal through singular images 
regularly redistributed within common cyberspaces. The use of a common template allows each 
instance to support further instances through a shared culture, thus spreading the antisemitic views. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 26. 
15 For example, the Nazi film Der ewige Jew (1940), juxtaposes images of unshaven, starving Jews in the Warsaw 
Ghetto with images of rats, promoting both a visual comparison and the concept of Jews as vermin. 
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Tools and environments provided by the social internet have enabled a self-perpetuating 
culture surrounding the Merchant meme. Before the internet, antisemitic imagery would share 
certain traits, but would never be based on such a common, and commonly shared, template. The 
breakdown of geographic and language barriers has allowed a broad userbase to edit and publish 
these images, resulting in the globalisation of this crude imagery and thus a global culture 
surrounding it. It is worth mentioning that there is no analogous meme (i.e. a similarly prominent 
template) for any other ethnic or religious minority, which indicates a distinctiveness to 
antisemitism online. This is despite the origin of the caricature in a comic strip situated alongside 
another caricature of a black man (appendix C, figure 8.1), and the meme’s creator creating 
additional caricatures of black (appendix C, figures 8.2, 8.3) and Mexican (appendix C, figure 8.4) 
men.16 While some of Mann’s other creations are also used as memes, particularly the “Around 
Blacks Never Relax” caricature,17 these memes are less prominent, and typically do not advance 
anti-black hatred, instead applying the template to unrelated phenomena and even other 
ethnicities.18 Ultimately, it is only the Merchant creation that is as ubiquitously used and 
recognised as a qualitatively distinct symbol of hate online. 
 
Antisemitism 2.0 
Building on the literature on pre-internet antisemitism and the terminology of digital cultures, the 
next step is to combine these areas in a framework based on the existing academic work on 
 
16 Know Your Meme, A. Wyatt Mann (2017), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/people/a-wyatt-mann> [accessed 
15 December 2019]. 
17 Ibid., para. 7 of 11.  
Know Your Meme, Around Blacks Never Relax (2015), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/around-blacks-never-
relax> [accessed 14 June 2019]. 
18 Ibid. 
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antisemitism online. For this purpose, the framework of “Antisemitism 2.0” is used. Antisemitism 
2.0, a term coined by Andre Oboler,19 describes the way antisemitism was adapted to web 2.0 and 
social media so as to normalise antisemitism online. This particularly relates to normalisation 
through the fostering of social acceptability of both long-standing antisemitic tropes, and the 
methods used by online antisemites. 20 Applying this framework to analyses of antisemitic online 
content helps explore how antisemitism has qualitatively and quantitatively changed due to the 
rise of the internet, web 2.0 and social media.  
Oboler coined the term “Antisemitism 2.0” in 2008, linking it to the term web 2.0, referring 
to the technological changes that facilitated greater interaction between users of the internet. 
Oboler summarises the definition of antisemitism 2.0 in a series of papers21 written on the matter: 
 
[Antisemitism 2.0 is] the use of online social networking and content collaboration to share 
demonization, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, and classical antisemitic motifs with 
a view to creating social acceptability for such content.22 
 
Antisemitism 2.0 involves not just promoting antisemitic ideas, but also conferring on their 
legitimacy in the broader public sphere, by insidiously mixing them with existing mainstream ideas 
 
19 Andre Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism 2.0. ‘Social Antisemitism’ on the ‘Social Web’’, Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs, 67 (2008) <http://jcpa.org/article/online-antisemitism-2-0-social-antisemitism-on-the-social-web> 
[accessed 10 December 2019]. 
20 Ibid., para. 10 of 70. 
21 Ibid. 
Andre Oboler, ‘Facebook, Holocaust Denial, and Anti-Semitism 2.0’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 86 
(2009) <http://jcpa.org/article/facebook-holocaust-denial-and-anti-semitism-2-0> [accessed 2 March 2019]. 
Andre Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism: The Internet and the Campus’, in Anti-Semitism on the Campus: Past and 
Present, ed. by Eunice G. Pollack (Brighton: Academic Studies Press 2010), pp 330-354. 
22 Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism 2.0’, para. 10 of 70. 
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and movements. However, Oboler stops short of identifying this mixing as an explicit “aim or side 
effect” of antisemitism 2.0.23 This chapter and chapter five explore how the normalisation of 
antisemitism online can be spread despite varying levels of intent behind users and website 
administrators. 
 One of the key ways antisemitism 2.0 normalises antisemitic ideas and motifs is through 
“deep antisemitism”, which Oboler identifies as “an underlying link to classical antisemitic 
motifs.”24 Deep antisemitism can result in individuals and groups inadvertently promoting 
antisemitism, due to a failure to recognise classical antisemitic motifs present in sources they rely 
on. Oboler gives an example of an incident at a student government body at a UK campus circa 
2009, during which representatives began forcefully expressing antisemitic views.25 These 
individuals would not be classified as dedicated antisemites, but rather had taken stock in 
antisemitic content found in several places online. Oboler suggests that factors such as online 
repetition (that is, the presence of similar antisemitic lies on multiple websites, and high source-
ranking in search engines), could give the false impression of legitimacy to these antisemitic lies.26 
The groundwork for this strategy was laid in the Holocaust denial movement of the late twentieth 
century. The names and design of organisations like the IHR helped deniers to appear legitimate 
and unbiased, thereby masking the underlying antisemitism in their papers.  
 Antisemitism 2.0’s normalisation, ensuing spread, and underlying links to classical 
antisemitism have been confirmed by a ten-year long study by Monika Schwarz-Friesel.27 The 
 
23 Ibid., para. 13 of 70. 
24 Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism: The Internet and the Campus’, p. 333. 
25 Ibid, p. 330. 
26 Oboler, Online Antisemitism 2.0. ‘Social Antisemitism’ on the Social Web’, para. 43, 66 of 70. 
27 Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate: Hostility towards Jews as a cultural 
constant and collective emotional value in the digital age (short version) (Berlin: Technische Universität 
Berlin, 2018) <https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg72/Antisemitism_2.0_short_version_final.pdf> 
[accessed 21 May 2020] (p. 4). 
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corpus study was conducted between 2007 and 2018, drew data from both a growing list of 
websites and social media platforms, 28 and coded the antisemitic statuses of comments as classical 
antisemitism, post-Holocaust antisemitism or Israel-centred antisemitism.29 The data from the 
corpora is limited to text-based comments, which limits broader analysis on other forms of 
antisemitism, such as images (particularly memes), videos and audio. However, Schwarz-Friesel 
acknowledges the “multimodal encoding” of antisemitism on web 2.0,30 and it is worth considering 
that data collection methods focusing on text will still sweep up other modes of antisemitism which 
have drawn antisemitic comments (e.g. comments agreeing with a meme or video). Schwarz-
Friesel’s study found high quantities of classical antisemitic stereotypes regardless of context or 
stylistic differences,31 demonstrating the continuity of the Western tradition of anti-Judaism.32 The 
study also indicates a growing radicalisation over time,33 suggesting qualitative change to 
antisemitism due to web 2.0. Finally, the study demonstrates structural similarities in antisemitic 
encoding between Muslim, right-wing and left-wing antisemitism.34 The structural similarities can 
being linked to the interactivity and interconnectivity of web 2.0, allowing community and 
networks to be infiltrated by more radicalised antisemites (both in-group and out-group due to 
anonymity), resulting in increasing normalisation of more extreme manifestations of antisemitism. 
Compared to web 1.0, the interactive nature of web 2.0 more effectively facilitates the 
communication and organisation of hate groups, and the quantitative normalisation of 
 
28 Ibid., p. 11. 
29 Ibid., p. 6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., pp. 8, 11. 
32 Monika Schwarz-Friesel, ‘“Antisemitism 2.0”—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide 
Web’, in Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach, ed. by Armin Lange and others 
(Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), pp. 311-338 (pp. 331-332). 
33 Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate, pp. 7-8. 
34 Ibid., p. 11. 
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antisemitism. However, the existence of deep antisemitism and normalisation tactics before the 
internet may cast doubt on the hypothesis that the internet has caused significant qualitative 
changes to antisemitism. While changes in technology as significant as the internet represent a 
major change to antisemitism (along with other forms of discrimination) in itself, technological 
changes do not necessarily result in qualitative changes to antisemitic content and strategy. For 
example, the IHR initially used the internet to store materials, which were qualitatively unchanged 
from before the internet. While the materials are the same, the difference is quantitative; the low 
cost and ease of distribution providing access to people who would otherwise be either unexposed 
or incapable of finding the IHR’s material. It is worth considering whether and how technological 
changes brought by the internet have also resulted in greater degrees of qualitative and quantitative 
change to the content and strategy of antisemitism. The strongest component examined so far is 
the technological ability to participate as a creator, although that is limited to web 2.0, rather than 
the entire internet. The IHR was specialised and exceptional in its creation and distribution of 
antisemitism, even as it moved online, but the empowerment of user creativity brought about by 
web 2.0 has led to the development of newer manifestations of antisemitism (e.g. the Merchant 
meme). In order to properly determine the degree of quantitative and qualitative change to 
antisemitism brought about by the internet, chapter five analyses a select number of noteworthy 
antisemitic websites and social media platforms that have advanced antisemitism 2.0. 
Normalisation of antisemitism is also a key consideration in the distinction between 
individual and group-based antisemitic cyberbullying. Individual antisemitic cyberbullying is less 
likely to normalise antisemitism, but rather be a product of its normalisation (especially in the use 
of antisemitism jokes). Comparably, targeted group-based cyberbullying of Jews online may result 
in such harassment becoming normalised to bystanders, including the antisemitic content used 
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(e.g. slurs, jokes, memes). In addition, normalised antisemitic content within online spaces may 
encourage Jewish individuals (or people opposed to antisemitism) to leave those spaces, indicating 
that group-based cyberbullying can have a broader effect than just its direct targets. These 
intersections of cyberbullying and cyber-racism are key to understanding the broader changes to 
abuse and discrimination caused by to the internet, as seen in chapter two. Additionally, direct 
comparisons of these phenomena with antisemitism can determine whether these changes are 
likely common to all such manifestations of discrimination and harassment, or if there are further 
qualitative distinctions in the manifestation of antisemitic cyberbullying and cyber-racism. This 
comparison will also help to determine the extent of qualitative and quantitative changes caused 
by the technology of the internet itself. Therefore, before applying antisemitism 2.0 and other 
frameworks to analyses of antisemitic spaces online, this chapter provides a holistic consideration 
of antisemitism’s relationship to cyberbullying and broader online discrimination. This holistic 
consideration further informs the construction of additional frameworks applied in the analyses of 
antisemitic spaces. 
 
Cyberbullying and Online Antisemitism 
Targeted harassment of Jews online represents how antisemitism can be a subset of cyberbullying, 
and how cyberbullying can be a subset of antisemitism. However, the ways in which cyberbullying 
perpetrators utilise antisemitism to antagonise individual Jews must be distinguished from any 
broader antisemitic campaigns. Nonetheless, individual cyberbullying using antisemitism still 
serves to normalise antisemitism online and risks individual users – particularly bullies – being 
influenced by antisemitic ideas. The relationships between antisemitism, cyberbullying and cyber-
hate, and how they intersect are key issues for the following sections (appendix C, figure 9.1). 
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Comparing the State of the Fields 
Cyberbullying research is arguably the most analogous and informative field to research regarding 
online antisemitism, representing a significantly large body of research on an adjacent 
phenomenon. Many manifestations of antisemitism online would fall under the umbrella of 
cyberbullying.35 Cyberbullying and cyber-hate can both take advantage of online anonymity, 
preventing damage to perpetrators’ reputations. The racist dimension of cyberbullying has been 
investigated by Kowalski et al. in Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age,36 and is typically 
considered a factor behind the growing number of studies on cyberbullying.37 While cyberbullying 
only makes up one aspect of online antisemitism, the correlations between the two fields over 
definitional issues, statistical trends, and qualitative and quantitative changes necessitate that 
future antisemitism researchers heed the lessons and issues in cyberbullying research. In addition, 
cyberbullying represents a harmful online activity that may be considered ‘fun’ by perpetrators. 
This warrants comparisons with antisemitism online, which has also become a ‘recreational’ 
activity for some, through the circulation of dark humour and provocative memes. 
Both cyberbullying and online antisemitism have roots in traditional/offline variants. In 
addition, research into both phenomena has roots in decades-old research on these traditional 
variants. As explored in chapter three, research into antisemitism goes back for potentially 
centuries, but prominently entered mainstream academia following the Holocaust. The first 
research studies on bullying emerged in Scandinavia in the 1970s, but the field experienced a 
 
35 These incidents would be cyberbullying of individuals in which antisemitism or racism is used as an attack, which 
is distinct from abuse coming from people intentionally seeking to abuse Jews or people of other races. 
36 Robin M. Kowalski, Susan P. Limber and Patricia W. Agatston, Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age 
(Blackwell Publishing: Sussex, 2012), pp. 27-9, 107, 200-04. 
37 Tracy E. Waasdorp and Catherine P. Bradshaw, ‘The Overlap between Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying’, 
Journal of Adolescent Health, 56.5 (May 2015), 483-488 (p. 486). 
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similar boom in interest during the 1990s after several highly publicised teenage suicides and the 
1998 Columbine school massacre.38 Interestingly, while there is arguably a larger volume of 
research into antisemitism than into bullying, the inverse is true when comparing research on 
cyberbullying and online antisemitism.  
While cyberbullying research has a far smaller body of literature compared to traditional 
bullying, chapter two demonstrated a recent boom of interest into cyberbullying, leading to a series 
of broad concurrent international studies. Comparatively, research into online antisemitism has 
been limited to a small number of researchers. While there are even several scholarly books 
focusing on cyberbullying, there is comparatively limited material published specifically on online 
antisemitism. The first dedicated report was an initiative of the Inter-Parliamentary Council 
Against Antisemitism, Antisemitism on the Internet: A Legal Analysis and Proposals for Action, 
published in 1998.39 There was limited material over the next decade, although antisemitism would 
be explored alongside cyber-racism in texts with a broader focus, such as in Racism on the Internet, 
published in 2009.40 Yet, the first book specifically dedicated to online antisemitism, Viral Hate, 
a non-scholarly text written by the directors of the Anti-Defamation League, was only published 
in 2013.41 Nonetheless, new articles investigating online antisemitism are coming out at an 
increasing rate, including studies spearheaded by the new Institute for the Study of Contemporary 
Antisemitism, founded in 2009.42  
 
38 Shelley Hymel and Susan M. Swearer, ‘Four Decades of Research on School Bullying: An Introduction’, 
American Psychologist, 70.4 (2015), 293-299 (p. 293). 
39 Nicholas Higham, Antisemitism on the Internet: A Legal Analysis and Proposals for Action (United Kingdom: 
Denton Hall, Inter-Parliamentary Council Against Antisemitism, 1998). 
40 Yaman Akdeniz, Racism on the Internet (Council of Europe, 2009). 
41 Abraham H. Foxman and Christopher Wolf, Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
42 Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism, Best Practises to Combat Antisemitism on Social Media: 
Research Report to the U.S. Department of State Office of Religion and Global Affairs (Bloomington: Indiana 
University, July 2017). 
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One of the most active sources of new information and publications about online 
antisemitism is the Online Hate Prevention Institute (OHPI), founded by Andre Oboler in 2012.43 
The OHPI focuses on a broad range of online discrimination and abuse, although its most ground-
breaking research has been on online antisemitism. The institute contributed to the 2015 UNESCO 
report on countering online hate speech,44 and has been the subject of a successful case study on 
creating online communities of resistance and solidarity.45 Most notably, Oboler and the OHPI 
combine research with direct action to reduce the quantity of antisemitism online. In Oboler’s 2016 
report Measuring the Hate: The State of Antisemitism in Social Media, he recorded quantities of 
user-reported antisemitic content on social media over time, as well as the response and remove 
rate of social media platforms to the content.46 The OHPI also hosts informative guides about how 
to report and combat antisemitism and other forms of discrimination on social media platforms, 
demonstrating the broad scope of the OHPI’s goals.47  
The reasons behind the (if modest) rise of academic interest in online antisemitism are 
similar to those behind cyberbullying; being linked to the rise of social media, increased media 
attention, and public awareness of both offline and online antisemitism. It is important to monitor 
the perception of antisemitism in the media and public sphere to determine how this affects 
academic interest in online antisemitism. This is necessary for researchers to avoid the assumption 
that an increase in either the number of studies or media attention implies a higher rate of 
 
43 The Online Hate Prevention Institute, Mission and Vision (2012), <http://ohpi.org.au/> [accessed 10 
December 2019] (para. 8 of 8). 
44 UNESCO, Countering Online Hate Speech, by Igino Gagliardone and others (Paris: United Nations, 2015), pp. 
40-49. 
45 Andrew Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race 
Hate (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 226-236. 
46 Andre Oboler, Measuring the Hate: The State of Antisemitism in Social Media (Melbourne: Online Hate 
Prevention Institute, 2016). 
47 The Online Hate Prevention Institute, Antisemitism (2019), <http://ohpi.org.au/antisemitism/#reports> [accessed 
12 December 2019]. 
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antisemitism. Ultimately, a cursory glance of the quantity of published material on online 
antisemitism demonstrates that there is a gap in research comparing traditional manifestations with 
online manifestations. This is especially prominent when compared to the shrinking gap between 
research on traditional bullying and cyberbullying. While quantity of research does not necessarily 
reflect quality of research, it does highlight that neither antisemitism researchers nor broader 
society may yet recognise the importance of research into online manifestations of antisemitism. 
In addition, many antisemitism researchers may lack the skills, or inclinations to learn new skills, 
to study online antisemitism. When considering the societal concern towards cyberbullying, people 
with the skills to research online abuse may be more attracted to areas such as cyberbullying, due 
to higher public demand, and may be dissuaded from antisemitism research due to high 
requirements of background study. These issues are worth addressing, and they may be mitigated 
by greater interdisciplinary collaboration between research on cyberbullying, broader cyber-
racism, and specific strains of discrimination online such as antisemitism and misogyny. 
The mixed reasons behind the growth of cyberbullying research demonstrate several 
lessons that are important for online antisemitism research. Firstly, cyberbullying represents a 
societal issue with potentially larger breadth than traditional bullying, as it is no longer physically 
and temporally confined to the ‘schoolyard’ – instead, it can be perpetrated anywhere at any time. 
The technology that enables the spread of bullying beyond the schoolyard also contributes to 
higher social awareness surrounding cyberbullying, due to factors of virality and ease of access. 
These effects are also reflected in higher media focus and rates of government and academic action. 
The pressure behind these actions, including further research, come from a broad-reaching societal 
concern over the mortality of children. The considerable rise in internet and mobile technology 
use has resulted in a rise in cyberbullying rates not necessarily linked to overall bullying rates. 
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This contributes to a perception of cyberbullying as a recently evolved, rapidly growing threat to 
children. The perceived rapid evolution reflects a disparity with interest in more established issues, 
such as Aboriginal youth suicide rates, and the persistence of antisemitism – the ‘longest hatred’. 
Despite the focus on children, cyberbullying also represents the closest thing to a universal threat 
to all users of electronic communications. The breadth of this threat constitutes another minor 
reason behind high quantities of cyberbullying research and indicates its value as a central focus 
in comparing broad forms of online victimisation, harassment, and discrimination. Ultimately, 
while research into cyberbullying has grown due to rising rates of the phenomenon itself, this 
growth has been accelerated by significant public attention. This latter point suggests that 
increasing public awareness of online antisemitism and other forms of online discrimination may 
have an effect on the growth of research into these phenomena, thereby reducing the research 
burdens on minority scholars. However, this strategy cannot be easily relied upon, warranting the 
development of additional strategies to encourage research on online antisemitism and other forms 
of abuse and discrimination online. 
 
Rates of Cyberbullying and Antisemitism 
One key method to determine the qualitative and quantitative effects of electronic communication 
on both bullying and antisemitism is to compare the statistics between offline and online variants 
for each phenomenon. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider whether any changes are common 
to both cyberbullying and antisemitism. If changes are common to both, it can be inferred that such 
changes are caused by the new medium. Conversely, significant differences would reflect that 
qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism online are due to causes specific to 
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antisemitism itself. Any inconsistencies in the rates between offline and online variants within 
each phenomenon would indicate a quantitative change caused by the change in technology.  
It is necessary to consider whether technology simply causes quantitative changes by 
streamlining similar activities, or whether the technology has contributed to actual qualitative 
changes in each phenomenon. If such qualitative changes exist, they may impede the ability to 
apply existing knowledge of offline phenomena to the online. The overlap between cyberbullying 
and online antisemitism here is important, as applicability of existing research can impact the 
success of countermeasures; cyberbullying’s resistance to countermeasures developed from 
research on traditional bullying suggests more than a mere quantitative change. The same principle 
also applies to online antisemitism. While multiple studies have measured rates of cyberbullying, 
inconsistency between methodologies has made it difficult to draw a clear picture of cyberbullying 
trends, except in cases where studies have been conducted over time with standard methodologies. 
Nonetheless, these studies are small in number, and may only be pointing to localised trends (e.g. 
cyberbullying within a single state or country). While general trends indicate that cyberbullying is 
on the rise and traditional bullying is in decline, standardised methodologies will be able to more 
accurately measure trends between studies, helping to ascertain any qualitative differences caused 
by the technology.  
Research into online antisemitism would benefit from considering the issues in quantitative 
cyberbullying research, especially considering only a small number of statistical analyses have 
been published on online antisemitism as of present. Parallel to traditional bullying, evidence 
suggested antisemitism was in decline in ‘Western’ countries towards the latter half of the 
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twentieth century.48 However, the recent rise in populism across the West has given new life to 
antisemitism, especially surrounding the 2016 US Presidential election. Nonetheless, it is 
important to consider how much this populism directly contributes to a rise in antisemitic incidents. 
The annual Anti-Defamation Audit on antisemitic incidents in the US recorded a 34% increase in 
incidents from 2015 to 2016, and an 86% increase in the first quarter of 2017 compared to 2016.49 
However, this is countered by a 2017 report by the Kantor Center, which describes an ongoing 
decrease of worldwide antisemitic violence throughout 2016 and early 2017, and warns researchers 
“to check if there is a discrepancy between the feelings and reactions of Jews, and the actual 
amount of incidents.”50 While the opposing trends between traditional bullying and cyberbullying 
are clear indicators of quantitative and possibly qualitative changes, research on online 
antisemitism must consider whether surges in online antisemitism are correlated to offline surges. 
This emphasises the need for standard methodologies, for if both offline and online antisemitism 
are on upwards trends it will prove more difficult to distinguish any clear quantitative differences.  
Similar to cyberbullying, rises in online antisemitism cannot be entirely accounted for by 
changes to technology, as both can be affected by offline events. Conversely, a rise in 
cyberbullying is still more likely to be strongly affected by technology and online culture than by 
other factors, as each incident of bullying is typically independent from other incidents (although 
they may create a culture of bullying in a localised community, such as a school). However, when 
 
48 Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany: The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 9. 
Anti-Defamation League and Martilla Strategies, A Survey of American Attitudes Towards Jews in America (2013), 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/adl-survey-attitudes-towards-jews-in-us-
2013.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019] (p. 4). 
49 Anti-Defamation League, ADL Audit: U.S. Anti-Semitic Incidents Surged in 2016-17 (2017), 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/Anti-Semitic%20Audit%20Print_vf2.pdf> [accessed 10 
December 2019]. 
50 Kantor Center, Antisemitism Worldwide: 2017 (European Jewish Congress, 2018) 
<http://www.kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/Doch_full_2018_220418.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019] 
(p. 8, 11). 
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antisemitism is utilised in the cyberbullying of individuals, this tendency may be increased by 
higher rates of offline antisemitism and/or greater normalisation of antisemitism. In addition, 
climates contributing to higher rates of antisemitism (e.g. during Middle East conflict flare-ups), 
may result in both offline and online attacks on Jewish groups or individuals that may not have 
otherwise happened. Both of these examples suggest how higher rates of offline discrimination 
and abuse may increase the broader cyberbullying of Jews, which contrasts with the relationship 
between cyberbullying and traditional bullying. 
There is further distinction to be made between reactive antisemitic cyberbullying of 
individuals, and more proactive group-based antisemitic cyberbullying. The former is more typical 
of common cyberbullying approaches and may involve exploiting a characteristic of a victim (this 
being antisemitic) who is already being cyberbullied to further harm them. Conversely, the latter 
represents a more proactive form of cyberbullying, seeking out and targeting Jews specifically 
because of their identity. The targeting of Jewish journalists on Twitter provides an example of 
this proactive cyberbullying, targeting a group rather than an individual. The common use of 
proactive, group-based bullying further distinguishes antisemitism online from more typical 
cyberbullying, and future research on online antisemitism would benefit from analysing other 
forms of online discrimination that also use this tactic. A comparison of rates of proactive 
cyberbullying in various groups could illuminate whether this trait is disproportionately 
represented by antisemitism (thereby indicating unique qualitative changes to online 
antisemitism), or if it is a change shared by broader cyber-hate. 
Currently, there are few statistical analyses into online antisemitism. Over 2015 and 2016 
two major reports on antisemitism on social media were released. The first was Oboler’s 
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Measuring the Hate report,51 which focused on a sample of antisemitic items from Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube between December 2014 and April 2015. The sample was collected from a 
cloud-based tool that allowed users to report the antisemitic content they encountered on social 
media.52 The second major report released between 2015 and 2016 was The Rise of Antisemitism 
on Social Media: Summary of 2016,53 by the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in collaboration with 
Vigo Social Intelligence. The WJC report identified 382,000 antisemitic posts during 2016, but 
only qualitatively analysed a 2% sample of the total.54 The WJC then followed up with another 
report, Anti-Semitic Symbols and Holocaust Denial in Social Media Posts, in January 2018.55 The 
WJC reports covered antisemitic content across most major social media platforms, reporting 83 
seconds as the average time between individual antisemitic posts in 2016, and that there was a 
30% higher use of antisemitic symbols on social media posts in January 2018 compared to the 
monthly average in 2016. In addition to antisemitic symbols, the 2016 report covered expressions 
of hatred against Jews, calls to hurt Jews, dehumanisation of Jews, and Holocaust denial, and 
generally followed the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016 (excluding some examples regarding Israel).  
 
51 Andre Oboler, Measuring the Hate.  
52 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
53 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media: Summary of 
2016 (Tel Aviv-Yafo: Vigo Social Intelligence, 2016) 
<http://www.crif.org/sites/default/fichiers/images/documents/antisemitismreport.pdf> [accessed 10 December 
2019]. 
54 Ibid., p. 13. 
55 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, Anti-Semitic Symbols and Holocaust Denial in Social Media 
Posts (Tel Aviv-Yafo: Vigo Social Intelligence, 2018) 
<https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/download/3KVjYgi8FNOTxdWd5HeFPw?utm_source=PRESS&utm_camp
aign=3d806f4ab8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c3b21e69b1-
3d806f4ab8-&utm_source=WJC+Mailing+Lists&utm_campaign=78bfed156d-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_02_08&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_04292c525e-78bfed156d-318920277> 
[accessed 10 December 2019].  
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The other most significant statistical study of online antisemitism is the Network Contagion 
Research Institute’s (NCRI) 2018 quantitative analysis of antisemitic memes and rhetoric on alt-
right spaces, such as 4chan’s /pol/ board and the Twitter clone, Gab.56 The NCRI report is the most 
recent study at the time of writing, being carried out between August 2016 and January 2018, and 
takes the form of a large-scale, quantitative analysis conducted from hundreds of millions of 
comments and images collected via automated techniques.57 The NCRI report differs from the 
Measuring the Hate and WJC reports by focusing specifically on alt-right spaces, rather than 
broader social media, although it does consider how these spaces spread antisemitic content to 
mainstream social media. This focus provides different insights into the creation and distribution 
of antisemitic content online, as it is within these radical spaces that much of this content 
originates.58 The NCRI report demonstrates a significant increase in the discussion and creation of 
antisemitic content within the study’s timeframe, corresponding to relevant real-world events, such 
as the election of Donald Trump and the 2017 Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally.59 The report 
also finds that the creation of antisemitic content in these spaces is strongly tied to white nationalist 
ideology and discussion.60 
The methodologies between the two WJC reports are the same, and bear similarities to the 
NCRI report, but they are significantly distinct from the Measuring the Hate report. The 
Measuring the Hate report relies on data reported from the public via an online tool, reflecting the 
public’s awareness of antisemitism and willingness to report it. Comparatively, the WJC reports 
utilise an automated system to monitor major social media for pre-determined categories of 
 
56 Joel Finkelstein and others, ‘A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online Antisemitism’, September 2018 
[pre-print] <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01644.pdf> [accessed 28 October 2019]. 
57 Ibid., p. 1. 
58 Ibid., p. 10. 
59 Ibid., p. 4. 
60 Ibid. 
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antisemitism, producing a large quantity of data before analysing a small sample.61 These divergent 
methodologies produce significantly different results, with the WJC showing a disproportionate 
amount of antisemitism on Twitter62 compared to a more evenly balanced distribution across 
platforms in the Measuring the Hate report, despite the data for both reports being collected during 
two close time periods.63  
The broad application of the WJC 2016 reports’ automated methodology risks distorting 
the picture of antisemitism on social media. Twitter has well-developed data analysis tools, and 
limits post lengths through character restrictions. This functionality makes it easier for both 
automated systems to pick up potential antisemitism, and for false positives to be cleared by an in-
person examination. In comparison, the WJC’s automated system would not be able to record 
antisemitism as accurately on video-sharing sites such as YouTube, due to its reliance on text and 
an inability to parse the contents of videos. The limitations of the WJC reports’ automated 
methodology are compensated for by the NCRI report. By focusing on two similar communities, 
both in their roles as fringe alt-right platforms and in their shared dominance of short-text and 
specific image-based content online, the NCRI report can present a far more confident projection 
of the rates of antisemitic discussion and content creation/sharing. Through focusing exclusively 
on alt-right spaces, the NCRI report also reduces the risk of acquiring false positives; terms like 
“Jew” and “White” are far more likely to relate to antisemitism and white nationalism on these 
platforms than on broader social media. While the WJC did follow up on their report with a 
subsequent 2018 report on antisemitic symbols, the NCRI report conducted a more holistic 
approach by considering both text and images within the same analyses. A final, if minor, point is 
 
61 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media, p. 13. 
62 Ibid., p. 39. 
63 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 5. 
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that the NCRI’s longer time frame of eighteen months, compared to WJC’s one year, provides 
broader insight into the trends of antisemitism online, particularly their relation to offline events.  
Another aspect to compare between the 2016 WJC and the Measuring the Hate reports is 
the types of antisemitism that are most commonly features. While the methodologies diverges 
again on the categorisation of antisemitism, it is more closely aligned than on data collection. Both 
reports include categories of promoting violence and Holocaust denial, which are both represented 
as small minorities of antisemitism.64 The Measuring the Hate report’s other two categories are 
“Israel-related” and “Traditional”. While the WJC report does not have a category for antisemitism 
relating to Israel, it does include “Dehumanization” and “Expressions of hatred” categories that do 
appear to roughly align with traditional antisemitism, as suggested in the explanations of those 
categories.65 Combining both of these categories in the WJC report would result in a rate of 49%, 
identical to traditional antisemitism in the Measuring the Hate report. However, complicating the 
comparison between the two reports, is the WJC’s category of “Use of Symbols”. Depending on 
context, the use of symbols may fit in any number of categories and does not appear to be ideally 
suited as a category of antisemitism in its own right. Because of this, it is unknown whether the 
use of symbols would be proportionally spread among other categories of antisemitism.66 Relating 
to this point, it is worth noting that despite Holocaust denial accounting for only 4% of posts in 
the WJC report, Holocaust references are seen in all of the other categories’ examples, excluding 
 
64 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 6. 
World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media, p. 17. 
65 Ibid., pp. 19, 31. 
66 Additionally, there is uncertainty over how an “Israel-related” category would skew the proportion of categories if 
it had been included in the WJC report. Furthermore, despite pledging to leave this category out, references to Israel 
and Zionism are still seen in some examples, suggesting there is some representation of Israel-related antisemitism 
within the WJC report’s data. 
Ibid., pp. 33, 36.  
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“dehumanization”.67 This highlights a complex issue when considering rates of types of 
antisemitism online: many manifestations of antisemitism may fit into more than one category. To 
solve this issue, future research should consider applying a broader range of multiple codes to each 
example of antisemitism, so to limit problematic compartmentalisation, provide deeper 
understanding of antisemitism, and reveal how types of antisemitism intersect and overlap. 
Comparing these existing statistical analyses on antisemitism online with research on 
cyberbullying provides two major insights for future quantitative research into online 
antisemitism. Firstly, researchers should collaborate to ensure that consistent, if not standard, 
methodologies are used, thereby preventing confusion over rates of antisemitism online, similar to 
that seen in cyberbullying research. Due to the smaller number of analyses thus far, this can be 
easily facilitated by collaboration and greater transparency of data; this is featured in the NCRI 
report,68 but not the 2016 WJC report. Secondly, despite the very high volume of content online, 
researchers should be cautious of using automated systems to collect and analyse data. The diverse 
nature of this content may not be fully captured by automated systems, leading to distorted findings 
when used improperly. A research focus on the communities responsible for the creation and 
spread of antisemitism online may help avoid this issue but may be limited when considering the 
impact on broader social media. Utilising methodologies with self-reported data, such as in the 
Measuring the Hate report, also avoids distortion, while also potentially providing insight into the 
perception of and opposition to antisemitism by web users. This second point emphasises another 
major lesson to be learned generally from cyberbullying research: to consider the perspectives of 
the victims and witnesses of online abuse. Nonetheless, self-reporting methods prevent proper 
 
67 While Holocaust references are not necessarily Holocaust denial, they do suggest a higher significance of the 
Holocaust to antisemitism than is suggested by the 4% of Holocaust denial posts. 
Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 29 
68 Finkelstein and others, p. 1. 
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quantification of the degree of deep antisemitism on social media, as regular web users are less 
likely to identify it; therefore, new methodologies are needed to fill this gap. Still, new 
methodologies should be informed by existing studies, so as to help develop interdisciplinary 
approaches that support existing research by avoiding inconsistencies and providing answers to 
gaps in research. 
 
Definitional Issues 
While there are methodological differences between the Measuring the Hate and WJC reports,69 
they do avoid a significant problem seen in cyberbullying research by adhering to a single 
definition of their phenomenon: IHRA’s Working Definition of antisemitism. The Working 
Definition of antisemitism is a valuable milestone and a useful tool for research into both offline 
and online antisemitism. Similar to bullying and cyberbullying, antisemitism has had a difficult 
definitional history, especially considering the term’s problematic origins in German journalist 
Wilhelm Marr’s 1879 publications.70 IHRA’s Working Definition states: 
 
Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward 
Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish 
 
69 This is not as relevant for the NCRI report, as it focuses on specific manifestations of antisemitism, such as the 
‘Happy Merchant’ meme. 
70 Wilhelm Marr, Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum. Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus 
betrachtet (Bern: Rudolf Costenoble, 1879). 
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or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and 
religious facilities. 71 
 
The definition also provides several examples that are considered part of the definition.72 Since 
May 2016, this definition has been adopted by the EU Parliament and within government bodies 
of 19 IHRA member and observer nations.73 Despite this broad adoption, there is still significant 
academic discussion to be had about the issue of defining antisemitism. However, this issue is not 
to be extensively discussed in this thesis, which is more concerned over how academic definitions 
are used to benefit research and society, rather than the merits of a particular definition itself. While 
the study of online antisemitism is relatively new, the establishment of a ‘gold standard’ definition 
helps it avoid problems caused by definitional issues in cyberbullying research.  
While the IHRA definition is significant, it does not preclude online antisemitism 
manifesting in a way not covered by the definition. For example, antisemites on Twitter started 
using triple parentheses around a name – e.g. (((Ben Cohen))) – a technique called ‘echoes’, to 
indicate the Jewishness of a target to other antisemites.74 After significant attention was raised in 
2016, Google removed an antisemitic “Coincidence Detector” browser extension that 
 
71 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism (Bucharest: IHRA Plenary, 
2016) <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism> [accessed 10 December 2019] 
(para. 3 of 20). 
72 Ibid., para. 7-17 of 20. 
73 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Definitions and Charters: Policy guidance from IHRA experts 
(2018), <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definitions-and-charters> [accessed 10 December 2019] 
(para. 6 of 8). 
74 ‘ADL to Add (((Echo))) Symbol, Used by Anti-Semites on Twitter, to Online Hate Symbols Database’, Anti-
Defamation League, 6 June 2016. <https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-to-add-echo-symbol-used-by-anti-
semites-on-twitter-to-online-hate-symbols> [accessed 10 December 2019] (para. 1 of 7). 
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automatically added echoes to self-identified Jews or those with presumed Jewish last names, 75 
also building a database of Jewish people online.76 Since this browser extension served as a tool 
to identify Jews online without the observed victims realising this, it may be distinct from a clear 
“rhetorical or physical manifestation… directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals” of 
antisemitism as mentioned in the IHRA definition. Echoes are explored further in chapter five, and 
they indicate how manifestations of antisemitism online are qualitatively distinct from offline 
manifestations, especially when considering the IHRA definition. Similarly, cyberbullying 
research has shown that cyberbullying does not cleanly conform to the main criteria of traditional 
bullying (intentionality, repetition, and imbalance of power), indicating that cyberbullying is 
qualitatively distinct from traditional bullying. While the IHRA definition may have issues with 
applicability, it is still important to encourage its broad, if nuanced use in research on both offline 
and online antisemitism, accounting for any distinctly new manifestations. This will prevent the 
issues seen in cyberbullying research, with inconsistent use of definitions further adding to 
methodological inconsistencies.  
 Ultimately, cyberbullying research demonstrates difficulties inherent in adapting existing 
research methods to a phenomenon that has changed with new and evolving technologies. While 
research into online antisemitism avoids some of the problems faced by cyberbullying research, 
recent growth of antisemitism may make it difficult to identify major quantitative differences and 
interplay between offline and online antisemitism. Specifically, the 2016 report from the Kantor 
Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry stated: 
 
75 Lizzie Plaugic, ‘Google pulls Chrome extension that marked Jewish people online’, Verge, 3 June 2016. 
<https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/3/11853244/google-chrome-extension-jewish-people-pulled> [accessed 10 
December 19] (para. 1 of 5). 
76 Ibid. 
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…one [trend] is the continuance of a notable decrease in the number of incidents, especially 
the violent ones… The other trend is the continuation of the widespread increase, 
sometimes dramatic, in verbal and visual antisemitism on social media and during 
demonstrations…77  
 
These trends include both offline and online variants of antisemitism, ranging from public and 
identifiable incidents such as the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville,78 to the 
anonymous harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter.79 The temporal proximity of these events 
counters the assumption that abuse and discrimination are moving exclusively online due to the 
protection provided by anonymity. This proximity can also cloud the recognition of qualitative 
changes to antisemitism caused by electronic communications. The fact that not all antisemites 
online utilise anonymity may even facilitate public antisemitic activity. As antisemitism online 
becomes increasingly normalised, the perceived need for anonymity will decrease. This decreased 
anonymity will correlate with a reduced social risk associated with antisemitism (both online and 
offline), allowing public figures to engage in antisemitism, further encouraging its normalisation. 
 
 
77 Kantor Center, Antisemitism Worldwide: 2016 (European Jewish Congress, 2017) 
<http://www.kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/Doch_full_2016_230417.pdf> [accessed 10 December 2019] 
(p. 5). 
78 While the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally presents an example of this normalising phenomenon, it was 
seen as a step back by some on the alt-right, particularly those who see it as undoing the work to normalise their 
beliefs through the internet (appendix C, figure 14). 
79 ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 
Presidential Campaign (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016) 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-
Force_v2.pdf> [accessed 8 December 2019]. 
 175 
 
Cyber-racism and Online Antisemitism 
Comparing the State of the Fields 
Despite the large proportion of antisemitism in hate crimes statistics80 and its broad presence 
online, it has a significantly smaller quantity of dedicated research compared to broader cyber-
racism. One example of this is the significant disparity between research on antisemitism 
compared to racism against African Americans, especially online. One hypothesis for this disparity 
is based on two premises, relating to researchers’ familiarity with different forms of racism and 
fields of study. Firstly, while much research on racism is conducted by minorities, when non-
minority researchers wish to examine racism they tend to focus on the most familiar and well-
known example of racism to them, typically racism against African Americans. Relative 
familiarity with this form of racism may diminish any perceived need to collaborate with 
discrimination experts, thereby streamlining research in this field.81 In contrast, it is more likely 
antisemitism research would invoke a perceived need for collaboration due to the multifaceted 
manifestations, highly adaptable nature and long history of the hatred. The second premise is that 
existing antisemitism researchers are more likely to be trained in fields such as history, being less 
likely to have helpful skillsets for research on contemporary antisemitism, especially on the 
internet. Therefore, internet researchers examining antisemitism online would need to become 
familiar with antisemitism or collaborate with antisemitism scholars, many of whom are unsuited 
to conduct research alone. This situation is also exacerbated by other factors, such as 
 
80 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015 Hate Crime Statistics (2015), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/topic-
pages/incidentsandoffenses_final> [accessed 4 October 2018]. 
81 This streamlining may not produce quality research or even be ideal. In fact, this assumed capability to research 
racism against African Americans may contribute to issues in sociology research explored in chapter two. 
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antisemitism’s difficult history with intersectionality,82 which limits the use of frameworks used 
elsewhere in discrimination research.  
The comparable lack of research on online antisemitism may also suggest to researchers 
and the broader population that antisemitism is not a significant problem. Dealing with this issue 
may even be an uphill battle, as despite the empirical research that does exist proves an increase 
in verbal antisemitism, these results are often met by rejection, trivialisation and even a lack of 
interest in the broader public sphere.83 Carrying out comprehensive research into online racism, 
including online antisemitism, cannot be achieved by simply removing the research burden from 
minority researchers. Researchers should consider collaborating (even if they focus on different 
forms of discrimination and abuse), educate researchers from other disciplines, and help develop 
standard research methodologies that can be broadly applied across their fields and disciplines. 
 
Capacity for Research 
The false premise of a colour-blind internet, avoidance of ‘race trouble’ in online discourse, and 
downplaying of racism in sociological research represent important lessons for online antisemitism 
research. Firstly, researchers must consider the lines drawn distinguishing antisemitism from other 
conduct online. These include those laid down by the Working Definition on antisemitism by 
IHRA,84 specifically the lines drawn between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israel. 
Secondly, researchers must also consider antisemitic behaviours and rhetoric that may be 
dismissed or diminished for various reasons, such as “it was a joke”, and unknowing use of Jewish 
 
82 Brittney Cooper, ‘Intersectionality’, in The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, ed. by Lisa Disch and Mary 
Hawkesworth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 385-406, (pp. 385-387), Oxford Handbooks Online. 
83 Schwarz-Friesel, ‘“Antisemitism 2.0”—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide Web’, p. 314. 
84 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, para. 3 of 20. 
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stereotypes (e.g. calling someone a ‘Shylock’). Thirdly, researchers must be cautious to not 
accidently diminish antisemitism, and must avoid assuming that researching antisemitism, or 
racism more generally, precludes them from doing so. Fourthly, researchers must consider how 
perpetrators and bystanders perceive antisemitism online, and whether their perceptions contribute 
to qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism. For example, resistance to treating online 
antisemitic behaviour seriously, and willingness to dismiss examples of antisemitic rhetoric 
(especially when aided by anonymity and disinhibition), can lead to a normalisation of 
antisemitism not possible in an offline context (while ultimately contributing to offline 
normalisation as well). Considerations of bystanders must also consider ‘race trouble’ – the 
broader discomfort surrounding racial issues – alongside analyses of racist behaviour, and how 
users feeling ‘troubled’ by accusations of antisemitism contributes to its normalisation.85 
Researchers must also be aware of the rapidly changing, adaptive nature of online 
antisemitism, especially when drawing on old data. The problem highlighted by Bonilla-Silva and 
Baiocchi about surveys on racist attitudes using outdated questions (those developed in the 1950s 
and 1960s)86 applies especially to antisemitism in this context. Researchers using outdated ideas 
of discrimination can significantly underestimate quantities of discrimination in contemporary 
society, suggesting discrimination is declining when it has instead evolved and shifted. 
Antisemitism has significantly changed throughout history, and such changes can occur more 
rapidly online. Therefore, when researchers examine data about antisemitism online, they must 
 
85 This includes controversy and lack of clarity when distinguishing antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israel, 
which can be exacerbated by false accusations of antisemitism by others in the discussion. It may also include 
notions of ‘Holocaust fatigue’ or distaste at the discussion or perceptions of over-representation of the Holocaust in 
western media. 
86 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, ‘Anything but racism: how sociologists limit the significance of 
racism’, Race and Society, 4.2 (2001), 117-131 (p. 120). 
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consider both the age of the data, and any significant shifts in antisemitic discourse since then, 
especially if comparing rates of antisemitism online over time.  
 
Race, Racism and Antisemitism in the Social Media Age 
The creation of parallel realities within social media is key for facilitating the distribution and 
normalisation of antisemitism online. Before social media and the internet, commentators openly 
considering discriminatory ideas would have been more inhibited in sharing them, as they would 
not have had guaranteed access to a large audience agreeable to their views. Virtual spaces, 
comparatively, provide a reduced distance between commentators and their audiences. The 
breaking down of distance also emboldens the expression of discrimination if public figures are 
perceived to be allied with discriminatory commentators. This can be seen in online antisemitism, 
particularly in the increasing influence of antisemitism on debates regarding Israel. Commentators 
expressing antisemitic views in these debates can be reinforced by the voices of public figures and 
other commentators, exacerbating confusion over the line between antisemitism and legitimate 
criticism of Israel. Broader expressed attitudes can also have this effect, as seen with Trump and 
his denunciation of political correctness emboldening and normalising racism and white 
nationalism among his Twitter followers. Considering the alt-right overlap of antisemitism and 
white nationalism (as seen in the NCRI report), this virtual reality around Trump followers can 
also serve as a fertile ground for the normalisation of antisemitism. 
 One particular example that elucidates the overlap influence of antisemitism on the alt-
right is the ‘White Genocide’ conspiracy theory. This idea, likely first properly codified in 1995 
by American Neo-Nazi David Lane, claims a deliberate conspiracy to undermine and destroy the 
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white race through mass migration and miscegenation of people of colour into white-majority 
countries.87 This idea has been reproduced extensively throughout far-right literature in a variety 
of forms, such as ‘The Great Replacement’ conceptualised by French writer Renaud Camus over 
2010-2012.88 The conspiracy theory often pins Jews as the perpetrators of this plot, notably in 
Lane’s screed and in Neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce’s novel The Turner Diaries,89 evoking a 
conspiratorial lineage starting with the Protocols and leading to cyberspace.90 However, some 
proponents of this theory do not evoke Jews as conspirators, most notably Camus and Brenton 
Tarrant, perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch massacre.91 Abandoning the antisemitic roots serves 
to mainstream the conspiracy theory by appealing more generally to white fragility and concerns 
of immigration, allowing both its attachment to mainstream political figures, such as Donald 
Trump, and its efficient perpetuation through cyberspace.92 Despite this ‘sterilising’ of the 
conspiracy theory, the concurrent influence of the Protocols cannot be ignored,93 nor can the 
influence of antisemitism on the structure and conceptualisation of racist narratives within right. 
If anything, this sterilisation serves to temporarily fit the current Overton’s Window, and will 
likely shift it towards the further normalisation of antisemitism within right-wing parallel realities. 
 
87 David Lane was also responsible for the infamous “14 words” slogan of white nationalism.  
Dirk Moses, ‘“White Genocide” and the Ethics of Public Analysis’, Journal of Genocide Research, 21.2 (April 
2019), 201-213 (pp. 207-208).  
88 Ibid., p. 208. 
Renaud Camus, Le Grand Remplacement (Paris: David Reinharc, 2011). 
89 J.M. Berger, ‘The Turner Legacy: The Storied Origins and Enduring Impact of White Nationalism’s Deadly 
Bible’, ICCT Research Papers, 7.8 (September 2016), 1-50 (p. 10). 
William Luther Pierce, The Turner Diaries (West Virginia: National Vanguard Books, 1978). 
90 Stephen Eric Bronner, A Rumour about the Jews: Conspiracy, Anti-Semitism, and the Protocols of Zion (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 131-132. 
91 Moses, ‘“White Genocide” and the Ethics of Public Analysis’, p. 206. 
92 Andrew F. Wilson, ‘#whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory: How Secrecy and Suspicion 
Contributed to the Mainstreaming of Hate’, Secrecy and Society, 1.2 (2018), 1-47 (pp. 25-36).  
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The shifting of Overton’s Window and creation of parallel realities online play key roles 
in antisemitic rhetoric seeping into criticism of Israel, potentially even normalising overtly 
antisemitic tropes such as blood libel and Jewish influence on the media. Schwarz-Friesel suggests 
the importance of this avenue for normalising antisemitism is due to a need for many antisemites 
to find legitimate reasons to justify classical antisemitic feelings in a post-Holocaust world: 
 
Egodystonic hatred of Jews is a phenomenon of the modern age, linked to the processes of 
reason-based enlightenment and rationalization. The experience of Auschwitz makes it 
impossible for a humanist, educated person to accept old forms of hatred of Jews as 
egosyntonic. The need to legitimize Judeophobic feelings among such people gives rise to 
processes of projection and reinterpretation.94 
 
These phenomena are demonstrated in social media users’ efforts to dismiss, deflect, and complain 
about Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration. These efforts are represented in seemingly 
instinctual needs to mention or compare Palestinian suffering in response to posts about the 
Holocaust,95 responding with Holocaust denial,96 or even making calls for further atrocities.97 
These examples demonstrate how platforms like Twitter and Facebook aid such manipulation of 
conversations, by allowing the creation of discrete spaces and realities where counter-narratives 
 
94 Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate, p. 10. 
95 Online Hate Prevention Institute, Modern antisemitism: The Holocaust and other genocides (2015), 
<http://ohpi.org.au/modern-antisemitism-the-holocaust-and-other-genocides> [accessed 10 December 2019] (para. 
33 of 55). 
Schwarz-Friesel, ‘“Antisemitism 2.0”—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide Web’, p. 329. 
96 Online Hate Prevention Institute, Unbelievable responses on Holocaust Memorial Day (2016), 
<http://ohpi.org.au/unbelievable-responses-on-holocaust-memorial-day> [accessed 12 August 2019] (para. 2 of 13). 
97 Ibid., para. 3 of 13. 
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that dismiss the need for and value of Holocaust commemoration can flourish. The users that 
subscribe to these counter-narrative spaces then normalise discriminatory talking points by 
attempting to establish them as relevant to the conversation. By utilising existing networks and 
social media infrastructure (for example by hijacking established hashtags), discriminating actors 
can work to normalise these ideas with unprecedented ease. 
 The impact of positivity or negativity biases, as discussed in chapter two, is important when 
considering how social media platforms establish virtual realities wherein antisemitism is 
normalised. In addition, the function of like buttons can facilitate ‘information laundering’, 
particularly for manifestations of deep antisemitism, manipulating algorithms to present 
antisemitic material to a broader audience. Pre-internet manifestations like Holocaust denial are 
particularly susceptible to information laundering, as they are already built upon an extensive 
canon of pseudo-academic literature. Holocaust denial represents a more quantitative change to 
antisemitism, as the strategic aims of this movement can be more effectively facilitated in web 2.0. 
While the normalisation of views through information laundering may be more distinct in 
Holocaust denial, this tactic still represents a significant qualitative change to antisemitism more 
broadly, and to other forms of online discrimination.  
 
Developing Effective Methodologies for Discrimination Research Online 
Developing methodologies to quantify rates of deep antisemitism may benefit from considering 
processes that spread deep antisemitism. The inability to quantify subtle manifestations of 
discrimination is an issue antisemitism research shares with the PORS scale, representing a 
significant gap in broader cyber-racism research. However, the varied and complex manifestations 
 182 
 
of antisemitism may place antisemitism researchers in a better position to develop methodologies 
quantifying subtle examples of racism. Antisemitism’s adaptability and reactive relationship with 
scholarship, as seen through Holocaust denial in particular, requires antisemitism scholars to be 
well-versed with the nuances of subtle and new manifestations. One way to research deep 
antisemitism online is by attempting to measure the ability of internet users to recognise deep 
manifestations, such as Holocaust denial, as antisemitism. This is a key part of the research study 
in chapter six. The findings of this study can then help develop methodologies that may quantify 
deep antisemitism and other forms of subtle discrimination, for example, by comparing recognition 
rates of Holocaust denial with self-reported rates of perceived online Holocaust denial. However, 
the development of further methodologies is dependent on effective collaboration with other fields 
and disciplines, as suggested by Jakubowicz et al.98 Such collaboration will avoid the problems 
that arise from inconsistent methodologies and help develop holistic approaches geared to solve 
the broader problems of online discrimination.  
 
#GamerGate as an Intersection of Online Abuse 
While Jakubowicz et al. argue for transdisciplinarity in studying cyber-racism, this thesis also has 
demonstrated the need to consider intersecting and analogous fields to properly understand the full 
dimensions of online abuse and discrimination. GamerGate serves as an example of how 
cyberbullying and misogyny online intersect, but rarely are manifestations of online abuse and 
discrimination cleanly limited to such a binary intersection. The ability of discriminatory actors to 
shape virtual realities that spread and normalise discrimination means that large scale reactionary 
 
98 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64. 
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movements serve as opportunities for other discriminatory movements, including antisemitic 
movements. Discriminatory users can use these overlapping movements to influence and even 
recruit other users from other movements. This section will therefore compare GamerGate to 
antisemitism, considering how they contrast, overlap, and contribute to each other. The 
intersection of group-based cyberbullying with misogyny and online antisemitism can be depicted 
in a three-way Venn diagram (appendix C, figure 9.2). 
Salter’s conceptualisation of GamerGate as a “toxic technoculture”99 justifies portraying 
GamerGate as a reactionary movement. For the movement’s proponents, the criticism and actions 
of female and feminist developers, journalistic, game critics, and researchers were perceived as a 
threat to a traditionally masculine and chauvinistic culture. However, the reactionaryism of 
GamerGate can be distinguished from antisemitism, for even if the perceived threat to the gamer 
‘identity’ and culture was inflated to conspiratorial levels, there does exist a genuine intent to 
combat misogyny present in the video game industry.100 This contrasts to antisemitism, 
particularly the chimeric antisemitism that manifests in the form of conspiracy theories, such as in 
the Protocols. GamerGate’s manifestation as a conspiratorial reactionary movement therefore 
allows for particular comparison and contrast with antisemitic conspiracy theories. 
Comparing GamerGate and antisemitism requires examining two key steps in each type of 
conspiracy theory. The first step is the recognition of real, concerted efforts to promote inclusivity 
and reduce discrimination. The second is the reaction to these efforts, predominantly by a dominant 
group, that creates an environment for irrational conspiracy theories to spread. Regarding the first 
 
99 Michael Salter, ‘From geek masculinity to Gamergate: the technological rationality of online abuse’, Crime Media 
Culture, 14.2 (2018), 247-264 (p. 259). 
100 A more recent continuation of this conflict can be seen over the backlash to the inclusion of women as playable 
multiplayer characters in the World War II-themed first-person shooter Battlefield V. 
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step for Gamergate, there were developer efforts to increase market share by appealing to the 
broader population and there were long-existing women and minority fans of video games trying 
to achieve greater representation. In addition, with the growth of social media, there was greater 
visibility of female and minority voices in the gaming community, particularly those calling out 
chauvinism and exclusivity. While for antisemitism it can be said that Jews have been associated 
with pushes for cultural change to protect minorities,101 and that this trend may have been used to 
justify antisemitism in a comparable way, Jewish voices are neither dominant nor alone in broader 
pushes against discrimination. Furthermore, the manifestations of antisemitic conspiracy theories, 
like the Protocols, feature fantastical ideas not rooted in reality. There is a clearer connection 
between GamerGate’s targeting of certain internet users, and these targets’ opposition to 
chauvinism in video game culture; even though this opposition could not be called a coordinated 
conspiracy. Currently, it is less likely for the first step to occur for antisemitism, which means the 
prominence of antisemitic conspiracy theories and harassment online cannot be primarily 
attributed to a straightforward reactionaryism, as per GamerGate. Considering this ‘gap of motive’ 
alongside the embedding of antisemitism within reactionary movements online reveals unique 
redemptive and even chimeric qualities to online antisemitism. While this distinction has existed 
between pre-internet antisemitism and other forms of discrimination, its continuation online 
represents a different trajectory for online antisemitism compared to other forms of online 
discrimination. 
Another trait to compare between the GamerGate movement and online antisemitism is 
how the internet makes cyberbullying, harassment, and discrimination ‘fun’ or recreational. The 
 
101 Harry J Enten, ‘Why Jewish Americans vote Democratic’, Guardian, 2 October 2013. 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/02/jewish-americans-vote-democratic> [accessed 10 
December 2019]. 
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creation of antisemitic memes and broad participation in antisemitic humour on spaces like 4chan 
(as explored in chapter five) demonstrates how the internet has made antisemitism recreational, 
contributing to the normalisation of antisemitism. Comparatively, although GamerGate was a 
movement dedicated to combating a perceived threat in a ‘culture war’, elements of abusive 
behaviour were also considered ‘fun’ by the participants. Mortensen looks at the GamerGate 
movement through a lens of “leisure-centred aggression”, comparing the proponents to football 
hooligans, always ready to attack the other team, and motivated more by the thrill rather than actual 
strategy.102 However, unlike football hooliganism, the internet and anonymity utilised by 
GamerGate removed all comparative risk to real world hooliganism, such as risk of identification, 
injury, and retaliation by the ‘other team’. This change in risk represents a qualitative distinction 
from offline aggressive behaviour. However, the strategy of antisemites online to normalise and 
justify antisemitism through humour is distinct from GamerGate, due to not originating from a 
leisure-centred origin. GamerGate originated with video games, a pre-existing leisure activity, 
whereas antisemites online work to create a new form of leisure through the creation and sharing 
of antisemitic humour and harassment of Jews online. This distinction is further explored in 
chapter five, predominantly in the profiles of 4chan, Daily Stormer and social media. 
GamerGate also represented the evolution of other online harassment tactics, such as 
doxing. Doxing was often initially used as a prank, ordering victims mass numbers of pizzas or 
odd magazine subscriptions.103 Eventually it would also be used to cause more serious harm, such 
as destroying the reputation Justine Sacco, a PR executive, causing her to lose her job and face 
 
102 Torill Elvira Mortensen, ‘Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of #GamerGate’, Games and Culture, 13.8 
(2018), 787-806 (p. 796-97). 
103 Whitney Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the Relationship Between Online Trolling 
and Mainstream Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2015), p. 61. 
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ongoing harassment after making a single racist tweet in 2013.104 Participants in GamerGate 
attacked victims using doxing and other harassment, targeting a perceived class of people – ‘Social 
Justice Warriors’ – in retaliation for their perceived conspiracy against gaming culture.105 This 
indicated a departure from recreational discrimination (contrasting with many manifestations of 
online antisemitism), with GamerGate discrimination taking on a more intentional, ideological 
aspect, even if remaining casual and ‘leisure-centred’. This is relevant to recreational 
manifestations of antisemitism, representing qualitative changes caused by web 2.0. Many of these 
recreational manifestations are shown in chapter five to have originated with a pre-existing 
ideological intention among dedicated antisemites like Andrew Anglin. This contrasts GamerGate, 
which had a more ‘organic’ evolution from being ‘fun’ (particularly during the original harassment 
of individuals) to developing an actual ideological aspect. On a surface level, GamerGate moved 
from leisure to ideology, while antisemitism online moved from ideology to leisure. Yet, on a 
closer examination, the ideological aspects of online antisemitism have always been present, so 
the shift towards ‘fun’ content reflects an intentional strategic change, as opposed to GamerGate’s 
more ‘organic’ evolution. 
 The reactionaryism of the GamerGate movement highlights another shared trait with online 
antisemitism; each phenomenon perceives their enemies as waging a ‘cultural war’ against a 
culture manufactured by its adherents.106 In these circumstances the manufactured cultures are 
either flexible or broad enough to suit the needs of the reactionaries. A core narrative of GamerGate 
 
104 Jon Ronson, ‘How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life’, New York Times Magazine, 12 February 
2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html> 
[accessed 10 December 2019]. 
105 Michael James Heron, Pauline Belford and Ayse Goker, ‘Sexism in the circuitry: female participation in male-
dominated popular computer culture’, ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society, 44.4 (2014), 18-29 (p. 22). 
106 For antisemitism, this may manifest in the defence of ‘white’ culture, or a more generalised ‘Western’ or 
‘European’ culture, and this trope goes back centuries, most prominently featured in Nazi propaganda and The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 
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is that video games’ masculine technoculture is being attacked in a ‘cultural war’ by feminists and 
broader progressives.107 The general application of this conspiracy framework – that traditional 
cultures are being attacked by vague progressive or alien forces – led to an overlap between the 
phenomena. Mortensen highlights the adoption of antisemitic sentiments by members of 
GamerGate, with claims that Jews were attempting to pacify white men by encouraging politically 
correct video games. There was also a broader overlap between GamerGate, the ‘Cultural 
Marxism’ conspiracy theory (itself an antisemitic trope), and other reactionary and discriminatory 
movements such as men’s rights activists and pick up artists.108 This represents significant 
qualitative change to online discrimination and conspiracy theory movements brought about by 
the internet; features of the technology facilitate the connection and collaboration of like-minded 
individuals from different movements, even without leaders or united agreement among the 
individuals. However, the lack of a reactionary ‘gap of motive’ for antisemitic movements means 
that these overlaps with GamerGate and analogous movements provide essential recruitment 
opportunities for antisemitic movements. By promoting a broader ‘cultural war’ framework, 
antisemites can increase the opportunities for recruitment by interweaving with a wider range of 
reactionary movements. 
This ‘gap of motive’ represents a unique quality to online antisemitism when compared to 
clearer triggers in GamerGate and other reactionary movements. Internet technology enables 
recruitment between these movements through overlapping communities. While this opportunism 
exists broadly along these overlapping movements and the alt-right, online antisemitism is unique 
in that the ‘gap of motive’ has required it to depend heavily on these opportunities for recruitment. 
 
107 Salter, p. 255. 
108 Mortensen, p. 788. 
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Without taking advantage of these overlaps, antisemitic movements lack a straightforward path to 
recruitment in a post-Holocaust world, especially in former allied countries. This opportunistic 
recruitment is especially prominent in online spaces where discriminatory movements overlap, 
such as 4chan’s /pol/ board, which both is populated by antisemites and hosted so much 
GamerGate discussion that website owner Christopher Poole chose to completely ban the topic.109 
The ease of involvement with GamerGate’s leaderless swarm-like movement, comparable 
thrill/fun-based motivations for abuse, and patterns of harassment, allowed for easy infiltration of 
GamerGate and overlapping movements by antisemites. Internet technology’s enabling of echo-
chambers spaces have facilitated radicalisation and a sense of victimisation, giving rise to 
comparable ‘cultural war’ narratives and allowing further infiltration of these spaces by 
antisemites. This recruitment of new antisemites through the exploitation of shared qualities allows 
both researchers and online antisemites to frame antisemitism as an ‘end point’ to radicalisation 
online. For antisemites, this ‘end point’ provides a redemptive antisemitic worldview that can 
explain every aspect of their prior reactionaryism. 
 
Organisation Scale 
The comparison between antisemitism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and 
between the research on each, has provided the necessary groundwork to conduct a holistic 
analysis of antisemitic spaces online. This thesis demonstrates why considering these analogous 
fields is key to contextualising and understanding the place of antisemitism online. Chapter five 
analyses manifestations of antisemitism online through the lens of their platforms, as it is the 
 
109 Adrienne Massanari, ‘#Gamergate and The Fappening: How Reddit’s algorithm, governance, and culture support 
toxic technocultures’, New Media & Society, 19.3 (2017), 329-346 (p. 335). 
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functions of those platforms that ultimately determine how antisemitism is shaped online. 
Furthermore, examining ‘archetypes’ of particular types of platforms can create profiles that 
provide a broader picture of antisemitism online. However, before analysing archetypes of 
platforms that spread antisemitism, it is necessary to construct frameworks that help distinguish 
these websites from each other, and from antisemitism before the internet.  
Beyond comparing the technical aspects of websites (e.g. social media as compared to an 
online archive or personal website), it is also necessary to compare the motivations behind each 
website, and/or the users of those websites. Some websites that aid the spread of antisemitism do 
not do so out of intent. Social media giants such as Facebook, Twitter and Reddit are all used to 
spread antisemitic materials, primarily because they host large, interconnected audiences. For 
example, Facebook can connect people based on shared interests as indicated through liking, or 
being part of, antisemitic pages and groups. These platforms should be distinguished from websites 
that intentionally create and disproportionately distribute antisemitic content. In addition, those 
who actively use social media to promote antisemitic agendas should be distinguished from users 
that spread, or even create, antisemitic content casually in their regular online activity. Finally, 
users who actively work to normalise antisemitism should be distinguished from followers who 
merely accept antisemitism as good and accommodate it. An example of this distinction is between 
those who create antisemitic memes and distribute them to normalise antisemitism in other spaces, 
compared to those who like or share the memes, either because they see it as ironically 
participating in controversial humour, or because they believe in the narrative behind the memes.  
This thesis will distinguish between ‘organised’, ‘recreational’, and ‘casual’ antisemitism 
on the internet. An early version of this paradigm has been applied to research on Holocaust denial, 
particularly examining how the rise of web 2.0 shifted the role of the organised Holocaust denier 
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movement towards the preservation and sharing of existing material rather than prioritising the 
creation of new material, thus supporting the activities of casual antisemites.110 However, a simple 
dichotomy between organised and casual antisemites is rooted in the relationships between 
antisemites before web 1.0, and is not suitable for a broader study of antisemitism in web 2.0. For 
this reason, a new category in this framework – recreational antisemitism – has been included to 
demonstrate one of the most significant qualitative changes caused to antisemitism by web 2.0. 
Anonymity, dissociation, and difficulty in parsing intent on the internet have allowed for the 
evolution of antisemitic manifestations that do not specifically promote antisemitic agendas, but 
are instead made to engage in particular online cultures. The terms ‘organised’, ‘recreational’ and 
‘casual’ can be used to explore the roles of a website’s producers and/or consumers in spreading 
antisemitism, and to determine whether and how consumers participate in prosumption. This 
framework also demonstrates how manifestations of antisemitism have qualitatively changed 
between web 1.0 and web 2.0. After explaining this and other frameworks, chapter five applies 
them to prominent archetypes of antisemitic websites and mainstream social media platforms. 
 
Organised Antisemitism 
Organised online antisemitism refers to three key phenomena. Firstly, it refers to websites created 
for the purpose of spreading antisemitism.111 This phenomenon started in web 1.0, but still extends 
into web 2.0. These producers can be dedicated antisemites, potentially both part of and 
responsible for the organisation of antisemitic hate networks through the websites they create and 
 
110 William Allington, ‘New Media, Old Hatred: The Rise of Holocaust Denial on the Internet’, (unpublished 
honours thesis, 2014), p. 58. 
111 This would not be limited to spreading antisemitism exclusively.  
 191 
 
run. This phenomenon of organised antisemitism is rooted in pre-internet organisational methods, 
such as how Holocaust denial organisations mailed imitations of peer-reviewed journals to their 
subscribers and donors. These originally offline Holocaust denial organisations represented the 
bulk of organised online antisemitic activity and content during web 1.0. These organisations 
continue in web 2.0 under a newer generation of pseudo-academic Holocaust deniers: Thomas 
Graf, Jürgen Graf and Carlo Mattogno.112 However, this older model has fallen in relevance 
compared to newer, more provocative, and simpler websites, such as Andrew Anglin’s Daily 
Stormer.113 While the relationship between antisemitic producers and casual followers is mostly 
unchanged from a publisher-consumer basis, the content shift represented by the Daily Stormer 
indicates a notable qualitative change. 
Organised online antisemitism secondly refers to networks of antisemites or antisemitic 
spaces organised through social media and other web 2.0 platforms, which eschew the social risk 
of offline grassroots organisation in favour of online anonymity/pseudonymity and laissez-faire 
moderation policies. This manifestation of organised antisemitism is a new development under 
web 2.0 and demonstrates quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism through internet 
technology. One significant change is lacking the need for ‘credentials’ or reputation to establish 
these networks or spaces (although the existence of ‘credentials’ can still help). The rise of online 
anonymity and its role in reducing social risk can result in antisemites accepting the legitimacy of 
spaces and networks without any knowledge of the users behind them. In addition, some of these 
networks and spaces can be populated entirely by organised, dedicated antisemites, who no longer 
need a casual antisemitic support base, monetary or otherwise, to execute their agendas. 
 
112 Committee for the Open Debate on the Holocaust, Holocaust Handbooks & Documentaries (2015), 
<https://holocausthandbooks.com/index.php?page_id=28> [accessed 10 December 2019] (para. 1 of 11). 
113 Daily Stormer, Daily Stormer (2019), <https://dailystormer.name> [accessed 10 December 2019]. 
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Thirdly, organised online antisemitism refers to individual social media users who can 
essentially replicate the efforts of pre-internet antisemitic networks alone through web 2.0 
technology. They achieve this by accruing digital subscribers and establishing virtual discussion 
spaces for their content.114 Similar action pre-internet would have required physical printing, 
distribution of material, and organisation of physical spaces for discussion, all of which require 
greater resources, often supplied by a larger group and/or monetary resources. Organised online 
antisemites have the ability to run or disproportionately contribute to free ‘subsites’115 (e.g. 
Facebook pages, YouTube channels, or Reddit subreddits) that can reach a broader audience than 
pre-internet or web 1.0 antisemitic websites. Through subsites, anonymous/pseudonymous 
organised users can direct the swarm-logic of other discriminatory movements, like GamerGate, 
without drawing attention to their deeper antisemitic motives. These antisemites’ ability to run 
online spaces by themselves makes them distinct from the second subcategory of organised 
antisemitism, which depends on a broader group producing material and activities in a 
collaborative effort. The audience responding to this third group are typically reacting to the 
organised individual’s antisemitic capital or may even act relatively independently in the spaces 
the individual created. This audience can still produce content themselves, but by being dependent 
on the spaces provided by the organised antisemite, and without further networking, they fall into 
the categories of casual or recreational antisemitism.  
 
 
114 A particular example of an individual doing this is u/soccer on reddit, who established a broad network of 
Holocaust denying and antisemitic spaces on reddit largely by themselves and was able to ensure their continuity as 
a “safe space” for antisemites through merely logging on every few weeks.  
Allington, pp. 54-64. 
115 ‘Subsites’ refers to parts of websites within a larger website or platform, often with their own community, culture 
and rules. Examples of this include Facebook groups and pages, and Reddit subreddits. 
 193 
 
Casual Antisemitism 
Casual antisemitism refers to antisemites who do not create content but provide financial or moral 
support to antisemitic content creators (organised and recreational antisemites), and/or spread 
antisemitism by sharing content and using antisemitism in everyday interactions. This process 
normalises antisemitism over time, promoting a potentially unconscious assimilation – an osmosis 
– of antisemitism into society. This osmosis happens due to casual antisemites accepting 
antisemitism as acceptable and normal, which can range from not understanding the harmfulness 
of content, to merely assuming antisemitic content is truthful and morally good to share. Casual 
antisemites typically do not contribute significant time or effort to spreading antisemitism or 
advancing antisemitic agendas; their engagement primarily happens in their free time and need not 
affect their broader lifestyles. However, the constant connectivity provided by social media and 
other web 2.0 platforms can still result in greater exposure time to antisemitism, despite the 
streamlining of antisemitic content consumption. 
Casual online antisemitism in web 1.0 was largely comparable to pre-internet casual 
antisemites, with only quantitative changes to antisemitism due to easier access and sharing. 
Publicly accessible websites reduced cost barriers to antisemitic content; casual antisemites no 
longer needed to pay mailing costs or subscription fees, although subscription fees would aid the 
creation of new material. These quantitative changes extended into web 2.0 as barriers were further 
removed. Access could be enhanced by subscribing to antisemitic content creators on multiple 
platforms and participating in spaces where they participated. Media tools and spaces enhanced 
the ability of casual antisemites to share the content they consumed, helping antisemitic material 
to be promoted to broader audiences, rather than being limited to private lists of casual subscribers.  
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 Online anonymity and streamlined electronic communication are the key dimensions that 
distinguish casual antisemitism between pre-internet/web 1.0 and web 2.0. Before web 2.0, the 
promotion or sharing of antisemitic content could threaten casual antisemites’ social capital. The 
ostracisation and damage to prominent organised antisemites such as Holocaust deniers would 
warn casual antisemites against similar behaviour. Furthermore, casual antisemites would lack the 
ability and dedication to promote antisemitism to broader society, limiting their distribution to 
closer networks of friends and family. For these reasons, the spread of casual antisemitism would 
be limited to private communication, thereby leaving the social risk and onus of spreading 
antisemitism publicly to the organisers of antisemitic movements. Online anonymity removes this 
risk, and when combined with social connectivity online, casual antisemites can contribute to the 
spread and normalisation of antisemitism within broader communities. Features like hash-tagging 
even allow casual antisemites to reach audiences beyond their own social media echo chambers. 
On platforms such as Facebook, casual antisemites can provide enough likes on antisemitic content 
to make it appear in other users’ ‘news feeds’. This broadened reach can manifest even further into 
direct harassment of Jews on social media. For example, if a casual antisemite is subscribed to a 
Jewish individual’s account, or an antisemitic content creator shares a Jewish individual’s post, 
the casual antisemite can post slurs and other antisemitic content on the Jewish person’s profile. 
Effort and risk-wise, this is little different from using an antisemitic slur when a Jewish individual 
is mentioned in private conversation, yet on social media its manifestation is distinct due to being 
promoted to more people, and even directly antagonising people affected by it. Ultimately, casual 
antisemitism is reactive, but as the internet has evolved, reactions of casual antisemitism can affect 
a broader range of people in ways not possible before web 2.0. 
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Recreational Antisemitism 
Recreational antisemitism represents one of the most significant changes to antisemitism caused 
by web 2.0. It refers to those who are deliberately antisemitic and create antisemitic content, but 
do not do so for any grander purpose. Recreational antisemites say explicit antisemitic statements 
and create antisemitic memes and jokes. They may deliberately use antisemitic slurs when being 
antagonistic towards a Jewish person and may even seek out Jews and create antisemitic content 
to antagonise them. This would typically represent antisemitic cyberbullying of an individual 
rather than group-based antisemitic cyberbullying, however recreational antisemites may still also 
participate in group-based antisemitism for recreational reasons. They may even create antisemitic 
material for their own purposes or spaces, but do not actively work to create an organised network. 
Changes brought by web 2.0 provided the spaces, technology and opportunities to engage in this 
recreational behaviour, which in turn affects the tone, leadership, and strategy of organised 
antisemites. This category of recreational antisemitism does not imply that organised and casual 
antisemites do not engage in antisemitic humour or ‘leisure-centred’ antisemitic cultures, but rather 
that there is a distinct group engaging in antisemitic humour for primarily self-amusement. These 
individuals represent potential recruits to organised antisemites, thereby encouraging organised 
antisemites to produce content appealing to them. This change to organised antisemitic strategy 
further perpetuates and normalises antisemitic humour online, encouraging more naïve users to 
engage in antisemitism. Members of this category can range from those who do not believe in 
antisemitic ideas but engage in humour that utilises them, to those who do believe in the antisemitic 
claims but still only engage in a limited fashion compared to organised antisemites. 
 There are limited examples of recreational antisemitism before the internet, and those few 
examples highlight the significance of recreational antisemitism online. One example is the use of 
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antisemitic jokes in stand-up comedy. Audiences for controversial and provocative humour do 
exist, and stand-up comics using antisemitic content may not be antisemitic in intent, justifying 
their ‘edgy’ content using the “it’s just a joke” defence. However, there are significant differences 
in the perception of this offline content compared to recreational antisemitism online. For the 
stand-up comic, audiences will recognise the purpose of the material to be a joke, even if it is 
harmful. Online, there may be no distinction between the antisemitic content created by a 
recreational antisemite trolling, or seeking to provoke reactions, and the content produced by an 
organised antisemite in order to advance an agenda. Furthermore, without a specific, clear context 
for provocative humour, such as a comedy theatre environment, viewers of the content are less 
likely to understand any intent behind the content,116 made even more difficult by online 
disassociation and anonymity. Finally, antisemitic stand-up jokes are intended to remain in the 
theatre, evident in the need to create a space for that humour. Recreational antisemitism online can 
be spread outside antisemitic spaces, potentially motivated by the desire to provoke reactions by 
trolling. This excursion beyond antisemitic spaces is facilitated by the social anonymity and 
connectivity provided by web 2.0, which provides targets and reduces risk. 
 
Organised, Recreational and Casual Antisemitism in Web 2.0 
While the rise of recreational antisemitism is one of the key qualitative changes to 
antisemitism in web 2.0, the categories of organised and casual antisemitism also have undergone 
significant change between pre-internet/web 1.0 and web 2.0 (appendix C, figures 10.1-10.4). The 
 
116 Even in online spaces where this context might exist, say an antisemitic joke creating space, there will be less 
feedback affirming the harmful nature of the content. A stand-up routine involving antisemitic jokes may result in 
groans or nervous laughter that possibly affirms the absurd and problematic nature of the content. Such feedback 
may not exist or be as perceivable through primarily text-based communication online. 
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greater user interaction brought about by web 2.0 gives casual antisemites an entry-point to the 
broader public sphere, and access to antisemitic material without the need to actively participate 
in or subscribe to the infrastructure of an organised group. They may also be attracted to spaces 
where antisemitism is common, even if that space is not necessarily part of an organised antisemitic 
network. Even among spaces with agendas to promote antisemitism, such as Stormfront, the 
technology of web 2.0 allows for direct feedback from casual antisemites, encouraging them to 
participate (even if they do not need to in order to access content). Agenda-driven websites can 
also provide ‘safe spaces’ for casual antisemites, virtual spaces where they can interact at virtually 
anytime, from any place, with little social risk. Finally, agenda-driven spaces also actively 
encourage the transformation of casual antisemites into recreational or organised antisemites. In 
the case of conversion to recreational antisemitism, easy content creation online and the cultures 
facilitated by cyberspaces encourages more active participation in the creation of antisemitic 
content, particularly memes and other short, jocular content. For conversion to organised 
antisemitism, web 2.0’s interconnectivity removes the social risk and other barriers that might 
otherwise limit active involvement in antisemitic movements and provides access to casual 
audiences that enhances organised antisemitic network recruitment efforts. 
The qualities of web 2.0 allow users to produce and spread antisemitism with a greater 
reach than pre-internet hate networks, without even needing to reveal their identity. This ability 
enables organised creators of antisemitic content to distribute their content without the 
infrastructure of a group. While organised antisemites can work individually, this does not mean 
that they are replacing other organised antisemitic groups; indeed, groups based on web 2.0 
technology are far more relevant to the growth and evolution of antisemitism. One key 
development that is explored through this ‘organisation’ scale is how antisemitism 2.0 has resulted 
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in shifting relationships between organised antisemitic networks, dedicated antisemitic individuals 
(both organised and recreational), and casual spreaders of antisemitism. The role of prosumption 
is important here, especially regarding the rise of recreational antisemitism. Through the sharing 
of antisemitic memes for recreational purposes, online users can promote spaces that facilitate 
regular feedback of more antisemitic humour. Those who enjoy antisemitic humour, even if not 
holding particularly antisemitic views, may be encouraged to create antisemitic memes and content 
to both support these spaces and receive positive social feedback from participating. The lens of 
prosumption illustrates how the circulation of antisemitic humour online can push people towards 
antisemitism. Online interaction allows the creation of spaces where expressions of antisemitism 
are tolerated, and where organised antisemites can go specifically to recruit others into their 
networks and ideologies. 
 
Clarity Framework 
Another factor to consider is how clearly antisemitism manifests to viewers online. Different levels 
of clarity can be used by organised antisemites to achieve different goals, ranging from pushing 
Jews out of online spaces, to deceiving viewers into assuming the acceptability of antisemitic 
beliefs. The clarity framework provides three categories of antisemitism, based on how clear they 
appear to viewers. The first category is covert antisemitism, which attempts to package or cloak 
antisemitic beliefs in legitimate sounding language so to encourage people to believe it (appendix 
C, figure 11.1). The second is overt antisemitism, specifically made to be viewed as antisemitic by 
the audience (appendix C, figure 11.2). The third is invisible antisemitism, which is the result of 
antisemitism being normalised. This latter category does not count as covert as the antisemitism is 
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not actively hidden but is simply accepted as normal by posters and other viewers, especially if 
left unchallenged (appendix C, figure 11.3). 
Different levels in antisemitism’s clarity online, particularly in intent and explicitness, 
serve to achieve different goals for online antisemites. For example, covert antisemitism seeks to 
promote antisemitism to immediate viewers, so that antisemitism becomes normalised in the 
mainstream over time as per antisemitism 2.0. Covert antisemitism can also serve as signals to 
other antisemites online without attracting the attention of the mainstream, helping them establish 
and organise antisemitic networks. Through ‘dog-whistling’ and cloaked content, antisemites can 
direct audiences from public forums to antisemitic spaces, isolating uninformed viewers from 
contrary viewpoints that may point out or refute the antisemitism. If these users ask questions or 
look for more information, these new spaces provide answers that may further direct them towards 
antisemitic ideas, potentially even explicit ones. Furthermore, covert antisemitism may intimidate 
viewers who do perceive it, resulting in them feeling unwelcome in particular spaces. In this 
situation, covert antisemites may have degrees of plausible deniability due to the ignorance of the 
broader audience, making it more difficult for their antisemitism to be called out. 
Overt antisemitism also serves to intimidate online users who are opposed to antisemitism 
and can normalise online antisemitism in a different way to covert antisemitism. By exploiting 
inconsistent social media moderation and diminished consequences for bigotry online, antisemites 
can flood online spaces with explicit antisemitism. Such deluges can serve as projections of 
strength; disproportionate amounts of online antisemitism in targeted spaces can make online 
antisemites appear more numerous and organised. Overt antisemitism also serves to push Jews and 
others opposing antisemitism out of online spaces, limiting the number of users willing to combat 
antisemitism. This ‘ceding’ or ‘colonisation’ of virtual territory is implied in the commonly well-
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known social media tips “don’t read the comments” or “don’t feed the trolls”,117 where the 
existence of unsavoury elements in certain online spaces, including antisemitism, is considered 
normal.  
Invisible antisemitism represents the impact of covert normalisation efforts, while 
perpetuating this impact more broadly. Antisemitism is invisible when its adherents and the spaces 
they inhabit do not conceive the discrimination inherent in the content. This contrasts spaces where 
overt antisemitism is normalised, as users they likely recognise the discrimination, but accept it as 
normal for ideological or recreational reasons. Once antisemitism is invisible, attempts to call it 
out may result in responses promoting the Livingstone Formulation, inadvertently furthering 
another antisemitic conspiracy theory. Invisible antisemitism advances the goal of antisemitism by 
both normalising antisemitism and hampering efforts to combat it. By considering the clarity of 
antisemitic content to the broader online community, and even other antisemites, the profiles in 
chapter five determine how iterations of antisemitism in different online spaces serve the various 
goals of antisemites, including the advancement of antisemitism 2.0. 
 
Minor Frameworks 
Another minor framework covers the distinction between ‘dormant’ and ‘active’ antisemitism 
online (appendix C, figures 12.1 and 12.2). Web 1.0 revolutionised the publishing and 
redistribution of material, allowing high volumes of material to be preserved digitally and easily 
accessed anywhere. This indicates an evolution of dormant antisemitic material. The preserved 
 
117 Nicole Sullivan, ‘Don’t feed the trolls’, unpublished paper delivered at the conference, ‘O’Reilly Fluent 
Conference 2012’ (San Francisco, 29-31 May 2012) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ulNSlES1Fds> [accessed 10 December 2019]. 
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relevance of dormant antisemitism is one of the key qualitative and quantitative changes brought 
to antisemitism merely through changing technology. For example, it allows Holocaust denial 
content to be continuously circulated despite the energy of antisemites moving elsewhere. With 
this concept in mind, online antisemitism resembles more of a growing catalogue of propaganda, 
rather than a collection of discrete attempts to keep antisemitism relevant. Comparatively, pre-
internet dormant antisemitism could contain ideas that may eventually be recycled, but without 
easy access to their storage and streamlined publishing, these ideas and material would stay unused 
unless significant resources were dedicated to republishing them - as in the case of the Protocols.118 
Active antisemitism, by contrast, refers to new content being actively created, whether web videos, 
articles or memes. Web 2.0 has resulted in the line between dormant and active antisemitism being 
narrowed, as dormant antisemitism is commonly reposted by organised antisemites, and active 
antisemitism can manifest as simply as altering a meme, which may be based on dormant content. 
The narrowing of this framework highlights further significant qualitative and quantitative changes 
to antisemitism caused by web 2.0. 
Another useful framework not original to this thesis is the TEMPIS taxonomy used by the 
Online Antisemitism Working Group in their 2013 report.119 The TEMPIS taxonomy distinguishes 
factors of communication timings, administrator and moderator empowerment, moderation, 
material publicness, user identity and social impact of different websites. The TEMPIS taxonomy 
allows researchers to effectively parse the distinguishing factors of these websites, thereby 
providing context to how and why antisemitism manifests on their platforms. The TEMPIS 
 
118 Steven Leonard Jacobs and Mark Weitzman, Dismantling the Big Lie: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New 
York: KTAV publishing, 2003), pp. xi–xiv, 1–4. 
119 Andre Oboler and David Matas, Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the problem, the response and the 
need for change (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013), pp. 5-10. 
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taxonomy can be used for archetypes of both dedicated antisemitic websites, and mainstream 
social media platforms (appendix C, figure 13). 
Because of individuality and anonymity/pseudonymity online, identifying trends or 
patterns in antisemitic content can be difficult, especially on a macro level applied to entire 
websites. Adopting frameworks of organisation, clarity, and dormancy of antisemitism establishes 
categories for content before accessing the content. This is more practical than attempting to 
categorise antisemitic incidents and material after collating them, for two reasons. Firstly, it can 
be difficult and resource intensive to draw connections between large quantities of individual 
pieces of discriminatory content. While doing so is possible and has been done so before, such as 
in the OHPI’s 2013 report on anti-Muslim hate,120 such methodologies are best done in samples, 
which becomes increasingly complicated as more websites and types of platforms are investigated. 
Earlier in the internet history it was possible to do comprehensive overviews of every searchable 
antisemitic website, as the Simon Wiesenthal Center did in its Digital Hate series, but such 
methodologies are too outdated for web 2.0.121 Secondly, the frameworks aim to be encompassing 
enough to draw clear conclusions from most instances of online antisemitism. The design of these 
frameworks has been based on existing research on antisemitism and structured on the qualities of 
previously examined antisemitic content. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that cultures 
and content are constantly evolving on the internet, and the antisemitic content examined in 
previous research may be considerably different from future content. The frameworks have been 
 
120 Andre Oboler, Islamophobia on the Internet: The growth of online hate targeting Muslims (Melbourne: Online 
Hate Prevention Institute, 2013), p. 29. 
121 Simon Wiesenthal Center, Digital Hate 2002: Internet Report and Analysis (Los Angeles: The Simon Wiesenthal 
Center and Snider Social Action Institute, 2002) [on CD]. 
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designed with these considerations in mind, being broad enough to allow for the adaptive nature 
of antisemitism, yet specific enough to allow researchers to draw informative conclusions. 
 
Conclusion 
Direct comparison of research on cyberbullying and cyber-racism with online antisemitism 
demonstrates key lessons, which would not be observed with a narrow focus on online 
antisemitism. These lessons include the need for consistent definitions between studies, while 
avoiding the temptation to define phenomena differently due to qualitatively distinct 
manifestations online. In this case, it is better to maintain the original, offline definition and use 
the new manifestations to demonstrate how the internet results in qualitatively distinct 
manifestations of online abuse and discrimination. Another lesson is to consider how intersecting 
forms of abuse and discrimination result in opportunistic recruitment from adjacent discriminatory 
movements, and how actors from these movements can use social media to shape virtual realities 
that normalise their ideologies. This opportunism, seen significantly in GamerGate, is one of the 
strongest arguments for online abuse and discrimination research to incorporate consideration of 
intersecting and analogous fields of research. However, issues in the research of African American 
racism, and comparatively lower rates of research into online antisemitism, both demonstrate the 
need to properly understand intersecting fields of research. This all points towards the need for 
collaboration in future research on online abuse and discrimination, to both encourage the 
development of interdisciplinary approaches, and facilitate effective cooperation between fields. 
Still, the research and frameworks produced in this chapter demonstrate how effective research 
can be done individually. This thesis’ individual research serves the broader fields by 
demonstrating how holistic approaches can be conducted, through developing methodologies that 
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can be adopted by researchers in different fields - an objective further promoted by the research 
study in chapter six. 
This chapter’s frameworks, being informed by broad research on antisemitism, 
cyberbullying, and cyber-racism, allow for analysis in chapter five of the interplay between 
adaptable features of antisemitism and functions of online platforms. With these frameworks, 
profiles can be made of key websites and social media platforms that contribute to antisemitism’s 
spread online. These profiles then help determine how the internet, and web 2.0 in particular, has 
led to quantitative and qualitative changes to antisemitism, including the extent of these changes 
and how antisemitism compares to other forms of online discrimination. Regarding antisemitism 
2.0, these profiles help determine the degree of social acceptability of antisemitism online, and the 
continuity of such social acceptability between websites and social media. Ultimately, the research 
enabled by these frameworks in chapter five can inform the production of tools and strategies to 
educate and equip newer online generations for encounters with online antisemitism, particularly 
when combined with the findings from chapter six’s research study. 
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Chapter 5 
Profiles of Hatred: Antisemitism on Websites and Social Media 
 
This chapter analyses archetypal examples of antisemitic websites and manifestations of 
antisemitism on various social media platforms, applying the frameworks developed in chapter 
four to create profiles of these websites and platforms. Individual instances of antisemitism are 
examined with consideration of spaces where they manifest, analysing what qualities of the 
website or platform enable such content and activity. Furthermore, creating profiles of different, 
yet archetypal websites, allows this chapter to examine key areas of antisemitic dissemination and 
activity, producing a synthesised picture of antisemitism on the broader internet. The antisemitic 
websites examined in this chapter were chosen due to their impact and specific roles in both 
spreading and promoting the social acceptability of antisemitism online. The Institute for 
Historical Review, Stormfront, 4chan,1 and the Daily Stormer websites represent archetypes of 
different websites specifically used for disseminating antisemitism. The social media platforms 
examined are Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Reddit, some of the most popular social media 
platforms, which vary in their functionality, moderation, and use by antisemites. The websites and 
platforms selected are not exhaustive and do not necessarily represent the most extreme 
manifestations of antisemitism (e.g. 8chan compared to 4chan, Gab compared to Twitter). Some 
of these extreme manifestations are discussed briefly alongside other archetypes and platforms. 
 
1 While 4chan may differ from the others in this category by not being specifically dedicated to antisemitic or 
adjacent ideologies, the pervasiveness of antisemitism on major boards, like /pol/ and previously /news/ distinguish 
it from social media platforms, where antisemitism is not centrally prominent. In addition, while the antisemitism is 
largely centred around these specific boards, its embedding within the website’s broader culture and presence on 
other boards warrants a profile of the entire site. 
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Nonetheless, this selection represents a broad picture of online antisemitism, demonstrates how 
web 2.0 has impacted the manifestation of antisemitism online, and serves as an example of how 
to examine broader manifestations of abuse and discrimination online.  
 
Institute for Historical Review 
The Institute for Historical Review (IHR) website represents a web 1.0 archival website made to 
streamline the cost and efficiency of distributing antisemitic content. During the advent of the 
internet in the 1990s, many antisemitic groups and individuals established websites to digitally 
store their material and attract new followers. Due to the quantity of these websites, not all will be 
analysed here,2 so the IHR’s website serves to represent the archetypal websites of this initial shift 
to online-based antisemitism. This website is a worthwhile example of this shift, as the IHR is one 
of the most influential post-war antisemitic organisations and demonstrates the role of pseudo-
academic antisemitism online. The IHR, founded in 1978, came online in 1998 at ihr.org,3 although 
associate director Greg Raven had started archiving material on his personal website from 1996.4 
The website initially served as an online archive for the Journal of Historical Review and broader 
denial material. For the IHR, which previously had grown through donations and circulation of the 
 
2 Some others of note that will not be mentioned in this forum include the Vanguard News Forum, Focal Point 
Publications, The Zündelsite, Radio Islam, revisionists.com, Vrij Historical Onderzoek, Committee for the Open 
Debate on the Holocaust, Adelaide Institute, AAARGH.org, and others that included the personal websites of 
prominent antisemites, such as Arthur Butz and Greg Raven. These websites have been covered in greater depth in a 
paper on the history of Holocaust denial’s rise online. 
William Allington, ‘Holocaust Denial Online: The Rise of Pseudo-Academic Antisemitism on the Early Internet’, 
Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism, 1.1 (2017), 33-54. 
3 Institute for Historical Review, Institute for Historical Review (1998), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/19981201091812/http://ihr.org> [accessed 15 December 2019].  
4 Greg Raven, File additions, modifications, and corrections (1998), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20000527030016/http://www.corax.org/revisionism/top/new.html> [accessed 15 
December 2019] (para. 20 of 20]. 
Allington, ‘Holocaust Denial Online’, p. 39. 
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(physical) Journal of Historical Review, their website represented a technological revolution in the 
distribution and dissemination of their pseudo-academic antisemitic propaganda.  
The IHR, along with the broader global Holocaust denial movement, suffered a series of setbacks 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.5 The organisation split with founder Willis Carto,6 and numerous 
prominent Holocaust deniers such as David Irving,7 Frederick Toben,8 Robert Faurisson9 and Ernst 
Zündel10 suffered costly legal defeats, public reprisals, and even imprisonment.11 By 2002, the 
IHR had to stop publishing the Journal of Historical Review. Nonetheless, the creation of the 
IHR’s website allowed all existing volumes of the journal to be stored online and accessed by 
anyone with an internet connection. In early 2004, the IHR’s website shifted from an archive to a 
news-style website, publishing short opinion pieces by director Mark Weber and other Holocaust 
deniers alongside links from mainstream media and other hate sites.12 While the IHR has had a 
diminished impact in the twenty-first century compared to the twentieth century, the website is 
 
5 The IHR lost 90% of the stock, which was uninsured, in a firebombing attack in 1984. The movement online by 
the IHR meant that that kind of vigilante action would no longer be effective against the organisation. 
Anti-Defamation League, Holocaust Denial: an online guide (1997), 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20151222153329/http://archive.adl.org/holocaust/ihr-2.html> [accessed 15 December 
2019] (para. 1 of 11). 
6 Michael Granberry, ‘Judge Awards $6.4 Million to O.C. Revisionist Group’, Los Angeles Times, 16 November 
1996. <http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-16/local/me-65105_1_judge-awards> [accessed 15 December 2019] 
(para. 6 of 13). 
7 ‘Irving defiant over libel defeat, BBC News, 12 April 2000. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/709996.stm> 
[accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 9 of 21). 
8 Aislinn Simpson, ‘‘Holocaust denier’ Gerald Toben arrested at Heathrow’, Telegraph, 1 October 2008. 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/3116061/Holocaust-denier-Gerald-
Toben-arrested-at-Heathrow.html> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 1 of 8). 
9 ‘French Historian Who Dismisses Holocaust Is Beaten’, Los Angeles Times, 17 September 1989. 
<http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-17/news/mn-509_1_french-historian> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 1 of 
9). 
10 ‘Zundel turned over to German authorities’, CBC News Canada, 1 March 2005. 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/zundel-turned-over-to-german-authorities-1.529567> [accessed 15 December 
2019] (para. 1 of 10). 
11 Allington, ‘Holocaust Denial Online’, pp. 41-44. 
12 Institute of Historical Review (2004), <http://web.archive.org/web/20040207210956/http://www.ihr.org:80> 
[accessed 15 December 2019]. 
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still active in 2020,13 and continues to store the entire Journal of Historical Review and other 
antisemitic resources. 
 Because the IHR and similar websites are rooted in their web 1.0 design, the TEMPIS 
taxonomy is not particularly applicable here. There are few avenues for the website’s consumers 
to communicate with content producers and other consumers. The website is also a continuation 
of the pre-internet and web 1.0 style of organised antisemitism, which distinguishes these 
organised antisemites from newer web 2.0 organisers. The IHR still serves as a prominent example 
of covert antisemitism online, sharing content from more mainstream and conservative online 
sources in order to dilute and legitimise their antisemitism (appendix D, figure 18). The IHR’s 
evolution over time highlights its differences to newer manifestations of antisemitism on web 2.0. 
 The online role of the IHR and other older antisemitic organisations is somewhat 
paradoxical. These organisations have declined as the energy of antisemites has shifted away from 
pseudo-academia towards alt-right antagonism.14 However, while Holocaust denial groups 
diminished significantly in the twenty-first century,15 the internet has allowed their material to 
remain accessible, potentially to a greater degree than during the peak of the Holocaust denial 
movement. Dormant pre-internet materials can still be referenced and spread on more active 
antisemitic websites such as Stormfront, antisemitic spaces on 4chan, and broader social media. In 
addition, the cloaked, covert nature of their antisemitic materials risks newer online generations 
 
13 Institute for Historical Review (2020), <http://ihr.org> [accessed 18 January 2020]. 
14 Nicholas Terry, ‘Holocaust denial in the age of web 2.0: Negationist discourse since the Irving-Lipstadt trial’, in 
Holocaust and Genocide Denial: A Contextual Perspective, ed. by Paul Behrens, Nicholas Terry and Olaf Jensen 
(London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 34-54 (p. 53). 
15 In 2009, Mark Weber admitted the death of millions of Jews, and the irrelevance of Holocaust denial in the 
contemporary world.  
Nathaniel Popper, ‘Revisionist: It’s Time To Quit Shoah Fight’, Forward, 15 January 2009. 
<http://forward.com/news/14953/revisionist-it-s-time-to-quit-shoah-fight-03176> [accessed 15 December 2019] 
(para. 4, 11 of 21). 
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being misled into believing pseudo-academic antisemitism is legitimate and socially acceptable, 
exacerbated by factors such as the innocuous name of the Institute for Historical Review. 
Ironically, as the Holocaust denial movement declines and becomes less newsworthy, its potential 
to influence others increases. This relationship would not be viable without the internet, due to the 
comparatively lower likelihood of coming across Holocaust denial offline. 
Quantitatively, the internet first affected antisemitism by removing cost and distribution 
barriers for propaganda, allowing for greater volumes of content to be published. This in turn 
further demonstrates the diminished importance of organised antisemitic propaganda outlets such 
as the IHR. While their materials continue to be shared, the organisations have not regrown or 
been replaced, for many of their functions relating to the distribution of content have been replaced 
by streamlined online technology. Qualitatively, the declining importance of the IHR website 
indicates how changes in the internet have led to a more informal and grassroots spread of 
antisemitism, utilising the new phenomenon of prosumption. Organisations like the IHR facilitated 
the emergence of antisemitism 2.0 by trying to legitimise ideas like Holocaust denial and 
conducting the first major shift of organised antisemitism and their resources online. While such 
organisations no longer have a significant impact on antisemitism, the internet allows their legacy 
to remain in perpetuity, with their relative insignificance ironically resulting in young web users 
being unprepared, and potentially even sympathetic, when encountering their resources.  
 
Stormfront 
Stormfront represents an early and highly successful attempt to connect fractured networks of 
racists, including antisemites, through creating an online community space. While other 
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antisemitic web forums exist, Stormfront’s early success and size warrants its representation as the 
archetype of these websites. However, despite once being the most renowned and popular racist 
online forum, Stormfront eventually went into a long period of decline. Website activity, in the 
form of posts and user registrations, peaked in mid-2007, around the time Obama was nominated 
as the Democrat candidate for president. The rise in registration was in part caused by his electoral 
success, however over the eight years of Obama’s presidency, activity declined almost to the same 
level as when the forum was born in 2001.16 However, this data represents the decline of 
contributors, not all consumers, and therefore it should not be assumed that there is a causal link 
between Obama’s presidency and the decline of Stormfront. Rather, it is more likely that this 
decline was caused by the dispersion of antisemites across social media sites, which are more 
suitable for contemporary online interaction than the relatively older forum. This dispersion is 
partially explained by a shift in the online attention economy, as the older style forum sites favour 
longer threads of text and even long-prose essay-style posts, which take longer time to consume 
than the ‘bite-sized’ articles of the Daily Stormer, or mixed image and short-text threads of 4chan. 
Despite this decline, there has been a significant rise in ‘lurking’ on Stormfront, the online 
behaviour of browsing a forum without logging in or posting; essentially being an almost invisible 
presence to others on the website.17 This behaviour has been causally linked with the electoral 
success of Donald Trump by the website’s founder, former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard Don 
 
16 Keegan Hankes and Sam Zhang, ‘A Waning Storm: Once the World’s Most Popular White Nationalist Website, 
Stormfront is Running out of Steam’, Southern Poverty Law Center Hatewatch, 22 February 2017. 
<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/02/22/ 
waning-storm-once-world%E2%80%99s-most-popular-white-nationalist-website-stormfront-running-out> 
[accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 4-5 of 12). 
17 Vanessa Paz Dennen, ‘Pedagogical lurking: Student engagement in non-posting discussion behavior’, Computers 
in Human Behavior, 24.4 (2008), 1624-1633 (p. 1624). 
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Black, who reportedly upgraded the website’s servers to accommodate more traffic.18 This activity 
was corroborated by the website’s Alexa ranking, which peaked most recently in January 2017, 
corresponding to Trump’s inauguration; although this quantity has declined through 2018 and 
2019 (appendix D, figures 19.1, 19.2). Its ranking plummeted in the latter half of 2019 to the mid-
90,000s (appendix D, figure 19.3), which contrasts its 2014 high point in the low 10,000s.19 In 
addition, the lead up to the 2016 election featured the rise of the alt-right and mainstream 
recognition of 4chan-produced meme content (e.g. ‘Pepe the Frog’),20 and the rise of additional 
online reactionism to progressive diversity (e.g. GamerGate). This was associated with a shift 
away from websites like Stormfront, and an increase in activity on social media websites such as 
Twitter, Gab, and Discord. Concurrently, these shifts motivated the rise of new alt-right media 
sources, including The Daily Stormer, which produces shorter, more provocative content imbued 
with 4chan-style humour. However, even if Stormfront has experienced a decline in activity, the 
content produced over its history is easily accessible and still receives a broad audience, even if 
the active discussion and use of such content are moving to different spaces. Stormfront has had a 
significant role in establishing a white nationalist and antisemitic presence on the internet, and is 
renowned enough to serve as a drawing point for antisemites and other racists online, as evidenced 
from its continuing, if declining traffic. This analysis also demonstrates that online antisemitism 
is directly affected by real-world events, and vice versa – it does not exist in its own ‘bubble’, even 
 
18 Ben Schreckinger, ‘White Supremacist groups see Trump bump’, Politico, 12 December 2015. 
<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/donald-trump-white-supremacists-216620> [accessed 15 December 2019] 
(para. 14 of 23). 
19 Alexa rankings measure overall traffic to the website, which explains why its Alexa ranking peaked in 2014 
versus post quantities and user registrations peaking in 2007. 
‘TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: HOW DON BLACK’S SON ESCAPED THE WHITE SUPREMACIST 
MOVEMENT HE WAS BORN TO INHERIT’, Southern Poverty Law Center Hatewatch, 3 November 2019. 
<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/03/take-money-and-run-how-don-black%E2%80%99s-son-escaped-
white-supremacist-movement-he-was-born> [accessed 29 October 2019] (para. 34 of 69). 
20 Know Your Meme, Pepe the Frog (2019), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/pepe-the-frog> [accessed 15 
December 2019]. 
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if functionally serving as an echo chamber. For these reasons, it is still important to consider the 
older, well-established websites in surveying online antisemitism, even if they are falling in 
relevance. 
Stormfront was founded by Don Black in 1995, after he took computer programming 
classes while imprisoned for his role in a planned mercenary invasion of the Dominican 
Republic.21 These classes provided him with the ability to create the first major white nationalist 
website, originally serving as a bulletin board for former Klansman David Duke’s campaign for 
the Louisiana State Senate.22 Stormfront originally served as a resource website, with Black 
singlehandedly providing, sharing and uploading the content for browsers to consume. Yet Black 
was swift to enhance the communicative abilities of the website, encouraging more users to 
contribute. In 1997, he started a weekly e-letter system called “Stormwatch”, and a prototype 
forum called “Stormfront-L”.23 “Stormfront-L” operated like a newspaper opinion section, where 
subscribers could email in their opinions, which Black would present in a “Daily Digest”. This 
allowed consumers to respond to each other, encouraging daily discussion of the “Stormwatch” 
newsletter and other website material. “Stormfront-L” represented one of the first online 
developments that allowed casual antisemites and other racists to produce and share content of 
their own. Black’s developments resulted in considerable growth over the first five years – 
reaching 7,000 people per day in 2000 according to Black’s own estimates.24 This growth was 
 
21 T.K. Kim, ‘Hate Website Stormfront Sees Rapid Growth of Neo-Nazi Community’, Southern Poverty Law Centre 
Intelligence Report, 27 July 2005. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2005/hate-website-
stormfront-sees-rapid-growth-neo-nazi-community> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 14 of 58). 
22 Carol M. Swain and Russell K. Nieli, ‘Don Black’, in Contemporary Voices of White Nationalism in America, ed. 
by Carol M. Swain and Russell K. Nieli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 153-165 (pp. 153-
154). 
23 Don Black, Stormfront: White Nationalist Resource Page (1997), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/19970302004235/http://www.stormfront.org/stormfront> [accessed 15 December 
2019]. 
24 Don Black, Stormfront: White Nationalist Resource Page (2000), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20000301104024/http://stormfront.org> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 4 of 4).  
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further accelerated by the airing of an HBO documentary called Hate.com, which covered the rise 
of Stormfront, establishing it as a household name despite the documentary’s negative tone.25 The 
rising demand and success of “Stormfront-L” led to Black establishing a web forum, effectively 
turning Stormfront into the first major prosumption-oriented racist website.  
Even on the forum, Black and other leading antisemites took a strong hand in producing 
and disseminating antisemitic content. Inside the various sub-forums with labels such as “Ideology 
and Philosophy” and “History & Revisionism”, select discussion threads have been ‘stickied’, a 
colloquialism meaning that they always appear at the top of the list of discussions, regardless of 
how much activity those threads receive. This guarantees they are seen by all visitors to those sub-
forums. As of November 2019, four out of fifteen stickied threads in the Ideology and Philosophy 
sub-forum are explicitly antisemitic, promoting National Socialism and discussing the idea of 
“Jewish Supremacism”.26 In the History & Revisionism sub-forum, ten out of the thirteen stickied 
threads are antisemitic, mainly regarding Holocaust denial.27 Another instance worth mentioning 
is the “Opposing Views” sub-forum, meant to allow anti-racist visitors to debate with the website’s 
regular users. One of the stickied threads there is called “Tales of the Holocaust”, created by a user 
with the pseudonym “Yehuda_Abraham”, a simplistic caricature of an Orthodox Jew. Between 
2006 and 2010, this user would regularly link to “tales of the Holocaust” in the media, mocking 
what they viewed as the absurdities of these stories. This thread is one of the most popular on 
Stormfront, receiving over 2.1 million views as of April 2017,28 and 2.6 million as of September 
 
25 This can be attributed by comparing the website’s view counter between 2001-2003, demonstrating a significant 
spike in the time after the documentary was aired. 
26 Stormfront, Ideology and Philosophy (2019), <https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f9> [accessed 15 December 
2019]. 
27 Stormfront, History & Revisionism (2019), <https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f36> [accessed 15 December 
2019]. 
28Stormfront, Opposing Views (2017), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20170418234516/https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f14> [accessed 17 January 2020]. 
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2019,29 continuing well after “Yehuda_Abraham” went inactive in 2010. This represented an 
increase of approximately 25% in two and a half years, despite the thread originating in 2007, 
thereby demonstrating how Stormfront is still extensively used as a resource for antisemites despite 
the decline in broader activity on the website. 
On August 28th, 2017, Stormfront was pulled off the ‘open’ web by its domain provider 
following the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally, during which counter-protestor Heather D. 
Heyer was intentionally run over by Neo-Nazi James Alex Fields Jr.30 Stormfront’s temporary 
removal occurred alongside an online campaign carried out by activist groups, allegedly including 
the ‘hacktivist’ collective Anonymous, which aimed at taking down as many Neo-Nazi and white 
supremacist websites as possible.31 Anonymous described their actions in an online letter alongside 
the hashtag #OpDomesticTerrorism: 
 
Yesterday we were successfully able to shut down multiple servers that promoted and 
supported the hatred that happened in Charlottesville, as well as those that did not speak 
out against the domestic terrorist attack…We also were successful in outing multiple KKK 
members and white supremacists.32  
 
29 Stormfront, Opposing Views (2019), 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20190916140517/https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f14> [accessed 17 January 2020]. 
30 Alex Hern, ‘Stormfront: ‘murder capital of internet’ pulled offline after civil rights action’, Guardian, 29 August 
2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/29/stormfront-neo-nazi-hate-site-murder-internet-pulled-
offline-web-com-civil-rights-action> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 4, 9 of 15). 
31 Cara McGoogan and Mark Molloy ‘Anonymous shuts down neo-Nazi and KKK websites after Charlottesville 
rally’, Telegraph, 14 August 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/14/anonymous-shuts-neo-nazi-
kkk-websites-charlottesville-rally> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 5 of 16). 
32 Ibid., 
 #OpDomesticTerrorism (2017), <https://pad.riseup.net/p/r.7cc16bd7f4d3379a9ed6b83e090dea71> [accessed 3 
October 2017]. 
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The self-descriptive actions of Anonymous make it difficult to verify how successful these activists 
were. They were not directly responsible for shutting down Stormfront, but they highlighted the 
public outrage that assumedly led to Stormfront’s domain provider Network Solutions shutting 
down the forum. Network Solutions officially stated that Stormfront was violating the provider’s 
policy against racism and discrimination.33 Stormfront was initially blocked from repossessing its 
domain, but on September 29th, a month later, Black managed to negotiate to have the domain 
transferred to a different provider, Tucows.34 While the website was restored, the temporary 
instability significantly affected the traffic to their website, as their Alexa ranking has significantly 
declined since then despite a small increase in January 2018 (appendix D, figures 19.1-19.3). 
This series of incidents represents the shrinking gap between offline and online 
antisemitism, both in regard to antisemitic action and the reactive relationship between real-world 
events and online communities. Both Black and anti-Stormfront activists pointed out that 
Stormfront had been violating Network Solutions’ terms of service for over twenty years, but it 
was only after a highly publicised incident that any action was taken. In addition, Network 
Solutions initially blocked Stormfront from moving their domain, but later acquiesced when the 
furore had declined.35 Therefore, while real world antisemitic events reciprocally affect online 
antisemitic communities, qualitative differences between events and communities affect this 
relationship. Online communities like Stormfront are not especially visible, for while they are 
accessible, finding the community requires a concerted search. Comparatively, real-world 
 
33 John Biggs, ‘Another neo-Nazi site, Stormfront, is shut down’, Techcrunch, 28 August 2017. 
<https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/28/another-neo-nazi-site-stormfront-is-shut-down> [accessed 15 December 2019] 
(para. 4 of 7). 
34 Jessica Schulberg, Dana Liebelson and Tommy Crags, ‘The Neo-Nazis Are Back Online’, Huffington Post, 4 
October 2017. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/ 
nazis-are-back-online_us_59d40719e4b06226e3f46941> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 3 of 18). 
35 Ibid. 
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antisemitic events can be highly visible, especially in ‘Western’ liberal democracies. When online 
communities like Stormfront are intertwined with highly publicised real-world events, reactions 
to these events carry over to online communities. However, due to the comparatively unseen nature 
of online communities, Stormfront could re-establish its online presence after the furore had died 
down, while generating little attention to itself. Comparably, a hypothetical chapter of the KKK 
trying to organise a meeting offline a month after the “Unite the Right” rally may require the hiring 
of a public space or public advertisements, warranting far more public attention than a website 
simply reappearing. To summarise, this series of incidents demonstrates that while offline 
antisemitism and online antisemitic communities are increasingly intertwined, qualitative 
differences established by the internet allow online communities to persist with less resistance. 
Despite its TEMPIS taxonomy staying consistent over the last two decades (appendix D, 
figure 26.1), Stormfront has evolved from a resource website into an active prosumption-based 
web forum, and is shifting back into a resource website. Nonetheless, the perseverance and 
popularity of Stormfront means that its relevance for online antisemitism will likely continue. 
Stormfront features a mix of organised and casual antisemites, and represents the evolution of their 
relationship in web 2.0. Technological features such as the “Stormfront-L” prototype shifted the 
relationship from a pure producer/consumer relationship, into one where casual antisemites can 
contribute and discuss. Casual antisemites are no longer dependent on organised content output 
(although they still benefit from it), but rather rely on the sustainability of online spaces. 
Stormfront set a precedent for the overt nature of its antisemitism with its early use of 
pseudonymity and interaction from its consumer base. It also represents an environment where 
casual antisemites can evolve into organised antisemites. Due to the shared space and culture on 
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the website, casual users may begin creating overt content themselves, encouraged by the broad 
sense of community otherwise unavailable before the internet.  
Quantitatively, Stormfront is a key example of how evolving communication technology 
has aided the growth of antisemitism. The ease of access and dialogue offered by Stormfront is far 
more appealing than organising offline antisemitic groups. Comparatively, the Ku Klux Klan, the 
longest running offline white nationalist antisemitic group in the United States, has been suffering 
from an extended period of decline.36 Despite the decline in real-world racist infrastructure, 
Stormfront has allowed these ideologies to persist through the internet, even benefitting from the 
decline in offline group infrastructure through recruitment of existing offline antisemites. While 
the Ku Klux Klan is in a long period of decline, the overall number of hate groups in the United 
States (the main consumers of Stormfront) has generally been on the rise, especially since the start 
of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in 2015.37 The decline of the Klan has led to the rise of 
a broader range of antisemitic groups in the United States. The advent of Stormfront has given 
independence and support to this broader and more individually tailored range of antisemitic 
groups, who no longer need to rely on offline grassroots organisation and structure to survive. 
Stormfront’s early rapid growth established it as a broadly known community for online 
antisemitism, although the explicitness allowed by its pseudonymity may have also set it as a 
broadly known benchmark for antisemitism. For many, especially those who watched Hate.com, 
Stormfront represents what antisemitism on the internet looks like, potentially leading to users 
 
36 Brian Palmer, ‘Ku Klux Kontraction’, Slate, March 2012. 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/ku_klux_klan_in_decline_why_did_the_kkk_los
e_so_many_chapters_in_2010_.html> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 3 of 7). 
37 Southern Poverty Law Center, Hate Groups 2000-2018 (2018), <https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map> [accessed 
15 December 2019]. 
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lowering their guard when encountering more implicit manifestations of antisemitism. This 
benchmark aids the normalisation of implicit antisemitism, thus advancing antisemitism 2.0. 
The persistence of antisemitic ideologies in virtual worlds does not remove their impact 
from the offline world. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) published a report in 2014 
documenting nearly 100 murders committed by users of Stormfront, noting a shared pattern of 
activity on Stormfront or other racist websites and blogs before the killings.38 While the report 
lacks any clear pattern of coordination between Stormfront and the killers, nor a specific trend 
towards antisemitic violence, it remains a significant correlation. In addition, the report identifies 
significant spikes in traffic after high-profile white nationalist terror attacks, such as the 2011 Oslo 
bombing by Anders Breivik. What Stormfront represents here is an opportunity for white 
nationalists and antisemites to discuss, commemorate, and learn from examples of right-wing 
violence, potentially replicating and encouraging more in the future. The anonymity provided by 
Stormfront allows frank and open discussions of these topics. At the very least, the rise of virtual 
antisemitism via Stormfront does not represent a decline in real world antisemitic violence; online 
clandestine antisemitism is not replacing offline antisemitism. This trend contrasts the relationship 
between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, where electronic communications can be used to 
avoid detection and circumvent traditional bullying countermeasures. The major qualitative 
changes represented by Stormfront include the introduction of pseudonymous global discussion of 
antisemitism, the shift of the antisemitism propagation from highly organised groups to dedicated 
organised individuals, and the radicalisation of casual antisemites into organisers. This latter aspect 
in particular is facilitated by users’ broader access and input to the development and spread of 
 
38 Heidi Beirich, ‘White Homicide Worldwide’, Southern Poverty Law Centre Intelligence Report, 24 May 2014. 
<https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/ 
white-homicide-worldwide.pdf> [accessed 15 December 2019] (p. 5).  
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antisemitic content, and the lack of potential social risk posed by related discussions online. The 
distinction between anonymity and pseudonymity is significant here, as well-recognised 
pseudonyms, like “Yehuda_Abraham”, can still earn praise of their peers without risking social 
capital in the real world. While Stormfront is in a general period of decline, it has had an extensive 
quantitative and qualitative impact on antisemitism in the twenty-first century, enabled by 
opportunities presented by the internet. 
 
4chan 
4chan represents how streamlined methods of contribution and consumption allow antisemitism 
to be spread anonymously, casually, and to even become ingrained in internet culture. This process 
is especially facilitated by 4chan’s prominent anonymity and limited moderation. The archetype 
represented by 4chan covers other websites like 8chan, which featured even more extremist 
content, however, 4chan was the original iteration and inspiration behind these branch-offs. 4chan 
is a relatively popular website, ranking fairly consistently on Alexa in the 800s between early 2016 
and late 2019 (appendix D, figures 20.1, 20.2). 4chan started in 2003 as an early social media 
imageboard intended for the discussion of anime related topics, mirroring the popular Japanese 
imageboard 2channel.39 However, 4chan quickly grew in popularity, becoming an online space for 
discussing a wide variety of topics, ranging from video games,40 to guns and knives, 41 and 
politics.42 The board where anonymous users discuss politics, also known as /pol/ or “Politically 
Incorrect”, is a space regularly used by Neo-Nazis and other antisemites to promote antisemitic 
 
39 Futaba Channel, Futaba Channel (2019), <http://www.2chan.net> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
40 4chan, /vg/ - Video Game Generals (2019), <http://boards.4chan.org/vg/> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
41 4chan, /k/ - Weapons (2019), <http://boards.4chan.org/k/> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
42 4chan, /pol/ - Politically Incorrect (2019), <http://boards.4chan.org/pol/> [accessed 15 December 2019].  
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viewpoints, particularly through memes. These users take advantage of the culture of anonymity 
and hands-off approach to moderation implemented by the website’s founder, Christopher Poole 
(a.k.a “moot”, his online persona). 4chan’s culture and limited moderation has produced an 
environment that tolerates and encourages discussion of subjects intended to shock and disgust 
others. This behaviour has turned 4chan into one of the internet’s most popular spaces for internet 
‘trolls’, uniting them to the point where they can organise ‘raids’: rapid influxes into other online 
spaces to antagonise or cause chaos.43 4chan’s troll-friendly environment fosters a significant 
antisemitic presence, yet also presents difficulties in analysing the intent behind antisemitism on 
4chan. Many participants in antisemitic discussions or ‘raids’ may not believe in antisemitic 
ideology, but merely promote it to provoke ‘entertaining’ responses from others, representing the 
qualitative evolution of recreational antisemitism. 
 One incident demonstrating 4chan’s recreational antisemitism was the “Dub the Dew” raid 
in August 2012, targeting an online vote for the name of a new Mountain Dew soft drink. 4chan 
users brigaded the poll, making “Hitler Did Nothing Wrong” the most popular option.44 The 
coverage of this stunt led to the term “Hitler Did Nothing Wrong” becoming a renowned and 
repeatedly used internet meme.45 There were other popular vulgar options resulting from the raid 
that were not antisemitic (e.g. ‘gushing granny’), however the broader community in the raid 
supported the antisemitic option. The mix of antisemitism with broader vulgarity suggests that the 
majority culture of 4chan at this time was not antisemitic. Instead, the antisemitic result was an 
 
43 Whitney Phillips, ‘Internet Troll Sub-Culture's Savage Spoofing of Mainstream Media [Excerpt]’, Scientific 
American, 15 May 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
internet-troll-sub-culture-s-savage-spoofing-of-mainstream-media-excerpt> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 1, 
10 of 35). 
44 Know Your Meme, Dub the Dew (2019), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/dub-the-dew> [accessed 15 
December 2019] (para. 2 of 6). 
45 Know Your Meme, Hitler Did Nothing Wrong (2018), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/hitler-did-nothing-
wrong> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 1 of 4). 
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extension of the shock culture that permeated the platform. Therefore, while not every antisemitic 
incident on 4chan is carried out exclusively by dedicated antisemites, other trolls and users are 
complicit in its normalisation, both on the website itself and elsewhere online. Nonetheless, there 
is easily recognisable antisemitic propaganda on 4chan that serves to intimidate Jews and radicalise 
other users, primarily through its political boards. In January 2011, Poole removed the /new/ 
message board, which was intended for discussing news, but instead hosted racist content 
paralleling that on Stormfront. 
 
As for /new/, anybody who used it knows exactly why it was removed. When I re-added 
the board last year, I made a note that if it devolved into /stormfront/, I'd remove it. It did 
-- ages ago. Now it's gone, as promised.46 
 
Eventually, Poole introduced the /pol/ board to replace /new/, and in 2015 stepped away from the 
website, however much of the antisemitic presence on the website became ingrained in /pol/ as 
well. 
4chan’s dated design and lack of long-reaching archives makes it difficult to keep tabs on 
antisemitic trends on /pol/. However, advances in automated quantitative research methods have 
led to fresh insights into these antisemitic trends, presented in research undertaken by the NCRI.47 
The NCRI’s report found high popularity for both the term “jew”, and antisemitic slurs like “kike”. 
 
46 Christopher Poole, Why were /r9k/ and /new/ removed? (2011), <http://www.webcitation.org/6159jR9pC> 
[accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 5 of 7). 
47 Joel Finkelstein and others, ‘A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online Antisemitism’, September 2018 
[pre-print] <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01644.pdf> [accessed 28 October 2019]. 
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Both terms increased in use between mid-2016 and late 2018, alongside broader ethnic identity 
discussion, especially “jew”.48 Their data shows a strong correlation between the trends in the use 
of “jew” and “white”, and a lesser but still significant correlation with “nigger”. Increased trends 
were strongly linked with offline events, such as Trump’s inauguration and the Charlottesville 
rally.49 The report’s broader analysis makes a connection between antisemitism and /pol/ and white 
supremacism, and suggested the use of the term “jew” correlated with classical antisemitic 
contexts.50 This connection emphasises that antisemitism’s adaptability and interconnectedness 
with other discriminatory movements is significantly enhanced through the internet, particularly 
on platforms with low rates of moderation and high rates of anonymity. The broad extent of 
antisemitism’s adaptability and range of manifestations is indicated through a node graph 
representing words associated with “jew” on /pol/. This graph categorises these words into 
“communities” based on their context. Such contexts include Jews as morally corrupt entities, 
powerful geopolitical conspirators, and a distinct ethnic group, alongside more general discussions 
of religion and cryptic lore.51 The graph reveals various manifestations of classic antisemitism on 
4chan along with a significant quantity of newly invented slurs (e.g. “jewboy”, “(((them)))”, and 
“turbokik” [sic]) demonstrating how the internet both affects pre-internet manifestations of 
antisemitism and facilitates the creation of new manifestations. The “explosion” of new antisemitic 
slurs in particular demonstrates the exponential increase in antisemitism’s adaptability and 
evolution on platforms like /pol/. This trend represents a significant qualitative change to 
antisemitism alongside the new manifestations themselves. 
 
48 Ibid., p. 4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 6. 
51 Ibid., p. 7. 
 223 
 
The NCRI report also covers the dissemination of the Happy Merchant meme on and 
beyond /pol/, previously discussed in chapter four. The meme’s dissemination demonstrates both 
the versatility of the meme as a new manifestation of antisemitism, and the impact /pol/ has on 
broader online communities. The NCRI used automated systems to collect memes from /pol/ and 
other online communities, and were even able to collate derivations of the Merchant template, and 
instances of other memes clearly influenced by the Merchant caricature.52 The results 
demonstrated consistent posting of Merchant memes on /pol/, and significant rates of sharing these 
memes to other online communities.  
 
Our results show that /pol/ is the single most influential community for the spread of memes 
to all other Web communities. Interestingly, the influence that /pol/ exhibits in the spread 
of the Happy Merchant surpasses its influence in the spread of other memes.53 
 
The spread of antisemitic tropes from the Merchant meme to other meme templates further 
demonstrates the adaptability of antisemitism through meme culture, and indicates the extreme 
extent of normalisation of antisemitic tropes within /pol/’s culture. The pervasive spread of 
antisemitic tropes from the Merchant meme to other templates reveals that exposure to 
antisemitism on 4chan and satellite spaces is near inescapable, due to the meme’s ubiquity. This 
ubiquity also suggests how meme culture facilitates the feedback loop of antisemitism within these 
spaces, as the ‘creative’ use of Merchant tropes in other memes encourages further ‘creativity’. 
Before the internet, it would be impossible to spread Jewish caricatures to so many instances of 
 
52 Ibid., p. 9. 
53 Ibid., p. 10. 
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cultural communication, even during the Third Reich. In addition to this being a quantitative 
change, the seemingly recreational culture self-perpetuates these tropes; antisemitic manifestations 
in such varied contexts is a qualitative change enabled by the features of 4chan itself.  
Between its toleration of antisemitic stunts, its viral antisemitic content, and the pervasive 
presence of dedicated antisemites, 4chan serves as a central hub bringing together dedicated 
antisemites and potential audiences. Since the website was not intended to be specifically 
antisemitic, and since it caters to a range of users, embedding antisemitism within the culture of 
the website normalises antisemitism to a far broader audience than just antisemites and their 
followers. The feedback loop of consistent posting of antisemitic memes and their variations 
encourages the participation of users not involved in dedicated antisemitic movements, thereby 
representing their complicity in recreational antisemitism. The popularity of antisemitic stunts like 
the “Dub the Dew” raid suggests the broader community of 4chan tolerates and engages in 
antisemitic humour recreationally as an extension of the platform’s shock culture. However, as 
antisemitism is increasingly normalised on the platform, it will be harder to distinguish between 
recreational complicity in antisemitism and active participation in spreading antisemitism. 
Nonetheless, it can be expected that increased normalisation both represents and increases active, 
intentional antisemitism. These problems may also extend to other spaces influenced by 4chan, as 
the influential meme culture popularised on the platform increasingly intersects with antisemitism.  
 4chan’s TEMPIS taxonomy represents the unique functions and qualities of the platform 
(appendix D, figure 26.2). While messages are stored, they are only stored for a limited amount of 
time (three days) before disappearing. This motivates users to continuously repost content to 
ensure discussion on it endures, which is a likely reason for the consistent rate of Merchant meme 
posts. Moderators are significantly empowered over the users, and can remove individual posts at 
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will or after being reported. However, there is significant controversy about moderation within 
4chan, due its perception as a free-speech space. 4chan’s anonymity and anarchic methods of 
posting allows anyone to contribute to any thread and to create their own threads, allowing their 
content to be seen by the entire sub-site board. While 4chan provides no tools for active sharing 
of the content elsewhere, the site still has a reputation as a driver of viral content. 
The impact and popularity of 4chan’s antisemitic stunts demonstrate the enhanced ability 
of individuals to promote antisemitism online, both organised and recreational. These stunts may 
be originated by anonymous users who aim to generate attention on the site broadly, rather than 
specifically reaching out to antisemitic users. Individual antisemites can therefore reliably inspire 
antisemitic activity that before the internet would typically be coordinated by a group. For casual 
antisemites, this evolution frees them from relying on group infrastructure for the implementation 
of large-scale antisemitic activity online. These stunts can also set precedents that may encourage 
copycat users to spark more antisemitic stunts, expecting similar support on the website. Users 
also contribute material relating to these stunts as a way of participating in the website’s culture. 
These individual acts of antisemitism that attract popularity represent the qualitative evolution of 
recreational antisemitism. The anonymity of 4chan leads to a particularly free space for expression, 
but also leads to dissociation where motivations are concealed and may be varied between users, 
including antisemites. One user may create antisemitic memes to promote a particular agenda, 
while another may do the same to appeal to the culture of provocative humour on 4chan and 
elsewhere online. 
Ultimately, 4chan features primarily overt, active antisemitism, where organised 
antisemitic individuals and casual antisemites intersect resulting in the major evolution of 
recreational antisemitism. Recreational antisemites’ participation in the culture is aided by 
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anonymity, and the ease of content creation and distribution facilitated by web 2.0 technology. 
4chan can also be a space for the recycling of dormant antisemitism, where Nazi propaganda and 
Holocaust denial material are regularly promoted in recycled threads (appendix C, figure 17). 
4chan’s culture is a major driving force for both the qualitative evolution and quantitative growth 
of antisemitism, being a major source of viral online content that is often shared to broader 
websites and social media platforms. This culture arguably serves as the main reason for the most 
significant evolution of explicit antisemitism online, inspiring other antisemitic spaces such as the 
Daily Stormer and 8chan.54 
The quantitative changes driven by 4chan are straightforward, yet significant. 4chan’s 
popularity and renown as a source of internet culture55 has normalised the use of anonymity online 
for a wide variety of malicious purposes, including harassment and broader ‘trolling’. This 
provides an outlet for antisemites, where they can promote antisemitic content or activity without 
any consequences (such as a risk to social capital). Naturally, this normalisation and easy 
promotion has led to a quantitative rise in online antisemitic content, with no straightforward way 
to hold content creators or promoters socially accountable. The lack of accountability lays the 
groundwork for higher quantities of antisemitism on 4chan and similarly influenced spaces, as 
online users are conditioned to tolerate 4chan’s brand of explicit antisemitism, as exported through 
stunts, memes, and harassment.  
 
54 8chan in particular evolved after Moot banned discussion of GamerGate on 4chan, resulting in a migration to 
8chan. The fact that 8chan then later became associated with far-right terrorist attacks, including the Poway 
synagogue shooting in April 2019, further suggests the intersection of discriminatory conspiracy movements like 
GamerGate with the encompassing worldviews offered by ‘redemptive’ antisemitism. 
55 Caitlin Dewey, ‘Absolutely everything you need to know to understand 4chan, the Internet’s own bogeyman’, 
Washington Post, 25 September 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/ 
wp/2014/09/25/absolutely-everything-you-need-to-know-to-understand-4chan-the-internets-own-
bogeyman/?utm_term=.5eaa6c8b4ea2> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 12-14 of 28). 
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The most significant qualitative change to antisemitism pushed by 4chan is the 
normalisation of antisemitism through humour, encouraging recreational users who do not 
necessarily hold antisemitic views to participate in antisemitic activity for leisure and amusement. 
This antisemitic activity has some slight parallels in history, such as spikes in antisemitism 
associated with pogroms (at least in terms of engaging in antisemitic activity to fit in with society 
and to gain some social or material benefit). However, 4chan’s brand of antisemitism is distinct 
by potentially appearing benign due to being conducted ‘in jest’ and not reflecting a genuine belief 
or set of values. This relates to the leisure-centred aggression of GamerGate, as the recreational 
and vulgar culture of 4chan encourages broader participation in antisemitism for thrill and 
entertainment, not just ideology. Furthermore, this activity is distinct from pre-internet actions, 
due to the diminished visibility of the activity’s consequences. Actions like pogroms leave explicit 
evidence of physical violence and property damage, while the virtual nature of online interaction 
actually obscures potential harm. This harm is most likely psychological, which is also less visible 
than physical violence, and is enabled by people being disassociated from others online. The 
diminished visibility of harm in turn helps further normalisation of this antisemitism, as its 
participants may themselves be convinced that their participation is harmless.56 This attitude is 
aided by the depersonalisation of the internet, which allows users to remove themselves from the 
impact of their activity through the removal of any offline connection to those affected or upset. 
These changes can ultimately result in recreational antisemites transitioning into dedicated 
organised ones, facilitated by exposure to the sheer quantity of antisemitism on 4chan.  
 
 
56 Since the pretence behind the antisemitic behaviour is often based on the idea that such actions are controversial, 
dark and ‘edgy’, it is ironic that such behaviour actually serves to make it less controversial through normalising 
antisemitism. 
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The Daily Stormer 
The extreme, sardonic Daily Stormer ‘news’ website represents the archetype of online 
mouthpieces of extreme antisemitism in the age of 4chan and the alt-right, using web 2.0 
manifestations of antisemitism to organise antisemitic networks. The Daily Stormer’s impact is 
strong evidence of the successful impact of 4chan-style antisemitic content. Taking its name from 
the Nazi-era tabloid Der Stürmer, the Daily Stormer presents itself as a twenty-first century 
replication of the publication, relying on explicit, crude and low-effort antisemitic memes to attract 
a younger, 4chan-influenced audience. The Daily Stormer is operated by Andrew Anglin, an 
American Neo-Nazi who was driven towards a fascist ideology by 4chan’s antisemitic content on 
the /new/ board. This ideology initially motivated him to create the blog-style website Total 
Fascism.57 Total Fascism’s long-form essay style was ineffective, so Anglin changed his strategy 
with the creation of the Daily Stormer, adopting provocative language and internet memes. Anglin 
makes extensive use of the ‘Pepe the Frog’ meme, a cartoon of a frog that is often used on 4chan 
and by members of the alt-right. The meme was eventually categorised as an antisemitic hate 
symbol by the ADL due to its large, albeit not complete association with alt-right extremism.58 
The SPLC has contrasted the successful design of The Daily Stormer to the increasingly dated 
appearance of Stormfront: 
 
The Daily Stormer was featuring flamboyant and eye-catching — if grotesquely racist and 
guttural — headlines that functioned as “click bait.” In effect, Stormfront looked like an 
 
57 Southern Poverty Law Center, Andrew Anglin (2017), <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/individual/andrew-anglin> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 12 of 42).  
58 The ADL does note, however, that not all uses of Pepe are antisemitic, and neither is the original comic creator.  
Anti-Defamation League, Pepe the Frog (2019), <https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/pepe-the-
frog> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 3 of 6). 
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ancient online version of The New York Times, even as The Daily Stormer increasingly 
took on the appearance and jazzy language of modern news sites like Buzzfeed.59 
 
Anglin is very explicit with his antisemitism, dedicating an entire section of the website to 
the “Jewish Problem”,60 making liberal use of antisemitic slurs, and supporting traditional 
antisemitic conspiracy theories. Anglin also promotes new antisemitic conspiracy theories, such 
as suggesting that bomb threats against Jewish targets are a conspiracy theory.61 This latter theory 
was supported by President Trump regarding the surge in bomb threats against Jewish targets in 
early 2017.62 Anglin’s activities are not just limited to writings on his website, but also include 
recruiting a ‘troll army’ from his website’s readers, through which he and others direct the 
harassment and intimidation of Jews and other ideological opponents. For example, in June 2016, 
Daily Stormer users spread the personal details of Erin Schrode, a Jewish woman running for office 
in California, resulting in her being bombarded with antisemitic messages such as “fire up the 
oven”.63 Anglin shares the same explicit antisemitic content as 4chan, yet without the plausible 
deniability of trolling. What the Daily Stormer represents is the new style of online antisemitic 
harassment popularised on 4chan being directed by resourceful Neo-Nazi ideologues. While this 
 
59 Keegan Hankes, ‘Eye of the Stormer’, Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, 9 February 2017. 
<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/eye-stormer> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 
19 of 51). 
60 Daily Stormer, Jewish Problem (2019, <http://www.dailystormer.com/section/jewish-problem> [accessed 15 
December 2019]. 
61 Joseph Jordan a.k.a. Eric Striker, ‘#HoaxGate: Neo-Nazi Brain Tumor Now Being Blamed for Jewish Center 
Bomb Threats’, Daily Stormer, 31 March 2017. <http://dstormer6em3i4km.onion.ly/hoaxgate-neo-nazi-brain-tumor-
now-being-blamed-for-jewish-center-bomb-threats> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 13 of 15). 
62 Aaron Blake, ‘Trump is flirting with the idea that anti-Semitic incidents are false flags again’, Washington Post, 1 
March 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/28/trump-is-reportedly-hinting-that-anti-
semitic-incidents-are-false-flags-it-wouldnt-be-the-first-time> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 3-4 of 12). 
63 ‘‘Fire up the oven’: Neo-Nazis target Jewish candidate in California’, Times of Israel, 5 Junes 2016. 
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/fire-up-the-oven-neo-nazis-target-jewish-candidate-in-california> [accessed 15 
December 2019] (para. 7 of 18). 
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style of antisemitism was born in anonymous forums, Anglin’s website has proven that it can be 
promoted publicly, supporting its material with Anglin’s public reputation. However, the public 
promotion of this content comes with risks, and Anglin himself has been ruled against in several 
lawsuits relating to the activity on the Daily Stormer.64 These lawsuits, along with other issues 
caused by the Daily Stormer’s vulgarity and popularity, have put the website’s future in jeopardy. 
While the site represents the potential of public organised antisemites on the internet, it also 
represents limits to that potential. 
Anglin has idolised of Donald Trump on his website, and through this idolisation, the Daily 
Stormer connects with other members of the alt-right, particularly those who populated /pol/ with 
a significant pro-Trump presence.65 Anglin has since used the election of Trump to the US 
Presidency in 2016 as an opportunity to promote his website to the broader right wing. This 
opportunism is reflected through the changing of the website header graphics. For the first three 
years of the website, starting in 2013, the header largely featured Nazi symbolism (appendix D, 
figure 21.1). In mid-2016, he started using the slogan “The World’s Most Visited Alt-Right Web 
Site” (appendix D, figure 21.2). Finally, after Trump’s victory in November 2016, the header’s 
slogan became “America’s #1 Most-Trusted Republican News Source: First in Facts – First in 
Integrity!”, flanked by portraits of Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump (appendix D, figure 21.3). 
Anglin’s attempt to expand the Daily Stormer’s audience appears to have been successful, as the 
 
64 Jacey Fortin, ‘Comedian Wins $4.1 Million in Lawsuit Against The Daily Stormer’, New York Times, 17 June 
2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/us/dean-obeidallah-daily-stormer.html> [accessed 15 December 2019] 
(para. 1, 18-21]. 
Antonia Noori Farzan, ‘A neo-Nazi unleashed a ‘troll storm.’ Now he could owe his Jewish victim $14 million’, 
Washington Post, 16 July 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/07/16/andrew-anglin-daily-stormer-
tanya-gersh-million-verdict> [accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 5 of 19). 
65 Abby Ohlheiser, ‘‘We actually elected a meme as president’: How 4chan celebrated Trump’s victory’, 
Washington Post, 9 November 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/11/09/ 
we-actually-elected-a-meme-as-president-how-4chan-celebrated-trumps-victory/?utm_term=.105301c81e7b> 
[accessed 15 December 2019] (para. 1, 4, 6). 
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Alexa ranking of the website on April 3rd, 2017, was 12,898, up by over 4,000 rankings from the 
previous year, and ten thousand higher than Stormfront.66 Yet troubles for the Daily Stormer began 
after its domain was lost following controversy over the website’s content during and following 
the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” rally August 2017. Ongoing issues severely impacted the 
website’s traffic, and began a series of events that threatened its viability as a mouthpiece for 
explicit antisemitism and intersecting forms of discrimination online. 
Preceding Stormfront’s own domain loss in August 2017, the Daily Stormer fell under 
attacks by hacktivists and its domain was eventually shut down. Following the “Unite the Right” 
rally, the Daily Stormer described Heather Heyer, the counter-protestor intentionally mowed down 
by a Neo-Nazi, as a “Fat, Childless 32-Year-Old Slut”.67 The Daily Stormer’s post-Charlottesville 
coverage resulted in domain registrar GoDaddy informing them that they had violated the 
company’s terms of service, giving them 24 hours to find a new registrar.68 Concurrently, a 
message appeared on the website’s headline claiming that the hacktivist group Anonymous were 
now in control of the website.69 However, Twitter accounts linked to Anonymous claimed there 
was no evidence of any connection between the hack and Anonymous, suggesting it could be a 
stunt run by the website itself to garner attention.70 Nonetheless, the alleged Anonymous message 
 
66 Alexa, Dailystormer.com Traffic Statistics (2017), <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/dailystormer.com> [accessed 3 
April 2017]. 
67 Andrew Anglin, ‘Heather Heyer: Woman Killed in Road Rage Incident was a Fat, Childless 32-Year-Old Slut’, 
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heather-heyer-woman-killed-in-road-rage-incident-was-a-fat-childless-32-year-old-slut> [accessed 15 December 
2019]. 
68 (@GoDaddy, 13 August 2017), ‘We informed The Daily Stormer that they have 24 hours to move the domain to 
another provider, as they have violated our terms of service.’ (tweet), 
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disappeared as Anglin posted that he’d “Retaken Control of the Site”,71 suggesting that it was a 
legitimate hack, but done by an independent group modelling themselves after Anonymous. This 
highlights an interesting dynamic: while the internet has empowered individual dedicated 
antisemites, it has also empowered vigilantes motivated to oppose them. Nonetheless, vigilante 
action such as hacking a website requires more extensive skills than posting antisemitic content to 
a website. 
Problems did not end for the Daily Stormer, as they attempted to re-establish themselves 
on several American domain registrars, including Google, but were repeatedly removed. They then 
attempted to move onto international servers in Albania, Austria, Russia, Iceland, Catalonia, and 
Hong Kong.72 The website was then forced to move to non-national domain .red and after losing 
that and another .top domain, eventually reappeared on a Chinese-based company domain of .name 
in January 2018. The Daily Stormer remained stable on the .name domain for its Alexa ranking to 
stabilise at 20,717 at the end of May 2018.73 The Daily Stormer’s rankings stayed mostly stable in 
the low 20,000s for the rest of 2018,74 demonstrating that it bounced back compared to 
Stormfront’s significant decline. Despite losing almost a dozen different domains over the course 
of six months, the Daily Stormer managed to maintain much of its popularity, and still sat well 
above the Alexa rankings of other comparable alt-right blog-style websites such as Richard 
Spencer’s Radix Journal (recorded at 1,611,147 at the end of May 2018).75 While issues continued 
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73 Alexa, Dailystormer.com Traffic Statistics (2018), <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/dailystormer.com> [accessed 
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for the Daily Stormer, it demonstrated the resilience of modern web 2.0 antisemitic platforms, 
stabilising after repeated setbacks that caused older websites to decline.  
The Daily Stormer’s Alexa rating stayed mostly stable over the first three quarters of 2019, 
as per the last three quarters of 2018, but still featured a slow downwards trajectory through the 
mid-20,000s (appendix D, figure 22.1). While this could be linked to the previous troubles in 2017, 
the website had stabilised, and it is more likely that this slower decline was caused by the rise of 
Gab, a competitive site for alt-right discussion and community (similar to how The Daily Stormer’s 
rise was associated with Stormfront’s traffic decline). However, the website experienced a 
steepening decline in traffic in the latter part of the year, beginning to slide in September and 
bottoming out in the low 60,000s by December (appendix D, figure 22.2). The Southern Poverty 
Law Center connected this decline to the loss of BitMitigate,76 a content delivery network that 
enabled and protected the visibility of the website’s content online. BitMitigate has also ensured 
the continued visibility of other alt-right content online, such as Infowars and 8chan, however the 
number of attacks the Daily Stormer attracted ended up warranting higher costs. After not paying 
these costs, the website went down again. These payment issues coincided with the culmination 
of the lawsuits against Anglin, which ordered total costs of $18.35 million to be paid to his various 
victims.77 It is unlikely Anglin can pay these costs, but it is also uncertain whether he will be 
compelled to, as during the lawsuits his location was generally unknown, potentially even leaving 
the United States.78 Regardless, the Daily Stormer faced continued difficulties, resulting it no 
 
76 ‘Daily Stormer Website Goes Dark Amid Chaos’, Southern Poverty Law Center Hatewatch, 18 September 2019. 
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longer appearing in search engines, and experiencing a significant drop in traffic. It returned as of 
November 2019, but Anglin’s warning that “we’ll have trouble staying online for the future” bodes 
poorly for the website.79 
Due to the domain changes and the BitMitigate problems, the website also operates on the 
‘dark web’, a term describing websites that are not accessible by ordinary search engines such as 
Google, but rather through tools such as the Tor browser and network. The Daily Stormer’s 
original domain moved there on August 17th, 2017, and while the Tor project team expressed 
disgust, they said they could not remove it due to the ethos behind the tools, which provides 
essential anonymity for human rights activists and journalists (although it can also be used by 
criminals and paedophiles for distributing illegal products).80 If the Daily Stormer loses their 
domain again, the dark web will still allow them to operate and be found by regular users. 
However, the Daily Stormer will not be found through search engines, preventing them from 
attempting to manipulate search ratings to lead users to the site. In addition, it will prevent them 
from easily distributing links to their website, as the vast majority of users will not be using the 
tools required to access the Daily Stormer on the dark web. Stormfront managing to re-establish 
themselves back online in 2017 demonstrated that the Daily Stormer just needed to find a domain 
registrar that would tolerate or ignore them, which they have achieved with .name. The ongoing 
struggle to remain visible online, alongside the ability to keep resources available on the dark web, 
presents one of the clearest examples of qualitative change in antisemitism caused by the internet. 
The abilities of electronic communication technology make it almost impossible to completely 
remove an antisemitic group or media outlet. This contrasts the Journal of Historical Review being 
 
79 ‘Daily Stormer Website Goes Dark Amid Chaos’, para. 6. 
80 Shona Ghosh, ‘The Tor Project is 'disgusted' by the Daily Stormer -- but can't censor it’, Business Insider, 18 
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discontinued in 2002,81 due to the inability of the IHR to fund its publication after multiple 
expensive legal battles and infighting. Lobbying domain registrars and hacktivism present new 
potential strategies for challenging antisemitism in this new online context, although the content 
put online by antisemites is extremely durable. 
The Daily Stormer emulates a web 2.0 news website that allows casual user discussion 
through commenting on articles, as seen in its TEMPIS taxonomy (appendix D, figure 26.3). While 
anyone can view these comments, they are administered through a third-party discussion board 
website that features profiles and moderators.82 The Daily Stormer is distinct from other organised 
antisemitic news-style websites like the IHR. One key distinction is the space for discussion by 
content consumers, also allowing them to share antisemitic content, such as memes, from other 
spaces like /pol/. This space facilitates communication between casual antisemites, and between 
casual antisemites and website content creators, and provides a space for variations of recreational 
antisemitism. These instances of recreational antisemitism differ from 4chan, being more likely to 
be actual antisemites with limited/self-involved participation in the alt-right, as opposed to 4chan’s 
broader userbase tolerating antisemitic humour. This discussion space demonstrates how the ease 
of antisemitic content creation and distribution online facilitates the shift of casual antisemitic 
followers into recreational antisemites. Another distinction between the Daily Stormer and IHR 
websites is shareable tools, like that on web 2.0 news websites, allowing users to promote the Daily 
Stormer’s content to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. Overall, the most 
significant distinction is that of tone, with the Daily Stormer being extremely overt versus the 
IHR’s long-standing covertness. Despite the IHR having a long history and recognition by 
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antisemites, the Daily Stormer has been significantly more popular. This popularity can be 
attributed to all these distinguishing factors, especially the tone of the content that evolved due to 
the internet. 
The main qualitative changes established by The Daily Stormer can be characterised as 
‘online commercialisation’ of antisemitism: the use of online media strategies to generate more 
clicks and views. These strategies, such as ‘click bait’, eye-catching graphics, and short, sardonic 
articles, represent a significant shift from the pseudo-academic antisemitism of Holocaust denial. 
The difference is most stark when considering the self-identification of antisemites; Irving and 
other deniers repeatedly dismissed the charge of antisemitism, while Anglin and his ilk bear it 
proudly. The covert nature of Holocaust ‘revisionism’ was effective in normalising and justifying 
antisemitic ideas before the internet, whereas the Daily Stormer’s provocative, bite-sized, 
attention-grabbing diatribes are particularly effective in the web 2.0 attention economy. Both 
antisemitic camps have the same goal – the normalisation of antisemitism – but have significantly 
different strategies to achieve it. Holocaust denial aimed to have its claims accepted as legitimate 
intellectual perspectives, while The Daily Stormer aims to generate enough attention so that 
outrage against it turns stale, lessening the controversy of antisemitic claims. The Daily Stormer 
strategy specifically appeals to the younger 4chan generation, indicating that this qualitative 
change may also be a generational one. Both these strategies have proven to be effective in 
different social and technological contexts, and their shift over less than fifty years represents the 
rapid adaptability of antisemitism. The decline of the Daily Stormer echoes the decline of the 
organised Holocaust movement, but rather than being complacent, researchers should anticipate 
the next inevitable evolution of organised antisemitism. 
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While the ‘online commercialisation’ of antisemitism also produces some quantitative 
change in terms of content and followers, it is not the most notable quantitative change to 
antisemitism driven by The Daily Stormer. The main change is the increased focused harassment 
of Jews online, being directed by an infamous online media outlet. This is influenced by the 
qualitative change to antisemitism generated on 4chan, except with differences in organisation and 
anonymity (or lack thereof). Anglin and The Daily Stormer are recognised as the origin of these 
harassment campaigns,83 which trade higher risk of harmful legal action for broader recognition 
(and therefore a potential growth in readers) and appeal to younger generations. This relates to 
Kahn et al.’s theory that lower anonymity online results in lower discrimination rates, due to the 
social risk of being publicly linked to discrimination.84 The Daily Stormer has demonstrated this 
is not true, at least in the short term, as Anglin’s low anonymity in particular supports the high 
rates of discrimination pushed by the Daily Stormer, including general antisemitic group-based 
cyberbullying. However, the Daily Stormer distributes less discrimination, due to it attracting more 
resistance, evidenced by the instability of the website’s domain and reduced traffic in 2019. 
Considering the troubles faced by Anglin and the Daily Stormer, these practices are likely 
unsustainable for organised antisemitic networks online in the long term. However, the impact of 
Anglin’s website and networking can still linger through the social media networks he abused to 
undertake his harassment and propaganda campaigns. 
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Social Media - Facebook 
Facebook is the largest social media platform on the internet, featuring an active daily userbase of 
over 1.5 billion people at the end of 2019. This size represents the largest social media audience 
targetable by the spread of antisemitic content.85 Being a social media platform, Facebook is a 
prime example of prosumption; the administrators and website runners produce little content, but 
rather yield that role to the consumers, who both produce and consume content through 
communicative interaction. With Facebook’s considerable size, it is not surprising that the 
platform has had problems with the spread of hate speech, despite such speech being banned 
according to Facebook’s community standards.86  
Facebook has been accused of ignoring antisemitism in the past, including for a refusal to 
categorise Holocaust denial as antisemitism. This refusal was re-affirmed by CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg in 201887 despite communication with Jewish and anti-hate groups,88 allowing 
Holocaust denial pages to stay up after being reported.89 Documents leaked to The Guardian in 
May 2017 revealed that Facebook only removed Holocaust denial material in four countries: Israel, 
Germany, Austria, and France, allegedly due to risk of legal action in those countries where 
Holocaust denial is illegal.90 Holocaust denial pages may be removed if hosting more explicit 
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antisemitic content, yet pseudo-academic, covert Holocaust denial is still permitted on Facebook 
in most countries. This inconsistent policy is detailed in a 2019 letter by Facebook VP Joel Kaplan, 
obtained by Jewish Insider. 
 
We take down any content that celebrates, defends, or attempts to justify the Holocaust. 
The same goes for any content that mocks Holocaust victims, accuses victims of lying 
about the atrocities, spews hate, or advocates for violence against Jewish people in any 
way… posts and articles that deny the Holocaust often violate one or more of these 
standards and are removed from Facebook… [But Facebook will] not remove lies or 
content that is inaccurate, whether it’s denying the Holocaust, [or other atrocities].91 
 
So, despite a consensus among Jewish and anti-hate groups that Holocaust denial is hate speech, 
Facebook is confident in making its own judgement about what constitutes hate speech on its 
platform.  
Facebook’s inconsistent policy towards hate speech suggests greater concern about its 
public relations regarding the balancing of free speech, than about actually fighting hate speech. 
This suggestion is supported by controversy over their pledge to push Holocaust denial results to 
the bottom of search functions. Such results remained in top search results well after this pledge, 
and were only removed after Business Insider published an article proving Holocaust denial 
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groups’ continued dominance of search results.92 This controversy demonstrates that Facebook 
only acted when held accountable by the public. Facebook’s problematic approach to Holocaust 
denial may be solved by a European Union court decision in October 2019 that may force 
Facebook to remove hateful posts worldwide when contravening EU country hate speech laws.93 
Nonetheless, this broad-reaching solution perpetuates controversy over the balance of free and 
hate speech on social media. 
Between 2012 and 2013, Oboler and the Online Hate Prevention Institute (OHPI) released 
a series of reports surveying the presence of antisemitism on Facebook, tracking the removal 
progress of antisemitic content reported on October 4, 2012.94 By January 30, 2013, only four of 
the seventeen explicit items had been removed. The OHPI contacted Facebook and asked for an 
update at the end of February, at which point Facebook had removed all but three of the items. The 
OHPI’s actions indicate that Facebook only dealt with reports of antisemitism reactively, and 
required pressure to remove offending content. Oboler argued that this proved Facebook’s poor 
capacity to combat antisemitism; its moderators required education about the varied manifestations 
of antisemitism and other forms of hate speech. However, since Facebook has made its own 
decisions about what constitutes hate speech, it seems unlikely that moderators will be properly 
educated about the academic consensus on hate speech. This echoes the problem faced in 
 
92 Rob Price, ‘Facebook has been promoting Holocaust denial groups at the top of its search results, and now says it 
made a mistake’, Business Insider, 21 July 2018. <https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-search-promotes-
holocaust-denial-groups-2018-7/?r=AU&IR=T> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
93 Adam Satariano, ‘Facebook Can Be Forced to Delete Content Worldwide, E.U.’s Top Court Rules’, New York 
Times, 3 October 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/technology/facebook-europe.html> [accessed 15 
December 2019]. 
94 Andre Oboler, Recognizing Hate Speech: Antisemitism on Facebook (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention 
Institute, 2013) <http://ohpi.org.au/reports/ 
IR13-1_Recognizing_hate_speech_antisemitism_on_Facebook.pdf> [accessed 15 December 2019] (p. 17). 
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sociological research where resistance to considering the evolution of racism can result in faulty 
research on discrimination, inhibiting broader efforts to combat racism. 
By mid-2017, all of the items detailed in the 2013 OHPI report had been removed or 
blocked, although there still were explicitly antisemitic Facebook pages with over 1,000 
followers.95 By early 2019, many of the more explicitly antisemitic pages were deleted,96 but 
antisemitic pages with over 3,000 followers were still able to be found.97 In particular, the page 
“Zionism is a Cancer” continued to remain online as of December 2019.98 Indeed, the pages that 
remained were overall more likely to be associated with anti-Zionist manifestations of 
antisemitism. While some of these pages utilise covert antisemitism, some, like “Zionism is a 
Cancer”, regularly utilise explicit antisemitism (appendix D, figure 23). One reason why these 
pages endure is because these manifestations have been normalised into becoming invisible 
antisemitism. Even pages with explicit antisemitic content can be shielded from scrutiny through 
this invisible antisemitism, using methods as simple as replacing “Jew” with “Zionist”. Even if 
Facebook improves its antisemitic material removal rates, Facebook’s reactive approach to 
moderation may result in little being done to prevent organised individuals and networks using 
Facebook to spread antisemitism. Furthermore, Facebook’s attitude towards moderating only 
certain manifestations of antisemitism means that the website administrators have likely been 
affected by the normalisation tactics organised antisemites use to advance their agendas. 
Ultimately, even if antisemitism scholarship avoids definitional issues, that does not guarantee that 
 
95 Exposing Judaism (Facebook page), <https://www.facebook.com/Exposing-Judaism-948295368523778> 
[accessed 5 June 2017]. 
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96 Ibid. 
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<https://www.facebook.com/DelendaEstZionism/?ref=br_rs> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
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efforts combating antisemitism benefit from the existence of a ‘gold standard’ definition, as social 
media platforms may simply choose not to adhere to it. 
The Measuring the Hate report found that Facebook had the lowest reported rate of 
antisemitism of the three major platforms, which was attributed to a higher rate of removal 
compared to Twitter and YouTube. This finding was supported by an increased rate removal of 
the reported items in the 10 months after the data’s collection, further diminishing antisemitism on 
the platform (although by this point still 60% of the items were still present on Facebook).99 Anti-
Zionism was the category of antisemitism with the lowest rate of removal on almost all platforms 
(excluding calls for violence on Twitter), indicating its normalisation and the successful use of 
covert tropes. Facebook only removed 27% of anti-Zionist antisemitism, compared to 42% of 
traditional antisemitism, 58% of Holocaust denial,100 and 75% of calls for violence.101 The report 
also argued that platforms encouraging more effective moderation (particularly relevant for 
Facebook) disincentivises antisemites from posting there. Effective moderation would thus result 
in lower rates of antisemitism being posted and higher removal of those items, thereby significantly 
decreasing the quantity of antisemitism present.  
While the periods of data collection between the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and 
Measuring the Hate reports do not overlap, they are close enough (late 2014-early 2015 versus 
2016) that some comparison can be made. While this paragraph digresses from the current focus 
on Facebook, it lays the stage for a more comprehensive quantification of antisemitism on social 
media platforms, including Facebook. The WJC methodology attributes a disproportionate amount 
 
99 Andre Oboler, Measuring the Hate: The State of Antisemitism in Social Media (Melbourne: Online Hate 
Prevention Institute, 2016), p. 6. 
100 While Facebook does not have a policy against Holocaust denial specifically, it is likely that these instances were 
removed for containing more explicit antisemitic tropes and features, rather than more covert Holocaust denial. 
101 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 7. 
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of antisemitic content to Twitter, identifying Twitter as the source of 63% of the total antisemitic 
posts on social media,102 considerably contrasting to the more balanced figures presented in the 
Measuring the Hate report (identifying the highest quantity on YouTube at 41%).103 This disparity 
may not be accounted for by the WJC including foreign language instances, as 82% of all posts 
were in English.104 The methodologies therefore produce significantly different quantifications of 
antisemitism, which may be due to the WJC report collating data through brand analytics company 
Talkwalker.105 Talkwalker focuses disproportionately on recognisable words, phrases, and images, 
which does not necessarily reflect what might be perceived as antisemitic by average users, or 
intended by antisemitic users, particularly regarding covert antisemitism and rapidly evolving 
antisemitic symbolism. Furthermore, Twitter is a more suitable target for analytics due to the 
platform’s own pre-existing tools106 and a fairly consistent style of content (every post being 
limited to 280 characters). These problems support the suggestion that quantifying antisemitism 
on mainstream social media is currently better served using sample collection, rather than 
automated methodologies that are ill-suited for detecting multifaceted manifestations of 
antisemitism in such a broad arena. However, interdisciplinary collaboration can help design 
methodologies that can avoid the problems of the WJC report, and effectively quantify 
antisemitism on mainstream social media using automated systems. The NCRI report’s approach 
in particular presents a key method for future researchers. By starting with specific spaces such as 
 
102 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, The Rise of Antisemitism on Social Media: Summary of 
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/pol/ and Gab, researchers can measure the rate at which instances of antisemitic content are shared 
to broader platforms.107 
While issues exist in the overall rates presented in the WJC report, its data for particular 
platforms may still be used. Comparing the rate of types of antisemitism found in the WJC report 
against the removal rates in the Measuring the Hate report can produce a rough estimate of how 
much antisemitism of each category might be viewable by the public. The categories between the 
two reports do not completely overlap, but the categories of calls for violence and Holocaust denial 
exist in both. The WJC report detected 1550 antisemitic calls to violence on Facebook in 2016, 
and the 75% removal rate of antisemitic calls to violence in the Measuring the Hate report results 
in approximately 387 calls to violence staying visible 10 months after being reported. The 182 
instances of Holocaust denial posts on Facebook (as detected in the WJC report) would be removed 
at a rate of 58% (as reported in the Measuring the Hate report), leaving approximately 106 
instances visible. While these statistics only include publicly viewable posts and not content from 
groups or private messages, they do demonstrate the impact moderation can have on the public 
spread of antisemitism on Facebook.  
The TEMPIS taxonomy has already been applied to Facebook in the original 2013 Online 
Antisemitism Working Group report and is largely unchanged since then,108 although it cannot be 
summarised in a single application. There are significant differences in functionality between 
Facebook’s profiles, groups, pages, messages, and apps, particularly in regard to publicness, 
identity (Facebook page owners can be completely anonymous), and social impact. Therefore, a 
comparison between the WJC and Measuring the Hate reports does not represent a full picture of 
 
107 Finkelstein and others, p. 10. 
108 Oboler and Matas, pp. 9-10. 
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antisemitism on Facebook, as these reports do not examine private groups and messages. While 
much of the antisemitism on Facebook may be contained in private groups, this may still be 
targeted by moderation if users opposing antisemitism gain access to groups, or detect 
antisemitism in the title. Nonetheless, because these materials are more private, future research 
needs to consider new approaches to determine the nature of antisemitism in those spaces.  
Facebook provides valuable ‘subsites’ to organised antisemites, allowing them to organise 
networks between themselves and garner followers of casual antisemites. Facebook can also 
provide outlets for recreational antisemites, ranging from providing a platform for private groups 
(within which activity is contained), to presenting public targets for recreational antisemitic 
harassment. Facebook therefore facilitates the group-based antisemitic cyberbullying of public 
Jewish figures on social media, although the next section shows how these harassment campaigns 
are more effective on Twitter. Antisemitic content on Facebook can present as explicit, covert, and 
invisible. However, pressure from moderation can result in diminished visibility of explicit 
antisemitism, eventually disincentivising its posting on Facebook, resulting in a higher proportion 
of covert and invisible antisemitism. This is also exacerbated by Facebook’s administrators being 
manipulated by invisible and covert antisemitism, particularly anti-Zionism and Holocaust denial, 
seeing them as distinct from the antisemitism banned on the platform. 
Facebook has a significant quantitative impact on online antisemitism, as it represents the 
largest prospective online audience for antisemites. Antisemitic groups, particularly those 
presenting themselves as anti-Zionist groups, can offer content to audiences of thousands. This 
content can automatically show up in their ‘news feed’ alongside updates from friends, media 
outlets, and other pages. Public ignorance over the line between legitimate criticism of Israel and 
antisemitism can result in large groups unintentionally promoting antisemitism, which is further 
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legitimised through ‘likes’ and ‘shares’, giving the antisemitism higher visibility. Manifestations 
of covert and invisible antisemitism thus present a significant danger on Facebook, whose 
management struggles to even recognise the danger of Holocaust denial. Even if users recognise 
and report covert and invisible antisemitism, there is no guarantee Facebook moderators will 
recognise it as antisemitism and agree to remove it. While Facebook’s mixed results of moderation 
have somewhat inhibited the ability and motivation to share antisemitism, there are few 
mechanisms preventing removed groups or individuals from creating new pages, or spreading 
material on a different account. Facebook profiles are usually tied to users’ real-world identity, 
unlike 4chan, which is completely anonymous. This real-world link somewhat inhibits the spread 
of antisemitism on Facebook compared to other social media platforms, as there is higher risk of 
losing social capital from sharing and linking antisemitic content on one’s public profile. 
Therefore, the quantitative impact of Facebook on antisemitism is derived more from the size of 
Facebook and its audience, rather than the suitability of the platform for spreading hatred. 
Facebook’s size means it is often used as a benchmark to determine the social acceptability of 
antisemitism online, and the current record demonstrates a considerable danger in the rise of 
antisemitism 2.0 on Facebook. 
While Facebook may not necessarily be the most problematic social media platform for 
spreading antisemitism, its unparalleled size allows it to be easily impacted by antisemitism’s 
growth elsewhere. Qualitatively, Facebook furthers the impact of other social media platforms, 
like 4chan, which promotes antisemitism through memes and other swiftly digested content. Since 
Facebook connects users’ profiles to their friends, groups, hobbies, and virtually any interest, any 
antisemitic content needs to compete for time and space on a news feed. This results in antisemitic 
image-based memes being a particularly prevalent form of antisemitism on Facebook, as affirmed 
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by the WJC’s and Measuring the Hate reports, with the former reporting that 67% of antisemitic 
posts on Facebook take the form of symbols or photos.109 One benefit of this trend is that memes 
can be easier to regulate, as they can be cross-checked against a growing database of antisemitic 
memes and images; this approach is possible even with a reactive model of moderation. 
Nonetheless, such a policy would require swifter reactions than seen previously, so as to counter 
the rapidly evolving nature of antisemitic memes and symbols online. 
 
Social Media - Twitter 
While it is necessary to consider antisemitism on Facebook due to the platform’s size, 
consideration of antisemitism on Twitter is necessitated due to its alleged disproportionate quantity 
of antisemitism. Twitter is a micro-blogging platform designed around the rapid creation and 
consumption of content. Originally limiting all posts to 140 characters and 3 images, before 
expanding the limit to 280 characters in November 2017,110 Twitter represents the increased 
efficiency of communication caused by social media, and thus the increased efficacy of 
distributing antisemitism online. Many of Twitter’s functions also apply to the website Gab, which 
differs from Twitter in its domination by the alt-right. Due to this dominance, this analysis of 
Twitter dedicates a small section to Gab. Twitter has a mixed stance on anonymity/pseudonymity 
and real-life identity; while many users use their real-world identity, Twitter allows individuals to 
create entirely pseudonymous accounts. Renowned and identifiable real-world users can verify 
their account with a blue tick next to their names. The combination of succinct content and a mix 
 
109 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, pp. 9-10. 
110 Aliza Rosen, ‘Tweeting Made Easier’, Twitter Blog, 7 November 2017. 
<https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2017/tweetingmadeeasier.html> [accessed 15 December 
2019] (para. 1 of 10). 
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of pseudonymous and real-world profiles has resulted in Twitter becoming arguably the most 
prolific social media platform for antisemitism. On Twitter, pseudonymous users can easily and 
directly target Jews online with a barrage of antisemitic content, while facing virtually zero 
consequences. 
The 2016 WJC report disproportionately recorded 63% of all recorded antisemitic social 
media posts as being on Twitter – more than Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and blog platforms 
combined111. In contrast, the Measuring the Hate report of late 2014 to early 2015 measured a rate 
of 36% of reported antisemitic items found on Twitter, reduced to 35% after 10 months.112 False 
positives have also been detected in the WJC report, which raises further concerns over its 
methodology, including the qualitative analysis. In one of the three examples of antisemitism on 
Twitter used in their final report, user SeanLuckettWriter (@SeanCMLuckett) writes: 
 
@mikeloveuk @cloud_swatch YEAH! Gas the Jews! Slaughter the muslim! Kill the gays! 
Good old valid opinions…113 
 
Upon closer analysis, it appears this tweet was a sardonic response to right-wing rhetoric, not 
reflecting antisemitic views or calling for violence at all. The Twitter user in question is a left-
wing media writer, who has shown no indication of actually holding these opinions. He has 
retweeted other accounts commemorating Anne Frank114 and victims of the Pittsburgh massacre 
 
111 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, pp. 19-39. 
112 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 5. 
113 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 47. 
114 (@JonnyGeller, 27 January 2019), ‘The only footage of Anne Frank, from 1941. She would have been 89. 
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in October 2018.115 Beyond the methodological concerns, the WJC report failed to identify false 
positives, even promoting one in its final report, distorting any conclusions drawn from the 
qualitatively analysed 2% sample. Nonetheless, there are some trends in the WJC report supported 
by the Measuring the Hate report, particularly how higher removal rates are needed to 
disincentivise antisemites. Twitter had an antisemitism removal rate of 22%, compared to 
Facebook’s 37% and YouTube’s 8%.116 As mentioned above, it is likely that Facebook’s higher 
removal rate results in disincentivising posting antisemitic content there, while Twitter’s lower 
rate may not provide enough of a disincentive. Furthermore, since content creation on Twitter is 
likely to be less time consuming due to limits on the size of posts, it is likely an even higher 
disincentive would be needed on Twitter.  
It is necessary to consider how removal rates will differently affect historic content on 
various social media platforms (i.e. content posted before the window of the sample’s collection). 
For example, Twitter content is more immediately relevant, and users are unlikely to encounter 
past tweets unless they are actively searching for them. Comparatively, searching for a video on 
YouTube can produce results based on relevancy, regardless of the year they were uploaded. 
Therefore, the presumably lower rate of removal on YouTube, even before the sample was 
collected, would have affected the quantity of antisemitic content found on YouTube. The quantity 
on Twitter, conversely, would be largely limited to content from the sample’s time frame. This 
‘historical’ disparity is evident in the examples provided in the report, with every tweet in the 
report having been posted during the sample’s collection time frame,117 as opposed to at least three 
 
115 Frank McDonough (@FXMC1957, 29 October 2018), ‘One of the victims of the Pittsburgh massacre was 97-
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 250 
 
of the YouTube video examples being posted before 2012.118 YouTube’s low removal rate would 
affect the sample during collection, suggesting that Twitter actually has a higher rate of antisemitic 
content creation, considering the close rates in the initial sample (36% on Twitter against 41% on 
YouTube). Therefore, as per the WJC’s report general trend, Twitter is likely the most active major 
social media platform for new antisemitic content posting. 
2016 was a noteworthy year for antisemitism on social media, particularly Twitter, due to 
the controversial United States Presidential election of that year, which potentially skewed the data 
in the WJC report. The ADL also examined the rise of antisemitism on Twitter between August 
2015 and July 2016, particularly focusing on the increasing attacks on Jewish journalists, and 
published a report in October 2016.119 Their methodology, utilising a broad set of keywords and 
key phrases, resulted in a significantly higher quantity of antisemitic tweets than even the WJC 
report, despite overlapping time frames. The report found over 2.6 million tweets “containing 
language frequently found in anti-Semitic speech”,120 compared to 242,000 posts in the WJC 
report.121 The disparity in these numbers suggest significant problems still exist when trying to 
quantify antisemitism on major social media platforms. Until standard methodologies are 
developed, it is better to use other research methods, such as reported samples in the Measuring 
 
118 The full picture of pre-sample videos is not known as some have been removed and the screenshots do not have 
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the Hate report (especially over multiple time frames), or automated methodologies with smaller 
scopes, as per the NCRI report. 
While not all of the tweets detected by the ADL are specifically antisemitic in intent, their 
proliferation potentially risks the normalisation of antisemitism. The ADL focused on 19,253 
manually reviewed explicit antisemitic tweets targeting over 800 journalists, reduced from an 
initial sample of 50,000. They found that over 68% of these tweets were generated by just 1,600 
accounts, and that the majority were direct replies to tweets by the targeted journalists.122 These 
disproportionate results reveal how a small number of antisemitic users can disproportionately 
harass a considerable number of prominent Jews on platforms such as Twitter, taking the form of 
group-based cyberbullying. The imbalance of anonymity is partially responsible for this, as Twitter 
allows spaces to be shared between pseudonymous users and identifiable public personalities. 
Twitter thus represents a platform that is difficult to control, for while it forbids hate speech and 
harassment, and users can block harassing users, it is exceptionally easy for banned users to create 
new accounts and continue the harassment. Of the 1,600 accounts behind the majority of the 
harassment, only 21% were banned over the study period (August 2015 – July 2016).123 Twitter’s 
lack of moderation became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the ADL reported that half of the targeted 
journalists interviewed did not report the tweets, partially due to the lack of faith in Twitter 
resolving the issue.124 This demonstrates that poor moderation both lowers disincentives for 
antisemites to post, and disincentivises users from reporting antisemitism, compounding the 
problem of antisemitism on the platform.  
 
122 Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, p. 1. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., p. 9. 
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While the ADL report did not examine how many journalists left the platform, the 
effectiveness of online harassment in silencing users is demonstrated by a 2014 study by the Pew 
Research Center. This study found that 31% of online harassment victims either cease their 
involvement in online events, change their username, replace their profile, or withdraw entirely 
from the forum where the harassment occurred.125 Many of the antisemitic tweets during the 2016 
election season were replies to Jewish journalists covering the election, often referring to classic 
antisemitic motifs rather than to the election itself.126 This trend demonstrates both that offline 
events can trigger spikes in antisemitism online, and that these events are used as an excuse to 
promote general antisemitism. In addition, the patterns of antisemitism on Twitter surrounding the 
2016 election demonstrate how antisemitism can have a snowball effect on the platform, creating 
more antisemitic content over extended periods of time. 
Much of the antisemitism on Twitter has been directed by prominent antisemites, such as 
Andrew Anglin and The Daily Stormer, through both public and clandestine electronic 
communication. The trolls on Twitter do not only rely exclusively on Twitter’s technology for 
their antisemitic campaigns, but also develop tools on their own, representing a degree of organised 
sophistication. The ‘echoes’ tactic mentioned in chapter four utilised a Chrome browser app to 
identify Jews on Twitter and other social media platforms.127 With the app installed, users would 
see the usernames of prominent Jewish social media users surrounded in triple parentheses – e.g. 
(((username))).128 This extension allowed antisemites to immediately identify Jews on Twitter 
 
125 Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2014) 
<http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment> [accessed 16 December 2019] (p. 1). 
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to-target-jews-online#.chqIL4fOX> [accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 9-12 of 38). 
128 For example, @benshapiro on Twitter appears with the username “Ben Shapiro” without the extension. With the 
Chrome extension, it would display as “(((Ben Shapiro)))”.  
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without having to research their background, aiding the efficiency of their harassment campaign. 
Echoes also serve as a prominent example of a text-based meme. Beyond the browser extension, 
they are often added by antisemites to things deemed to be ‘Jewish’ or ‘Jew-controlled’, as seen 
with the new slurs in the NCRI report.129 After Mic revealed this phenomenon, many non-Jewish 
Twitter users placed triple brackets around their own username, so as to diminish the effectiveness 
of the extension and make it more difficult for users to identify Jews on Twitter. While this use of 
echoes was defensive, it would further entrench the meme into online culture. Echoes demonstrate 
how public awareness of a covert antisemitic symbol can transform it into an overt antisemitic 
meme, which is a qualitatively new evolution of antisemitism enabled by social media.130 Google 
did eventually remove the app from its browser, but the app’s brief history still demonstrates the 
ease with which Jews can be targeted on social media, the evolution of tactics used by antisemites 
to harass them, and the entrenchment of antisemitism into online cultures. 
The TEMPIS taxonomy was applied to Twitter in the original 2013 Global Forum report 
on online antisemitism,131 and while Twitter is largely unchanged there are some factors that need 
to be clarified (appendix D, figure 26.4). When the taxonomy was first applied one of Twitter’s 
unique qualities was that it was complaint moderated. This meant that only profiles could be 
reported, not specific tweets, and entire profiles would be disciplined.132 That rule changed in 
November 2017, with users becoming able to report specific tweets, although with mixed level of 
 
129 Finkelstein and others, p. 10. 
130 This qualitative change is primarily linked to the original covert nature of the symbols, which on the internet, 
serve as rapidly evolving signals for antisemites. The qualitative change is then further enabled by web 2.0’s 
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132 Ibid., p. 6. 
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administrator and user input over the tweet’s actual deletion.133 Generally, Twitter does not delete 
tweets themselves, but can limit a tweet’s visibility and block a user from tweeting until it is 
removed. As of October 2018, Twitter actively hides rule-breaking tweets until deleted by the user, 
notifying the user of which rules the tweet broke.134 Progress is therefore being made on the 
removal of antisemitic tweets, although additional studies utilising the Measuring the Hate report’s 
methodology would help to determine the impact of these moderation changes. There are 
indications that Twitter’s heightened moderation in the last five years is disincentivising 
antisemites. One key development supporting this indication is the rise of rival platforms such as 
Gab, which has become a hive for antisemitic tweet-style posting.135 However, contemporaneous 
causes for rises in antisemitism, such as the 2016 US election, may present difficulties in 
determining reasons behind quantitative changes to antisemitism on Twitter. The influence of the 
offline on the online therefore warrants caution when examining any changes to antisemitism. 
The Twitter-clone Gab is a relatively recent addition to the plethora of antisemitic websites, 
evolving even later than the Daily Stormer. Gab publicly launched in May 2017, and featured over 
one million users as of July 2019, many of whom are alt-right provocateurs banned from Twitter.136 
Gab is renowned for its extreme alt-right content, and was the other website reviewed in the NCRI 
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report in its quantitative analysis on antisemitism online.137 Gab’s rise presents issues for efforts 
combating hate, in particular providing evidence that deplatforming and/or banning discriminatory 
and abusive users may be ineffective, since said users can migrate to more friendly platforms.138 
This phenomenon was already seen with GamerGate, as many users migrated to 8chan after 
Christopher Poole banned discussion of GamerGate from 4chan, impacting the increasing 
radicalisation of 8chan. However, recent evidence suggests significant limitations to these alternate 
platforms, particularly Gab. An upcoming report has found that due to its nature as a micro-
blogging platform, Gab “is inherently unsuited to the kind of deliberative processes and sustained 
cooperation between movement participants that is needed to formulate effective strategy, 
establish movement goals, or weigh up alternative courses of action”.139 Furthermore, Gab lacks 
the access to the broader online public sphere that was provided by platforms like Twitter, thereby 
inhibiting its users’ ability to coordinate and carry out harassment campaigns online. As a result, 
Gab’s use is limited to developing interpretive ‘frames’ among far-right narratives, rather than 
mobilising resources and strategising.140 So while the NCRI report shows significant rates of meme 
sharing between Gab and other spaces, these other spaces represent gateway communities to alt-
right content, and tend not to be the result of a broader strategy. Gab’s limits do suggest that 
deplatforming does have some effect on antisemites’ efforts to distribute content and harass, 
without being a conclusive approach to eliminating online hate. Ultimately, the differences in 
Twitter and Gab, primarily their userbase, highlight how the impact of antisemitic activity on the 
archetype of micro-blogging platforms is affected by access to other users.  
 
137 Finkelstein and others.  
138 Rashna Farrukh, ‘The Rot Starts At The Top: The Problem With De-Platforming The Far-Right’, Junkee, 2 April 
2019. <https://junkee.com/gab-facebook-deplatforming/200060> [accessed 30 October 2019] (para. 7 of 29). 
139 Greta Jasser and others, ‘The Uses and Limitations of Alt-Tech: The Far-Right and Gab.com’, 30 August 2019 
[pre-print], p. 14. 
140 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Twitter can be extensively used by organised, recreational, and casual antisemites. 
Organised antisemites can use it to direct harassment towards Jews, as evidenced by a small 
number of Twitter accounts accounting for a disproportionate quantity of antisemitic tweets 
directed towards journalists. These harassment efforts can be compounded through directing 
casual and recreational antisemites to engage in similar behaviour. Twitter’s promotion of short, 
single-thought content allows its extensive use by casual antisemites, who can state their 
antisemitic opinions generally as though in casual conversation, potentially through text-based 
memes (e.g. putting echoes around things associated with Jews or Judaism). Twitter can thus 
emulate casual antisemitic conversation, allowing networks to grow between these users and 
organised antisemites they follow. Twitter also provides an outlet for recreational antisemitism by 
providing easy targets for harassment and provocation, and antisemites can easily attain publicity 
for their recreation by jumping onto a prominent hashtag or comment chain. Content wise, the 
short character limit favours overt and invisible antisemitism. Covert antisemitism can exist, but 
the character limit inhibits users’ ability to effectively cloak antisemitic content (in contrast to the 
density of pseudo-academic Holocaust denial). Nonetheless, covert symbols such as echoes, if not 
highly publicised and exposed, can be used discreetly to identify Jews and signal other antisemites, 
leaving other users in the dark. Finally, the content on Twitter is significantly slanted towards 
active antisemitism, as the platform favours more immediate communication compared to 
Facebook and YouTube. 
Quantitatively, Twitter arguably represents the largest spread of antisemitic content on 
social media. Twitter’s design greatly aids both the generation and visibility of antisemitic content. 
The ADL report estimated that the 19,253 antisemitic tweets targeting journalists between August 
2015 and July 2016 received roughly 45 million views, and that the 2.6 million tweets containing 
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antisemitic terms would have received 10 billion views – roughly the exposure expected from a 
$20 million Super Bowl commercial.141 In another report released in May 2018, the ADL detected 
4.2 million antisemitic tweets between 2017 and 2018, using a similar methodology as the 2016 
report, although expanding the set of keywords used to identify antisemitic language.142 While the 
inconsistent methodology precludes confident assertions about antisemitism’s growth on Twitter, 
the report still indicates the continued prominence of antisemitic content on the platform. Based 
on the statistics discussed thus far, Twitter appears to lack the ability to control the spread of hate 
speech (in particular antisemitism) on its platform, which in turn dissuades users from trying to 
report it themselves. The statistics also indicate how a small number of users, with minimal or no 
direction, can generate an unprecedented wave of antisemitism through manipulating the ‘swarm 
logic’ of broader users, as seen in GamerGate. Twitter also represents a behavioural shift towards 
the direct antagonism of journalists, which while not unprecedented in Jewish history, is 
exacerbated by higher quantities of harsher harassment facilitated through diminished social risk.  
Qualitatively, Twitter has demonstrated how antisemitism can still be effective without 
strong organisation or monetary resources, in contrast to past examples such as the Nazi party or 
IHR. Nonetheless, these contrasting online manifestations are dependent on the functions provided 
by Twitter that allow easy access to Jews online. Furthermore, Twitter can be used as a vehicle for 
the normalisation of antisemitism, as antisemitic expressions are so easily and swiftly distributed 
that explicit antisemitism may begin to appear normal, and implicit antisemitism seems 
comparably uncontroversial. Repeated harassment may force Jews off Twitter, both encouraging 
the use of harassment on other platforms, and further normalising antisemitism through the 
 
141 Anti-Defamation League’s Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, pp. 1, 4-5. 
142 Anti-Defamation League, Quantifying Hate: A Year of Anti-Semitism on Twitter (New York: Anti-Defamation 
League, 7 May 2018) <https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/quantifying-hate-a-year-of-anti-semitism-on-
twitter#methodology> [accessed 15 December 2019] (p. 3). 
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ostracisation of Jews in the public sphere. This ostracisation limits the ability of victims to educate 
others on the antisemitism they experience and witness, risking Overton’s window shifting beyond 
normalisation, towards acceptability of antisemitism. Countering this normalisation with 
increasing moderation may result in the rapid evolution of antisemitic symbolism in order to avoid 
said moderation. Twitter’s inability to control this wave of hatred has produced a miniature 
renaissance of antisemitism that may spread to other platforms if not halted. 
 
Social Media – YouTube 
YouTube, as an archetype of a video-sharing website, represents different ramifications for the 
creation and distribution of antisemitic content compared to other social media platforms. 
YouTube is a video-sharing website, founded in 2005 and purchased by Google in 2006.143 It is 
the second most popular social media platform as of October 2019,144 behind only Facebook. 
YouTube’s role as a video-sharing website makes it qualitatively distinct from other, largely text 
and image-based, social media platforms. Because of this role, YouTube did not originally fit into 
the scope of social media. The design principles of YouTube, being the creation of personal 
channels to which users upload videos, was more similar in format to a blog. These principles still 
fit the participatory web 2.0 scope of user-generated content and self-publishing platforms, but 
YouTube’s design was not necessarily oriented towards the creation of online social networks. 
 
143 Paul R. La Monica, ‘Google to buy YouTube for $1.65 billion’, CNNMoney, 9 October 2006. 
<https://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/googleyoutube_deal> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
144 Statista, Most famous social network sites worldwide as of October 2019, ranked by number of active users 
(2019), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users> [accessed 
16 December 2019]. 
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Even as late as 2011, some tech-media outlets still did not consider YouTube to be social media.145 
However, this view of YouTube is only based on its design, and ignores the versatility of video as 
compared to text. Indeed, the popularity of the platform ultimately resulted in the creation of online 
social networks. Scholars recognised the impact of YouTube as a pop-cultural phenomenon in 
2007, particularly how its intended use for amateurs gave rise to both the platform’s popularity 
and potential for social networking.146 YouTube’s online functions range from the archiving of 
non-user created content, (e.g. documentaries, film clips) not dissimilar to the functionality of web 
1.0, to the development of social networks. These networks can be centred around a single high-
profile video-blogger and their commentators, or a broader community of content creators, 
particularly following the rise of smartphone technology. YouTube’s popularity and versatility as 
a social media platform suggest that it has significant effects on the shifting manifestations of 
online antisemitism. 
The 2013 Measuring the Hate Report found that YouTube was the source of the highest 
percentage of reported antisemitic items (41%).147 While YouTube has the highest reported rate of 
antisemitic content, this is attributed to content being accumulated over time, compounded by a 
significantly lower rate of removal. In the Measuring the Hate report’s initial findings, YouTube’s 
ratio of reported antisemitism was 5% higher than Twitter (41% compared to 36%). This difference 
grew to 12% (47% compared to 35%) after ten months, demonstrating how even a few months of 
low removal rates (22% compared to 8%) can impact the disparate quantity of antisemitism 
 
145 ‘What is the difference between social media and Web 2.0?’, Technopedia, 29 November 2011. 
<https://www.techopedia.com/2/27884/internet/social-media/what-is-the-difference-between-social-media-and-web-
20> [accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 5 of 5). 
146 Manoj Parameswaran and Andrew B. Whinston, ‘Social Computing: An Overview’, Communications of the 
Association for Information Systems, 19.37 (2007), 762-780 (p. 766). 
147 Oboler, Measuring the Hate, p. 5. 
 260 
 
between platforms.148 YouTube’s low removal rate resulted in a cumulatively high volume of 
antisemitic material found, regardless of the contents’ age.149 Holocaust denial and traditional 
antisemitism were the most prominent categories of antisemitism; YouTube accounted for over 
50% of each category on the three major social media platforms ten months after the initial data 
collection.150 YouTube's format suits these well-entrenched categories of antisemitism due to their 
extensive reservoirs of historical material, such as Nazi propaganda films or pseudo-academic 
Holocaust denial documentaries. This trend is greatly contrasted in the WJC report, which 
attributes 1% of collated Holocaust denial content to YouTube, 11% to Twitter, and 13% to 
Facebook.151 However, the WJC report admits that YouTube cannot be as consistently quantified 
using the WJC report methodology compared to other social media platforms.152 While this is 
partly due to the WJC’s use of a branding analytics company, the overall reasons for this are more 
complex. The impact of antisemitism on YouTube is not just measured in numbers of posts, but in 
numbers of views. A highly viewed video promoted by YouTube’s algorithm may have a far 
greater impact in spreading antisemitism than hundreds of individual tweets or Facebook posts. 
The Measuring the Hate report therefore provides a more accurate estimate of the quantity of 
antisemitic content on YouTube, due to the reporting-based methodology. However, different 
approaches are required to further analyse YouTube’s impact in the spread of antisemitism.  
The antisemitic material distributed on YouTube can range from pre-internet antisemitic 
propaganda, such as that produced by Nazism,153 to video-based conversations containing explicit 
 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid., p. 7. 
150 Ibid., pp. 19, 35. 
151 World Jewish Congress and Vigo Social Intelligence, p. 35. 
152 Ibid., p. 58. 
153 While much Nazi propaganda has been stored on YouTube by historical organisations, the top result for a search 
of “Triumph of the Will” in September 2018 linked to a full copy of the film hosted by an openly National Socialist 
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antisemitic sentiments. However, YouTube presents ramifications for online antisemitism beyond 
the nature of uploaded content. In June 2018, an investigation by the Wall Street Journal 
demonstrated how YouTube’s algorithm for video searches and recommendations gave 
prominence to videos featuring conspiracy theories and inflammatory and fringe discourse: 
 
YouTube’s recommendations often lead users to channels that feature conspiracy theories, 
partisan viewpoints and misleading videos, even when those users haven’t shown interest 
in such content. When users show a political bias in what they choose to view, YouTube 
typically recommends videos that echo those biases, often with more extreme 
viewpoints.154 
 
This pattern continued despite efforts by YouTube to change their algorithm in 2017. These 
changes were intended to recommend more mainstream sources, after YouTube disproportionately 
promoted conspiracy videos surrounding the 2017 Las Vegas mass shooting.155 Also in 2017, an 
investigation by The Times revealed that YouTube allowed the ‘monetisation’ of videos containing 
 
channel. Some of the other Nazi propaganda films on the channel had features disabled, but not Triumph of the Will. 
The copy distributed by this channel came with a video description expressing support towards National Socialism 
and also had fostered a pro-National Socialist conversation in the comments. The channel and its videos were 
removed following the June 2019 policy changes, ending the channel’s role as a space to promote and foster 
antisemitism. 
(The Third Position, 29 March 2015), ‘Triumph of the Will’ (YouTube video), 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7eOUzjn7pM> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
154 Jack Nicas, ‘How YouTube Drives People to the Internet's Darkest Corners’, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 
2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
how-youtube-drives-viewers-to-the-internets-darkest-corners-1518020478> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
155 Jack Nicas, ‘YouTube Tweaks Search Results as Las Vegas Conspiracy Theories Rise to Top’, Wall Street 
Journal, 5 October 2017. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
youtube-tweaks-its-search-results-after-rise-of-las-vegas-conspiracy-theories-1507219180> [viewed 15 September 
2018]. 
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antisemitic content.156 Monetisation refers to the generation of revenue (through advertisements) 
for content creators receiving high numbers of views on their videos.157 These investigations 
revealed that regular users were being increasingly exposed to antisemitic content on YouTube for 
years, and these content creators were potentially making money from distributing antisemitism. 
In response to criticism over its poor moderation, YouTube introduced a ‘limited features’ 
policy in late 2017: 
 
Our Community Guidelines prohibit hate speech… Some borderline videos, such as those 
containing inflammatory religious or supremacist content without a direct call to violence 
or a primary purpose of inciting hatred, may not cross these lines for removal. Following 
user reports, if our review teams determine that a video is borderline under our policies, it 
may have some features disabled.158 
 
This policy would end the ability of certain videos to generate revenue, would hide 
recommendations provided by the algorithm, and would hide other information about the video, 
such as comments and total views. Nonetheless, this half-measure further emphasised YouTube’s 
limitations in effectively moderating its platform from antisemitism and other discriminatory 
 
156 Alexi Mostrous, ‘Taxpayers are funding extremism’, Times, 17 March 2017. 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/taxpayers-fund-extremism-csdn0npsf> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
157 Google, How to earn money on YouTube (2019), <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72857?hl=en> 
[accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 3 of 7). 
158 Google, Limited Features for certain videos (2018), 
<https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7458465?hl=en> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
Jasper Hamill, ‘DOWN THE 'TUBE YouTube quietly launches new ‘CENSORSHIP’ scheme designed to ‘limit’ 
access to videos’, Scottish Sun, 3 October 2017. <https://www.thescottishsun.co.uk/tech/1504490/ 
youtube-accused-of-censorship-over-controversial-new-bid-to-limit-access-to-videos> [accessed 16 December 
2019] (para. 29 of 47). 
 263 
 
material. Anywhere between 300-500 hours of video content are uploaded to YouTube every 
minute,159 representing a far more difficult and time-costly moderation process compared to text-
based platforms. This problem is exacerbated by policies that further complicate the application of 
rules and require moderators to manually view reported videos when they could simply be 
removed. 
The difficulty for YouTube to moderate content on their own terms means that much of 
the responsibility falls to the users instead, requiring them to ‘flag’ rule-breaking content. 
However, videos flagged by users and later removed can potentially be reuploaded on another 
channel. This potential for preserving antisemitic content online was illustrated by an incident 
report published by Oboler and the OHPI.160 The report detailed YouTube user momlvx1, whose 
account had existed since 2009 without any uploaded videos before suddenly uploading 1,710 over 
the course of a single day - June 26th, 2012. 87% of the videos contained hateful content, the vast 
majority of it being antisemitism, especially Holocaust denial.161 Oboler suggests the reason for 
this dormant account’s sudden activity was because another account held by the same user may 
have closed, forcing the user to upload their content to a new channel. While the new videos would 
have no views, they also would have not been flagged by the community, allowing any videos 
previously removed or limited to have free reign once again. In response to the report being 
released, YouTube removed the channel in question, but also adopted a new moderation tool: 
removed content would be added to a list and new uploads would be compared against this list to 
 
159 Statista, Hours of video uploaded to YouTube every minute as of May 2019 (2019), 
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/259477/hours-of-video-uploaded-to-youtube-every-minute> [accessed 16 
December 2019]. 
160 Andre Oboler, Incident Report and Analysis: YouTube User momlvx1 (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention 
Institute, 2012) <http://www.ohpi.org.au/reports/IR12-1.pdf> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
161 Ibid., p. 1. 
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block them being reuploaded.162 While this tool represents a significant step forward in limiting 
the presence of antisemitism on YouTube, the tool’s value only goes so far as YouTube’s own 
policies towards forms of antisemitic content. If antisemitic videos are considered acceptable by 
YouTube, such a database will not prevent their redistribution and spread. 
YouTube has previously been reluctant to draw clear lines on acceptable content, including 
regarding antisemitism. As seen with their limited features policy, they appear to stand closer to a 
laissez-faire position on free speech regarding hateful content, despite such content being against 
their policies. While the limited features policy warns unsuspecting audiences about controversial 
content, expanding its use undermines the policy to check uploaded videos against a database of 
banned videos. The limitations of this policy were particularly demonstrated by the limited and 
inconsistent moderation exercised against Holocaust denial on YouTube. Before June 2019, only 
some Holocaust denial material was subject to the limited features policy, particularly explicit 
content (e.g. through the use of provocative terms, like “Holohoax”), or videos linked together in 
a large collection (e.g. in video playlists or channels). When one searches “Holohoax” on 
YouTube, the first results are playlists of videos under that term (appendix D, figure 24.1).163 In 
September 2018, many of the videos in these playlists were subject to limited features, although 
 
162 Ibid., p. 3. 
163 The appearance of these playlists has fluctuated over the writing of this thesis. In September 2018, the first two 
playlists appeared at the top of the search results, but then when searched again in October 2019, the bottom two 
playlists referenced appeared at the top of the search results. The first playlist was still active as of October 2019, 
just not appearing in the top search results, while the second was deactivated. As of January 2020, the bottom two 
playlists still appear at the top of search results. 
(Paul Pinard, 15 October 2019) ‘Holohoax’ (YouTube playlist), 
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1YZr2DC3CQJdQd5U9oaZhPHoeKacXjri> [accessed October 2019]. 
(Lasse Karagiannis, 30 December 2018) ‘Holohoax’ (YouTube playlist), 
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL164DA736DFAD5111> [accessed 16 September 2018]. 
(pianomanhere, 24 August 2019), ‘Holohoax’ (YouTube playlist), 
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLP8bdj2LuBNoSRTqKst0whRD_47eD8HIF> [accessed October 2019]. 
(Boneless Kidd 1312, 20 August 2019) ‘The Holohoax’, (YouTube playlist), 
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_g5e4pB7SESeESOYHy4gyx37exBEpxL8> [accessed 31 October 
2019]. 
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in inconsistent patterns. Beyond these playlists, accounts that promoted Holocaust denial had some 
of their denialist videos limited, but others were not limited. This included the Committee for Open 
Debate on the Holocaust’s (CODOH) official channel, which was banned later in 2019, although 
this inconsistent moderation raises questions over why it was not simply banned in the first round 
of moderating action.164 These inconsistencies, even with overt antisemitism, demonstrated the 
problems with a lacklustre moderation policy against hate speech. 
In June of 2019, YouTube finally expanded its hate speech policy to explicitly forbid the 
promotion and glorification of Nazi ideology and the denial of well-documented violent events, 
including the Holocaust.165 Following this point, many of the videos in the “Holohoax” playlists 
were removed, and even through new “Holohoax” playlists continued to be assembled, they have 
less material to drawn upon. Nonetheless, newer playlists are still more likely to be complete, 
including one full of David Irving speeches uploaded in 2017, which remains largely intact as of 
January 2020.166 It is concerning that YouTube’s increased moderation policy, far harsher on 
Holocaust denial compared to Facebook, applies only to videos and does not extend to playlists. 
While YouTube’s expanded hate speech policy has limited the spread of Holocaust denial, the 
adaptability of antisemites is demonstrated by their use of playlist infrastructure to continue 
organising and promoting Holocaust denial.  
 
164 Based on the covert nature of CODOH, it is unlikely that the impetus to ban their channel came from an action on 
their behalf. 
(CODOH – Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust), (YouTube Profile), 
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCv_oU-0RfVNPPuUfMwD73Cw/videos?flow=grid&sort=p&view=0> 
[accessed 16 September 2018]. 
165 Online Hate Prevention Institute, YouTube strengthens response to hate (2019), <https://ohpi.org.au/youtube-
strengthens-response-to-hate> [accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 5, 8 of 10). 
166 (pianomanhere, 24 August 2019), ‘Holohoax’ (YouTube playlist), 
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Before the June 2019 changes, covert antisemitism was particularly resistant to the limited 
features policy. A September 2018 search of “Holocaust Revisionism” revealed four denialist 
videos without limited features topping search results (appendix D, figure 24.2). The first result, 
“Holocaust Revisionist Faurisson”, was an hour-long documentary that had existed on YouTube 
for over seven years and had over 29,000 views.167 The first video to have limited features in that 
search was called “Holocaust Revisionism for Beginners part 1 – 1/5”, which was uploaded in 
2007 and had over 47,000 views.168 The only limited features in this video were a warning screen 
to click through to watch, and restricted recommendations (although that did not prevent clicking 
through to the next video in the series). However, after the June 2019 policy changes, a repeated 
search finds none of the Holocaust denial videos from the September 2018 search. The new results 
even reflect an understanding of the obfuscation behind the term ‘revisionism’, with top results 
featuring educational videos about Holocaust denial instead (appendix D, figure 24.3). Covert 
Holocaust denial’s long persistence on YouTube represents the limitations of limited features 
moderation policies towards antisemitism on social media. However, the differing search results 
between 2018 and 2019 indicate the positive potential of stronger policies consistent with the 
academic consensus on manifestations of antisemitism (which Facebook still lacks). In the months 
following the June 2019 changes, large quantities of Holocaust denial videos were removed from 
YouTube. Some of these videos had been on YouTube for over a decade, and ranged from overt 
to covert in their content.169 The stronger content policy and database for vetting new uploads 
against existing banned content prevented organised antisemites from reuploading content as they 
 
167 (YoutresTuve, 21 April 2011), ‘Holocaust Revisionist Faurisson’ (YouTube video), 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_PKklPg-U> [accessed 16 September 2018]. 
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had done in the past. While the use of playlist infrastructure reveals that antisemites are continuing 
to adapt and that there is still more content to moderate, the post-2019 landscape of YouTube is a 
far cry from its previous role as a Holocaust denial resource depot. 
While those who upload and reupload antisemitic content on YouTube are largely 
organised antisemites, it is also worthwhile to explore how recreational antisemites normalise 
discrimination on the platform. A key incident in this category is when user PewDiePie, a famous 
YouTube personality, uploaded a video on January 11th, 2017, in which he paid a pair of Indian 
workers $5 to unfurl a banner saying, “DEATH TO ALL JEWS”.170 PewDiePie, real name Felix 
Kjellberg, was the most subscribed-to user on YouTube between 15 August 2013 and 27 March 
2019 (although still ranked second with over 102 million subscribers as of December 2019171), and 
is known for primarily playing video games and vlogging. PewDiePie apologised in the video after 
the incident, saying “I am sorry. I didn't think they would actually do it… It was a funny meme, 
and I didn’t think it would work, okay”. Nonetheless, the video received significant criticism from 
some of his subscribers and the broader media.172 PewDiePie made a further statement on his blog, 
stating, “I am in no way supporting any kind of hateful attitudes”, but criticising the broader 
coverage of the incident.173 In the wake of the heightened media attention, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that since August 2016, PewDiePie had included antisemitic and Nazi content in nine 
 
170 Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 11 January 2017), ‘I’ve Discovered The Greatest Thing Online’ (YouTube video), 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtxXKezbQ9w&> [accessed 12 January 2017]. 
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171 Socialblade, Top 100 Subscribed Youtube Channels (2019), 
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videos, as well as promoting far-right channels.174 This incident and its ensuing publicity led to 
several major donors severing ties with him, including Disney.175 Later, in September 2017, 
PewDiePie faced further controversy when he said “nigger” while live-streaming a game of 
PlayerUnknowns Battlegrounds.176  
PewDiePie’s incidents, particularly the “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” banner, 
demonstrate the extent of the normalisation of antisemitism that has happened on the internet. The 
incidents also indicate how this normalisation can be furthered by high-profile internet celebrities, 
especially on YouTube. PewDiePie’s reference to the incident as a “funny meme” links to the 
vulgar humour inspired by 4chan. Despite repeat incidents, PewDiePie’s initial apology during the 
video itself seems to suggest he does not intend to actively promote antisemitic views. 
Furthermore, PewDiePie explained the “nigger” incident as “[it] just slipped out”,177 and could not 
be edited out as it was live-streamed. Overall, it seems likely that actively racist intentions are not 
behind these incidents, although their accidental nature does not preclude him from having 
discriminatory views. Both PewDiePie’s casual treatment of the “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” 
incident, and the existence of antisemitic content in previous videos demonstrate that antisemitic 
humour was normalised and popular enough to be exhibited on the most popular channel on 
YouTube. Significant backlash after the incident did not prevent PewDiePie’s then 52 million 
subscribers (many being impressionable young people) being exposed to the antisemitic joke, nor 
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Posts’, Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2017. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/disney-severs-ties-with-youtube-star-
pewdiepie-after-anti-semitic-posts-1487034533> [accessed 16 September 2018]. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Paul Meekin, ‘WATCH: PewDiePie In Hot Water Again: Drops N-Word During PUBG Stream’, Heavy, 10 
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did the backlash diminish his userbase. Ultimately, vulgar 4chan-style antisemitism being 
promoted by one of the internet’s most popular personalities suggests that antisemitism has been 
normalised to the point where even popular figures ignore social risks, and engage in it for the 
amusement of themselves and their audiences. 
The broader impact of antisemitism on PewDiePie’s fanbase was revealed by a controversy 
around his attempt to donate to the ADL in September of 2019. On 10 September, he uploaded a 
video in which he announced a $50,000 donation to the ADL,178 which had notably criticised him 
for his “DEATH TO ALL THE JEWS” stunt.179 Immediately following this announcement, many 
followers spread antisemitic conspiracy theories that PewDiePie was being forced into the 
donation.180 The next day PewDiePie tweeted that reasons for the donation were linked to the 
Christchurch shooter saying “subscribe to PewDiePie” in his livestream of the atrocity.181 In 
addition, the ADL also stated that they first learned about the donation after PewDiePie’s original 
video.182 Nonetheless, there was continued conspiratorial thought and fan backlash over 
PewDiePie’s donation announcement.183 This backlash featured multiple manifestations of 
antisemitism on his fanbase’s Reddit community, as well as efforts from 4chan to brigade and 
 
178 Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 10 September 2019) ‘Unboxing 100 MIL YouTube AWARD!!’, (YouTube video), 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYlesHOaPkY> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
179 Jonathan Greenblat (@JGreenblattADL, 15 February 2017), ‘Thank you, @Disney, for severing ties with 
#PewDiePie’ (tweet), <https://twitter.com/jgreenblattadl/status/831581445646843906?lang=en> [accessed 31 
October 2019]. 
180 Know Your Meme, PewDiePie ADL Donation Controversy (2019), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/ 
pewdiepie-adl-donation-controversy> [accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 4 of 8). 
181 It is also worth considering that PewDiePie’s existing recreational antisemitism had been noticed by far-right 
actors like Tarrant, and their reference to him in their meme culture served to further associate him with the far-
right. 
Ibid., para. 8 of 8. 
182 Daniel Sugarman, ‘ADL reports no sign of $50,000 donation from YouTube star criticised for antisemitic video 
content’, The Jewish Chronicle, 11 September 2019. <https://www.thejc.com/news/world/adl-reports-no-sign-of-50-
000-donation-from-youtube-pewdiepie-star-criticised-for-antisemitic-1.488500> [accessed 31 October 2019] (para. 
4 of 10). 
183 (Ovikeat, 11 September 2019) ‘Why is he giving money to the ADL who tried to get him kicked off Disney’ 
(Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/PewdiepieSubmissions/comments/ 
d2e8hr/why_is_he_giving_money_to_the_adl_who_tried_to> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
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support anti-ADL sentiment.184 PewDiePie rescinded his donation pledge in a video two days after 
the initial announcement.185 The fan backlash was largely motivated by the perceived prior 
antagonism toward PewDiePie by the ADL, which was likely amplified by PewDiePie’s own 
criticism of the coverage over his controversies back in 2017.186 This controversy demonstrates 
that YouTube celebrities being called out for recreational antisemitism can result in their fanbase 
becoming antagonistic towards efforts to combat antisemitism. The fanbase comes to the 
celebrity’s defence, likely facilitated by the online echo chambers and parallel realities that form 
around them. The recreational antisemitism can even spread to the fanbase itself, potentially 
influencing the creators to diminish their own accountability and curtail attempts to make amends. 
Furthermore, the normalisation of recreational antisemitism within these celebrity-based 
communities can result in them becoming recruiting grounds for organised antisemites from other 
spaces, such as 4chan. This controversy represents the serious risk posed by recreational 
antisemitism. Once it receives a mainstream audience, calling it out can amplify it, while leaving 
it alone continues its normalisation. 
YouTube’s TEMPIS taxonomy is largely similar to that of the other major social media 
platforms (appendix D, figure 26.5). Posts are easily shareable to the broader platform and internet, 
and users do not need a verified ID. Users are empowered to turn off commenting on their video 
and delist their video from public view. However, these features are not as extensive as 
Facebook’s. Recent policy changes have resulted in moderation expanding from solely exception 
 
184 (LivingstoneInAfrica, 11 September 2019) ‘r/PewdiepieSubmissions reacts to PDP's donation to the ADL’ 
(Reddit post) <https://www.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/ 
d2kolf/rpewdiepiesubmissions_reacts_to_pdps_donation_to> [acccessed 31 October 2019]. 
185 Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 12 September 2019), ‘My 100 Mil Award Broke!' (YouTube video) 
<https://youtu.be/PbfX3ZyHLJg> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
186 Kjellberg, ‘just to clear some things up…’. 
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moderation to also pre-moderation, which can have increased effectiveness against antisemitism 
and other forms of hate speech.  
Organised antisemites can use YouTube as a cost-effective way to engage a much larger 
audience than before the internet. For Holocaust denial, the few encounters that compare to a 
moderately performing Holocaust denial video on YouTube are the occasions where a prominent 
denier was invited onto a television show.187 However, these pre-internet actions required 
heightened publicity and produced social risk, whereas both can be eliminated by the 
pseudonymity provided by YouTube. YouTube has also provided an outlet for organised 
antisemites to store older antisemitic material. While this activity has largely diminished following 
the June 2019 policy changes, such storage is still possible on other video-sharing websites with 
less stringent hate speech policies. Nonetheless, casual antisemites can more easily consume 
content on YouTube, and can easily share videos from this platform to broader online spaces. Their 
support of organisers is streamlined by providing views and subscriber numbers, even resulting in 
the monetisation of antisemitism on YouTube. However, YouTube policy changes have 
demonstrated how stronger moderation can significantly reduce the ability both of organised 
antisemites to distribute antisemitism, and of casual antisemites to consume it. The highest dangers 
now lie with recreational antisemitism, as seen with example PewDiePie normalising antisemitism 
to his broader userbase. Measures have been introduced to reduce the risk of exposing large 
channel audiences to prohibited material. One notable measure is incentivising channels with 
higher subscriber numbers to have all their videos manually vetted in the Google Preferred 
program.188 Once again, policy is only as strong as a platform’s content policy, which on YouTube 
 
187 As happened with Bradley Smith and David Cole on the show Donahue in 1994. 
188 Paul Muret, ‘A new approach to YouTube monetization’, Google Blog, 16 January 2018. 
<https://www.blog.google/products/ads/a-new-approach-to-youtube-monetization> [accessed 16 December 2019] 
(para. 7 of 10). 
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is now strong enough to effectively mitigate the spread of antisemitism, assuming moderators are 
educated about its covert and invisible forms. 
YouTube has traditionally been a haven for overt, covert and invisible antisemitism. 
Previously, the platform’s limited removal rates had allowed all types of antisemitic content to 
remain available. Even now, this history has contributed to an insidious level of normalisation of 
antisemitism on YouTube. Despite the introduction of new moderation policies in June 2019, it is 
likely that this normalisation of antisemitism has persisted, especially considering the age of some 
of the antisemitic content on the platform. The platform’s increasing moderation is now limiting 
the viability of antisemitism, but the limited features policy serves as an example of the 
ineffectiveness limited moderation provides, especially for covert forms of antisemitism. This 
example is especially relevant for other platforms that might take heed of the moderation policies 
adopted by YouTube. However, some users may reject such policies and form an alt-tech platform, 
as Gab did in reaction to Twitter’s moderation. In such cases, antisemitic videos can be expected 
to stay rooted online, although the diminished access to broader audiences will limit their reach 
(as in the case of Gab) and prevent antisemitism from being effectively monetised. YouTube has 
been a source of both active and dormant antisemitism, with dormant antisemitism being the most 
significant. The platform allowed reserves of old antisemitic content to be reuploaded, both as an 
archive and to recycle it into the public sphere. This trend has resulted in a significant proportion 
of antisemitism on YouTube manifesting in traditional and Holocaust denial forms. However, this 
recycling of dormant materials is significantly diminished after being combined with a more 
stringent prohibition against antisemitic material. 
Quantitatively, YouTube represents the digital preservation of antisemitic material, a goal 
of organised antisemites since web 1.0 in the 1990s. While improvements in technology have 
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facilitated more efficient archiving of these resources since then, YouTube’s new policies and tools 
have limited the extent of this storage and redistribution. By implementing a strong content policy 
and checking uploaded videos against a list of already banned videos, YouTube can play a leading 
role in the restriction and limitation of antisemitic content online. However, inconsistent 
enforcement has limited the potential of these tools, enabling organised antisemites to continue 
using YouTube as a distribution platform. Only dealing with antisemitism on a video-by-video 
basis (except when an entire channel is banned) allows antisemites to create channels and playlists 
in which some videos will not be negatively affected. Nonetheless, even with these tools being 
partially effective, this does mean that organised antisemites on YouTube are far more likely to 
limit their material to covert antisemitism. Furthermore, users being required to repeatedly upload 
their content or channel is it is removed makes it likely that the material will remain dormant, or 
even eliminated for good if checked against a database of banned content. While the partial 
implementation of these tools has limited the spread of organised antisemitism on the platform, 
other video sharing sites may still serve the same purpose without similar limitations. This 
heightens the need for YouTube to effectively implement these tools and policies, so that they can 
serve as an example for other video sharing websites to follow. 
Despite the decline of organised and explicit antisemitism on YouTube, the platform can 
still be used to potentially increase both casual and recreational incidents, and covert and invisible 
forms. It is difficult for YouTube and its community to fully moderate video content, especially 
livestreams. This difficulty makes it more likely that covert or invisible expressions of 
antisemitism by smaller channels and personalities remain hidden, compared to those on text-based 
platforms. The culture established around prominent channels and personalities demonstrates how 
antisemitism has been normalised online, and how social media and internet fame can perpetuate 
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its normalisation. YouTube’s relatively late adoption of effective moderation has left a legacy of 
antisemitism’s normalisation. This normalisation results in both a qualitative change in 
antisemitism, as explicit content becomes more normalised and acceptable, and quantitative 
change, as it represents a growth in antisemitic incidents across the platform. PewDiePie’s 
antisemitic incidents demonstrate how far the explicit antisemitism of 4chan has reached. 
Furthermore, the backlash to PewDiePie’s attempted ADL donation reveals how the concentration 
of communities around channels with millions of subscribers extends antisemitism’s 
normalisation, and even provides recruitment opportunities for organised antisemitic networks. As 
antisemitism is further normalised, there is an increased risk of social media personalities 
accidentally or recreationally promoting antisemitic content to their audience. While the backlash 
against PewDiePie may mitigate this normalisation and encourage personalities to be more 
mindful of what they put into videos, there is always the risk of it “slipping out”. Therefore, despite 
positive moderation changes, YouTube may continue to serve as a vehicle for the normalisation 
of antisemitism on the internet, potentially even more so than other social media platforms. 
 
Social Media - Reddit 
Reddit distinguishes itself from other social media platforms by significantly encouraging the 
creation of open online communities and activity therein, and using larger quantities of text in 
online conversation. For antisemitism, Reddit represents the streamlined formation and 
recruitment of antisemitic networks on social media, as well as the ability for antisemites to target 
entire communities based on their identity or content. Reddit is a news aggregate-cum-social media 
website, that at its peak in 2018 was the 3rd most visited website in the US and 8th most visited in 
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the world.189 This rank decreased in 2019, however, it consistently ranked 6th in the US and 18th 
globally between March and December of 2019.190 Reddit began as a news aggregate website – a 
space where various news articles from different outlets can be posted, with users able to ‘upvote’ 
or ‘downvote’ news articles based on their usefulness, relevance, or information. The most upvoted 
links are pushed to the top of the website’s list-style format, ensuring they would be viewed first 
by visitors to the website. Reddit eventually created subsites known as ‘subreddits’, allowing the 
same list-vote mechanism to be applied to specific areas of interest. Users are pseudonymous, and 
can create their own subreddits, basically allowing forums to be made about potentially any topic, 
ranging from television shows, to animals, to web comics. Users’ creation of communities marked 
a proper transition to social media, as the new style of the website encouraged people to submit 
their own content. This included the functionality of ‘text-posts’, which emulated the thread-based 
conversations on web forums, allowing other users to reply to posts with comments. Regarding 
antisemitism, Reddit’s structure allows antisemites to set up their own subreddits where they can 
produce/consume content, organise, and potentially spread their material to other corners of the 
website. 
While the owners and administrators of Reddit did not create antisemitic content 
themselves, they helped foster an environment that would allow it to take root. This was facilitated 
by their hands-off libertarian-style approach to running the website, exemplified by Reddit’s 
simplistic content policy’s failure to restrict hate speech.191 Prohibited “behaviour” (as opposed to 
content) is limited to manipulating votes, creating additional accounts to avoid punishment, or 
 
189 Alexa, The Top 500 sites on the web (2018), <http://www.alexa.com/topsites> [accessed 26 May 2018]. 
190 Alexa, reddit.com Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic (2019), 
<https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/reddit.com> [accessed 7 March 2019, 16 December 2019]. 
191 Reddit, Reddit Content Policy (2019), <https://www.redditinc.com/policies/content-policy> [accessed 16 
December 2019]. 
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trying to sabotage Reddit itself. This policy is a noticeable split from the tacit opposition to 
discrimination by Facebook and Twitter, who at least include a rule against “hateful conduct”.192 
Additionally, while 4chan may have an even more laissez-faire attitude towards content, 4chan 
does not receive as much traffic as Reddit, and has an existing reputation for vulgar content. 
Furthermore, Reddit administrators have an inconsistent record of enforcing the rules above. In 
June 2015, Reddit banned a subreddit called /r/fatpeoplehate over the subreddit organising the 
harassment of overweight people online, particularly in other online spaces.193 However, from 
2016, the pro-Donald Trump subreddit, /r/the_donald, encouraged its large subscriber base to 
harass various targets online. Instead of removing the subreddit, the administrators would remove 
only select users, or not take any action at all. For example, no action was taken against a post that 
encouraged users to flood a Jill Stein Facebook Q&A livestream with attacks and abusive 
comments.194 This inconsistency has resulted in a website culture that journalist Adrian Chen, who 
uncovered one of the most notorious rule-breakers on Reddit, described as “online feudalism”.195 
Reddit’s online feudalism enables ordinary users to wield extraordinary power based on their 
userbase, regardless of their experience or views, and despite administrators attempting to portray 
the website as friendly to all communities.  
 
192 Twitter, The Twitter Rules (2019), <https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
193 Alex Abad-Santos, ‘Why Reddit’s ban on Fat People Hate is ripping it apart’, Vox, 11 June 2015. 
<https://www.vox.com/2015/6/11/8767035/fatpeoplehate-reddit-ban> [accessed 16 December 2019] (para. 13 of 
37). 
194 (/u/doubbg, 26 November 2016), ‘CENTIPEDES! Jill Stein is about to have a Facebook Q&A Livestream! YOU 
KNOW WHAT TO DO! GET ON THIS!’ (Reddit post), <https://np.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/comments/ 
5ewh53/centipedes_jill_stein_is_about_to_have_a_facebook> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
195 Adrian Chen, ‘Unmasking Reddit’s Violentacrez, The Biggest Troll on the Web’, Gawker, 12 October 2012. 
<http://gawker.com/5950981/unmasking-reddits-violentacrez-the-biggest-troll-on-the-web> [accessed 16 December 
2019] (para. 31 of 70). 
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In June 2019, /r/the_donald was eventually ‘quarantined’196 after calls to violence were 
made in support of Oregon Republicans who had fled the state to obstruct climate change action.197 
Quarantining on Reddit is similar to YouTube’s limited features policy, meaning that any user 
visiting /r/the_donald for the first time would first be prompted with a warning page, stating: 
 
This community is quarantined: It is restricted due to significant issues with reporting and 
addressing violations of Reddit's rules against violence and other aspects of the Content 
Policy. As a visitor or member, you can help moderators maintain the community by 
reporting and downvoting rule-breaking content. 
 
Users would be required to click through the warning page before accessing the subreddit, and 
would need an existing email-verified account to continue. Furthermore, while in the subreddit, 
the same warning would be posted above the subscribe button. Quarantining a subreddit also 
ensures that no material from said subreddit can make it to Reddit’s ‘front page’, and limits the 
customisation of that community’s page design. Interestingly, the administrators informed the 
moderators of /r/the_donald that their quarantine could be later lifted, conditional on good 
behaviour,198 but it has not been lifted as of January 2020. It appears that Reddit administrators 
 
196 (/u/thestickystickman, 27 June 2019), ‘The_Donald has been quarantined!!!’ (Reddit post) 
<https://old.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/c5s9ol/the_donald_has_been_quarantined> [accessed 31 
October 2019]. 
197 Alex Kaplan, ‘A pro-Trump subreddit is full of calls for violence in support of Oregon Republicans’, Media 
Matters, 24 June 2019. <https://www.mediamatters.org/donald-trump/pro-trump-subreddit-full-calls-violence-
support-oregon-republicans?redirect_source=/research/2019/06/24/ 
A-pro-Trump-subreddit-is-full-of-calls-for-violence-in-support-of-Oregon-Republicans/224018> [accessed 31 
October 2019] (para. 1 of 24). 
198 (/u/DramaMod, 27 June 2019), ‘/r/The_Donald has been quarantined. Discuss this dramatic happening here!’ 
(Reddit post), <https://www.reddit.com/r/SubredditDrama/comments/ 
c5safq/rthe_donald_has_been_quarantined_discuss_this> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
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were concerned about the appearance of cracking down on a large subreddit dedicated to the US 
President, even if that subreddit had contravened Reddit’s rules to a greater degree than other 
spaces that were not given second chances to lift quarantines or avoid bans. Fears that banning the 
community would be ineffective are unfounded, according to a 2017 study on the efficacy of 
Reddit’s bans of toxic communities in 2015, notably /r/fatpeople hate.199 The study found the bans 
resulted in an overall reduction in hate speech following the ban of abusive and discriminatory 
communities, resulting in migrations away from Reddit rather than to other spaces in Reddit.200 
Therefore, by taking away their access to the broader communities, banned discriminatory and 
abusive subreddits face similar difficulties to the alt-right sections of Gab lacking easy access to 
the userbase of Twitter. 
 One way Reddit fosters antisemitism is through linking communities, drawing users to 
subreddits that relate to, or share similar views to subreddits that they already use. Drifting 
userbases on Reddit represent ‘information laundering’, which can result in a parallel shift of the 
Overton’s window for discriminatory content between communities. This practice could be 
described as ‘gateway antisemitism’, bringing in users from more mainstream communities, and 
exposing them to further antisemitic material. Over the course of the 2016 United States election, 
there was a growth in this practice, linking communities around /r/the_donald to more extreme 
spaces. The Trump campaign was linked to Reddit’s broader alt-right, which featured white 
nationalism, neo-Nazism, and the ‘manosphere’.201 The manosphere, also known as the ‘Red 
 
199 Eshwar Chandrasekharan and others, ‘You Can’t Stay Here: The Efficacy of Reddit’s 2015 Ban Examined 
Through Hate Speech’, Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 1.CSCW (2017), 1-22. 
200 Ibid., p. 17. 
201 Debbie Ging, ‘Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere’, Men and 
Masculinities, 22.4 (2017), 1-20 (p. 3). 
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Pill’,202 is a loosely organised misogynistic movement that promotes the concept of ‘alpha’ men.203 
Eventually a subreddit was specifically set up for the broader alt-right, which promoted extreme 
antisemitic and racist views, including promoting genocide,204 and fantasising about the execution 
of Jews.205 /r/altright specifically targeted subscribers of the /r/the_donald, and attempted to have 
the two subreddits linked. In a post on 26 August 2017, /r/altright welcomed new subscribers from 
/r/the_donald, and directly told them that the alt-right was a “racial movement”.206 Furthermore, 
the top comment on this post was a user asking, “Why do you hate the Jews”; with the ensuing 
comment thread of antisemites providing in depth answers to their worldview, including links to 
antisemitic propaganda.  
The effectiveness of gateway antisemitism on Reddit was demonstrated by the positive 
reception to a meme promoting Holocaust denial, posted on /r/the_donald (appendix D, figure 
25.1).207 The meme depicts the European Union as a hijab-wearing Muslim alongside antisemitic 
tropes, including the (((echo))) symbol, Star of David badge, and “six million”, (a tongue-in-cheek 
reference to the approximately six million Jews who died in the Holocaust). The post received a 
net upvote count of over 3,600, and one comment saying “OMFG “six million” that shit is dank” 
 
202 The terms ‘red pill’ and ‘redpilling’ originate from the 1999 film The Matrix and is associated generally with 
enlightenment as opposed to ongoing ignorance. This term is commonly used in misogynist communities adjacent to 
GamerGate, as explored in chapter two and four, and /r/pussypass, as explored in chapter five, although its broader 
use in the alt-right further indicates the intersections between overlapping forms of discrimination. 
203 ‘Misogyny: The Sites’, Southern Poverty Law Centre Intelligence Report, 1 March 2012. 
<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2012/misogyny-sites> [accessed 16 December 2019] 
(para. 9 of 13). 
204 (/u/HerrFarage88, 1 January 2017), ‘Polish Kebab Removal’ (comment on Reddit post), 
<https://archive.is/6JkNx> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
205 (/u/ididthatthatsmyfault, 15 January 2017), ‘Jewish academic in Sweden admits that jews are “at the center of” 
the “multicultural” agenda and says that Europe MUST accept mass non-white immigration. NO BITCH. THE 
TIDE IS TURNING. WE WILL EXPEL NON-WHITES AND/OR SEGREGATE’ (comment on Reddit post), 
<https://archive.is/lnF90#selection-2675.0-2675.226> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
206 (/u/LetThereBeWhite, 26 August 2016), ‘To the new subscribers coming from /r/The_Donald, The Alt Right is a 
racial movement and if you've heard otherwise then you've heard wrong.’ (Reddit post) 
<https://archive.is/8yZkb#selection-2751.0-2751.139> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
207 (/u/usa_DJT_usa, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (Reddit post), <https://archive.is/SrmuC> 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
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(appendix D, figure 25.2)208 received a net of 39 upvotes. No net upvoted comments called out the 
antisemitic content. This meme is an instance of the broader antisemitic trend noticed in the 
NCRI’s quantitative analysis of antisemitism on /pol/ and Gab. Their analysis also noted 
exceptional rates of Merchant meme posts being shared by /r/the_donald.209 Of all the spaces 
examined in their study, /r/the_donald was the most efficient in spreading Merchant memes to 
other web communities (although /pol/ was the source of the largest quantity of merchant memes). 
This efficiency shows that /r/the_donald’s gateway antisemitism does not just represent a 
transitioning space to other antisemitic places, but has evolved to also push antisemitism to other 
spaces as well. However, /r/the_donald accounted for only 19.5% of the total Merchant meme 
instances detected on Reddit, suggesting the presence of more antisemitic spaces on Reddit. These 
spaces provide audiences for this content distributed from ‘upstream’ spaces, including /pol/ and 
even gateway spaces like /r/the_donald. In addition, since /r/the_donald’s Holocaust denial meme 
did not feature derivations of the Merchant, it is clear that a wide range of antisemitic content is 
being spread on Reddit through gateway antisemitism, which may be harder to detect through 
automated quantitative methodologies.  
r/altright was eventually banned, not due to extreme content, but because it engaged in 
‘doxxing’, the practice of revealing peoples’ anonymous/pseudonymous identities on the internet 
and/or posting personal information for the purpose of harassing a target.210 Nonetheless, other alt-
right spaces continue to exist on Reddit, including /r/debatealtright and /r/the_donald, the latter 
already shown to be vulnerable to alt-right antisemitism. In addition, much antisemitic content 
 
208 (/u/BearskiMcBear, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (comment on Reddit post), 
<https://archive.is/grnPv> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
209 Finkelstein and others, pp. 8-10.  
210 (/u/WhiteRussianChaser, 2 February 2017), ‘/r/altright has been banned!!!’ (Reddit post) 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/AgainstHateSubreddits/comments/5ri8cc/raltright_has_been_banned> [accessed 16 
December 2019]. 
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came to be featured on /r/pussypass, which was part of a group of misogynistic linked communities 
on Reddit, including /r/theredpill. ‘Pussy pass’ refers to the concept of women receiving 
discounted or free services, or immunity from law enforcement due to their gender; the eponymous 
community was linked to Reddit’s broader alt-right community. Despite the narrow connotations 
of subreddit’s name, a search of the term “jew” in the subreddit reveals an array of antisemitic 
content, including Holocaust denial, antisemitic conspiratorial theories and anti-Judaism 
(appendix D, figure 25.3). This content represents the intersection of online discriminatory 
movements, as organised antisemites saw an opportunity to influence other communities that 
feature heavy misogyny. Furthermore, this intersection lays the groundwork for ‘redemptive’ 
antisemitic worldviews such as the cultural Marxism conspiracy theory, linking these intersecting 
forms of discrimination in a worldview that places higher blame on a Jewish cabal. The moderators 
of /r/pussypass eventually banned neo-Nazi content, which did diminish its antisemitism 
henceforth. While banning communities has been proven to diminish hate-speech on Reddit,211 
there are other factors at play. The NCRI’s report on /pol/ and Gab demonstrated that antisemitism 
on Reddit is also coming from external sources. Furthermore, through the intersection of 
discriminatory movements on the alt-right, antisemitism can be spread to a wide variety of linked 
communities, even after major existing communities are banned.  
 Reddit’s linking of communities allows the spread of antisemitic material across broader 
social media, thereby allowing antisemites to reach broader audiences. One key example of this is 
associated with an infamous Donald Trump tweet of 2 July 2017, which featured a video of 
Trump’s 2007 WrestleMania appearance, edited so that the CNN logo was superimposed on his 
 
211 When subreddits like /r/fatpeople were banned, their dispersed users would “invade” other subreddits, moving 
rapidly into different spaces. Nonetheless, despite the influx of these users from hate-speech spaces, there was not 
any detected increase in hate-speech rates within the “invaded” subreddits. 
Chandrasekharan and others, ‘You Can’t Stay Here’, p. 20. 
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foe’s head.212 It is not exactly clear how Trump came across the video, which was created by a 
Reddit user /u/HanAssholeSolo.213 This user had also posted antisemitic, racist, and Islamophobic 
memes and comments, which were subsequently projected to international significance. Most 
prominent was an antisemitic meme made about CNN, posted to /r/the_donald on 13 June 2017 
with the title “Something strange about CNN… can’t quite put my finger on it”.214 This meme 
depicted the portraits of 121 CNN employees with stars of David by their faces, along with their 
names and position within CNN. The meme was sized so all portraits could fit into an image 
suitable for viewing on a smartphone, along with an antisemitic screed at the bottom: 
 
If Jews represent just 2% of the U.S. population, would it be odd for a media organization 
(whose parent company has a Jewish president and Jewish-majority of C-level executives) 
to also have a Jewish President and a Jewish Vice-President, a Jewish-majority of 
Executive Vice Presidents, and a Lead Political Anchor, Chief Political Correspondent, 
Chief Political Analyst, Chief Political Director, Chief National Correspondent, and Chief 
Washington Correspondent – all 6 of its “Chief” anchor positions – who are all Jewish, as 
well as a majority – at least 13 – of the network’s currently-running shows having Jewish 
hosts? It’s almost as if… 
 
 
212 Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump, 2 July 2017), ‘#FraudNewsCNN #FNN’ (tweet), 
<https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881503147168071680> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
213 Adam Gabbatt, ‘Reddit user who took credit for Trump's CNN tweet has history of racist posts’, Guardian, 4 
July 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/03/trump-tweet-reddit-user-history-hanassholesolo> 
[accessed 9 January 2020]. 
214 (/u/HanAssholeSolo, 13 June 2017), ‘Something strange about CNN… can’t quite put my finger on it’ (Reddit 
post), <https://i.4pcdn.org/pol/1499243723487.jpg> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
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Trump’s sharing of /u/HanAssholeSolo’s video demonstrated that content made by antisemites can 
potentially reach audiences as powerful as the President of the United States, who in turn can 
promote it further. Even though Trump did not share the antisemitic content, his sharing of 
/u/HanAssholeSolo’s other content allowed this user’s antisemitic material to receive 
unprecedented attention, including being covered in major news outlets.215 This publicity affirms 
the strategy of antisemites elsewhere, specifically on Twitter, demonstrating that the more activity, 
regardless of the subject, the greater the likelihood that their material will reach a broader audience. 
This capability extends even to individual organised antisemites like /u/HanAssholeSolo, 
demonstrating an enhanced ability of individuals to gather followings and expose others to 
antisemitism online, especially if appealing to sentiments of recreational antisemitism. 
 Reddit’s subreddit system allows antisemites to create a subreddit on any subject (if the 
subreddit name is not already in use) and fill it with the content they want. In 2014, a study 
publicised that the /r/holocaust subreddit was created and run by Holocaust deniers, allowing them 
to completely design it as a Holocaust denial platform.216 Despite generating significant attention, 
Reddit administrators refused to hand the platform over to users who would run it as an informative 
subreddit about the history of the Holocaust. Furthermore, the study found that the head moderator 
and creator of the subreddit, /u/soccer, had created many subreddits when the subreddit system 
was first introduced, and therefore was able to control their content. This most significantly 
included /r/Iran, the clearest choice for users wanting to discuss and celebrate Iran, and /r/xkcd, a 
subreddit focusing on the popular webcomic series xkcd. This user was able to control /r/Iran to 
reflect the country’s antisemitic manifestations to a disproportionate degree, such as the official 
 
215 ‘Reddit User Behind Trump’s anti-CNN Video Has History of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia’, Haaretz, 3 July 
2017. <http://www.haaretz.com/us-news/1.799112> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
216 William Allington, ‘New Media, Old Hatred: The Rise of Holocaust Denial on the Internet’, (unpublished 
honours thesis, 2014), p. 53. 
 284 
 
policy of the Iranian government regarding Israel. In /r/xkcd, /u/soccer removed examples of 
comics that mocked or critiqued antisemites and broader racists.217 The study also found that 
/u/soccer was bartering with subreddits and offered to trade ownership of /r/xkcd for ownership of 
/r/stormfront, which at the time was held by anti-racists who made it into a subreddit about weather. 
These examples demonstrate the huge potential power antisemites could have on Reddit, being 
able to take advantage of the website’s structure to influence content, potentially reaching 
thousands of people every day. In May 2018, /r/holocaust was still under the control of Holocaust 
deniers, despite /u/soccer being banned from the website. The subreddit’s resources of covert 
Holocaust denial constituted a risk for users visiting /r/holocaust, potentially becoming influenced 
by Holocaust denial (appendix D, figure 25.4). /r/holocaust thus demonstrates the threat posed by 
antisemites controlling social media spaces, especially in ways that promote covert antisemitism.  
In June 2018, /r/holocaust was quarantined by Reddit administrators (appendix D, figure 
25.4). While this quarantine limited some functions, and provided a customised warning directing 
people to the United State Holocaust Memorial Museum website, its effect was limited by 
/r/holocaust’s comparatively smaller subreddit population. There is little value restricting 
/r/holocaust’s ability to reach the front page of the website if that would not be possible anyway. 
Nonetheless, users would need to opt-in to view any content from the subreddit, even if they were 
subscribed to similar subreddits, thereby potentially inoculating uninformed viewers about the 
subreddit’s covert antisemitic content. Quarantining did have some effect on the traffic to the 
subreddit, as its subreddit rank had fallen from the low 11,000s to the 50,000s a year after its 
quarantining (appendix D, figure 25.5). Reddit administrators’ choice to quarantine /r/holocaust in 
2018, yet not ban it outright, suggests that they were susceptible to growing public pressure 
 
217 Ibid., p. 59. 
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surrounding discrimination on their platform, yet were still committed enough to their laissez-faire 
approach to not remove antisemitism entirely.  
In October 2019, r/holocaust was banned permanently, alongside a large number of other 
discriminatory subreddits including overt and covert antisemitic subreddits.218 The crackdown on 
these subreddits was linked to changes to the bullying and harassment policy of Reddit, rather than 
the introduction of policies against hate speech in particular.219 This policy development was 
positive, yet represented Reddit’s inconsistent application of moderation. r/holocaust’s low 
subscriber base, decline in traffic, and history of activity indicated that it was not used for the 
cyberbullying of Jews, but rather as a resource depot for Holocaust denial. It seems that r/holocaust 
was banned in a general crackdown on abusive and discriminatory subreddits. /r/holocaust being 
banned, despite no change in Reddit’s policy against hate speech, and in consideration of Reddit’s 
failure to ban /r/the_donald for far more abusive actions, demonstrates a continuation of Reddit’s 
attempts to balance its laissez-faire approach to free speech with inconsistent and arbitrary 
moderation. These actions cannot be removed from the broader online context of this period, which 
also led to changes in moderation on other social media platforms, most notably YouTube’s policy 
changes in June 2019. When considered in this context, Reddit’s actions may simply be a 
comparably lesser reaction to steps taken by other social media platforms. Reddit’s inconsistent 
attempts to maintain this laissez-faire approach ironically leaves it open to criticism by the 
userbase that favours free speech, as demonstrated by the comments reacting to their updated 
 
218 (/u/phedre, 1 October 2019), ‘You get a ban, you get a ban, EVERYONE GETS A BAN! Mass ban wave goes 
out as admins update their bullying & harassment policy.’ (Reddit post), 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/SubredditDrama/comments/dbjacc/you_get_a_ban_you_get_a_ban_everyone_gets_a_ba
n> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
219 (/u/landoflobsters, 1 October 2019), ‘Changes to Our Policy Against Bullying and Harassment’ (Reddit post), 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/dbf9nj/changes_to_our_policy_against_bullying_and> 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
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bullying and harassment policy.220 This backlash to Reddit further emphasises the value of having 
a consistent anti-hate speech policy, but this change will likely not occur while Reddit still has a 
largely reactive attitude towards moderation. 
 It is also worth mentioning the existence of invisible antisemitism on Reddit, primarily 
within left-wing communities. Relatively far left subreddits like /r/ChapoTrapHouse,221 a 
subreddit dedicated to the left-wing podcast of the same name, regularly feature criticisms of Israel 
that traverse into antisemitism. These incidents primarily manifest as upvoted posts delegitimising 
Israel’s existence (appendix D, figure 25.6), equating Zionism with racism,222 promoting 
Zionology-esque associations of Israel with fascism, European imperialism, and violence,223 and 
multiple instances of the Livingstone Formulation (appendix D, figure 25.7). These incidents do 
occur among broader (and sometimes measured) conversations about Israel and strong criticisms 
of antisemitism, which nonetheless further the risk of these manifestations becoming normalised 
and invisible to the community. This development indicates how websites with infrastructure and 
features like Reddit can facilitate the spread and acceptability of invisible antisemitism. 
Nonetheless, this development does not pose as significant a risk as the information laundering of 
alt-right antisemitic meme culture on Reddit. 
Reddit shares some features with other major social media platforms, particularly the 
publicness and shareability of content (appendix D, figure 26.6), but its subreddit system provides 
an even greater degree of user flexibility than Facebook groups and pages. The ability to have 
 
220 Ibid. 
221 Appendix D, figure 25.6 will show that /r/ChapoTrapHouse is quarantined. The quarantining of the subreddit is 
unrelated to any antisemitism. 
222 (/u/Learning_Communism, 25 July 2019), ‘Zionism is racism’ (Reddit post), 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/chag79/zionism_is_racism> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
223 (u/Phediuk, 8 August 2019), ‘If you support Israel in any way you are promoting violence’ (Reddit post), 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/ 
cne0oy/if_you_support_israel_in_any_way_you_are> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
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private subreddits allows antisemites to collaborate and organise as per on Facebook, but with 
reduced risk of their personal identities being unveiled, due to Reddit’s pseudonymous usernames. 
Subreddits are effective resource centres for antisemitism, enabling users to customise the 
subreddit design, such as including features like sidebars and top links that allow the archival and 
recycling of antisemitic content. Publicly, a subreddit named after a particular phenomenon 
becomes recognised as the definitive space for it, where people go to if they want information or 
links on that phenomenon. If a subreddit is occupied by organised antisemites, it can be difficult 
to have that space taken away from them. Subreddit moderators are empowered to have complete 
control over their subreddits, which presents opportunities for organised antisemites on Reddit to 
‘collect’ as many subreddits as possible, allowing antisemitism to be disseminated there as well. 
While subreddit moderators are notionally meant to have responsibility for ensuring their spaces 
are consistent with Reddit’s policies, in practice these policies are irregularly enforced. With 
enough effort, antisemites can create popular enough spaces that result in antisemitic content being 
broadcast to the wider platform, providing a straightforward path to the distribution and 
dissemination of antisemitism. 
The subreddit system allows for the establishment of community spaces for casual 
antisemites as well, easily providing them with new antisemitic content, and eventually 
encouraging them to create content of their own. This also provides a path for recreational 
antisemitism, both in subreddits that are tailored specifically for antisemites, and in more 
prominent subreddits that serve as antisemitic recruitment grounds. As the subscriber bases of 
these communities overlap, it can encourage a broad participation in recreational antisemitism, and 
the general normalisation of antisemitism in the more mainstream subreddits. While this system 
does provide avenues for the spreading of overt antisemitism, it primarily benefits the spread of 
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covert and especially invisible antisemitism. This spread occurs through the gateway antisemitism 
phenomenon on Reddit, which can result in antisemitism becoming normalised to users of these 
spaces, potentially leading them to casually engage in it themselves. The platform promotes both 
dormant and active antisemitism; its upvoting system provides a function to continuously recycle 
dormant material, while also encouraging the active generation of original antisemitic content. 
These functions combined can result in users of larger subreddits being exposed to antisemitism 
from overlapping antisemitic subscriber bases, luring these users into more antisemitic spaces. 
These increasingly extreme spaces provide them directly with material to support the growth of 
antisemitic worldviews, and the creation and sharing of new content keeps them continuously 
involved in the more extreme subreddit. 
 Quantitatively, Reddit is not especially significant in the spread of antisemitism online. 
The platform may encourage individuals to become antisemites and may contribute to the creation 
and sharing of antisemitic content, however the communities specifically dedicated to 
antisemitism are small in subscriber base. While spaces like /r/the_donald are targets for the spread 
of antisemitic material, that quantitative impact is more associated with spaces like /pol/ and Gab, 
who are creating the material. Even the case of /u/HanAssholeSolo is more of an example of how 
online pseudonymity in general has led to the qualitative evolution of antisemitism online, which 
has been better demonstrated by Twitter. Unlike examples such as 4chan, content on Reddit and 
Twitter that has been made by an individual user will remain linked to their account. Subsequently, 
if any later content goes viral, their earlier content may be swept up in the viral wave, all while 
similarly protecting their real-life identity almost as well as with pure anonymity.224  
 
224 It bears mentioning that /u/HanAssholeSolo was tracked down by CNN, who decided to not reveal their identity 
in the media. Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding /u/HanAssholeSolo were extraordinary, considering they 
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Reddit’s structure aids a qualitative change in antisemitism furthered by the trends brought 
about by the internet. The subreddit system provides a clear pathway for content collaboration 
between online communities. Such pathways can lead to antisemitism 2.0 through the information 
laundering of gateway antisemitism, and even demonstrates how social acceptability of implicit 
antisemitism can evolve into social acceptability of explicit antisemitism. The subreddit system 
represents another step towards the ease of antisemitic organisation, compared to the early online 
antisemites’ need to register and design their own websites. Reddit also furthers the normalisation 
of antisemitism online by attempting to link antisemitic communities and content with more 
mainstream subreddits, and allowing users to control antisemitic content on various smaller 
subreddits. The deliberate intersection of antisemitism with other discriminatory movements 
demonstrates a path towards the formation of redemptive antisemitic worldviews, facilitated by 
developing recreational antisemites who upvote antisemitic memes into dedicated antisemites. 
Reddit demonstrates the elusiveness of antisemites online, particularly how the internet 
and rise of social media and web 2.0 has created cyber infrastructure allowing antisemites to spread 
propaganda with virtually no consequences, and with little ability for non-antisemites to fight back. 
As soon as antisemites are removed or banned in one place, they can show up again elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, removal and dispersion can still result in them adopting cautious approaches that 
reduce overall antisemitism rates, or at least shift their activities to covert manifestations. Reddit 
is distinct due to its subreddit system, which facilitates the streamlined establishment of discrete 
yet adjacent online groups and spaces, created and run by users themselves. The subreddit system 
 
involved the President of the United States, and it is unlikely that their identity would have been revealed without 
said circumstances. 
David Mack, ‘The Reddit User Who Made The Trump/CNN Wrestling Video Has Posted An Apology’, Buzzfeed 
News, 4 July 2017. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/davidmack/hanassholesolo> [accessed 17 January 
2020] (para. 22 of 30). 
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therefore allows antisemitic users to accumulate power and platforms, to control narratives and 
content. This accumulation is the most straightforward method for establishing antisemitic parallel 
realities in cyberspace. The almost ‘feudal’ moderators of these spaces have significant ability to 
acquire, change, and control these spaces to suit their own worldviews, benefiting further from the 
laissez-faire attitude of Reddit administrators. This power has broader influence, as evidenced by 
/r/kotakuinaction persevering as one of the most prominent GamerGate spaces on mainstream 
social media.225 Reddit demonstrates a significant power gain for antisemites through the internet, 
as rather than just trying to promote their information to others, they are gaining the means to 
control the information intake of others. This power gain can result in a greater normalisation of 
antisemitism within targeted online spaces, and can potentially be wielded by organised antisemitic 
groups through the possession and moderation of subreddit-like spaces. 
 
Conclusion 
Technological changes to media and communication, starting with the evolution of the printing 
press and mass media, have impacted a broad range of social phenomena, including the role of 
education, information and public discourse in society. The rise of the internet has already had 
significant qualitative and quantitative changes on these social phenomena, considerably changing 
the way individuals interact within the public sphere, and how we consume and produce 
information. It is logical that the internet could also be expected to have caused significant 
qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism. The profiles of websites examined in this 
 
225 Megan Farokhmanesh, ‘Reddit employee saved Gamergate forum KotakuInAction after its creator tried to 
destroy it’, Verge, 13 July 2018. <https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/13/17568598/reddit-employee-gamergate-
forum-kotaku-in-action-creator> [accessed 31 October 2019] (para. 4 of 7). 
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chapter (including both dedicated antisemitic platforms and broader social media platforms), 
demonstrate a number of these changes, and discuss how they were brought about by the internet, 
especially web 2.0.  
The profiles of the IHR, Stormfront, 4chan and the Daily Stormer websites represent an 
evolution of antisemitism alongside the evolution of the internet, providing insight into the rise of 
antisemitism 2.0 outside of major mainstream social media platforms. Both the IHR and 
Stormfront are attempts by pre-internet organised antisemites to take advantage of the rise of the 
web. Yet while the IHR website floundered into relative obscurity with the decline of its 
organisation, Stormfront’s community of more casual and recreational antisemites brought their 
website to global prominence and prolonged its visibility. The prominence of recreational 
antisemitism on 4chan may suggest that recreational antisemitism is replacing organised 
antisemitism online as the most significant source of antisemitic content. However, the increasing 
spread and normalisation of recreational antisemitism can produce dedicated organised antisemites 
such as Andrew Anglin, who intensify and direct the impact of recreational antisemitism by 
adapting to its style. The enduring prominence of Anglin’s Daily Stormer indicates that even 
visible organised antisemites can still rise to prominence and organise hate campaigns with 
concerning effectiveness. Another concern is that these explicit communities of Stormfront, 4chan 
and the Daily Stormer are setting themselves up as straw men of antisemitism online. With the 
visibility of their explicit antisemitism, promoters of implicit antisemitism can potentially deflect 
criticisms by identifying these spaces as the ‘real’ antisemites. Covert and invisible forms of 
antisemitism become more effectively normalised due to diminished resemblance to more overt 
forms. While explicit antisemitism may have limited effectiveness in recruiting people to 
antisemitic causes, especially if it attracts significant resistance as per the Daily Stormer, its 
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prolonged visibility online can condition others to its presence and wear down peoples’ opposition 
to it. These mutually beneficial but differing paths of normalisation for overt, covert, and invisible 
antisemitism represent a major advancement for antisemitism 2.0. 
The profiles of each explored social media platform present different ways they cater to 
antisemites and facilitate the spread of antisemitism 2.0. Despite the lack of antisemitic intent 
behind the creation of these platforms, their sheer size and reach presents an even greater risk than 
the intentionally antisemitic websites explored earlier. Facebook represents the greatest reach of 
content collaboration resulting in antisemitism 2.0 through its enormous userbase, ease of creating 
groups, and the promotion of shared content on news feeds. Covert antisemitism is a significant 
problem for Facebook, as its algorithms are designed to produce content that suits the interests of 
the user, resulting in the creation of echo chambers and parallel realities. Covert antisemitism can 
be shrouded in a false sense of legitimacy through these algorithms, enhanced by manipulatable 
values such as reactions and likes. Facebook’s design encourages consumers to share this content 
further, turning them into unintentional prosumers of antisemitism. Contrasting with Facebook, 
Twitter has been a hotbed for overt antisemites; organised, casual, and recreational. The main 
contributions of Twitter to antisemitism 2.0 are the fast dissemination of content, and the ease of 
demonising and harassing Jews online through shorter virtual distance - even forcing them off the 
platform. Twitter’s difficulties in dealing with antisemites on its platform present a risk of this 
harassment becoming normalised on Twitter, creating a degree of social acceptability for even the 
most vulgar forms of antisemitism. YouTube originally provided a streamlined space for the 
organisation of antisemitic video content, both for redistribution and for casual antisemitic 
consumption. As antisemitism spread online, YouTube served as an entry point to antisemitic 
beliefs and antisemitism’s normalisation. With YouTube personalities accumulating audiences 
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akin to high-profile radio stars, even a small ‘slip-up’ or misplaced joke can promote antisemitism 
to their large subscriber bases. Finally, Reddit, while arguably the least significant quantitatively 
of the three platforms, demonstrates the potential pathways of antisemitism 2.0: firstly, how users 
become conditioned to increasingly explicit forms of antisemitism, and secondly, how even 
loosely organised networks of antisemites on the platform can greatly facilitate the sharing of 
content, even controlling large spaces, potentially unnoticed by the broader userbase.  
All these platforms reflect a generally slow and reactive pattern of adjusting their content 
and moderation policies to prevent the spread and normalisation of antisemitic content on their 
platforms. Comparing the previously covered antisemitic and countercultural websites with 
mainstream social media platforms demonstrates the ease with which the antisemitic content from 
the former can make their way on the latter. Despite having no antisemitic intentions, the 
administrators of these platforms have been largely ignorant, ill-equipped or incapable of fully 
handling the spread and normalisation of antisemitism from dedicated spaces to their platforms. 
However, as these companies slowly improve on this front, they demonstrate the effectiveness of 
strong moderation and content policies. Furthermore, challenging social media’s reactive 
moderation, and encouraging administrators’ collaboration with academics studying abuse and 
discrimination, will create significant roadblocks against the distribution of antisemitism on social 
media. These roadblocks will force antisemites away from these platforms to alternatives more 
suited to their ideologies, but as seen with the example of Gab, the lack of access to broader online 
userbases significantly limits their ability to strategise. 
While antisemitism has historically had access to platforms in the form of various media 
outlets, said platforms would have almost complete editorial power to determine whether they 
would or would not promote antisemitism. In contrast, social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, 
 294 
 
YouTube, and Reddit lack the ability to control completely the content they host, share and 
promote. Considering over half of Australian adults226 and over two-thirds of US adults receive 
their news from social media,227 the platforms that most commonly distribute news no longer have 
comprehensive control over what is distributed, allowing potentially any content to be slipped into 
a news-stream and appear legitimate. Quantitatively, this streamlining results in a higher 
proportion of antisemitism being viewed, with more individuals from more diverse backgrounds 
being affected by antisemitic material. This increased quantity begets the creation of more 
antisemites, networks of antisemites, and new manifestations of antisemitism, while diminishing 
the visibility and presence of Jews and their allies online. 
The distribution of antisemitism is greatly aided by the internet, especially web 2.0 and 
social media, by significantly reducing the cost, time, and risk of distribution. With social media, 
a single antisemitic meme can be spread by a few dozen people, to reach multiple thousands of 
views within a few minutes. This phenomenon can be significantly extended through content’s 
virality, and the concentration of subscribers on sites such as YouTube. Smaller quantities of 
antisemitic material can have a larger impact than before, and through this and the structure of 
social media, antisemites are encouraged to spread small ‘bites’ of content rather than long 
antisemitic screeds. This ‘less is more’ attitude to antisemitism produces a fundamentally 
qualitative change (although it has quantitative impact), as it encourages antisemites to tailor their 
content specifically to this new medium. A prominent example of this tailoring is the development 
of the Merchant meme. The cartoon can be easily photoshopped into other images, and through its 
 
226 Statista, News sources used by consumers in Australia as of February 2019 (2019), 
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/588441/australia-news-sources> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
227 Katerina Eva Matsa and Elisa Shearer, ‘News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2018’, Pew Research Center, 
10 September 2018. <http://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018> 
[accessed 16 December 2019] (p. 1). 
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wide recognition, facilitated by spaces like 4chan, is recognised as a humorous meme by various 
online antisemites. This propagates its spread, even in other meme templates. ‘Less is more’ also 
applies to the number of antisemitic individuals online. As demonstrated by Twitter, even a small 
number of antisemites can reach and impact a larger audience than ever before, projecting an 
enhanced illusion of strength.  
The most significant qualitative changes to antisemitism brought about by the internet, 
particularly web 2.0, are firstly the increased ability for individual users to create content, and 
secondly the rise of anonymity and pseudonymity in the public sphere. When online antisemitism 
is compared to offline Holocaust denial, one of the most significant antisemitic trends in the post-
war West, it is clear that the internet has led to a significant change in tone and style of content 
used by antisemites in the public sphere. The examples of YouTube, Reddit, 4chan, Daily Stormer, 
and even Twitter show that there is now less fear, and more willingness to resort to crude, extreme 
and vulgar examples of antisemitism. There is no longer a need to retain plausible deniability about 
being antisemitic, as per Holocaust deniers like David Irving. In addition, the connectivity of the 
internet encourages antisemites to use this new tone, as this harsher content has been used 
successfully to intimidate and harass Jews enough to force them offline, and out of the public 
sphere. Furthermore, the example of the Daily Stormer shows that with enough of this activity, 
antisemites can be encouraged to attach their real-world identity to this kind of activity, as per 
Andrew Anglin, in an attempt to promote real-world social acceptability to antisemitism. 
Nonetheless, with the “Unite the Right” rally this real-world publicity resulted in significant 
backlash to online antisemitism, indicating a close relationship between their manifestations, 
despite key distinctions. 
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Finally, the last major qualitative change is the elusiveness of antisemites online. Before 
the internet, sources of antisemitism could potentially be readily identified (excluding anonymous 
attacks such as vandalising Jewish graveyards and synagogues), through publishing addresses, 
public identities, or other sources. The internet, and social media especially, has provided 
antisemites with unlimited cyberspace to colonise and inhabit. Even if they are shut down in one 
location, it is exceptionally easy for them to pop up in another, especially when organising from 
external spaces. Their ability to organise while posing as recreational antisemites also allows them 
to orient the swarm logic of other reactionary movements. Difficulties in stopping sources of 
antisemitism (even through extreme measures such as hacktivism) further encourages antisemites 
to spread their material. Greater quantities of antisemitic content online wears down opposition to 
antisemitism and normalises its presence, resulting in antisemitism 2.0. From this assessment, it 
can be confidently stated that the internet, particularly web 2.0 and social media, have 
revolutionised information sharing and communication in such a way as to cause antisemitism to 
go through many quantitative and qualitative changes. These changes demand a re-examining of 
strategies used to counter antisemitism, and consideration of whether they apply to other forms of 
discrimination and abuse. The former requirement is examined in the following chapter, while the 
latter is discussed in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Study: Young Adult Capacity to Resist Holocaust Denial Online 
 
Grounds for the Study 
Any overlap of the phenomena of cyberbullying and online antisemitism presents a heightened 
threat to young people. This risk may manifest through antisemites directly targeting Jewish 
children or teenagers online with hate material, and be exacerbated through the use of readily 
available antisemitic material. The impact of the antisemitic material also presents a considerable 
danger to those engaging in cyberbullying. While antisemitic material may be utilised to support 
instances of cyberbullying, continuous use can lead to messages in that material being absorbed. 
These perpetrators may be especially susceptible to this risk, given that they already have a 
negative impression of their Jewish victims. The use of antisemitism in bullying can also 
potentially influence bystanders. This risk is heightened when considering the phenomenon of 
reciprocal bullying, which can result in an unyielding cycle of bullying behaviour, aggravated by 
the disinhibition and anonymity/pseudonymity of online interaction. Therefore, any consideration 
of the impact of online antisemitic material on cyberbullying must include the impact on 
perpetrators and bystanders, particularly young people. 
The danger of online antisemitic material to young people is not limited to cyberbullying. 
Prior to the advert on the internet, parents and guardians could hypothetically shield children from 
antisemitic material by regulating what they read, and monitoring their interactions with other 
children and adults. Cyberspace and social media have complicated this situation. Not only is it 
more difficult to continue these measures, but researchers Albert Kienfie Liau, Angeline Khoo and 
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Peng Hwa Ang argue that parental monitoring needs to be reconceptualised, as former methods 
(such as looking over a child’s shoulder at their material) are no longer satisfactory.1 In addition, 
young people are increasingly using the internet for homework and research, and may be 
impressionable and inexperienced enough to be convinced by pseudo-intellectual antisemitism.  
Bernadette Dwyer states that increased internet use has resulted in students conducting 
online research in a “consumerist” fashion, using few methods to inquire for information, and 
rarely evaluating the reliability of information.2 This consumerist research allows antisemites and 
other bigots or pseudo-intellectuals to specifically aim their online ‘pitches’ to young people, who 
are often researching for a school project.3 One example is the creation of the domain 
martinlutherking.org by white supremacists, who specifically designed the website to look 
informative to young people, while actually containing white supremacist propaganda. This 
technique is an example of a ‘cloaked website’, through which individuals or groups disguise their 
agenda using web design techniques.4 In the context of antisemitism, the most renowned website 
utilising cloaking is most likely that of the Institute for Historical Review, which represents an 
evolution of the pseudo-academic disguise used in its pre-internet days. Cloaked websites 
demonstrate how parental monitoring methods, such as looking over the shoulder, are insufficient 
to properly supervise the content young people are using online. Even dedicating more time and 
attention to monitoring may still be insufficient, as parents and guardians could potentially also 
 
1 A.K Liau, A. Khoo, P.H. Ang, ‘Parental Awareness and Monitoring of Adolescent Internet Use’, Current 
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290 (p. 280). 
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fall for cloaking techniques. Ultimately, this demonstrates a need to directly provide young people 
with the tools and strategies to ‘inoculate’ themselves against discriminatory material online, so 
that they are able to recognise, research, respond and refute discrimination when encountered. 
The need to find solutions to online hate echoes Jakubowicz et al.’s call to adopt new 
interdisciplinary research methodologies that are problem-driven rather than theory-driven.5 This 
call is the driving motivation for this chapter’s research study, which aims to analyse the ability of 
young people to resist antisemitic claims in an online context, thereby determining what training 
and resources are required when encountering antisemitism online. This study simulated multi-
participant conversations with a (false) Holocaust denier in an online space, although with 
participants being initially unaware that a Holocaust denier (actually the researcher) would be 
participating. Due to the ethical concerns involving deception and potentially upsetting content, 
the study used participants aged 18-19 years old rather than school-age children. The participants 
were provided with existing online material that could refute the antisemitic claims presented, and 
they were tasked to use such material and their own research skills to discuss Holocaust denial. 
Results of the study, including participants’ contributions to the conversations and survey data, 
were analysed to determine what predictors were most influential in effectively resisting and 
reacting to the encounter. 
The research used an interdisciplinary approach, involving both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, based on an inter-field approach with an adaptive design. Testing the viability 
of this methodology is a major aim of this research, allowing it to be adapted to study other forms 
of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. The concept for this study is adapted from an 
 
5 Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race Hate 
(Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 60-61. 
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unpublished 2011 study by Robin Kowalski, which simulated a cyberbullying incident between 
two researchers and placed an unaware participant as a bystander in order to evaluate the 
willingness of participants to intervene against cyberbullying.6 The similarity between this study 
and Kowalski’s demonstrates the applicability of similar methodologies to analogous phenomena 
of online abuse and discrimination. After adopting the concept of deception-based research on 
abuse, for which the internet is well-suited, this study applies an interdisciplinary approach 
involving content, statistical, and thematic analyses, thereby pushing the research in a solution-
focused direction.7 The research model is designed to be easily applied to other forms of online 
abuse, discrimination, or misinformation through changing the subject matter of the simulated 
conversation, and/or adding an extra false participant (in the case of cyberbullying as per 
Kowalski’s study).8 Future research based on the same methodology will make it possible to 
compare and contrast the data between studies on different forms of online abuse and 
discrimination (e.g. whether young people resist antisemitism more or less effectively than other 
forms of racism online). This study advances the current state of research firstly by providing 
insight into young adults’ capacity to resist online antisemitism, and secondly, by testing a research 
methodology that can be adapted to other forms of online abuse. 
 
Methodology – Research Question 
There are two sets of research questions for this study: the first regarding the conclusions drawn 
from the study itself, and the second being the meta-evaluation of the study’s viability in broader 
 
6 Robin M. Kowalski, ‘Cyberbullying Intervention’ (unpublished manuscript, Clemson University, 2011).  
Robin M. Kowalski, Susan P. Limber and Patricia W. Agatston, Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age 
(Blackwell Publishing: Sussex, 2012), pp. 90-95. 
7 Jakubowicz and others, p. 61. 
8 Kowalski. 
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fields and disciplines. The first set of research questions will be the main focus in this section, as 
the results lay a foundation for the discussion of the second set. 
 
Psychological and Inoculative Resistance 
The first focus of this research study is to evaluate the ability of young people to resist antisemitism 
in current online contexts. This focus is divided into one central research question supported by 
several sub-questions. The central research question is:  
 
Considering the degree of antisemitism online, what is the ability of young people – often 
the target audience of antisemitism – to resist it when encountered online? 
 
The concept of resistance in scholarship has a variety of meanings, including as an outcome, 
process, motivation, and quality.9 In psychology, resistance is primarily considered as a process 
and motivation, ‘process’ referring to mechanisms used to prevent changes to attitudes, 
particularly counterarguments, and ‘motivation’ referring to the resistance to change attitudes or 
aim to protect existing attitudes.10 However, this definition only considers individual actors, and 
does not consider how manifestations of resistance might help or hinder others resisting the same 
material. Social media has made this latter aspect of resistance far more relevant, as there is often 
no knowing how many bystanders, or ‘lurkers’, are observing an exchange between users online.11 
 
9 Eric S. Knowles and Jay A. Linn, Resistance and Persuasion (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 66. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Vanessa Paz Dennen, ‘Pedagogical lurking: Student engagement in non-posting discussion behavior’, Computers 
in Human Behavior, 24.4 (2008), 1624-1633 (p. 1624). 
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Online exchanges may influence the attitudes of bystanders, regardless of the academic and logical 
strength of the arguments. For example, if users respond to Holocaust denial with outrage, abuse, 
and no counterarguments, a bystander may consider that the Holocaust denier is being unfairly 
treated, and that their arguments are sounder than the resisting users.  
A relevant study, ‘Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online’ by Elissa Lee and Laura 
Leets, examined the effects of online hate narratives on adolescents.12 The study measured the 
level of psychological resistance to various hate narratives by counting the number of 
counterarguments in thought-listing exercises after reading the narratives.13 However, this study 
was published in 2002, and a thought-listing technique was suitable for measuring degrees of 
resistance, due to the producer-consumer relationship of web 1.0. In web 2.0, the prominence of 
prosumption, along with the immediacy of communication, limits the viability of this 
methodology, requiring new methods and definitions of resistance contemporary online contexts. 
This study considers psychological resistance using the same metric of counterargument quantity, 
and adds a new concept of ‘inoculative resistance’ appropriate to this new online environment. 
Inoculative resistance refers to the public behaviours exhibited by participants as they respond to 
antisemitic discourse. The behaviour may be successful, unsuccessful or counterproductive in 
inoculating other users, particularly bystanders, against the antisemitism in question. This study 
examines the nature of ‘ideal inoculative resistance’, that is, responses which most effectively aid 
bystanders in resisting persuasion by antisemitic online content. Ideal inoculative resistance 
addresses the core issue of antisemitism’s spread online, as counterarguments against antisemitic 
 
12 E. Lee and L. Leets, ‘Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online: examining its effects on adolescents’, 
American Behavioral Scientist, 45 (2002), 927–957. 
13 J. T. Cacioppo and R. E. Petty, ‘Social psychological procedures for cognitive response 
assessment: The thought-listing technique’, in Cognitive Assessment, ed. by T. V. Merluzzi, C. R. Glass, and M. 
Genest (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 309-342. 
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positions are unlikely to influence dedicated antisemites themselves (who are committed to 
irrational worldviews), but are important in preventing bystanders from being attracted to 
antisemitic positions and spaces. While measuring psychological resistance is the most effective 
approach for determining the extent of a problem, measuring inoculative resistance can help point 
towards solutions, as it can be linked to predictors that influence productive behaviour in 
combating online hate.  
 The sub-questions in this study (appendix E, figure 27) examine how inoculative resistance 
can be measured in this new online context. Due to the evolution of antisemitic tactics discussed 
in chapter four, such as cloaked and covert content, two key components to resistance are an ability 
to recognise antisemitism that others may not have noticed, and to respond to this (a step which is 
impeded by online spaces’ anonymity and dissociation). These difficulties can be further 
exacerbated, particularly with respect to covert or invisible antisemitism, by hesitancy to engage 
in ‘race-trouble’, i.e. hesitancy to accuse others of antisemitism. While counterarguments are the 
core representation of resistance in the 2002 study, using a thought-listing technique outside of the 
space containing the hateful narrative precluded consideration of the quality of counterarguments 
as a factor in determining resistance. This methodology was appropriate within its context, as web 
1.0 websites often lacked the means to publicly respond. However, the immediacy of conversation 
in web 2.0 means that resistance often manifests in a public response,14 which can in turn be 
responded to, both by the source of the offensive material and by other participants in the 
conversation. Users arguing more among themselves, rather than countering the arguments of the 
offensive material, may suggest to bystanders that the offensive material is not significantly 
 
14 While resistance can be experienced without a public response online (e.g. purely psychologically), the nature of 
participating in a web 2.0 space will push participants towards expressing any resistance they have to offensive 
material. 
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problematic. Since web 2.0 is a dynamic communicative space, the quality of counterarguments 
to offensive material may have an impact on the ability of other participants to resist the material. 
For this reason, two other key components of resistance (in addition to recognise and respond) are 
the ability to research and refute. Researching assists the formation and execution of sound 
counterarguments to offensive material, strengthening their refutations and helping bystanders 
discover resources that further counter the offensive material. Finally, high-quality refutations can 
discredit the offensive material, but poor-quality refutations may inadvertently aid the offensive 
material’s persuasiveness to bystanders. For this study, inoculative resistance to antisemitism 
online refers to recognising, researching, responding to, and refuting antisemitism, and these 
behaviours relate to the sub-questions of this study. 
 
The Nature of Effective Resistance  
Consideration of effective resistance to online antisemitism must include whether active resistance 
is advisable, or whether it may simply “feed the trolls”. The idea of ignoring antisemites, thereby 
denying them attention, goes back well before web 2.0 and has been extensively critiqued by 
Deborah Lipstadt.15 Ignoring antisemites was likely not an effective counter-strategy even before 
the internet, and now with web 2.0, ignoring antisemitism potentially opens allows the widespread 
colonisation of online spaces by antisemites, essentially normalising antisemitism in those spaces. 
This colonisation highlights the need to actively confront and resist antisemites online. 
 Responding is necessary and is aided by an ability to research information that refutes 
antisemitic material. Nonetheless, effective responses require further considerations. One key 
 
15 Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (London: Penguin Books 
1993), pp. 28-30. 
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consideration is the most effective length of a response. A longer response allows for a greater 
degree of refutation; however, this may not be suitable for web 2.0 environments, especially those 
frequented by young people and where attention is a contested commodity.16 There are significant 
diminishing returns to be found on the length of a refutation with regards to its impact on observers, 
as many will not bother to dedicate time to reading the entirety of the information. This is 
compounded by a change in learning style by digital generations, moving towards multitasking 
that can bottleneck their ability to write or read a lengthy refutation of antisemitism online.17 In 
fact, engaging with antisemites for too long – both in terms of time and word count – may be 
counterproductive, as it can give them more attention and opportunities to present more arguments 
of their own. While antisemitic arguments are often poor in quality, a high quantity of arguments 
can have a strong persuasive effect on those who are engaging with the arguments peripherally18 
(i.e. those engaging an argument with low motivation to process the message’s content19). Large 
quantities of arguments can be taken as a heuristic by less motivated individuals to assume that a 
message has persuasive value.20 In the case of antisemitism, engaging too long with antisemites in 
counterarguments will motivate them to continuously respond, as they will receive both 
engagement from the resister, and potentially broader attention due to the quantity of activity.21 
Ideal refutations of antisemitism in online contexts should therefore be succinct, balancing the 
 
16 Thomas Davenport and J.C. Beck, The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of 
Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), p. 20. 
17 P.A. Kirschner and A.C. Karpinski, ‘Facebook and academic performance’, Computers in Human Behaviour, 26.6 
(2010), 1237-45. 
18 Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, ‘The Effects of Involvement on Responses to Argument Quantity and 
Quality: Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46.1 (1984), 
69-81 (pp. 77-78). 
19 Lee and Leets, p. 931. 
20 Petty and Cacioppo, p. 78. 
21 Many websites and social media platforms will prioritise attention towards spaces with high levels of activity, 
both algorithmically (e.g. posts with more reactions or responses will be more likely to appear on social media 
feeds) and organically (e.g. the post will be shared elsewhere by an observer as an example of ‘internet drama’). 
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need to respond while diminishing the opportunity and motivation for the antisemite to make a 
higher quantity of arguments. For this reason, measurements of inoculative resistance will not be 
concerned with the quantity of responses exhibiting resistant behaviours (as opposed to quantity 
of counterarguments exhibiting psychological resistance), but rather the pattern of resistant 
behaviours. 
Despite a need to confront antisemitism, there is an important point to acknowledge from 
the “don’t feed the trolls” maxim: the significance of emotion. Responses lacking a refutation or 
containing a poorly formulated refutation can be counterproductive, as an inability to properly 
refute an antisemitic point may improve the standing of antisemites among bystanders online even 
more than a lack of response. Being highly emotional in this context may be viewed by antisemites 
and bystanders as the resistor being humiliated due to them ‘taking the bait’ offered by the 
antisemite. In addition, a heightened emotional reaction to cloaked or ‘dog-whistling’ content may 
be viewed as disproportionate and unfair by bystanders unaware of the antisemitic nature of the 
content, gaining bystander sympathy for the antisemite. Provoking emotional responses, or 
‘trolling’ is an already established tactic among antisemites, as indicated by the success of 4chan 
and the Daily Stormer. Trolling can even have a psychological reward for those lacking in empathy 
and displaying high levels of sadism and psychopathy,22 a group which overlaps with people drawn 
towards discriminatory viewpoints online. With both a tactical and psychological motivation to 
provoke emotion in users online, those seeking to refute antisemitic viewpoints online should aim 
to minimise emotion in their responses. By diminishing both the opportunity to recruit and 
psychological rewards, responses with low emotionality may discourage antisemites from 
 
22 Naomi Craker and Evita March, ‘The Dark Side of Facebook®: The Dark Tetrad, Negative Social Potency, and 
Trolling Behaviours’, Personality and Individual Differences, 102 (2016), 79-84 (p. 84). 
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participating in certain spaces. This also supports succinct refutations of antisemitism online, as 
disproportionately long responses may be perceived as emotional by antisemites or bystanders as 
emotional. 
 Ultimately, this study seeks to evaluate the ability of young people to resist antisemitism 
online by evaluating their ability to recognise, research, respond to and refute online antisemitism. 
This study goes beyond the 2002 study on hate narratives by categorising elements of quality 
resistance that influence other participants or bystanders in an online space. By categorising and 
evaluating the key components of resistance into recognising, researching, responding to and 
refuting, the results of this study can be compared to survey results about each participant’s 
background to pinpoint the predictors that help or hinder young peoples’ ability to resist 
antisemitism online. For example, the results can indicate whether studying certain subjects aids 
the recognition and refutation of antisemitism, or whether certain ethnic and religious backgrounds 
might predispose participants to higher or lower emotional responses. In recognising which 
predictors help or hinder the ability to resist antisemitism online, this study provides insight into 
what tools and methods are needed to help young people resist antisemitism online (and other 
forms of discrimination). 
 
Methodology – Study Design 
This section explains the methodology of the study. It covers the broader theoretical justification 
for the research model as well as the choices of participants, recruitment, antisemitic material used, 
use of concealment, use of surveys, and contingencies put in place. This design was chosen to 
specifically to provide a safe environment in which young people can be confronted by online 
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antisemitism online, thereby allowing this study to evaluate how they resist. As such, this study 
has less to do with analysing the nature of antisemitism online, which has already been done in 
chapters four and five, and instead builds upon that analysis by determining what young people 
require to effectively resist antisemitism online. While there is a need for further studies on the 
nature of antisemitism online, the speed of antisemitism’s evolution on the web warrants 
concurrent studies on resisting antisemitism online.  
 
Background Research 
The design and intent behind this study was informed by a number of scholarly texts and existing 
studies. Most significant was Jakubowicz et al.’s 2017 book Cyber-Racism and Community 
Resilience, wherein the authors make the case for transdisciplinarity in research approaches to 
cyber-racism.23 Transdisciplinarity refers to the adoption of methodologies that integrate different 
forms of analyses. These analyses are drawn from overlapping disciplines in research on cyber-
racism, including sociology, criminology, political science, social psychology and information 
sciences. These disciplines utilise discourse, content, statistics, thematic, and social network 
analyses, among others. Jakubwicz et al. make the case that through adopting interdisciplinary 
approaches to research on cyber-racism, research can provide better explanations to more well-
informed questions, and provide research and data that can aid research in complementary 
disciplines and fields. For these reasons, this study is designed to allow content, thematic, and 
statistical analysis, and even discourse analysis in future iterations. In addition, the study is 
designed to allow both self-generated data from the participants in the forum, and researcher-
 
23 Jakubowicz and others, pp. 45-64. 
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driven data from surveys, providing answers to a broader range of research questions.24 This study 
takes the goal of this interdisciplinary approach further by designing the study to allow adoption 
by different fields, such as on different iterations of cyber-discrimination, cyberbullying, and 
misinformation, providing value to broader research fields and disciplines. 
Lee and Leets’ study was the first example of research attempting to measure young 
people’s resistance to cyber-racism.25 Yet, as previously mentioned, the dynamics of web 2.0 and 
the rise of phenomena such as cyberbullying and trolling make the design of their study unsuitable 
for this thesis. Nonetheless, Lee and Leets’ study informs the coding of data for the content analysis 
of this study’s results, particularly the use of counterarguments as a measure for resistance.26 Lee 
and Leets coded responses by adapting a mechanism by Donald Roberts and Nathan Maccoby that 
measured directionality, intensity, and focus of the messages,27 which is also used in this study. 
Beyond this pre-existing coding, this study considers further aspects of resistance through 
recognition, research, and refutation codes. The racist narratives in the 2002 study varied between 
high and low narrative, and explicit and implicit discrimination. Due to ethical concerns and the 
role of deception, this study would be forced to use a low narrative, implicit form of antisemitism. 
This study builds on the work of Lee and Leets by applying it to the sphere of web 2.0, but also 
expanding the measurements of resistance helps provide a nuanced picture of what young people 
need to effectively fight hate and misinformation online. 
 
24 Ibid., p. 58. 
25 Lee and Leets. 
26 Ibid., p. 938. 
27 Ibid. 
Donald F. Roberts and Nathan Maccoby, ‘Information Processing and Persuasion: Counterarguing Behavior’, in 
New Models for Mass Communication Research, ed. by Peter Clarke (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 
pp. 269-307 (pp. 285-86).  
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Finally, the element of deception in the study was adapted from Kowalski’s unpublished 
cyberbullying study.28 The study, carried out in 2011, involved the use of deception to simulate a 
real-time experience of cyberbullying for participants. In this design, the researchers would pose 
as participants in an unrelated research discussion, whereupon one of the researchers would begin 
to cyberbully the other. The other researcher would react appropriately, leaving the real participant 
in the middle of the simulated cyberbullying incident, allowing the study to record their reaction. 
The novel use of deception allowed the study to simulate the experience of reacting to 
cyberbullying properly, providing unique insights compared to other study models and increasing 
the validity of the data when applied to real situations. This study adopts the central premise of 
simulating an encounter with a form of online abuse, that being antisemitism, but differs 
significantly in having just one false participant, to which up to four real participants are 
responding. The number of participants provides a more organic encounter, rather than a 
performative one. This allows more data to be drawn from their interactions, including their 
influence on others when reacting to antisemitism. The adaption of this initial cyberbullying study 
demonstrates the inherent versatility of this study model, allowing it to be potentially applied in 
analogous fields studying other forms of discrimination, abuse, and even misinformation online. 
 
Online Discussion Approach 
The use of an online discussion to simulate an encounter with antisemitism further distinguishes 
this study’s design from Kowalski’s unpublished 2011 study.29 These choices both aid the 
 
28 Kowalski. 
Kowalski, Limber and Agatston, pp. 90-95. 
29 Ibid. 
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accuracy of the simulation and the collection of data. Unlike the 2011 study, which involved a live 
chat function, this study took place in an online forum (initially hosted on zetaboards.com and then 
tapatalk.com). While the design of such forums is somewhat dated, it still functionally resembles 
interactions on many social media platforms such as Facebook and Reddit, in which discussion 
participants either refresh a thread to view new comments, or are directed to return to a 
conversation via notifications. The distinction between the two designs is exhibited in the Global 
Forum for Combating Antisemitism’s TEMPIS taxonomy, in which the timing of communications 
can be split into real-time (i.e. live chat), and stored communications, with the latter having a 
greater impact on a broader audience.30 The live chat design choice in Kowalski’s study was 
suitable for cyberbullying, whereas prejudice is more typically encountered in social media posts, 
making the online forum design choice more suitable for this study.31 By directing up to four 
participants to engage in a conversation that stimulates an online encounter with an antisemite, this 
study captures the environment in which this stored content is created (i.e. the window in which 
the impact of this stored content is decided). This also increases the validity of this study’s design 
by more accurately replicating real online behaviour. The use of an online discussion has broader 
implications for the impact on and reaction of the participants themselves, as their stored 
interactions are left behind for bystanders to witness. Such stored communications may ultimately 
determine bystanders’ resistance to antisemitic arguments, and there may be no limit to how many 
bystanders view the stored content at a later date.  
Recruited participants were directed to engage in a discussion in the forum alongside three 
or four other participants, up to five in total. The participants in fact totalled three or four real 
 
30 Andre Oboler and David Matas, Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the problem, the response and the 
need for change (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013). 
31 Indeed, much of the analyses conducted in this thesis thus far are based on observable posts, partially due to the 
difficulty inherent in examining discrimination in private spaces, groups, and chats. 
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participants, and one false participant (the researcher) who promoted common Holocaust denial 
claims. Participants were asked to discuss a response to the question “Why do you think some 
people claim the Holocaust never happened?”, and were encouraged to draw material from 
elsewhere on the internet into the discussion. The researcher posing as the false participant would 
wait either until all other participants had contributed their first comments, or at least ten minutes, 
to determine whether any real Holocaust deniers had joined the discussion. In addition, the false 
participant’s initial comments would be cloaked in implicit language, thereby allowing the 
researcher to redirect away from Holocaust denial if one of the real participants started promoting 
Holocaust denial later. The false participant would continue to make Holocaust denial arguments, 
steadily decreasing in implicitness, but never switching to explicit antisemitism, and always 
maintaining the pseudo-academic façade of “just asking questions”. The discussion would take up 
to an hour, but would end early if 10 minutes had passed with no further comments from any of 
the participants. Following the discussion’s conclusions, a researcher would reveal the true nature 
of the study, provide a refutation to all Holocaust denial arguments made, and remain in the forum 
to allow any questions to be asked. Prior to starting, participants would be encouraged to withdraw 
from the study at any point they felt uncomfortable without risking loss of compensation. The 
study design aimed for four real participants for each discussion, so to ensure the Holocaust denier 
would always be outnumbered by other participants, and also to continue a majority in case people 
pulled out. If participants pulled out before the end of the discussion, they would be emailed the 
debrief and refutation of all Holocaust denial material.  
The format of the study cannot exactly emulate online social exchanges, as it is a closed, 
one-hour encounter where participants are encouraged to contribute. However, this format was 
chosen to allow measurement of both inoculative resistance and psychological resistance, as the 
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latter was measured by the quantity of counterarguments, which may not be as effectively assessed 
in a shorter encounter. This still presented an issue where participants would be encouraged by the 
format to continuously engage with the antisemite, resulting in longer overall responses, which as 
mentioned above are not ideal forms of resistance. In order to avoid this issue, the antisemite would 
introduce new arguments, resulting in between four and six different Holocaust denial arguments 
in each discussion. Thus, if a similar encounter happened outside of the study, concerns over longer 
engagement would be outweighed by the value of providing counterarguments to each point. The 
first argument introduced would always be the same to ensure similarity in the initial trajectory of 
each discussion.  
 
Participants 
Youth represent a particularly vulnerable group to online hate, firstly because of their age-limited 
experience and education regarding hate speech, and also because they are targeted for recruitment 
by antisemitic hate movements, especially online.32 Due to ethical concerns surrounding research 
involving children, this study utilised 18-19-year-old participants, specifically Australian year 12 
high school leavers. The participants were limited to Australia exclusively to control for 
demographic and language differences, and due to time zone considerations in arranging online 
conversations. The time frame of viable participation was up until the end of the year after they 
finished high school. These choices have been made so that participants are still appropriately 
considered youths, and that their research skills will not have significantly changed upon any 
 
32 James Hawdon, Atte Oksanen and Pekka Räsänen, ‘Victims of Online Hate Groups: American Youth’s Exposure 
to Online Hate Speech’ in The Causes and Consequences of Group Violence: from Bullies to Terrorists, ed. by 
James Hawdon, and Jeanne Chang (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014), pp. 165-182 (p. 168). 
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extended period of tertiary education. Nonetheless, there may have been some impact from early 
tertiary education on the participants’ research methods, which is considered in the discussion. 
 
Antisemitic Material 
The conversation with an antisemite was simulated through a researcher posing as another 
participant, but behaving as a Holocaust denier. However, in the case of one of the real participants 
expressing Holocaust denial themselves, the researcher would pose as an ordinary participant and 
engage minimally in the discussion. This would ensure that only one participant would be or 
behave as a Holocaust denier in each discussion group, as the probability of having multiple real 
Holocaust denier participants was considered negligible. While Holocaust relativisation and 
banalisation (and other antisemitic ideas) may arguably pose larger problems today, Holocaust 
denial was chosen as the antisemitic material in the study for several reasons. Firstly, Holocaust 
denial material is broadly established online, and is often cloaked in pseudo-intellectualism that 
may appear reasonable to impressionable young people.33 The language and use of personas by 
deniers online to legitimise their antisemitic claims to uninformed viewers has been analysed in a 
2004 master’s thesis by Mark Polger, based on a discourse analysis of Holocaust denial websites.34 
Secondly, the large quantity of material online allowed the researcher to pose convincingly as a 
Holocaust denier, using and quoting existing Holocaust denial material accurately, regardless of 
the direction of the discussion. Thirdly, the pseudo-intellectual language of Holocaust denial 
presented less of a risk to participants’ wellbeing than more abusive and explicit forms of 
 
33 Mark Aaron Polger, ‘Rewriting the Holocaust Online: A Discourse Analysis of Holocaust Denial Web Sites’, 
(unpublished master’s thesis, University of Waterloo, 2004), pp. 210-212. 
34 Ibid. 
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antisemitism. Finally, Holocaust denial can be more clearly distinguished compared to Holocaust 
relativisation and banalisation, and the use of a text-based online medium could otherwise risk 
misinterpreting Holocaust relativisation and banalisation. Ultimately, the use of Holocaust denial 
in this study is largely due to its attributes and history online, rather than its prominence today.  
The common approach to cloaking Holocaust denial content facilitated this study’s 
evaluation of young people’s ability to recognise implicit forms of antisemitism. The websites and 
material specifically dedicated to refuting the claims of Holocaust denial on the internet are dated 
and could be difficult for young people to navigate and utilise in an ongoing conversation, further 
testing their ability to research the Holocaust denial claims with which they were confronted. Two 
websites with material refuting Holocaust denial were provided to the participants (nizkor.org and 
The Holocaust History Project), so that their usefulness for young people could be directly 
analysed. They were framed as informative websites on Holocaust denial at the outset of the 
discussion, rather than as websites for refuting Holocaust denial, so as to avoid arousing suspicion 
about the true nature of the study. 
As mentioned above, the false participant would continuously introduce new Holocaust 
denial arguments. The flow of arguments helped prevent the conversation from stagnating, and 
encouraged further demonstration of resistance without encouraging longer responses, thereby 
allowing rates of both psychological and inoculative resistance to be observed. The first argument 
in each discussion was introduced in the same manner each time, alleging conspiratorial 
exaggerations behind the oft-cited six million death toll. Other Holocaust denial arguments 
included falsification of the gas chambers, the lack of any ‘final solution’ order, allegations of a 
conspiracy silencing Holocaust deniers, equivocating of the Allied war crimes to the atrocities of 
the Nazis, claims that crematoria did not have the capacity to cremate the quantity of victims, and 
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allegations that the Jews were behind World War II and thus deserving of imprisonment. Other 
minor tropes invoked included references to soap made from Jewish body fat and socks made from 
Jewish hair; casting doubt on other Holocaust claims, and framing doubt over mainstream 
Holocaust narratives as ‘redpilling’. Between four and six common tropes were invoked in each 
discussion, with death toll falsification being present in each discussion, followed by gas chamber 
falsification being present in seven out of the nine discussions, and deniers being silenced present 
in six. This array of tropes was a result of attempting to keep arguments similar, but still needing 
to respond organically to cues in the discussion. 
 
Concealment 
The study’s concealment began at initial recruitment. Potential participants were invited to a study 
called “Analysing Student Capacities to Discuss and Debate Antisemitism in an Online Space”, in 
which they would discuss a research question about antisemitism, while being provided with a list 
of resources to aid the discussion. Participants were advised that due to the subject matter of the 
study, other participants could potentially harbour antisemitic views. This provided a level of 
plausibility surrounding the presence of an antisemite within the study. Concealment ended upon 
the conclusion of the discussion, by means of the researcher explaining the concealment and 
reasons for concealment in a final post within the forum. 
Recruitment concealed the true nature of the study for two purposes. Firstly, engaging with a real 
antisemite online may induce feelings of anger or revulsion due to the controversial claims being 
made. These feelings may impact the nature of responses made by young people exposed to these 
claims, including how long they may be willing to engage with the antisemite. Such feelings could 
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also impact the quality and quantity of research participants utilise to respond to and refute the 
antisemitism. Therefore, to simulate the effects of these feelings on participants’ ability to 
recognise, research, respond to, and refute antisemitic arguments online, a methodology was 
chosen that encouraged participants to believe that they were engaging with a real Holocaust 
denier. Secondly, concealment was deemed necessary to prevent participants potentially preparing 
themselves before engaging in discussion with a Holocaust denier. If they knew Holocaust denial 
was the specific subject matter being discussed, or they were going to engage with a Holocaust 
denier online, they might have engaged in research or other preparations beforehand, which would 
not accurately simulate unexpectedly encountering antisemitism online.  
 
Surveys 
The study included two surveys. The initial survey took place before the discussion, to obtain 
demographic data about the participants including gender, history education, ethnic and religious 
background, and academic achievement (ATAR level if available35). The second survey followed 
the discussion, and inquired about the participants’ emotional response to the denier, whether they 
believed the denier was real, their prior knowledge of Holocaust denial, how effectively they 
thought they were able to resist Holocaust denial, how helpful the provided materials were, 
whether they would engage in Holocaust denial online again, and what assistance they thought 
was needed to help resist Holocaust denial online. 
 
 
35 The ATAR (Australian Tertiary Admissions Rank) is explained at the University Admission Centre website. 
University Admissions Centre, AUSTRALIAN TERTIARY ADMISSION RANK (2019), 
<https://www.uac.edu.au/future-applicants/atar> [accessed 17 December 2019]. 
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Data Collection process 
Time Period of Collection 
Data was collected in an 18-month period between May 2018 and October 2019. One discussion 
group was carried out in 2018 and eight discussion groups were carried out in 2019. 
 
Ethics 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained in December 2017 from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Sydney as Project 2017/847 (appendix F, figure 37). Further ethics 
approval was obtained for modifications of survey questions, compensation, and recruitment 
strategies and material. The initial survey was modified before any of the discussion groups were 
carried out. 
 
Recruitment 
Both offline and online methods were utilised in recruitment. Offline recruitment involved 
advertising through posters, posted primarily on university campuses. Online recruitment utilised 
targeted advertisements on Facebook and Reddit. Facebook advertisements allowed for targeted 
recruitment of 18-19-year-old participants in Australia. Reddit advertising could target specific 
subreddits, and so advertising was done on the /r/australia subreddit, and subreddits associated 
with other Australian cities and communities. Recruitment included a movie voucher as incentive 
in exchange for participation. Recruited participants were divided into discussion groups of up to 
four real participants, and one false participant (a researcher). 
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Contingencies and Safeguards 
Due to the use of concealment and the confronting material of the study, several contingencies 
were applied for the safety of participants. Firstly, participants were warned that there was a risk 
of another participant promoting antisemitic ideas within the discussion. The warning informed 
participants of how confronting the discussing would potentially be, thereby preparing them for 
the true nature of the study despite its concealment. In the case of an actual antisemite being present 
within the discussion, the researcher posing as a participant posed as an ordinary, ignorant 
participant with little to offer to the discussion. This ensured that the dynamic of a single antisemite 
against a majority of detractors would be consistent across all discussions. The researcher also 
withheld from commenting until after all other participants or for ten minutes, so as to ensure that 
the viewpoints of other participants would be known before they themselves potentially introduced 
antisemitic arguments. 
Due to the controversial nature of the antisemitic material used, participants were 
encouraged to withdraw from the study at any point. Doing so would still produce valuable data, 
as it determined the extent of their willingness to engage with and respond to an antisemite in an 
online discussion. In the case of a participant not returning to the discussion, they were contacted 
via email informing them of the true nature of the study. Participants were also provided with links 
to support services in case of emotional distress, and the researcher remained in the forum to 
answer any questions about the material or nature of the study. This debrief also included a 
comprehensive refutation of all the Holocaust denial arguments in the discussion. This refutation 
was also sent to any participants who withdrew and did not return to the study. If a participant 
promoted Holocaust denial themselves, the researcher refuted their arguments instead. If an 
antisemite joined the discussion and promoted significantly explicit and abusive antisemitism 
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towards other participants, the researcher would make a judgement to lock down the discussion, 
and arguments refuting the antisemitism would be sent via email to the discussion participants. 
 
Anticipated Issues 
The originality of the design and the premise of this study meant that there were anticipated issues 
with its process and outcome. One of the major issues considered was potential participation or 
even targeting of the study by real antisemites, sabotaging the discussions and potentially harming 
other participants. For this reason, ethical approval was given under the condition of contingencies 
and safeguards to ensure the safety of participants within the study. If a singular antisemite joined 
the discussion and promoted Holocaust denial, the discussion would not be cancelled, for this 
would still fulfil the study’s aim to simulate an encounter with a Holocaust denier online, and thus 
would not warrant the waste of participants and resources without additional risk. If more than one 
antisemite joined, this would require the discussion being discontinued, thus making the study 
vulnerable to potential targeting from organised antisemites. Another anticipated issue was the risk 
of participants being persuaded by the Holocaust denial material, therefore requiring they receive 
a full refutation to the Holocaust denial material in the study. 
Unlike Kowalski’s 2011 study, which allowed the discussion to be driven by the 
researchers posing as cyberbully and cyberbullying victim, the minority status of the researcher 
within the discussion gave participants far more freedom to shape the discussion. Because of this, 
it was anticipated that the variation between discussions may impact the reliability of study, as 
different discussions may lead to different exchanges between the Holocaust denier and the 
participants. For this reason, the false participant would always open with the same comments and 
 321 
 
would attempt to use the same Holocaust denial arguments in all discussions. Nonetheless, it was 
anticipated that attempting to perfectly emulate each discussion in the same way could seem stilted 
and provoke suspicion by the participants, thus requiring the researcher to react organically to the 
other participants. 
Sampling bias was anticipated based on the advertising of the study. The study was 
expected to attract a greater proportion of participants with higher levels of interest and knowledge 
about antisemitism, even with the offer of compensation. In addition, the strategy to recruit on 
university campuses (due to the high concentration of 18-19-year-olds) was anticipated to attract 
a more educated sample compared to the broader population. Furthermore, the impact of 
forewarning participants about Holocaust denial at the start of the discussion, even within the same 
one-hour time frame, would potentially strengthen their resistance against Holocaust denial.36 For 
these reasons, the population tested in this study is expected to exhibit a higher ability to resist 
antisemitism online, compared to the broader population of young people. 
Finally, the study was not able to independently verify whether all participants were within 
the population sample of first-year Australian high school leavers, and may have attracted 
participants outside of that sample (e.g. participants lying about their age) due to motivations of 
receiving compensation, or sabotaging the study (if an antisemite). The impact of these issues is 
evaluated in the second discussion of the study, regarding the viability of the design’s application 
to research on other forms of online abuse, discrimination and misinformation. 
 
 
36 Richard E. Petty, Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches (Boca Raton: Routledge, 
2018), pp. 227-228. 
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Study Procedure Summary 
The procedure of the study, including within each discussion group, is as follows: 
1. Study was advertised. 
2. Once potential participants had established contact with the researcher, they were provided 
with Participant Information Statement and Participant Consent Forms to return. 
3. Following the return of Participant Consent Forms, groups of up to four participants were 
advised on a date and time for their online discussion group. These times were weekday 
evenings. Participants were provided with a pseudonym, login details for the forum, and a 
link to the initial survey. 
4. On the dates of discussion groups, participants were sent reminders. 
5. Once all participants were present and had completed the survey, or only one participant 
was missing and 15 minutes had passed after the scheduled time, the discussion 
commenced. If two or more were missing, the discussion was rescheduled. 
6. Each discussion continued for an hour, or until 10 minutes since the latest response from 
any participant. 
7. After the conclusion of the study, the researcher revealed the study’s nature and refuted 
the Holocaust denial used. Participants were advised to ask questions during this debrief. 
8. The participants then completed the second survey. 
9. After the completion of the second survey, or two days without completion, participants 
were provided with their compensation. 
10. Steps 1-9 were repeated until data was collected. 
11. Data was analysed. 
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Approaches to Data Analysis 
To promote the interdisciplinary and inter-field application of this study’s model and results, data 
analysis in this study takes a variety of forms. These include deductive and inductive content 
analyses, thematic analysis, and statistical analysis. Combining the findings of these approaches 
informs suggestions to further assist young adults resisting online hate. They also provide insight 
in confirming or refuting the hypotheses undertaken before the study was carried out. 
 
Hypotheses 
The impact of trolling and harassment have been significant in the evolution and distribution of 
antisemitism online. One key reasons for this is that such tactics result in highly emotional 
reactions, which can be mocked and serve to radicalise bystanders who are disassociated from the 
victims and subject matter. Trolling, in particular, aims to induce these reactions, using victims' 
high emotionality to discredit the impact of any counterarguments. In addition, by inducing high 
emotion, these antisemites may influence victims into making errors in their counterarguments, 
further exacerbating their humiliation. While more explicit forms of trolling cannot be explored 
here for ethical reasons, Holocaust denial represents how covert antisemitism may be used in the 
same way. In fact, by presenting antisemitism in a pseudo-intellectual fashion, as is common with 
Holocaust denial, the effects of these tactics may be enhanced. Highly emotional responses to 
pseudo-intellectual Holocaust denial may appear even more unreasonable to uninformed 
bystanders. For these reasons, heightened emotion when responding to Holocaust denial reflects 
strong psychological resistance, but this does not translate into effective inoculative resistance. 
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  Holocaust denial also represents the adaptability of antisemitism and aspects common 
across the wide range of its manifestations. The large catalogue of antisemitism makes it less likely 
for respondents to be able to effectively form sound counterarguments, as a wider range of 
knowledge is required to be fully prepared. In particular, Holocaust denial’s pseudo-intellectualism 
and sizeable literature can be especially intimidating and difficult to effectively counter. This 
phenomenon reflects issues in scholarship, particularly the disparity in broader disciplinary 
research on antisemitism, likely due to the higher requirements of knowledge. For these reasons, 
general academic ability is no guarantee of an ability to counter antisemitic arguments. Instead, 
specialised knowledge is more likely to assist when resisting antisemitism, such as history and 
other humanities, when resisting Holocaust denial.  
These phenomena have been explored throughout this thesis. The impact of trolling culture 
is particularly demonstrated through the profiles of 4chan, Daily Stormer, and social media 
platforms in chapter five. The issues presented by antisemitism’s varied manifestations have been 
analysed in chapter four, and present significant obstacles for the future of research. In order to 
help develop solutions for these problems, this thesis uses them to formulate the hypotheses for 
this research study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Heightened emotion would be associated with lower levels of effective 
inoculative resistance to Holocaust denial, but higher levels of psychological resistance in 
the form of counterarguments. 
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Hypothesis 2: ATAR would not have any significant association with either psychological 
or inoculative resistance, however studying history in year 12, and studying a humanities 
degree would both be associated with higher psychological and inoculative resistance. 
 
Content Analysis 
Deductive content analysis in this study analyses metrics of resistance to hate online, furthering 
the research undertaken by Lee and Leets. Each individual response in each discussion group is 
subjectively coded by the researcher according to directionality, focus, and intensity, as per Lee 
and Leets’ adaption of Roberts and Maccoby’s coding scheme.37 Each response’s directionality is 
coded into one or more of the following categories: opposed, neutral, supporting, or irrelevant to 
Holocaust denial and antisemitism. Focus is also measured, coding whether the response focused 
on the content of Holocaust denial, idea of Holocaust denial, source of Holocaust denial (either 
the false participant or other Holocaust denial), or had an irrelevant focus. Intensity codes whether 
each response is weak, moderate, or strong in intensity. Intensity of responses is distinguished 
from self-reported emotionality, which is recorded in a separate survey response afterwards. 
Psychological resistance is coded as the number of counterarguments from all responses made by 
each participant. Finally, each response is coded according to whether it engaged in a productive 
or counterproductive form of inoculative resistance; analysed through participants’ ability to 
recognise, research, respond to, and refute Holocaust denial (Inoculative Resistance Online 
indices, discussed further below). Recognition is coded as either identifying the Holocaust denial 
as antisemitism or distinguishing it from antisemitism. Research is coded as either presenting 
 
37 Lee and Leet, p. 938. 
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research in a response or misrepresenting or misusing a source. Responses are coded as either 
counterarguments against Holocaust denial or arguments with other participants. Finally, 
refutations are coded as either quality or poor-quality. 
 Inductive content analysis is conducted on the responses and open-ended survey questions 
to determine any other major themes present in the discussion and among participants. Open ended 
survey questions cover previous experiences with antisemitism, specific emotions felt during the 
discussion, any external research conducted, what tools and instruction could better equip efforts 
to combat Holocaust denial, whether or not participants would engage Holocaust deniers in the 
future and why, and whether they suspected the Holocaust denier to be a false participant. Beyond 
these areas, any themes supported by more than 25% of participants are considered significant. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis covers data collected from close-ended questions in the surveys and considers 
them alongside the coded data from content analysis. The first survey asks participants about 
demographic data, specifically their gender, ethnic and religious backgrounds, ATAR, whether 
they went to private school, whether they studied history in year 12, whether they were enrolled at 
university, and what type of degree they did at university. The second survey contains a number 
of 10-point Likert scales concerning each participant’s prior familiarity with Holocaust denial, 
perceived persuasiveness of the Holocaust denier, compulsion to respond to Holocaust denial in 
this discussion and elsewhere, severity of emotional response to Holocaust denial in the discussion, 
value of the resources provided at the start of the study, and confidence in their ability to refute 
Holocaust denial. The coding of recognition, research, responses and refutations in the content 
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analysis are converted into a new metric for statistically analysing inoculative resistance. Statistical 
analyses are used to identify any relationships between variables measured by the surveys and 
coded metrics of inoculative resistance. 
 
The IRO Indices 
This study introduces new statistical metrics to measure inoculative resistance in the form of the 
Inoculative Resistance Online indices (IRO). The IRO indices are comprised of four individual 
indices scoring how successfully participants recognise, research, respond to, and refute 
discrimination or misinformation online, the results of which are then combined into a final 
resistance index score. These scores do not necessarily reflect whether or when participants 
recognised antisemitism, or how much they researched. Instead, the scores reflect whether 
participants express recognition and refutation of Holocaust denial, and the results of research in 
their responses, thereby inoculating other users from Holocaust denial. These metrics were chosen 
as they are observable; it is not possible to observe exactly when participants cognitively recognise 
antisemitism in an online study, and it is difficult to quantify exactly how much research they 
undertake. 
The four individual indices are divided into three categories evaluating their behavior as 
counterproductive, unsuccessful or successful. The measurement of these indices is determined by 
behaviour patterns over the course of an entire interaction, rather than quantities of positive 
behaviour, as successfully recognising, researching, responding and refuting antisemitism can be 
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achieved in any quantity of responses.38 This measurement differs from psychological resistance, 
which is measured through the quantity of counterarguments. Productive behaviour scores 0.25 on 
each individual index, unsuccessful behaviour scores 0, and counter-productive behaviour scores 
-0.25. After scoring each individual index, the scores are tallied together to make the final 
resistance index. A score of 1 represents successful behaviour in providing inoculative resistance 
to hate or misinformation online, while a score of -1 represents a proponent of the harmful content. 
A score of 0 represents unsuccessful behaviour, generally equivalent to leaving the hate or 
misinformation unchallenged. Scores above 0 represent degrees of productive behaviour, and 
scores below 0 represent 0 degrees of counterproductive behaviour (appendix E, figure 28). 
 The quantity of responses featuring each resistant behaviour is less significant in an online 
context due to the previously discussed importance of succinctness in ideal resistance. The IRO 
indices measure behaviour through majorities of productive versus counterproductive behaviour. 
Therefore, participants exhibiting at least one instance of a successful behaviour and no instances 
of counterproductive behaviour are scored as successful. For further control, statistical analysis is 
carried out after the scoring, determining whether there is any relationship between resistance 
index scores and quantities of responses. A failure to establish a statistical relationship between 
IRO scores and quantities of responses will demonstrate the validity of the IRO measure, showing 
that it is applicable to online interactions of any length. This is important, as the one-hour 
discussion study design does not perfectly emulate an online conversation where users may ‘check 
out’ of a conversation at any given time. Such activity was considered unlikely even despite 
 
38 Quantity of responses is also made redundant by how individual users split up their responses. One person may 
provide a comprehensive refutation in a single response, while other may present smaller responses, each presenting 
a different source or refutation. For these reasons, the coding of responses in this study also considers whether a 
single response may feature multiple instances of productive or counterproductive behaviour (e.g. refuting a 
Holocaust denial argument while also distinguishing it from antisemitism). 
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participants being told that they could leave at any time without risking their compensation, 
because the act of engaging in a research study likely adds additional motivating factors 
 Statistical analysis compares both the quantity of counterarguments and IRO indices 
against demographic data and responses on the Likert scales. These comparisons provide insight 
into which predictors have significant relationships with psychological and inoculative resistance 
to Holocaust denial online. Dividing inoculative resistance into individual indices and a final score 
allows the study to determine whether particular predictors are more important for specific forms 
of resistance, and which predictors are most important overall. Finally, comparing the metrics of 
psychological and inoculative resistance allows this study to determine whether psychological 
opposition to Holocaust denial translates into effective inoculative resistance, and which predictors 
contribute to both forms of resistance. 
 
Thematic Analysis 
The final form of analysis in the study is thematic, which specifically compares the major themes 
arising from both the inductive and deductive content analyses with the statistical analysis. Induced 
themes supported by 25% of the participants provide insight into patterns of behaviour that are not 
explained exclusively by the metrics of psychological and inoculative resistance. Comparing 
individuals’ resistance scores with their suggestions for tools and instructions, and their 
willingness to engage, helps inform future strategies that can help young people resist antisemitism 
online. Finally, these themes and results can be compared back to the broader findings of this 
thesis, providing further insight into the behaviour, needs, and attitudes of young people exposed 
to antisemitism online. 
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Results 
Participant Makeup 
33 Australian high school graduates participated in the discussion groups. According to self-
reported data, four participants had graduated in 2017 and participated in a discussion group in the 
first half of 2018. The remaining 29 had graduated in 2018 and participated in discussion groups 
between March and September of 2019, with two-four real, non-Holocaust denying participants 
per group. 51.5% (17) were male, 36.5% (12) were female, 9% (3) were transgender men and 3% 
(1) was gender non-conforming. 57.7% (19) reported Anglo-Australian or no ethnic background, 
30.3% (10) were of East Asian background and only 9% (3) were of Jewish background. Besides 
Judaism, religious backgrounds were split between non-religious at 51.5% (17), and Christian at 
39.4% (13). 57.6% (19) of participants reported ATARs over 90.00, with 42.4% (14) over 95.00. 
Only 21.2% (7) had either no ATAR or ATARs below 80.00. Just under a quarter (8) had studied 
history as a year 12 subject. Just over half (17) had gone to private school. 90.9% (30) participants 
were enrolled at university, dominated by 39.4% (13) undertaking STEM degrees, and 33.3% (11) 
undertaking humanities degrees, the rest studying business, medicine, and tertiary access degrees. 
Of the 33 participants, two exposed themselves as Holocaust deniers in their first responses 
of the study, these early responses allowing the false participant to refrain from promoting any 
Holocaust denial arguments. The first was sophisticated, likely an organised antisemite, promoting 
arguments remarkably similar to those used by the fake participant in other discussion groups, 
while also covertly presenting themselves as a moderate. The second appeared to be a casual 
antisemite, stating the Holocaust was false but only providing vague arguments. The former 
Holocaust denier thus inadvertently demonstrated the accuracy of the Holocaust denier portrayal 
in other discussion groups. Neither Holocaust denier was invited to engage in the final survey, and 
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were allocated IRO resistance index scores of -1, indicating their status as Holocaust deniers. The 
casual Holocaust denier provided suspect demographic information, saying they were a Uyghur 
transgender man with an ATAR between 50.00-54.95. While included, their data would not be 
considered in any evaluation of transgender or East Asian participants. Both Holocaust deniers 
were considered in ATAR related tests, although additional tests were conducted without the 
Holocaust deniers. Finally, one participant joined the study and posted one response before logging 
off and failing to fill out the final survey. It is presumed that this participant provided the minimum 
participation to procure compensation, and thus they are excluded from any analysis beyond their 
demographic data and coding of their only response. For these reasons, most of the results in the 
study (excluding some regarding inoculative resistance) concern the other 30 participants. 
Due to the small number of Jewish participants in the study, confident conclusions could 
not be made about the impact of ethnic and religious background on emotionality and resistance. 
However, there were some tendencies that are worth mentioning. The only significant emotional 
outburst in any of the discussions came from a Jewish participant, who specifically invoked their 
history in justifying their outrage. This was one of only two participants with a plurality of 
responses with strong intensity. Interestingly, another participant with an equal emotionality score 
(9), and another Jewish participant with a slightly lower emotionality score (8), did not have similar 
outbursts. The only other participant with a majority of strong responses had a significantly lower 
emotional score (3), but they only made one comment in the discussion, which strongly 
condemned the Holocaust itself, and then only observed the conversation going forwards. This 
single emotional outburst serves as an example of the successful result of trolling behaviour, and 
it is likely that the lack of further outbursts came from the more covert nature of the antisemitism 
used in the study. 
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Directionality, Intensity and Focus  
A total of 295 non-Holocaust denial responses were collected from the discussion groups, a mean 
of 32.8 per discussion and 9.5 per participant. While all responses were coded for their overall 
intensity, a small number of comments featured mixed directionality and foci, and received 
multiple codes in these categories where appropriate. 58.6% of these comments were coded as 
opposing Holocaust denial and antisemitism, a noticeable majority, and outside of the two real 
Holocaust deniers there were no participants that had a majority of comments supporting 
Holocaust denial.39 Just over one third (21) of non-Holocaust denying participants had a majority 
of comments opposed to Holocaust denial and antisemitism, and the remaining (10) had a plurality 
of neutral comments. It bears mentioning that directionality is not the same as psychological or 
inoculative resistance. These results suggest that young adults generally think Holocaust denial is 
wrong, and at least some expressions of doubt over the Holocaust are antisemitic. However, this 
does not necessarily translate into tendencies or abilities to resist Holocaust denial, especially when 
antisemites present it covertly so to manoeuvre around this sentiment. 
 A 73.6% majority of comments were coded as moderate in intensity, as opposed to 16.6% 
being weak, and only 9.8% being strong. As mentioned above, only two participants had a majority 
of strong comments, with one accounting for 13 out of the 29 strong comments, resulting from 
their emotional outburst. The vast majority of other participants (26) had a majority of moderately 
intense comments, with only three having a majority of weak comments. The predominately 
opposed directionality and moderate intensity of responses is significant, although it is difficult to 
draw confident conclusions about the relationships between directionality and intensity. These 
 
39 There were a small number of comments that supported various Holocaust denial arguments (9), despite the 
general opposition to Holocaust denial, which can be explained by participants not identifying the covert 
antisemitism and finding it reasonable. 
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conclusions could be reached in future studies with larger sample sizes. Still, these tendencies are 
significant, and are considered in the discussion. 
 Just under half of responses, 45.5%, focused on the content of Holocaust denial, 
predominantly the specifics of the arguments present by the Holocaust denier in each discussion. 
The next largest focus was the source of antisemitism, accounting for just over a quarter of the 
responses with 27.5%. However, this code was distinguished between responses focusing on the 
Holocaust denier in the discussion and Holocaust deniers in general. Out of the 81 source focused 
responses, 69 regarded Holocaust deniers in general, and only 12 focused on the Holocaust denier 
in the study. This prevalence may be explained by the discussion question at the start of the study, 
which considered broader Holocaust deniers. Many initial responses proceeded to answer this 
question before being distracted by the Holocaust denier. 16.3% of responses focused on the 
concept of Holocaust denial, 10.2% had an irrelevant focus, and 6.4% focused on other 
participants, often the result of additional arguments breaking out between them. These findings 
are generally unsurprising when considering the design of the study, but nonetheless indicate that 
the Holocaust denier was largely successful at distracting other participants from the discussion 
question, ensuring a more confident observation of psychological and inoculative resistance rates. 
 
Psychological Resistance 
Due to the demographic makeup of the participants, the analysis focused on a specific number of 
predictors when considering their relationship, if any, to both psychological and inoculative 
resistance rates. These included studying history in year 12, choice of degree (if any), ATAR, 
familiarity with Holocaust denial, feelings of compulsion to respond to the Holocaust denier, 
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emotionality, and confidence in their ability to refute Holocaust denial. Future iterations of this 
study could also consider relationships with ethnic and religious backgrounds, assuming a larger 
and more diverse sample has been recruited. The private and public schooling were equally 
distributed in the study, but were otherwise not compared to resistance. 
 The number of counterarguments was used as the metric for psychological resistance, and 
was compared to each of the above-mentioned predictors in a Poisson regression, a type of 
generalised linear analysis. Each analysis was found to be statistically significant (p<0.01). The 
predictors of higher psychological resistance included participants studying history in year 12 
(appendix E, figure 29.1), higher familiarity with Holocaust denial (appendix E, figure 29.2), 
feelings of compulsion to respond (appendix E, figure 29.3), emotionality (appendix E, figure 
29.4), and confidence in refutation ability (appendix E, figure 29.5). Despite the positive 
relationship between higher familiarity with Holocaust denial and psychological resistance, 
participants with self-reported familiarity scores of 6 or below (out of 10) had similar quantities of 
counterarguments. Degree choice and ATAR only had minor association with psychological 
resistance, only made clear with the removal of notable outliers.40 STEM undergraduates produced 
slightly higher psychological resistance than humanities undergraduates, who were then followed 
by business and then medicine undergraduates. Higher ATARs only resulted in slightly more 
counterarguments on average, although it should be mentioned participant ATARs were skewed 
towards higher ranks. The mean number of counterarguments per participant was 2.13, with a 
quarter of the responses following the first instance of Holocaust denial. 
 
40 For ATAR, the main outlier was one participant with an ATAR between 80.00-84.95 who engaged in the highest 
number of counterarguments (14), twice more than the second highest quantity. For Holocaust denial familiarity, 
one participant who recorded 2 on the scale had a higher number of counterarguments that was linked to their 
background in history. In fact, both outliers were part of the 25% who did history in year 12, which is shown to be 
one of the most significant predictors in determining quantities of counterarguments. 
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It is naturally unsurprising that a compulsion to respond had an association with the 
quantity of counterarguments. Of the other four noteworthy predictors, undertaking history in year 
12 had the clearest relationship with overall numbers of counterarguments, followed by emotion 
and confidence in ability to refute the arguments. The relationship between Holocaust denial 
familiarity and counterarguments is more unclear by comparison, but there are some explanations 
for the unexpected patterns. The high number of counterarguments for point 2 on the familiarity 
scale is explained by an outlier, where one of the participants who selected 2 studied history in 
year 12. The relatively low number of counterarguments for those on point 6 of the scale is 
explained by one participant getting sidetracked by a seemingly personal cause, in which they 
complained that Islamophobia is not condemned as much as antisemitism. Removing these 
outliers, Holocaust denial familiarity has a minor association with the number of 
counterarguments, as seen by the upwards trend between 6 and 9 on the scale, and the lower 
numbers between 1 and 5. Nonetheless, this relationship is not as noteworthy as the other 
predictors. Ultimately, studying history, being confident in one’s ability to refute antisemitism, 
and feeling a compulsion to respond are the most significant predictors in determining 
psychological resistance to Holocaust denial. 
 
Inoculative Resistance Scores 
Participants were all scored based on their ability to recognise, research, respond to and refute 
Holocaust denial through the IRO indices. Through these scores, this study can consider each 
participant’s ability to engage productively in the four indices of inoculative resistance, and their 
overall inoculative resistance. Of the four indices, only the respond index had a slim majority of 
participants engaging in productive behaviour (appendix E, figure 30.1). For the recognition index, 
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almost half of participants engaged in counterproductive behaviour, distinguishing the Holocaust 
denial arguments from antisemitism more than identifying it as antisemitic. 43% of participants 
engaged in overall productive activity, with only one participant achieving a perfect IRO score of 
1.00 (appendix E, figure 30.2). 40% of participants engaged in overall counterproductive 
behaviour, although this includes the Holocaust deniers with scores of -1.00.  
 
Predictor influence on IRO Indices 
The same predictors that were compared to psychological resistance were also compared to each 
of the IRO indices. The ordinal nature of the indices meant that differing analyses had to be used 
for certain predictors. History in year 12 was a demographic predictor with a Boolean response 
and was thus analysed for each index with an independent sample T-Test. Degree choice was a 
demographic predictor with multiple responses and was thus analysed for each index with an 
ANOVA one-way model. All other predictors were Likert-scales and thus were analysed in 
regression linear models. Unlike the results for psychological resistance, there were far fewer 
statistically significant results, and null hypotheses were supported in some cases. 
The only predictor that had any significant relationship with recognition rates was 
undertaking history in year 12, such that studying history was associated with higher recognition 
rates (p<0.05) (appendix E, figure 31.1). It is likely that the skill learned in these classes enabled 
participants to distinguish between legitimate historical questions and disingenuous gas-lighting 
about the Holocaust. Undertaking history in year 12 was also the only predictor to have a 
significant relationship with rates of research being presented in counterarguments and other 
responses to Holocaust denial. However, this did not predict a higher rate of research presented 
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for history students, but actually a lower rate (appendix E, figure 31.2). A likely hypothesis for 
this is that history students were likely more knowledgeable about the Holocaust and did not feel 
the need to research. Another related factor may be that participants did not appeal to an external 
authority due to heightened confidence in their own knowledge. Comparatively, those who did not 
undertake history in year 12 would lack background Holocaust knowledge, and thus may need to 
engage in research in order to understand and counter the arguments of the Holocaust denier.  
Of all the predictors analysed, none were found to have an association with response index 
scores. This opens the door to more studies investigating other potential predictors, such as average 
time spent online and common social media sites used, to determine what influences productive 
or counterproductive behaviour in responding to discrimination and misinformation online. 
 Two predictors had a positive relationship with refutation index scores: higher compulsion 
to respond (p<0.02) and higher confidence in ability to refute (p<0.02) (appendix E, figures 32.1, 
32.2). While the latter relationship is unsurprising, it is encouraging that a higher compulsion to 
respond results in better quality refutations. There could be a concern that too high a compulsion 
to respond could result in poor-quality refutations, due to rushed responses from a perceived need 
to immediately respond to the antisemite, although this finding allows this notion to be rejected. 
The rejection of this notion also relates to the lack of an observed relationship between refutation 
index scores and emotionality, suggesting that even when highly emotional, young adults still have 
the capacity to refute antisemitism online effectively.  
Compulsion to respond (p<0.05) and confidence in ability (p<0.05) to refute were also the 
only predictors with significant relationships to overall resistance index scores (appendix E, figures 
33.1, 33.2). Higher scores on these predictors were associated with higher resistance scores. It is 
appropriate that these predictors were the most significant, as the only other predictor with any 
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significant relationship with IRO indices scores was studying history in year 12. However, while 
studying history in year 12 had a positive association with recognition index scores, it had a 
negative association with research index scores. Ultimately, three main predictors had a positive 
association with young adults providing any degree of inoculative resistance against Holocaust 
denial online. These predictors were studying history in year 12, being compelled to respond to 
Holocaust denial, and being confident in one’s ability to refute Holocaust denial. The latter two 
predictors were the only ones with a positive association with overall inoculative resistance.  
A regression analysis of the relationship between quantities of responses after Holocaust 
denial was introduced and overall inoculative resistance was initially found to be statistically 
significant (p<0.05), with higher quantities of responses being associated with higher inoculative 
resistance. However, this was affected by a significant outlier, wherein the only participant who 
received a 1.00 resistance index score made a disproportionate number of responses, almost 50% 
more than the second highest quantity. Furthermore, this participant achieved a 1.00 resistance 
index score after making 15 responses (just over half of their overall 29 responses after the 
introduction of Holocaust denial), the rest of their responses not impacting their overall resistance 
index score. Removing this outlier and rerunning the test found no significant relationship between 
the two variables (p>0.25).  
 
Thematic Analysis 
Beyond the major findings presented in the statistical analysis, there were other significant themes 
drawn from the discussion groups themselves and the open-ended questions in the second survey. 
Themes present in discussion groups alone include Holocaust denial being inspired by disbelief at 
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the Holocaust’s scale, and that the exact death toll of the Holocaust does not matter. Themes 
present in survey responses alone include engaging Holocaust deniers being a waste of time, only 
having minor experiences with antisemitism, having experiences with antisemitism on social 
media, doing external research on Wikipedia, needing more education and tools to resist Holocaust 
denial, and feelings of anger and frustration. Another theme prominent in both discussion groups 
and surveys was a favourability towards neutrality (i.e. distaste towards emotional or extreme 
discussions). These themes were deemed significant due to more than 25% of the non-Holocaust 
denying participants supporting them in the discussion and/or survey responses (appendix E, 
figures 34.1-34.3).  
 
Additional Predictor Relationships 
Two additional regression analyses were carried out following the initial collation of psychological 
and inoculative resistance results. These analyses were conducted to better contextualise the results 
by determine any relationships between potentially related predictors. The first regression analysis 
found a significant positive association between higher emotionality and higher compulsion to 
respond to the Holocaust denier (p<0.01) (appendix E, figure 35). The second found a significant 
positive association between studying in history in year 12 and higher confidence in ability to 
respond (p<0.01) (appendix E, figure 36). 
 
Discussion 
Both hypotheses were partially proven, having some aspects supported by the data, but other 
aspects disproven. For Hypothesis 1, heightened emotion did have a statistically significant 
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association with higher quantities of counterarguments, suggesting a relationship between emotion 
and psychological resistance. Contrastingly, there were no statistically significant relationships 
between emotionality and any of the IRO indices. This result suggests that even in highly 
emotional circumstances, young Australians are capable of responding thoughtfully online, 
potentially providing quality inoculative resistance to other participants. In addition, the positive 
association between emotionality and compulsion to respond suggests that a moral opposition to 
Holocaust denial and antisemitism may be important in inducing resistance for young Australians. 
Both emotionality and compulsion to respond had significant associations with higher 
psychological resistance, although only the latter had a significant association with higher 
inoculative resistance. Therefore, raising awareness in young people about the moral problems 
within Holocaust denial and other forms of antisemitism may be effective in improving rates of 
resistance, however this should be tempered by messages of caution regarding emotionality. 
Young Australians (and potentially young people globally) should be instructed to consider how 
their responses appear online, who may be watching, and how certain bystanders might benefit 
from emotional responses. Emotion can be used to motivate resistance to Holocaust denial, but in 
some cases, it can lead to poor examples of inoculative resistance, as seen in the one discussion 
group with a significant emotional outburst.  
 Regarding the second hypothesis, higher ATAR had only a minor association with 
increased psychological resistance, and no significant relationship with inoculative resistance. 
These results demonstrate the danger in assuming that general academic ability enables better 
resistance to discrimination and misinformation online. Studying history in year 12 did have a 
significant positive association with increases in both psychological and inoculative resistance, but 
in the latter case the results were mixed. Studying history in year 12 would help young Australians 
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refute Holocaust denial as antisemitism, but it also appeared to diminish their presentation of 
research. In addition, it was shown that studying history in year 12 was associated with a higher 
confidence in ability to respond to Holocaust denial. However, the mixed results between history 
in year 12 and IRO indices show that this confidence can result in counterproductive behaviours 
when providing inoculative resistance. Confidence may result in a perceived lack of need to engage 
in research, increasing the risk of presenting poor-quality refutations. Adopting core educational 
techniques from year 12 history syllabi into broader education (e.g. expanding critical thinking in 
English classes) may extend the benefit of these classes to the broader cohort. In addition, since 
Holocaust denial is an antisemitic trope dealing directly with the misrepresentation of history, 
engaging in history in year 12 may only aid resistance rates against Holocaust denial, not 
antisemitism more broadly. This relationship emphasises the need for future implementations of 
this study model with other forms of discrimination, determining whether experiences in certain 
streams of high school education provide better resistance against varying forms of discrimination.  
 Of the major themes observed, the most significant for discussion are favourability to 
neutrality, considering engaging Holocaust deniers to be a waste of time, and feelings of anger and 
frustration. Favourability with neutrality correlates with the recognition index results, as the 
recognition index had the highest proportion of counterproductive behaviour (47%). This result 
suggests that participants prefer neutral and less emotional discussions online. This sentiment 
likely extends to them being unwilling to identify the Holocaust denial as antisemitism, as that 
could potentially cross the line out of neutrality. Indeed, distinguishing Holocaust denial from 
antisemitism would serve to ensure the neutrality of these discussions. This behaviour relates to 
the significant issue of ‘race trouble’, wherein users even actively avoid accusations or direct 
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discussions of racism.41 The study undertaken by Durrheim et al. also concerned online discussion, 
and indicated that accusations of racism would shut down otherwise ‘neutral’ discussion.42 While 
Durrheim et al.’s study concerned more explicit forms of discrimination, this study demonstrates 
the pervasiveness of this attitude and fear of ‘race trouble’ towards even covert antisemitism. In 
fact, the covert nature of Holocaust denial likely presents more of an excuse for participants 
actively avoiding accusations of racism, resulting in the high proportion of counterproductive 
behaviour. Explicit accusations of antisemitism were observed in the discussion group with the 
significant emotional outburst, resulting in multiple other participants accusing the emotional 
participant of treating the Holocaust denier unfairly. The aversion to ‘race trouble’ among young 
people indicates vulnerability to covert forms of antisemitism in particular.  
Favourability to neutrality also correlates with the other major themes of feeling anger and 
frustration, and considering engaging Holocaust deniers to be a waste of time. Almost half of all 
participants supported the latter theme, representing significant danger to the spread of inoculative 
resistance to Holocaust denial, as compulsion to respond was one of the most significant factors 
in determining this resistance. While emotionality may also facilitate immediate discussion, for 
some participants it induces an ongoing aversion to future engagement, as they prefer to avoid 
emotional discussions in favour of more neutral ones. These results indicate a need for young 
people to be educated about the value of inoculative resistance; engaging Holocaust deniers and 
other antisemites is not valuable for the purpose of changing their mind, but for influencing 
bystanders. These results also discredit the idea that hate speech can simply be countered with 
higher quantities of speech alone. While education may inform young people of the value of 
 
41 Kevin Durrheim, Ross Greener and Kevin A. Whitehead, ‘Race trouble: Attending to race and racism in online 
interaction’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54 (2015), 84-99 (pp. 94-95). 
42 Ibid., p. 97. 
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inoculative resistance, it will not remove their desire to avoid emotional discussions, representing 
a potential limit to their capacity to respond. In addition, while this study focused on a simulated 
interaction with an antisemite, this represents the last stage where inoculation can be provided. 
Ideally, young people should receive inoculation through other means beforehand. 
 The need for education about inoculative resistance also folds into other minor themes 
prevalent among participants, such as the desire for more instruction. Inoculation to antisemitism 
can be provided at an earlier stage than during online reactions to manifestations of antisemitism, 
such as in classrooms. The themes emerging from discussion groups, particularly the idea that at 
least some Holocaust deniers simply cannot comprehend the quantity of dead, indicate the lack of 
familiarity with Holocaust denial for some participants, further emphasising their need for 
instruction. The idea that numbers do not matter in terms of the horror of the Holocaust serves as 
a flawed defence to Holocaust denial. Such a defence allows them to ignore the implications behind 
the argument that the death toll was falsified, and can also inadvertently lead to an inability to 
recognise this argument as antisemitic. 
 
Assessment of Study 
This study succeeded in determining relationships between key predictors and psychological 
resistance with all but one of the IRO indices. The lack of a relationship between any predictor 
and the response index suggests there may be more complex reasons behind productive, 
unsuccessful, or counterproductive behaviour when responding to hatred online. Nonetheless, the 
response index was the only index with a majority of participants engaging in productive 
behaviour, so the lack of a clear predictor is less concerning than if this ambiguity applied to any 
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of the other indices. While the study had 30 non-Holocaust denying participants, which is an 
acceptable range for qualitative research, it is likely that a higher number of participants may have 
resolved this issue, and reduced the impact of outliers potentially skewing results. Higher numbers 
of participants would also potentially help to reveal other possible predictors, and allow the testing 
of these additional predictors.43 Finally, a higher number of participants would also help to reduce 
sampling bias, which was an anticipated issue in the study. 
 The participation of Holocaust deniers in the study was a key anticipated issue and occurred 
on two occasions. However, neither of the deniers engaged in abusive behaviour towards the other 
participants and one even echoed the arguments and discourse of the false participants, thereby 
strengthening evidence for the validity of the study. The casual denial of one participant, however, 
resulted in a slower discussion, as the denier did little to support their arguments. Nonetheless, 
both incursions from deniers resulted in between four and six Holocaust denial arguments in each 
respective discussion, bringing them in line with the other discussion groups. 
Interestingly, the real Holocaust deniers were more considered to be false at a far higher 
proportion than the false Holocaust denier. While confident conclusions cannot be drawn from this 
phenomenon, as there were only two real deniers, it does pose some interesting suggestions for 
future iterations of this research model. Both real deniers were more blatant in their denial, 
dismissing the ‘mainstream narrative’ of the Holocaust in their first responses (although one still 
presented their arguments in a cloaked manner). Interestingly, one participant even pondered that 
the more casual Holocaust denier was “just memeing”. Comparatively, this degree of doubt did 
not extend towards the false Holocaust denier, suggesting that the doubt may be linked to an 
 
43 Such as attendance at university overall, ethnic and religious background, and a greater variation of ATAR scores. 
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aversion to ‘race trouble’ or unwillingness to face the reality of the encounter. This potential link 
is further supported by the favourability to neutrality, although once again, this trend is too small 
to make any confident conclusions. Regardless of the cause, since this doubt did not extend to the 
false denier, future iterations of this study (either for antisemitism or other phenomena) should 
also adopt similarly slow and cautious approaches in order to avoid drawing suspicion. 
 The consistent number of Holocaust denial arguments in each discussion limits concern 
over the anticipated effects of participants’ freedom to shape discussion. Despite this ability, 
consistent quantities of Holocaust denial arguments were promoted in each discussion, thereby 
ensuring that discussions were directly comparable. The main effect of participants’ freedom was 
the need to introduce arguments organically based on the trajectory of the conversation, resulting 
in different arguments being presented in each discussion. Nonetheless, each argument still fit the 
requirements of being a covert manifestation of antisemitism, which did not engage in stereotypes, 
slurs, or caricatures that would cross the line into explicit manifestations. Ultimately, while 
participants’ ability to shape the conversation resulted in differences between each discussion, the 
key elements required for each discussion were still present. 
 The final anticipated issue in the study was sampling bias. A sampling bias occurred with 
respect to the vast majority of participants being university students and recipients of relatively 
high ATARs. While the relationships between ATAR and forms of resistance were either minor 
or insignificant, it can nonetheless be expected that the resistance scores of this study may be 
generally higher than the broader population of young Australians. While the study did not attract 
as many Jewish participants as expected (possibly due to emotional reasons outweighing interest), 
it is likely that it attracted participants more likely to be interested in antisemitism and thus 
Holocaust denial. On the 10-point Likert scale measuring familiarity with Holocaust denial before 
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the study, non-Holocaust denying participants recorded a mean of 5.77. This may demonstrate a 
degree of sampling bias in terms of interest towards the subject matter in the discussion, although 
the mean is only marginally higher than an expected moderate score of 5. The extent of this 
sampling bias would be made clearer through broader quantitative research on familiarity with 
Holocaust denial among young adults in Australia. Nonetheless, these sampling biases indicate 
that the resistance scores recorded may be higher than that of the broader cohort. Considering the 
proportions of participants who engaged in productive and counterproductive inoculative 
resistance overall was 43% and 41% respectively, this suggests that young Australians are likely 
to engage in about as much counterproductive behaviour resisting Holocaust denial as productive 
behaviour. 
The other key factor to assess in this study is the new metric of IRO indices. While there 
was an overall significant relationship between number of responses and inoculative resistance, 
this was impacted significantly by an outlier. When this outlier was controlled, the relationship 
was insignificant. This result provides evidence against the notion that better IRO indices scores 
are derived from higher quantities of responses. Participants could engage in highly productive 
behaviour even in a small quantity of comments, and continued engagement would present chances 
of engaging in either productive or counterproductive behaviour, rather than just increasing the 
likelihood of better resistance scores. Nonetheless, greater confidence in this finding could be 
achieved by further studies with a higher number of participants with 1.00 resistance index scores, 
so as to more confidently account for the impact of the outlier in this study. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile continuing to use IRO indices in future studies, particularly in repeated uses of this 
study model, but refinement of the concept may be beneficial in ongoing research. 
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Viability of Research Model for Inter-field Research 
The general findings explored above demonstrate how this study’s model can be used to 
investigate resistance towards various forms of discrimination and misinformation. With enough 
implementations of this model, resistance rates to different forms of discrimination and 
misinformation can be compared. These results can indicate the forms of discrimination or 
misinformation to which particular populations are most susceptible. Nonetheless, caution must 
be applied when considering whether resistance measured applies to an overall form of 
discrimination, or merely a single manifestation. In this case, the link between studying history in 
year 12 and resistance to Holocaust denial is probably due to the nature of Holocaust denial being 
an antisemitic misrepresentation of history. If Holocaust denial was replaced with anti-Zionist 
tropes, then studying history in year 12 would be less likely to have a significant relationship with 
resistance. However, other predictors, especially compulsion to respond, likely do reflect degrees 
of resistance towards antisemitism in general. It is likely that anyone feeling a compulsion to refute 
Holocaust denial would also feel similar compulsions to discredit other forms of antisemitism.  
Ethical concerns are a key limitation in applying this model to other forms of 
discrimination. Due to the risk inherent in presenting explicit discrimination to young people, uses 
of this study model will likely need to also rely on other covert forms of discrimination. While 
researching covert discrimination opens up a large range of potential research, excluding research 
on explicit discrimination is particularly limiting, as explicit discrimination is prevalent on the 
internet due to anonymity. Nonetheless, results from studies examining factors affecting resistance 
to covert discrimination may also provide insight into more explicit forms of the discrimination. 
While the ethical implications of explicit content limit research on discrimination, research on non-
discriminatory misinformation may utilise this research model without limitation. Such forms of 
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misinformation may include conspiracy theories and pseudo-intellectual ideas such as anti-
vaccination movements and climate change denial. The IRO indices would also translate 
effectively to these phenomena, with the recognition index determining whether participants 
identify the misinformation as pseudo-intellectual or treat it as a legitimate theory. In any case, 
applications of this study to either discrimination or misinformation should endeavor to recruit 
higher quantities of participants, consider additional predictors relevant to the discrimination or 
misinformation (e.g. year 12 environmental science when examining climate change denial), and 
attempt to keep the participant demographics similar to those in other uses of this model. Such 
measures will allow comparisons between the cohort’s rates of resistance to different phenomena. 
 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates the need to develop new tools and strategies to aid young people in 
resisting antisemitism online. While Holocaust denial is not the foremost trope of antisemitism 
online today, its broad presence online and ease of recycling makes it a common potential gateway 
into broader antisemitic networks and movements. While young adults appear to be opposed to 
Holocaust denial, this opposition does not necessarily translate into either psychological or 
inoculative resistance. Measuring psychological resistance through quantities of counterarguments 
cannot measure effective resistance against hate. Instead, the new IRO indices serve to measure 
the effectiveness of resistance against discrimination, thereby demonstrating whether and how a 
population needs to improve in resisting hate online. The majority of participants in this study 
engaged in counterproductive or unsuccessful behaviours for providing inoculative resistance 
against Holocaust denial online. These behaviours demonstrate that young adults cannot rely on 
their cohort to help them resist Holocaust denial. It is therefore important to develop new 
 349 
 
instructions and tools to support young people, which can both inoculate them against Holocaust 
denial and other forms of antisemitism, and help them inoculate others online wherever 
antisemitism appears. These instructions and tools should encourage people to speak out against 
antisemitism, countering the fear of engaging in ‘race trouble’ online. 
 The value in building interdisciplinary and inter-field approaches is demonstrated by this 
study in multiple ways. The very conception of this study was built upon research in multiple 
fields, including white nationalism and cyberbullying. Bringing fields together when conceiving 
new methods for research enables these methods to have a broader application. The design of this 
study allows for interdisciplinary applications, as it involves content, statistical and thematic 
analysis, which, when combined, helps point towards solutions and further explanations for 
phenomena in the study. The model even allows broader interdisciplinary applications, as 
discourse analyses could also be applied, determining whether the online format affects the 
discourse in a way that also affects resistance to online hate or misinformation. The applicability 
of the IRO indices present a path to provide a holistic picture of young adult resistance to a variety 
of hate and misinformation online, and thus every use of this study model will further illuminate 
the state and needs of young people online. Finally, the design of the study enables individual 
researchers to use it in their own fields, while at the same time contributing to the broader 
interdisciplinary and inter-field fight against discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion: Taking Research from Findings to Fixes  
 
Addressing the issue of antisemitism online in this thesis has required engaging in a number of 
endeavours. These covered defining and identifying online antisemitism, consulting existing 
bodies of research, applying frameworks to the phenomenon, comparing it to intersecting and 
analogous phenomena, and researching the abilities of vulnerable populations to resist it. To 
provide a comprehensive conclusion on the state of antisemitism online and how to address it 
further, this final chapter includes both a discussion and a conclusion. The discussion connects the 
disparate findings of the aforementioned endeavours, suggests potential future research, and 
considers any limitations that apply to both these findings and future research. The subsequent 
conclusion section will relate these intersecting conclusions directly back to the main purposes of 
this thesis, comment on its findings’ implications, and highlight its significance to the bodies of 
literature, both on antisemitism and in broader fields of discrimination and abuse online. 
 
Discussion 
Changes to Antisemitism in the Information Age 
This thesis opened with an example of how historic antisemitic tropes can intersect with other 
forms of abuse through the capabilities of online communication: a blood libel meme tweeted at a 
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Jewish journalist.1 Blood libel has had a long, continuous use by various antisemitic movements, 
often intersecting and complementing other antisemitic tropes, such as The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion being referenced in a 2003 Syrian broadcast.2 Thus, it may not seem entirely surprising to 
see it co-opted by yet another antisemitic movement within the context of the 2016 United States 
election in the case of the aforementioned tweet. However, this manifestation in particular is 
distinguished by its representation, which is not merely repeating the libel, but editing a memetic 
template so as to enable the multiple purposes of intimidation, entertainment, and signalling 
antisemitism to others. On a surface glance, this use may not seem so different from historical 
manifestations of the trope. Blood libel would undoubtedly serve to intimidate Jewish communities 
in the diaspora, and it had been used within entertainment, even as recently as in the 2002 Egyptian 
movie Horseman Without a Horse, and the 2003 Syrian television series The Diaspora.3 However, 
a closer examination reveals the new ease with which blood libel can be spread through the 
properties of the internet – one would not need to rely on film and television studios to either create 
this content, or to promote it to a broader audience. The technology of the internet, especially web 
2.0, allows for the cost-free, time-effective creation of these manifestations, and the cultures 
associated with online social media provide both the templates and the audiences for these memes.  
These online cultures demonstrate that the changes to antisemitism, as represented in this 
blood libel meme, are both quantitative and qualitative. The entertainment factor of this meme 
 
1 Naughty Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet). 
ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential 
Campaign, (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016) 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-
Force_v2.pdf> [accessed 8 December 2019] (p. 11). 
2 Hadassa Ben-Itto, The Lie That Wouldn’t Die: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 
2005), p. 376. 
3 ‘Some Ramadan Broadcasts In Arab World Serve Up Anti-Semitism And Hatred Of Israel’, Anti-Defamation 
League, 2 August 2012. <https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/some-ramadan-broadcasts-in-arab-world-serve-
up-anti-semitism-and-hatred-of> [accessed 17 December 2019] (para. 10 of 10). 
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indicates that it derives from an online culture favouring vulgarity, shock-humour, stunts and 
harassment, originating from spaces such as 4chan.4 Many of these stunts, like the “Dub the Dew” 
raid, would feature antisemitic tropes,5 but were originally attributed more to the value of vulgarity 
and shock rather than a dedicated antisemitic ideology. This culture contrasts significantly with 
historical distributers of antisemitism, whether originating in film studios in Egypt and Syria, 
European governments, or Christian churches. These distributors would be primarily driven by 
antisemitism, with potentially even entire worldviews being inspired by anti-Judaism.6 The lack 
of a dedicated antisemitic motivation in the culture within spaces such as 4chan, at least initially, 
set them apart from pre-social media antisemitic spaces online such as Stormfront. It was not long 
before the opportunity to use this culture for growing antisemitic networks was noticed by 
dedicated antisemites like Andrew Anglin. This culture was made possible specifically due to the 
features of the internet, allowing for anonymity and pseudonymity, which in turn contributed to 
senses of disinhibition and dissociation from the impact of one’s actions online. People cannot be 
easily punished for spreading discrimination and abuse online anonymously, and within this 
culture, they can even be rewarded. The potential of social reward, even if anonymous, encouraged 
a recreational participation in abuse and discrimination online, regardless of one’s attitude towards 
these beliefs. Nonetheless, enough exposure to and normalisation of antisemitism within these 
spaces would ultimately result in both dedicated antisemites using this culture for recruitment, and 
previously non-antisemitic users accepting increasingly more antisemitic beliefs. These trends 
illuminate the origin and motivations behind the blood libel meme. The grotesque exaggerations 
 
4 Whitney Phillips, ‘Internet Troll Sub-Culture's Savage Spoofing of Mainstream Media [excerpt]’, Scientific 
American, 15 May 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/internet-troll-sub-culture-s-savage-spoofing-
of-mainstream-media-excerpt> [accessed 17 December 2019] (para. 1, 10 of 35). 
5 Know Your Meme, Dub the Dew (2019), <http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/dub-the-dew> [accessed 15 
December 2019]. 
6 David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), p. 3. 
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of a Jewish caricature downing litres of “goyim blood” appeals to this vulgar humour, as well as 
the shock invoked through sending it directly to a Jewish journalist. The anonymity, dissociation 
and disinhibition provided through web 2.0 has thus resulted in a new culture, through which 
antisemitism has qualitatively changed. 
Rather than distinguishing antisemitism online as a qualitatively new form of antisemitism, 
as Earl Raab argued for ‘new’ antisemitism,7 this thesis has shown that the internet changes 
antisemitism more broadly, for online antisemitism does not exist in a vacuum. Online 
antisemitism reacts to and affects offline antisemitism as well, as seen by the rise of the alt-right 
and the growing number of antisemitic mass-shooters inspired by the 4chan culture-infused 
manifestations of antisemitism.8 By considering how online and offline antisemitism affect each 
other, not excluding changes to antisemitism that emerge from offline circumstances, this thesis 
avoids the issues present in the debate over ‘new’ antisemitism. Online antisemitism is not a ‘new’ 
antisemitism, but represents a significant evolution that affects existing and emerging 
manifestations of antisemitism. The effect of this evolution is so significant that it requires more 
research to inform strategies to counter it, including from analogous and intersecting fields. 
 
Antisemitism and Other Forms of Online Abuse and Discrimination 
Understanding other forms of online abuse and discrimination, and their distinctions from 
antisemitism online, provides key contextual considerations when understanding how the internet 
has changed antisemitism. As suggested in the blood libel meme example, what ultimately 
 
7 Earl Raab, ‘Is There a New Anti-Semitism?’, Commentary, 1 May 1974. 
<https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/is-there-a-new-anti-semitism> [accessed 25 November 2019]. 
8 Specifically, the Pittsburgh Synagogue of Life shooting in 2018, and the Poway Synagogue and Halle Synagogue 
mass shootings of 2019. 
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distinguishes antisemitism from other forms of online discrimination is the vast array of pre-
existing narratives, artifacts, imagery and arguments that have built up through the long history of 
antisemitism. The recycling of ancient and medieval tropes into a format specific to social media 
is a phenomenon unique to the world’s “longest hatred”.9 The age of many of these tropes indicate 
the unique trajectory of antisemitism online, and provide additional implications to consider. 
Taking the example of blood libel, it is unlikely the average online user would be familiar with the 
fantastical stories of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children. So, when blood libel is used in this 
meme, along with the relatively unfamiliar language of “goyim” to many users, the antisemitism 
may only be clear to the victim, perpetrators, and other antisemites. This not only demonstrates a 
different challenge in countering this form of discrimination, but also how the large catalogue of 
antisemitism can be used to covertly manipulate or intimidate others (even if expressed explicitly). 
This latter point is especially relevant to Holocaust denial, which, as a covert movement attempting 
to disguise its antisemitism, developed strategies now broadly used in the spread of antisemitism 
online. The age of this hatred has culminated in long-running and persistent anti-Jewish 
worldviews, allowing for the online propagation and evolution of discriminatory aspects unique to 
antisemitism, particularly ‘chimeric’ and ‘redemptive’ antisemitism. 
The “fantastic, hallucinatory, deeply obsessive antisemitism”10 of chimeric antisemitism, 
a manifestation of antisemitism not rooted in any observable fact or truth,11 is further facilitated 
by the internet. Potential anonymity reduces risk of social embarrassment that might occur from 
others observing such deep obsession, and these fringe views easily grow online where there are 
 
9 Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Schocken Books, 1991). 
10 Quoted from Christopher Browning. 
Yad Vashem Shoah Resource Center, An Interview With Prof. Christopher Browning (1997), 
<https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203848.pdf> [accessed 17 January 2020] 
11 Gavin Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), p. 
306. 
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multiple spaces catering to different niche audiences. These spaces range from Stormfront to social 
media echo chambers where parallel realities flourish, all of which can continuously and easily 
recycle older tropes, ranging in age from Holocaust denial to deicide. These spaces can create and 
spread newer chimeric antisemitic myths, facilitated by the trust users put into often anonymous 
or pseudonymous sources in these spaces. By catering to a wider range of discrimination, beyond 
just antisemitism, these spaces attract a broader audience. The internet thus facilitates the growth 
and spread of redemptive antisemitism, intersecting antisemitism with other forms of 
discrimination, and often placing antisemitism at the centre of these intersections. 
 Examining these intersections has provided insight into the similarities and distinctions 
between antisemitism and these other forms of abuse and discrimination online. Gamergate was 
primarily an intersection of misogyny and cyberbullying, but also featured antisemitism through 
the conceptualisation of a ‘culture war’ by the movement’s proponents.12 While the conspiracy 
theories that launched GamerGate were unfounded,13 the movement was a clear reaction to real 
efforts promoting inclusivity and diversity within video games and the video game industry. This 
contrasted with the more chimeric nature of antisemitic conspiracy theories, like that within the 
Protocols, which are completely based in fantasy. The long history of anti-Judaism-inspired 
worldviews encourages these ‘culture war’ conceptions to intersect with antisemitism. Such 
intersections can be seen in the adoption of antisemitic conspiracy theories by proponents of 
Gamergate and other analogous movements.14 Antisemitism did not serve as merely another 
dimension to this ‘culture war’ conception, but rather the natural endpoint of an all-encompassing 
 
12 Michael Salter, ‘From geek masculinity to Gamergate: the technological rationality of online abuse’, Crime Media 
Culture, 14.2 (2018), 247-264 (p. 255). 
13 Cherie Todd, ‘Commentary: GamerGate and the resistance to the diversification of gaming culture’, Women’s 
Studies Journal, 29.1 (2015), 64-67 (p. 64). 
14 Torill Elvira Mortensen, ‘Anger, Fear, and Games: The Long Event of #GamerGate’, Games and Culture, 13.8 
(2018), 787-806 (p. 788). 
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conspiracy theory. Through antisemitism’s long history it has associated Jews with many ‘culture 
wars’, including crypto-Judaism, Nazi-inspired Judeo-Bolshevism, the Soviet’s ‘rootless 
cosmopolitan’,15 and more recently Cultural Marxism. Merely observing the long history of 
antisemitic conspiracy theories may feed the confirmation biases of those seeking a greater 
explanation, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. GamerGate joined this long-line of conspiracy 
theories, with Jews presented as a malevolent force undermining the dominance of white men in 
‘Western’ society by promoting diversity in all spheres of society, even video games. Gamergate 
thus represents how the internet streamlines the injection of antisemitism into reactionary 
conspiracy movements, moulding them into new strains of redemptive antisemitism. Gamergate’s 
inclusion of Jews in its group-based cyberbullying demonstrates how the ‘swarm logic’ of online 
abuse can be weaponised against unsuspecting Jews, particularly when antisemitism becomes the 
endpoint to online reactionary movements. This ironic ‘inclusivity’ is a product of both the internet 
and the history of antisemitism, representing a unique quality and trajectory to antisemitism online. 
The ‘intersectionality’ of online reactionary hate and abuse with antisemitism at its 
endpoint results in real-world action against Jews being seen as a potential path to redemption. In 
other words, the intersections of hate and abuse result in redemptive antisemitic worldviews, 
leading to globalised action, such as mass-shootings against Muslims and Jews in 2018 and 2019.16 
This demonstrates the opportunism used by dedicated and organised antisemites in spreading 
antisemitism through the internet and social media to develop this worldview. Brenton Tarrant 
streamed the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting from a first-person shooter perspective, and said 
 
15 Cathy S. Gelbin and Sander L. Gilman, Cosmopolitanisms and the Jews (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2017), p. 190. 
16 Andre Oboler, William Allington and Patrick Scolyer-Gray, Hate and Violent Extremism from an Online Sub-
Culture: The Yom Kippur Terrorist Attack in Halle, Germany (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2019), 
pp. ii, 22, 34, 39-40.  
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“subscribe to PewDiePie” before starting his massacre, directly tying his discriminatory worldview 
to gaming culture. While Tarrant did not espouse antisemitic views, he inspired the explicitly 
antisemitic shooting attempt by Stephan Balliet in Halle, Germany, who both attributed inspiration 
to Tarrant and directly referenced gaming culture in his manifesto’s “achievements list”.17 While 
it is difficult to account directly for the influence of Tarrant’s statement on the PewDiePie fanbase, 
the influence of antisemites within said fanbase was nonetheless significant enough to force 
PewDiePie to recant a donation to the ADL.18 At the very least, it can be said that the controversies 
surrounding PewDiePie’s antisemitic and racist actions, and the ensuing defence of him by his 
fanbase, demonstrates the opportunities for influence and recruitment by dedicated racists online. 
In another vein, the link between Anglin’s Daily Stormer and the “Unite the Right” rally of 2017 
further demonstrates the growing relationship between online antisemitism and real-world 
antisemitic action. The vigilante-style action taken against the Daily Stormer and Stormfront also 
indicate that real-world antisemitism can inspire action against antisemitism online. Nonetheless, 
these events demonstrate the extent to which online antisemitism ingrains itself in broader online 
discriminatory movements and inspires real-world action, resulting in an intertwined relationship 
between online and offline antisemitism, and broader discrimination. 
 The positive biases, echo chambers, and pseudonymity inherent in social media platforms 
are key ingredients in the opportunistic influence and recruitment effort by dedicated antisemites 
within analogous reactionary and discriminatory movements online. The impact of these factors is 
demonstrated by the influence of antisemitic Happy Merchant memes in Reddit communities like 
 
17 This list detailed a video-game style set of achievements that could be achieved through various murderous 
actions against different populations, mostly Jews. 
Ibid., pp. 2, 22-23. 
18 Felix Kjellberg (PewDiePie, 12 September 2019), ‘My 100 Mil Award Broke!' (YouTube video) 
<https://youtu.be/PbfX3ZyHLJg> [accessed 31 October 2019]. 
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/r/the_donald,19 and the role of such spaces to serve as gateways to more discriminatory and 
antisemitic spaces, such as /r/altright or /pol/. The influence of Merchant memes in gateway 
communities represents the long-running effort to normalise antisemitic humour,20 sentiment, and 
ideas within their spaces, as per the goals of antisemitism 2.0.21 /pol/’s role as a major distribution 
point for these memes demonstrates the extent to which normalised recreational antisemitism has 
had an effect on the growth of organised antisemitic networks. While /r/the_donald’s 
discrimination is truly ‘intersectional’, featuring broader cyber-racism, misogyny, homophobia 
and transphobia, the example of GamerGate demonstrates how this opportunistic spread of 
antisemitic content to online spaces is a reliable recruitment method into organised antisemitic 
movements. The internet and social media have allowed a cost-free, risk-free, time-reduced 
method of recruitment. This recruitment is undertaken fairly covertly, even with explicit content, 
as the echo chambers of social media force opposing viewpoints out of these spaces, preventing 
potential inoculation. 
 
Strategies for Combating Antisemitism Online 
There are additional barriers to young people’s ability to provide inoculative resistance to 
discrimination more broadly. Despite the research study in chapter six focusing on antisemitism, 
it highlighted how the general aversion to ‘race trouble’ and emotional topics online present key 
 
19 Joel Finkelstein and others, ‘A Quantitative Approach to Understanding Online Antisemitism’, September 2018 
[pre-print] <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.01644.pdf> [accessed 28 October 2019]. 
20 Andre Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2014) 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/205092520/The-Antisemitic-Meme-of-the-Jew#fullscreen&from_embed> 
[accessed 12 December 2018] 
21 Andre Oboler, ‘Online Antisemitism 2.0. ‘Social Antisemitism’ on the ‘Social Web’’, Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs, 67 (2008) <http://jcpa.org/article/online-antisemitism-2-0-social-antisemitism-on-the-social-web> 
[accessed 10 December 2019] 
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motivational roadblocks to preventing the spread of discrimination online. The unwillingness to 
call Holocaust denial antisemitism, despite the prevalence of negative sentiment towards it, 
suggests that young people may be more likely to legitimise covert expressions of discrimination. 
Even with more blatant examples of discriminatory views, as seen with the two real Holocaust 
deniers who joined the study, there was a noteworthy lack of belief that these deniers were 
legitimate. This inherent scepticism towards more blatant expressions of discrimination shows the 
influence of recreational discrimination online; expressions of discrimination may be considered 
a ploy to trick people into an emotional response, and thus not worth reacting to. If explicit 
expressions of antisemitism are seen as not worth responding to, and users are reluctant to call out 
covert expressions of antisemitism, then there is little preventing antisemitism’s normalisation 
online beyond the slow improvements in moderation by social media giants. Preventing the spread 
of antisemitism and other forms of discrimination online require both top-down and grassroots 
efforts. Increased moderation can restrict the access of discriminatory actors to broader userbases, 
and spreading inoculative resistance can hinder efforts to influence vulnerable users. The inability 
of alternate alt-right platforms like Gab to mobilise direct action and recruitment effectively 
demonstrates the value in social media moderation pushing discriminatory actors out of their 
platforms.22 In order to encourage young userbases to spread inoculative resistance, these users 
need to receive education that specifically explains the value of drawing attention to and refuting 
discrimination online (even if not convincing the discriminatory actor themselves). Effectively 
motivated users then require tools that provide specific information on both discriminatory and 
incorrect online content, or otherwise risk engaging in counterproductive behaviour. 
 
22 Greta Jasser and others, ‘The Uses and Limitations of Alt-Tech: The Far-Right and Gab.com’, 30 August 2019 
[pre-print], pp. 14-15. 
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 Tools like the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) Working 
Definition of Antisemitism23 explain that particular ideas, tropes and arguments are antisemitic, 
and these tools can help young people to better identify antisemitism online. The definition also 
encourages consistent research on antisemitism, which can be contrasted with the inconsistent 
definitions of cyberbullying research. The definitional problems with cyberbullying can be traced 
to the lack of a ‘gold standard’ definition of traditional bullying,24 leading to disparate applications 
of definitions to cyberbullying. These disparate definitions result in an overall inconsistent picture 
of cyberbullying rates, and uncertainty over whether the problem is worsening. The existence of 
qualitative and quantitative changes to antisemitism does not mean that the IHRA Working 
Definition needs to change, but rather highlights that the list of examples is not complete, limiting 
its full educational benefit. The fact that the definition itself introduces the examples with the 
words “Contemporary examples of antisemitism… include, but are not limited to…”,25 potentially 
provides an opening to add new examples. Manifestations unique to the internet, such as ‘echoes’, 
antisemitic memes, and meme templates’ adoption of coded references to other antisemitic 
memes,26 often fall outside the list of examples included in the definition. A more complete list, 
or a companion of online examples, could help more people identify online antisemitism. Even 
without the newer online-specific references, the IHRA definition provides a succinct explanation 
of antisemitic tropes to young users, many of which do occur regularly online. By embedding this 
definition within educational programs alongside expanded online examples, young people can 
gain a general degree of inoculation to help them identify covert and unfamiliar expressions of 
 
23 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism (Bucharest: IHRA Plenary, 
2016) <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism> [accessed 12 December 2019]. 
24 V. Sky Wingate, Jessy A. Minney, Rosanna E. Guadagno, ‘Sticks and stones may break your bones, but words 
will always hurt you: A review of cyberbullying’, Social Influence, 8.2-3 (2013), 87-106 (p. 88). 
25 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, para. 6 of 20. 
26 Finkelstein and others, pp. 8-10. 
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antisemitism. Both expanding the use of the Working Definition and expanding the definition itself 
are especially important, considering the long and varied expressions of antisemitism online. These 
varied expressions include the tendency for antisemites online to rapidly co-opt memes (e.g. ‘Pepe 
the Frog’), and create new antisemitic expressions (e.g. echoes), both which emphasising the rapid 
need to expand and/or adapt existing tools, such as the definition. 
While definitional issues are not as prevalent in antisemitism research, the field does share 
quantification issues similar to those observed in cyberbullying and cyber-racism research. 
Attempts to quantify cyberbullying overall have been inconsistent, and measures to quantify covert 
expressions of cyber-racism with larger metrics such as Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS) 
have been limited.27 This latter issue applies to the World Jewish Congress’ (WJC) 2016 report on 
antisemitism in social media, with its automated system presenting a flawed picture of the rates of 
antisemitism online. This issue can be mitigated through combining smaller-scale research on self-
reported antisemitism, as conducted by the Online Hate Prevention Institute in the Measuring the 
Hate report,,28 and automated data collection on more specific antisemitic spaces and memes, as 
conducted by the Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI).29 While not providing an overall 
quantification of antisemitism online, the Measuring the Hate report’s data also indicates the 
willingness of internet users to report antisemitism. This willingness to report can be used as a 
potential indicator of inoculative resistance against certain manifestations of antisemitism on 
particular platforms. The NCRI provides a larger-scale quantitative analysis on specific antisemitic 
spaces and tropes, thereby evaluating their influence on other spaces. There are still issues in 
 
27 Brian TaeHyuk Keum and Matther J. Miller, ‘Racism in Digital Era: Development and Initial Validation of the 
Perceived Online Racism Scale (PORS v1.0)’, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 64.3 (2017), 310-324 (p. 321). 
28 Andre Oboler, Measuring the Hate: The State of Antisemitism in Social Media (Melbourne: Online Hate 
Prevention Institute, 2016). 
29 Finkelstein and others. 
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effectively quantifying covert antisemitism and discrimination, but quantifications of specific 
elements, such as self-reporting rates and particular manifestations, contribute to a holistic picture 
of discrimination online. This thesis’ study on young people’s resistance to online antisemitism 
adds to this picture, exploring the familiarity of the cohort with particular antisemitic arguments 
used in Holocaust denial. Through repeated implementation of this research on other covert tropes 
like anti-Zionism, collated data could be reflected back on research like Measuring the Hate in 
order to estimate what quantities of covert antisemitic expressions are being reported, ignored, or 
even accepted as legitimate. In addition, research on quantifying specific tropes and their influence 
can be combined with data on resistance to said tropes, thereby providing a clearer picture of the 
threat posed by particular antisemitic manifestations online. 
 
Inter-field and Interdisciplinary Approaches in Research 
While some distinctions set antisemitism online apart from other forms of abusive discrimination 
online, there are shared properties that point towards the value of inter-field and interdisciplinary 
approaches to combat all forms of online abuse and discrimination. The evolution of individual 
cyberbullying into group-based cyberbullying for both misogyny, as seen in GamerGate, and 
antisemitism, as seen in the harassment of Jewish journalists on Twitter,30 demonstrates the impact 
of the internet on bullying and other forms of abuse. GamerGate demonstrated how online 
reactionaryism can lead to misogyny-centred conspiracy theories that intersect other areas of 
discrimination. The ‘intersectionality’ of discrimination in spaces such as /r/the_donald involves 
a broad range of cyber-racism and other forms of online abuse and discrimination. These broader 
 
30 ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, p. 11.  
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forms of discrimination were also involved in the 4chan inspired culture of shock humour, to the 
point where the homophobic term ‘fag’ became a general colloquial term on the forum. The impact 
of this discriminatory culture on the motivation to commit real world atrocities applies to both 
antisemitism and Islamophobia, as seen with the 2018 Christchurch shooting, 2018 Pittsburgh 
shooting, and the 2019 Poway and Halle shootings. The intersection of these analogous forms of 
discrimination and abuse means that research with too narrow a focus on just one form risks 
misrepresenting the broader intersecting picture of discrimination and abuse online. However, 
comprehensively understanding all forms of discrimination and abuse before researching any of 
these phenomena online is not realistic. Alternatively, over-extended research goals also risk 
significant misrepresentation, as seen with the WJC report’s issues in quantifying antisemitism on 
social media. Two key solutions to these problems are presented in this thesis. The first is 
collaboration between fields. This is key to encouraging scholars in broader disciplines to research 
antisemitism online, as the long and varied history of antisemitism represents an imposing 
phenomenon to research. The other solution is developing interdisciplinary research methods that 
can be applied to multiple fields, thereby allowing results from each to be shared and compared, 
contributing towards a comprehensive picture of discrimination and abuse online. 
 The cyber-racism research methodology developed by Jakubowicz et al. for their Cyber 
Racism and Community Resilience project is a model example of both collaboration, and the 
development of interdisciplinary approaches to research into discrimination online.31 This example 
served as one of the key inspirations behind the research study conducted in this thesis. This study 
builds upon the work carried out by Jakubowicz et al. by demonstrating how individuals focusing 
 
31 Jakubowicz and others, Cyber Racism and Community Resilience: Strategies for Combating Online Race Hate 
(Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 59-61. 
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on specific phenomena can develop such methodologies, with broader inter-field applications. This 
thesis builds upon existing research and utilised statistical analyses of resistance to antisemitism 
online, despite its otherwise historical and sociological premise. Even with the generally narrow 
focus of this thesis’ study, the research model and Inoculative Resistance Online (IRO) indices are 
versatile enough to be applied to other forms of discrimination, abuse, and misinformation.  
Using similar population groups, the study model could measure psychological and 
inoculative resistance to other racist tropes, such as denial of the Stolen Generation of Indigenous 
Australians. Beyond cyber-racism it could measure resistance to homophobic connections between 
homosexuality and paedophilia, misogynistic portrayals of women, and transphobic 
generalisations of transgender people being mentally ill. Each of these ideas need to be recognised 
and identified as discriminatory, alongside resources providing counterarguments to effectively 
refute them. Beyond discrimination, this study’s research model and IRO indices could be applied 
to cyberbullying in the vein of Kowalski’s unpublished study from 2011,32 utilising two false 
participants to demonstrate an example of cyberbullying. The IRO indices could be adapted to 
measure willingness to identify the interactions as abusive, and whether participants intervene on 
behalf of the victim, bully, or not at all. Beyond abuse and discrimination, the IRO indices would 
not need to change in order to be applied to non-discriminatory misinformation. They could 
measure both the population’s willingness to identify beliefs such as climate change denial and 
anti-vaccination positions as pseudoscientific, and their ability to refute such beliefs. All these 
results can be collated to measure overall psychological and inoculative resistance among 
vulnerable populations to a wide range of abuse, discrimination, and misinformation online. The 
 
32 Robin M. Kowalski, ‘Cyberbullying Intervention’ (unpublished manuscript, Clemson University, 2011).  
Robin M. Kowalski, Susan P. Limber and Patricia W. Agatston, Cyberbullying: Bullying in the Digital Age 
(Blackwell Publishing: Sussex, 2012), pp. 90-95. 
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internet, particularly web 2.0 and social media, has presented new challenges in the battles against 
discrimination, abuse, and misinformation. However, the internet can also provide the tools 
necessary for grassroots resistance to these phenomena, so long as the requirements for such tools 
and instruction are researched through interdisciplinary approaches with inter-field applications. 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis set out to determine how the internet had impacted antisemitism, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, and how antisemitism online compared with other forms of online abuse and 
discrimination. The thesis has also explored how research could contribute to solutions both to 
online antisemitism, and to broader abuse and discrimination online. Much of the quantitative 
changes to antisemitism were achieved as early as web 1.0, which provided a new reduction in 
cost, effort and time for the storage, distribution and recycling of resources, evidenced through 
websites such as the Institute for Historical Review. Quantitative changes in web 1.0 were 
achieved through easier communication, as seen on Stormfront. These later evolved into 
qualitative changes on web 2.0, as the anonymity, disinhibition and disassociation of the 
participatory web facilitated the evolution of cultures that impacted the nature of antisemitism. 
Online cultures promoting shocking and vulgar humour, such as 4chan, were made possible 
through these features of web 2.0. These features encouraged those who had not initially held 
antisemitic views to recreationally participate in antisemitism, through continuous exposure to 
normalised antisemitic viewpoints, often promoted opportunistically by dedicated antisemites. 
Social media represents fertile ground for recruitment by these opportunists, and the success of 
websites such as Anglin’s Daily Stormer demonstrates the success of these normalisation and 
recruitment efforts. Many of these changes are shared by other forms of discrimination and abuse 
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online, such as how GamerGate’s misogynistic conceptualisation of a reactionary ‘culture war’ 
produced large-scale group-based cyberbullying. However, the long history of antisemitism has 
allowed antisemitism to serve as the endpoint of these other discriminatory movements, through 
ideologies formulated by anti-Judaism continuously adapted into redemptive antisemitic 
worldviews. Jews could be depicted as responsible for diversity in video games, Muslim 
immigration, LGBT movements, and more. Social media provided paths to conjoin these more 
immediately reactionary beliefs, using antisemitism as a cohesive discriminatory glue.  
The extensive history of antisemitic material - including the Protocols, Holocaust denial, 
blood libel, and Judeo-Bolshevism - could all be drawn upon in a cost-free, time-effective manner 
due to the ease of recycling material in online spaces. The intersections between antisemitism and 
the myriad forms of online discrimination and abuse indicate the need for broad methodological 
approaches to hate, abuse and misinformation online. The unwillingness of young people to engage 
in ‘race trouble’ and confront antisemitism online allows for virtually unopposed colonisation of 
online spaces, leading to increased normalisation of antisemitism online. Combining inoculative 
education and instruction on combatting antisemitism online with the demonstrated effectiveness 
of increased moderation on social media can provide a two-pronged approach to combating 
discrimination, abuse, and misinformation online. Developing and continuing to use 
interdisciplinary and inter-field research methods can further illuminate the points of vulnerability 
in the fight against these phenomena. These interdisciplinary and inter-field research methods are 
a necessary key, as this thesis has demonstrated that the ever-perpetual adaptability of antisemitism 
has been only enhanced by the medium of the internet. 
The adaptability of antisemitism highlights a key limitation in this thesis. Commenced in 
2016 and submitted in 2020, this thesis has been written and rewritten over one of the most 
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significant periods of evolution for antisemitism since the Holocaust. Indeed, not only has 
antisemitism changed, but also have responses to it. As antisemitism continue to evolve, some of 
the findings of this thesis may become outdated or irrelevant in years, if not months. Overreliance 
on past discrimination research must be resisted, especially in the information age, as relying on 
outdated conceptions and definitions of discrimination can result in issues being underestimated 
or even ignored.33 Furthermore, web 2.0’s functionality will hasten the evolution of discriminatory 
views, as seen by antisemitism’s increased radicalisation.34 Recognising these issues, this thesis 
has provided key tools that will not be as diminished by time, in the form of the chapter six research 
study and IRO indices. Inoculation is key to resisting abuse, discrimination, and misinformation 
online, which as indicated in the name of the Network Contagion Research Institute,35 are akin to 
contagions that must be resisted. While ethical concerns may limit the research model to only 
covering covert manifestations of these phenomena, it is covert manifestations of discrimination 
that have been the most difficult to quantify, research and combat online. Therefore, despite their 
limitations, these tools fill a key role in the research and resistance against discrimination, abuse 
and misinformation online, particularly those involving antisemitism. 
 
Further Implications of Research 
The intersections of discrimination and abuse online, combined with the parallel interweaving of 
online and offline realities, demonstrate the threat that online discrimination and abuse poses to 
 
33 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, ‘Anything but racism: how sociologists limit the significance of 
racism’, Race and Society, 4.2 (2001), 117-13 
34 Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Antisemitism 2.0 and the Cyberculture of Hate: Hostility towards Jews as a cultural 
constant and collective emotional value in the digital age (short version) (Berlin: Technische Universität 
Berlin, 2018) <https://www.linguistik.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg72/Antisemitism_2.0_short_version_final.pdf> 
[accessed 21 May 2020] (pp. 7-8).  
35 Network Contagion Research Institute, About NCRI (2019), <https://ncri.io/about> [accessed 17 January 2020]. 
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public health. As seen by synagogue mass-shootings inspired by online reactionary and gaming 
cultures, antisemitism is a key form of discrimination affecting broader public health. The 
cumulative effect of these atrocities, which continue to inspire even more similar events,36 
combined with the persistent normalisation of antisemitism online, result in an inescapable 
atmosphere of discrimination. Providing inoculative resistance can help to prevent the 
normalisation of antisemitism online, and when combined with more effective website moderation, 
can reduce both the prevalence of these atrocities and the dissemination of antisemitism online. If 
antisemites are relegated to separate spaces, such as Anglin’s Daily Stormer and Gab, this will 
reduce the normalisation and spread of antisemitism online, even if it cannot be eliminated 
completely. Racism is, and always has been, a key concern of public health. However, as suggested 
in this thesis, racism’s effect on public health can be diminished through methods that specifically 
target its dissemination, spread and normalisation online. 
 In addition to the rise and change of antisemitism, this thesis has been written during a time 
when knowledge of the Holocaust is fading, and many people are unaware of what constitutes 
antisemitism. Even though the study conducted in chapter six reflected strong sentiment against 
Holocaust denial, that sentiment does not translate into effective inoculative resistance if 
knowledge is significantly diminished among young people.37 While not all antisemitism is tied to 
the Holocaust, this declining knowledge of the Holocaust indicates a corresponding decline in the 
understanding of antisemitism and its dangers. Considering the broad variety of antisemitic 
manifestations, including new manifestations developed online, many internet users are now 
 
36 Andre Oboler, William Allington and Patrick Scolyer-Gray, p. 34. 
37 Shoen Consulting, The Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness Study Executive Summary 2018 (New York: The 
Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, 2018) <http://www.claimscon.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Holocaust-Knowledge-Awareness-Study_Executive-Summary-2018.pdf> [accessed 21 
October 2019]. 
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unaware that they are participating in antisemitism. The inability of many in the left to conceive 
of themselves engaging in racism can also result in the growth of new forms of antisemitism, such 
as the Livingstone Formulation,38 which are further reinforced by the echo chambers of social 
media. While knowledge of the Holocaust and ability to identify antisemitism fades among the 
broader population, knowledge of antisemitic ideas and narratives does not fade among 
antisemites. Blood libel, a fantastical medieval conspiracy theory, has been used to harass Jewish 
journalists on Twitter. ‘Zionology’ continues to perpetuate antisemitism within the left. The 
constant recycling of antisemitism’s enormous and growing catalogue alongside diminished 
knowledge of antisemitism risks further normalisation of antisemitism online. This diminished 
knowledge also can result in situations where previously explicit forms of antisemitism become 
covert (e.g. blood libel), as they may only be identified by antisemites and Jews themselves. The 
unwillingness of many to heed Jewish identifications of antisemitism, alongside the reluctance to 
engage in ‘race trouble’, presents a worrying future in which Jews may find themselves 
increasingly alone in the fight against antisemitism. This potential future further emphasises the 
need for inoculation, and for it to take the form of educating young people specifically about 
antisemitism’s varied manifestations, and the importance of identifying and resisting antisemitism. 
 
The Future of Research 
This thesis has made an explicit call for future research to develop interdisciplinary and inter-field 
approaches against discrimination. One particular way to resist the diminished knowledge of 
 
38 David Hirsh, ‘How raising the issue of antisemitism puts you outside the community of the progressive: The 
Livingstone Formulation’, in From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism: The Past & Present of a Lethal Ideology, ed. by 
Eunice G. Pollack (Brighton: Academic Studies Press, 2017), pp. 1-21. 
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historical antisemitism is to encourage these approaches through collaboration, promoting efforts 
to build a holistic picture of discrimination online so no field is left under-researched. It is hoped 
that the methodology and IRO indices developed in this thesis are used in future research to study 
other manifestations of antisemitism, as well as broader discrimination, abuse, and misinformation. 
However, critical examination of these tools would also be valuable, further developing them to 
best suit the needs of broader disciplines. New antisemitic manifestations and spaces continue to 
evolve, and the relationship between offline and online antisemitism will continue to intersect, as 
will online antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and abuse online. This thesis provides 
an examination of online antisemitism and its intersection with analogous phenomena, but also 
demonstrates the need for continued and higher quantities of research to tackle the damaging 
problems facing societies in the twenty-first century. These problems include both the broader 
impacts of discrimination and abuse, and the more specific adaptability of antisemitism. An ever-
present critical examination of antisemitism and its continual changes is needed. There was a 
perceived reduction in antisemitism in the late twentieth century,39 but in recent years antisemitism 
has risen again, as it has evolved alongside the growth of social media. Society must avoid 
complacency when it comes to tackling long-lasting hatred like antisemitism. Ultimately, 
combating antisemitism requires a two-pronged approach of recognising both the dangers of 
technology and the unique aspects of antisemitism,40 while allowing this approach to inform future 
research into broader abuse, discrimination, and misinformation online. 
 
39 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1996 Hate Crime Statistics (1996), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/1996> 
[accessed 2 December 2019] (p. 7). 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000 Hate Crime Statistics (2000), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2000> [accessed 
2 December 2019] (p. 7). 
40 Monika Schwarz-Friesel, ‘“Antisemitism 2.0”—The Spreading of Jew-hatred on the World Wide 
Web’, in Comprehending and Confronting Antisemitism: A Multi-Faceted Approach, ed. by Armin Lange and others 
(Boston: De Gruyter, 2019), pp. 311-338 (p. 334). 
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Final Remarks 
In her recent book, Antisemitism: Here and Now, Deborah Lipstadt said “[antisemitism] doesn’t 
go away; it’s not a onetime event. Though its outer form may evolve over time, its essence remains 
the same.”41 It is worthwhile reflecting that these words come from a scholar most famous for her 
clash with Holocaust denial. Even despite the hatred’s long history, Holocaust denial was then a 
new form of antisemitism. Truly original compared to the long line of myths and conspiracy 
theories, it represented an attempt to deny another manifestation of antisemitism. Yet unlike the 
attempts to categorise antisemitism surrounding Israel as a ‘new antisemitism’, Lipstadt recognises 
Holocaust denial as an extension of an antisemitism, the essence of which does not change. 
Holocaust denial was not distinct from antisemitism, but served as a shield to protect antisemites 
and allow the broader hatred to flourish. The essence of antisemitism has also not changed with 
the internet, although its appearance has undergone significant transformations that can make it 
hard to recognise and combat. These changes include recreational involvement, group-based 
harassment, and new tools to identify Jews online, all with a reduction in cost, risk and time 
involved. Yet, as seen with the injection of antisemitism into movements like GamerGate, the co-
opting of Brenton Tarrant’s Islamophobic attack to the antisemitic cause, and popularity of 
Merchant memes in spaces like /r/the_donald, these changes all serve to promote the long running 
“Western tradition”42 of hatred against Jews, and the promotion paths to redemption through their 
removal. The Irving-Lipstadt trial ended less than twenty years ago, and in that time, antisemitism 
has significantly evolved following this defeat faced by the Holocaust denial movement. This 
evolution echoes how Holocaust denial reflected another evolution of antisemitism following the 
 
41 Deborah Lipstadt, Antisemitism: Here and Now (New York: Schocken, 2019), pp. 18-19.  
42 David Nirenberg, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
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defeat of Nazi Germany. This thesis provides evidence, research and tools that can be used to 
combat antisemitism in the age of web 2.0 and beyond. Even if the current manifestations of 
antisemitism are stopped, the next evolution of antisemitism is always just over the horizon, and 
society must prepare for it in eternal vigilance. 
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Appendix A – Chapter 1 Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1 – Blood libel meme.1 
 
Figure 1.2 – Blood libel meme original template.2 
 
Figure 1.3 – Typical use of meme template. 
 
Figure 1.4 – Other antisemitic use of template. 
  
 
1 Naughty Raspberry (@HelloRaspberry, 19 May 2016), (tweet). 
ADL Task Force on Harassment and Journalism, Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential 
Campaign (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016) 
<https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/press-center/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-
Force_v2.pdf> [accessed 8 December 2019] (p. 11). 
2 The meme generator website for this meme template has been unavailable since December 2019, although the 
figure 1 variations of this meme are accessible through Google image searches of meme instances. 
Meme Generator, Drinking Tears - Caption | Meme Generator (2019) <https://memegenerator.net/Drinking-
Tears/caption> [accessed via Google images 20 January 2020]. 
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Figure 2 – Rise of active far-right political groups and individual linked to antisemitism. 
Founded Country Group 
1960s Germany National Democratic Party of Germany – Founded 1964; protested 
moment of silence for Auschwitz liberation 2005.3 
 United 
Kingdom 
National Front – Founded 1967; long running antisemitic party 
established by former members of Union of Fascists.4 
1970s Canada Nationalist Party of Canada – Founded 1977; promoted 
antisemitism in Nationalist Report,5 supported Holocaust denier 
Jim Keegstra.6 
France National Front – Founded 1972; founder found guilty of violating 
Gayssot Act with Holocaust denial and trivialisation.7  
 
  
 
3 Roland Nelles and Gabor Steingard, ‘The Threat of the NPD’, Spiegel Online, 31 January 2005. 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/the-threat-of-the-npd-rise-of-german-right-wing-party-evokes-ghosts-
of-past-a-339604.html> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 4 of 30). german-right-wing-party-evokes-ghosts-of-past-
a-339604.html> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 4 of 30). 
4 Martin Walker, The National Front (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 61. 
5 Drew Fagan, ‘Not guilty plea entered 2 publishers deny promoting hatred’, Globe and Mail, 17 September 1985. 
6 Stanley Oziewicz, ‘Evangelist wins Socred leadership, attacked as a racist by Keegstra’, Globe and Mail, 23 June 
1986. 
7 ‘Jean-Marie Le Pen renvoyé devant la justice pour ses propos sur l'Occupation’, Le Monde, 13 July 2006. 
<https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/07/13/jean-marie-le-pen-renvoye-devant-la-justice-pour-ses-propos-
sur-l-occupation_794895_3224.html> [accessed 2 October 2018]. 
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Founded Country Group 
1980s Greece Golden Dawn – Founded 1980; uses Nazi symbolism and elected 
members promote Holocaust denial.8 
Poland National Rebirth of Poland – Founded 1981; identified as noteworthy 
antisemitic organisation by European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance.9 
Sweden Sweden Democrats – Founded 1988; was infiltrated by members of 
Neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement.10 
 United 
Kingdom 
British National Party – Founded 1982; Chairman promoted explicit 
Holocaust denial.11 
 
  
 
8 Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism, New Holocaust denial from Golden Dawn MP (2013), 
<http://antisemitism.org.il/article/80006/new-holocaust-denial-golden-dawn-mp> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 
2 of 5). 
9 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third report on Poland (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
2005) 
<https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/PL/CE_POL_UPR_S1_2008anx_ECRIThirdReportdate
d071204.pdf> [accessed 2 October 2018] (p. 29). 
10 ‘SD-topp medlem i nazistgrupp: “En god sak”’, Dagens ETC, 12 September 2017. <https://www.etc.se/inrikes/sd-
topp-medlem-i-nazistgrupp-en-god-sak> [accessed 2 October 2018]. 
11 BNP: Under the Skin, BBC News, 2001, online video recording, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/programmes/2001/bnp_special/the_leader/beliefs.stm> [accessed 2 
October 2018]. 
 376 
 
Founded Country Group 
1990s Denmark National Socialist Movement of Denmark – Founded 1991. 
 Romania Greater Romania Party – Founded 1991; founder promoted Holocaust 
denial until 2004.12 
 Russia Russian National unity – Founded 1991; paramilitary, neo-Nazi 
organisation.13 
 Sweden Nordic Resistance Movement – Founded 1997; neo-Nazi organisation 
and has spread to Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland.14 
 Ukraine All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ – Founded 1991; electorally 
successful antisemitic political party.15 
 United 
States 
David Duke – Runs for Louisiana Gubernatorial Election 1991, wins 
38.8% of the vote.16 
  
 
12 Grig Davidovitz, ‘Valdim Sees the Light’, Haaretz, 4 April 2004. 
<https://www.haaretz.com/life/books/1.4773004> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 54 of 58). 
13 William D. Jackson, ‘Fascism, Vigilantism, and the State: The Russian National Unity Movement’, Problems of 
Post-Communism, 46.1 (1999), 34-42 (pp. 34-45). 
14 Øyvind Strømmen and Kjetil Stormark, New report: Neo-Nazis in the North (Hate Speech International, 2017) 
<https://www.hate-speech.org/new-report-neo-nazis-in-the-north/> [accessed 3 December 2019] (pp. 4-10). 
15 Viacheslav Likhachev, ‘Right-Wing Extremism on the Rise in Ukraine’, Russian Politics and Law, 51.5 (2013), 
59-74 (p. 60). 
16 Louisiana Secretary of State, Official Election Results: Results for Election Date: 11/16/1991, 16 November 1991 
<https://voterportal.sos.la.gov/static/#!/1991-11-16/resultsRace/Statewide> [accessed 2 October 2018]. 
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Founded Country Group 
2000s Hungary Jobbik – Founded 2003; called World Jewish Congress 2013 “Jewish 
attempt to buy up Hungary”.17 
2010s Australia United Patriots Front – Founded 2015; has called for Hitler’s portrait 
to be hung in classrooms and Mein Kampf distributed to students.18 
  Antipodean Resistance – Founded 2016; neo-Nazi group which has 
called for legislation to murder Jews.19 
 France National Rally – Formerly National Front, rebranded 2018; Jean-
Marie Le Pen suspended for trivialising the Holocaust.20  
 Germany Alternative for Germany – Founded 2013; founder criticised Berlin 
Holocaust memorial, called for reversal on politics of 
commemoration.21 
 United 
States 
American Freedom Party – Founded 2010; promotes white 
nationalism and antisemitism, has links with neo-Nazis.22  
 
17 ‘Jobbik rally against World Jewish Congress in Budapest’, BBC News, 4 May 2013. 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22413301> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 2 of 15). 
18 Michael Bachelard and Luke McMahon, ‘Blair Cottrell, rising anti-Islam movement leader, wanted Hitler in the 
classroom’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2015. <https://www.smh.com.au/national/blair-cottrell-leader-of-
aussie-patriots-upf-wanted-hitler-in-the-classroom-20151016-gkbbvz.html> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 1 of 
24). 
19 ‘Hatred on our doorsteps’, Australian Jewish News, 5 September 2017. <https://www.jewishnews.net.au/hatred-
on-our-doorsteps/67585> [accessed 2 October 2017] (para. 2 of 15). 
20 Alissa J. Rubin and Aurelien Breeden, ‘Far-Right Party in France Tries to Push Jean-Marie Le Pen, Provocative 
Founder, to the Margins’, New York Times, 4 May 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/world/europe/far-
right-party-in-france-tries-to-push-jean-marie-le-pen-provocative-founder-to-the-margins.html> [accessed 2 October 
2018] (para. 1 of 14). 
21 ‘AfD-Mann Höcke löst mit Kritik an Holocaust-Gedenken Empörung aus’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 
January 2017. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-geht-nach-umstrittener-rede-auf-distanz-zu-hoecke-
14686499.html> [accessed 2 October 2018]. 
22 Larry Keller, ‘New White Supremacist Party has Mass Electoral Ambitions’, Southern Poverty Law Center 
Intelligence Report, 30 May 2010. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2010/new-white-
supremacist-party-has-mass-electoral-ambitions> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 9 of 38). 
Heidi Beirich, ‘California State University, Long Beach Psychology Professor Kevin MacDonald Publishes Anti-
Semitic Books’, Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, 22 April 2007. 
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Figure 3 – Rate of hate crimes by religion in the United States
 
  
 
<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/california-state-university-long-beach-
psychology-professor-kevin-macdonald-publishes-anti> [accessed 2 October 2018] (para. 38 of 55). 
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Figure 4 – Race hate crimes statistics exclude antisemitism but can be compared to rates of 
religion hate crimes. 
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Figure 5 – FBI statistics allow comparisons between religious and race-based hate crimes.23  
 
 
23 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015 Hate Crime Statistics (2015), <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/topic-
pages/incidentsandoffenses_final> [accessed 4 October 2018]. 
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Appendix B – Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
Figure 6 – Google News mentions of Cyberbullying 2004-2018. 
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Appendix C – Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
Figure 7.1 – The ‘Happy Merchant’ meme template.24 
 
Figure 7.2 – Merchant meme altered to exaggerate unappealing features. 
 
Figure 7.3 – Merchant meme altered to associate Jews with rats. 
 
  
 
24 All figure 7 images are sourced from the Know Your Meme gallery for the ‘Happy Merchant’ meme. 
Know Your Meme, Happy Merchant Images (2018), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant/photos> 
[accessed 15 December 2019]. 
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Figure 7.4 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control over feminist, anarchist and LGBT 
movements. 
 
Figure 7.5 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control over the media. 
 
Figure 7.6 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish obsession with money. 
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Figure 7.7 – Bank note altered with Merchant meme features to imply Jewish control over banks. 
 
Figure 7.8 – Merchant meme altered to imply Jewish control and destruction of America.
 
Figure 7.9 – Merchant meme altered to associate Jews with Satan. 
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Figure 8.1 – A. Wyatt Mann comic where Merchant meme originated.25  
 
Figure 8.2 – A. Wyatt Mann comic featuring racist “…Around Blacks… Never Relax” meme. 
 
Figure 8.3 – A Wyatt. Mann comic featuring a racist stereotypes of an African American man. 
 
Figure 8.4 – A Wyatt. Mann featuring a racist, homophobic depiction of a Mexican man. 
 
 
25 All figure 8 images are sourced from the Know Your Meme page for ‘A. Wyatt Mann’. 
Know Your Meme, A. Wyatt Mann (2017), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/people/a-wyatt-mann> [accessed 
15 December 2019]. 
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Figure 9.1 – Intersections of cyberbullying, cyber-hate, and antisemitism. 
 
 
Figure 9.2 – Intersections of group-based cyberbullying, misogyny, and antisemitism.
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Figure 10.1 – Organised, casual and recreational antisemitism pre-internet/web 1.0. 
 
  
 
Organised Casual Recreational 
Pre-
internet/ 
web 1.0 
Creators of content: Journal of 
Historical Review, books 
Providers of moral/ 
financial support: 
subscribing 
Virtually non-existent – lack 
of distribution tools and 
social risks make it difficult 
Creators of infrastructure: 
Organisations, e.g. the 
Institute for Historical Review 
Being antisemitic in private 
conversation because it is 
seen as normal and OK 
Centralised strategies and 
leadership; pseudo-academia 
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Figure 10.2 – Organised, casual and recreational antisemitism on web 2.0. 
 
 
 
  
 Organised Casual Recreational 
Web 2.0 Creators of content: ranging 
from essays to memes 
Providers of moral/ 
financial support: clicks, 
likes, shares, comments 
Creators of original 
antisemitic content: humour 
and feedback motivated 
Creators of infrastructure: 
Online antisemitic spaces 
Being antisemitic in public 
anonymous conversation 
because it is seen as normal 
and OK; participating in 
group-based cyberbullying 
May create/engage in own 
spaces, but don’t attempt to 
organise or network 
Diversified strategies; 
individualised/small groups; 
weaponised humour; directing 
group-based cyberbullying 
Deliberately be antisemitic 
when anonymous and 
opponent perceived as 
Jewish; cyberbullying 
individuals 
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Figure 10.3 – Examples of organised, casual and recreational antisemitic websites.  
 ORGANISED  CASUAL  RECREATIONAL  
Websites 
Producer/ 
Consumer 
relationship 
• Radio Islam 
• Institute for 
Historical Review 
• Jew Watch 
• The Daily Stormer 
• Content readers 
• Commenting on 
articles + share 
• Donating to 
websites 
• Follow websites 
for humour 
• Like humorous 
content and 
respond 
Websites 
Interactive 
• Stormfront: 
Owners and 
content creators 
• Creators of 4chan 
antisemitic threads 
• ‘Lurkers’/casual 
Stormfront users 
• Follow 4chan 
antisemitic 
threads 
• Follow websites 
for humour 
• Engage in 
content creation 
on 4chan 
‘Subsites’ • Creators/ 
Moderators of 
Facebook pages 
• Create content on 
YouTube to be 
shared 
• ‘Supermoderators’ 
of antisemitic 
subreddits 
• Subscribe to 
Facebook pages 
• Subscribe/share 
YouTube content 
• Discuss in 
created 
antisemitic 
spaces 
• Create spaces 
for own 
individual use 
• Create content 
for own/shared 
spaces 
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Figure 10.4 - Examples of organised, casual and recreational antisemitism online.  
 ORGANISED CASUAL RECREATIONAL 
Activities • Organising 
antisemitic 
harassment on 
Twitter 
• Editing Wikipedia 
pages to include 
antisemitism 
• Create memes 
• Recruitment 
• Joining 
antisemitic 
harassment  
• Sharers of memes 
• General 
antisemitic 
comments 
• Harass Jews on 
Twitter for 
amusement 
• Creators memes 
for personal 
reasons 
• Seek to provoke 
reactions online 
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Figure 11.1 – Covert antisemitism. 
Covert antisemitism 
Type Examples 
‘Cloaked websites’ and pseudo-intellectual 
antisemitism 
One of the leading Holocaust denial 
organisations, the Institute for Historical 
Review, has tried to portray Holocaust denial as 
legitimate history. The archive for their journal 
is innocuously modelled, yet still features 
articles referring to gas chamber “myths”.26 
Promoting conspiracy theories that target Jews 
without making it explicitly clear.27 
Promotion of the conspiracy theories involving 
George Soros, who, as a prominent Jewish 
billionaire, is used as a ‘dog-whistle’ for Jewish 
conspiracy theories (appendix C, figures 15.1, 
15.2) 
Creating new symbols for communication 
between antisemites 
The use of triple parentheses, ((())), or ‘echoes’ 
were used by antisemites to identify Jews on 
social media. This included a browser extension 
that would automatically put echoes around 
names that sounded Jewish.28 
 
  
 
26 Institute for Historical Review, The Journal of Historical Review, Volume 5 (1984) (2013), 
<www.ihr.org/jhr/v05/v05index.html> [accessed 10 December 2019]. 
27 If Jewishness is mentioned or identifies figures as Jews, then it is overt antisemitism. 
28 Lizzie Plaugic, ‘Google pulls Chrome extension that marked Jewish people online’, Verge, 3 June 2016. 
<https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/3/11853244/google-chrome-extension-jewish-people-pulled> [accessed 10 
December 19] (para. 1 of 5). 
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Figure 11.2 – Overt antisemitism. 
Overt antisemitism 
Type Examples 
The Daily Stormer This website’s name is derived from the Nazi-era 
tabloid Der Stürmer, and has a section dedicated to 
the “Jewish Problem”.29 
Stormfront This White-Nationalist forum openly supports 
Nazism and features explicit antisemitic 
discussion. 
Antisemitic ‘trolling’ – e.g. targeted 
harassment of Jews online  
In October 2014, Jewish UK Labour MP Luciana 
Berger was targeted with antisemitic messages, 
encouraged by Andrew Anglin of the Daily 
Stormer.30 
 
Figure 11.3 – Invisible antisemitism. 
Invisible antisemitism 
Type Examples 
Trivializing of the Holocaust through memes 
and other online content 
The ‘Hipster Hitler’ comics and merchandise that 
lead to the trivialization of the Holocaust.31 
Websites not classifying Holocaust denial as 
hate speech, or considering it merely free 
speech 
Facebook has continuously refused to ban 
Holocaust denial despite banning other forms of 
hate speech.32 
 
  
 
29 Daily Stormer, Jewish Problem (2019), <https://dailystormer.name/section/jewish-problem> [accessed 10 
December 2019]. 
30 Marcus Dysch, ‘Neo-Nazi gave out internet abuse tips in campaign against MP’, Jewish Chronicle, 30 October 
2014. <https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/neo-nazi-gave-out-internet-abuse-tips-in-campaign-against-luciana-
berger-1.60174> [accessed 12 July 2018]. 
31 Know Your Meme, Hipster Hitler (2016), <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/hipster-hitler--2> [accessed 10 
December 2019]. 
32 Andre Oboler and David Matas, Online Antisemitism: A systematic review of the 
problem, the response and the need for change (Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism, 2013), p. 13. 
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Figure 12.1 – Dormant antisemitism.  
Dormant antisemitism online 
Types Examples 
Reposting of Holocaust denial 
material  
The r/holocaust subreddit on Reddit, which was 
moderated by Holocaust deniers, promoted Holocaust 
denial material in their sidebar and regularly posts it in 
new posts (appendix C, figure 16). 
Digitising and sharing Nazi 
propaganda 
/pol/ regularly has threads that provide links to viewable 
and downloadable Nazi propaganda, both in text and 
video form (appendix C, figure 17). 
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Figure 12.2 – Active antisemitism. 
  
 
33 Online Hate Prevention Institute, 4Chan’s /pol/ and the Trouble with Dean (2014), <https://ohpi.org.au/4chans-
pol-and-the-trouble-with-dean> [accessed 10 December 2019] (para. 1 of 14). 
34 Oboler, The Antisemitic Meme of the Jew (Melbourne: Online Hate Prevention Institute, 2014) 
<https://www.scribd.com/document/205092520/The-Antisemitic-Meme-of-the-Jew#fullscreen&from_embed> 
[accessed 12 December 2018]. 
Active antisemitism online 
Types Examples 
Writing and posting antisemitic 
articles 
Regular content on the Daily Stormer. 
Editing images to become 
antisemitic 
4chan trolls regularly would deface Ben Garrison’s 
cartoons to include Nazi and explicit antisemitic 
imagery.33 
Creating new versions of antisemitic 
memes 
The ‘Happy Merchant’ meme is regularly edited to 
include new contexts and ideas, as per regular memes.34 
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Figure 13 – TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 14 – Criticism of Charlottesville rally from “identitarian” on 4chan’s /pol/ board.35 
 
 
 
 
  
 
35 Anonymous (ID: 6K6gnY2p, 30 June 2018), ‘“Unite The Right” Rally. Before MID-TERMS?’ (4chan thread), 
[accessed 1 July 2018]. 
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Figure 15.1 – Jewish billionaire George Soros as ‘bogeyman’ for conspiracy theories.36  
  
Figure 15.2 – George Soros meme listing his alleged actions and methods.
 
 
36 All figure 15 images are sourced from the ‘George Soros Meme’ page on the OnSizzle website. 
Onsizzle, George Soros Meme (2019), <https://onsizzle.com/t/george-soros-meme> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
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Figure 16 – r/holocaust subreddit page on Reddit.37 
   
 
37 Reddit, r/holocaust (2019), <https://www.reddit.com/r/holocaust> [accessed 6 March 2019]. 
Leo Goldstein, Silicon Valley, Free Speech, and Holocaust Denial (2019), <https://defyccc.com/wp-
content/uploads/bad/2017-10-20--r-holocaust.png> [accessed 15 December 2019]. 
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Figure 17 – “National Socialist Library” post on 4chan’s /pol/.38  
 
 
  
 
38 Anonymous (ID: MMXeo6Po, 5 March 2019), ‘National Socialist Library’ (4chan thread), [accessed 6 March 
2019]. 
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Appendix D – Chapter 5 Tables and Figures 
Figure 18 – Institute for Historical Review as news/blog website.39 
 
 
39 Institute for Historical Review, Institute for Historical Review (2019), <http://ihr.org> [accessed 6 March 2019]. 
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Figure 19.1 – Stormfront Alexa rankings.40 
 
Figure 19.2 – Stormfront Alexa rankings.41 
 
Figure 19.3 – Stormfront Alexa rankings as of 29 October 2019.42 
 
 
40 Alexa, Stormfront.org Traffic Statistics (2018), <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/stormfront.org> [accessed 15 July 
2018]. 
41 Alexa, Stormfront.org Traffic Statistics (2018), <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/stormfront.org> [accessed 2 
March 2019]. 
42 Alexa, Stormfront.org Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic (2019), 
<http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/stormfront.org> [accessed 29 October 2019]. 
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Figure 20.1 – 4chan Alexa rankings 2016.43
 
Figure 20.2 – 4chan Alexa rankings third quarter 2019.44 
  
 
43 Alexa, 4chan.org Traffic Statistics (2016), <http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/4chan.org> [accessed 31 October 
2016]. 
44 Alexa, 4chan.org Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic (2019), 
<http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/4chan.org> [accessed 29 October 2019]. 
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Figure 21.1 – Daily Stormer 2013 header image.45 
 
Figure 21.2 Daily Stormer 2016 header image.46 
 
Figure 21.3 Daily Stormer 2016 header image featuring Reagan and Trump.47 
  
 
45 Daily Stormer, The Daily Stormer (2013), 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20140331090232/http://www.dailystormer.com> [accessed 15 January 2020]. 
46 Daily Stormer, The Daily Stormer (2016), 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20160827203041/www.dailystormer.com> [accessed 15 January 2020]. 
47 Daily Stormer, The Daily Stormer (2016), 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20161114170255/http://www.dailystormer.com> [accessed 15 January 2020]. 
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Figure 22.1 – Daily Stormer Alex rankings third quarter 2019.48 
  
1Figure 22.2 – Daily Stormer Alex rankings fourth quarter 2019.49 
  
 
48 Alexa, dailystormer.name Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic (2019), 
<http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/dailystormer.name> [accessed 29 October 2019]. 
49 Alexa, dailystormer.name Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic (2019), 
<http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/dailystormer.name> [accessed 7 January 2020]. 
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Figure 23 – Antisemitism on ‘Zionism Is A Cancer’ Facebook page.50 
  
   
 
50 The second image led to an antisemitic YouTube video posted by an account whose account picture is a clown 
variation of Pepe, linked to the antisemitic ‘Honkler’ meme. 
Zionism Is a Cancer (@DelendaEstZionism, 5 March 2015), ‘The big lie of the 20th century. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5QlWJUk4-o’ (Facebook post), 
<https://www.facebook.com/DelendaEstZionism/photos/a.178522858997449/396321053884294/?type=3&theater> 
[accessed 16 December 2019] 
Zionism Is a Cancer (@DelendaEstZionism, 1 November 2019), ‘https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=cLfQX4vSgMM&fbclid=IwAR0J4fFjjqpTz-z7a3WqwKMzc1C98HItmmo0sz1Qc-
NhJmdHJXan_84nwTU’ (Facebook post), 
<https://www.facebook.com/DelendaEstZionism/posts/1339306956252361> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
 406 
 
Figure 24.1 – “Holohoax” YouTube search results 15 September 2018.51
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Figure 24.2 – “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search 15 September 2018.52 
 
 
51 YouTube, “Holohoax” search results (2018), <https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Holohoax> 
[accessed 15 September 2018. 
52 YouTube, “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search results (2018), 
<https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=holocaust+revisionism> [accessed 15 September 2018]. 
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Figure 24.3 – “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search 29 October 2019.53 
 
 
53 YouTube, “holocaust revisionism” YouTube search results (2019), 
<https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=holocaust+revisionism> [accessed 29 October 2019]. 
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Figure 25.1 – Antisemitic meme on /r/the_donald.54 
 
Figure 25.2 – /r/the_donald reacts to antisemitic meme.55 
 
 
54 (/u/usa_DJT_usa, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (Reddit post), <https://archive.is/SrmuC> 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
55 (/u/BearskiMcBear, 25 June 2016), ‘The salt of the MSM is evident’ (comment on Reddit post), 
<https://archive.is/grnPv> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
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Figure 25.3 – Antisemitic content on /r/pussypass.56 
   
 
56 Reddit, “jew” /r/pussypass search results (2019), <https://old.reddit.com/r/PussyPass/ 
search?q=jew&restrict_sr=on&include_over_18=on&sort=relevance&t=all> [accessed 29 October 2019]. 
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Figure 25.4 – r/holocaust quarantine and content.57 
 
  
 
57 Reddit, r/holocaust (2019). 
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Figure 25.5 – Effect of quarantine on r/holocaust subreddit statistics.58 
 
  
 
58 Quarantining the subreddit made its subreddit statistics disappear, however, the subreddit’s subscriber rank was 
observable for a few months before the subreddit was permanently banned in September 2019. 
Subredditstats, r/holocaust stats (2019), <https://subredditstats.com/r/holocaust> [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
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Figure 25.6 – Invisible antisemitism on far-left subreddit, r/ChapoTrapHouse.59 
  
 
 
59 (feysal_gh, 19 June 2019), ‘Flag of Israel’ (Reddit post), 
<https://old.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/c2bu0p/flag_of_israel> [accessed 16 December 2019].  
(DouggieMohamJones, 26 November 2019), ‘Telling my kids this was the flag of Israel’ (Reddit post) 
<https://old.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/comments/e1ga28/telling_my_kids_this_was_the_flag_of_israel> 
[accessed 16 December 2019].  
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Figure 25.7 – Results of a search for “criticising Israel” in /r/ChapoTrapHouse.60 
 
 
60 “criticising Israel” r/chapotraphouse search results (2019), <https://old.reddit.com/r/ChapoTrapHouse/ 
search?q=criticising+Israel&restrict_sr=on&include_over_18=on&sort=relevance&t=all> [accessed 16 December 
2019]. 
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Figure 26.1 – Stormfront TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 26.2 – 4chan TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 26.3 – Daily Stormer TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 26.4 – Twitter TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 26.5 – YouTube TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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Figure 26.6 – Reddit TEMPIS taxonomy. 
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61 Only live videos, which are still later stored. 
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Appendix E – Chapter 6 Tables and Figures 
Figure 27 – Inoculative resistance sub-questions. 
Aspect of Inoculative 
Resistance  
Sub-Question  
Recognise  Do they call out subtler aspects of antisemitism, such as cloaked content 
and ‘dog-whistles’?   
Research  Do they present resources in counterarguments to antisemitic tropes, 
and avoid the misinterpretation or misuse of sources?   
Respond  Do they present counterarguments to antisemitism more than arguing 
with others? 
Refute  Do they provide sound refutations to the antisemitism in their 
counterarguments?  
Overall Is the capacity to resist antisemitism affected by education and attitude 
to antisemitism?  
Considering the role of ‘trolling’ in antisemitism online, do they 
become emotional and does this emotion hinder their resistance?  
 
Figure 28 – Inoculative Resistance Online (IRO) Individual Indices. 
  Successful +0.25 Unsuccessful +0 Counterproductive -0.25 
Recognition Called out Holocaust 
denial as antisemitism 
Did not call out more Distinguished Holocaust 
denial from antisemitism 
equal/more than called out 
Research Present research in 
response 
Do not present research in 
response 
Misrepresent source 
equal/more than presented 
research in response 
Response Counterargument No counterarguments Argue with other 
participants equal/ more 
than Holocaust denier 
Refute Quality refutations No refutation Poor-quality refutation 
equal/more that quality 
refutations 
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Figure 29.1 – Number of counterarguments v whether participants studied history in year 12.  
 
Figure 29.2 – Number of counterarguments v familiarity with Holocaust denial.  
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Figure 29.3 – Number of counterarguments v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.  
 
 
Figure 29.4 – Number of counterarguments v emotional response to Holocaust denier. 
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Figure 29.5 – Number of counterarguments v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier. 
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Figure 30.1 – Inoculative Resistance Online indices score proportions among cohort.  
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Figure 30.2 – Overall Inoculative Resistance Online scores among cohort. 
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Figure 31.1 – Recognition index scores v whether participants studied history in year 12.
 
Figure 31.2 – Research index scores v whether participants studied history in year 12.
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Figure 32.1 – Refutation index scores v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.
 
Figure 32.2 - Refutation index scores v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier.
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Figure 33.1 – Overall Inoculative resistance scores v compulsion to respond to Holocaust denier.
 
 
Figure 33.2 – Overall Inoculative resistance scores v confidence in ability to refute Holocaust 
denier.
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Figure 34.1 – Discussion group themes. 
Theme Discussions References Participants 
Denial coming from disbelief at 
scale 
6 11 8 
Exact numbers do not matter 8 15 12 
 
Figure 34.2 – Survey themes. 
Theme References Participants 
Engaging with Holocaust deniers is a waste of 
time 
18 14 
Only had minor experiences with antisemitism 12 11 
Had experiences of antisemitism on social media 13 10 
External research done on Wikipedia during 
study 
9 9 
Education is needed to help resist Holocaust 
denial 
20 17 
Tools are needed to help resist Holocaust denial 15 14 
Feelings of anger and/or frustration 25 14 
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Figure 34.3 – Themes prominent in both discussions and surveys. Represents how many times a 
theme was expressed in discussions and surveys, and by how many participants in each context. 
Theme Discussion 
references 
Discussion 
Participants 
Survey 
references  
Survey 
Participants 
Total 
references 
Total 
participants 
Favourability 
to neutrality  
3 3 14 11 17 12 
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Figure 35 – Emotional response to Holocaust denier v compulsion to respond to Holocaust 
denier.
 
 
Figure 36 – Confidence in ability to refute Holocaust denier v whether participants studied 
history in year 12.
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Appendix F – Ethics approval 
Figure 37 – Ethics approval letter dated 7 November 2017. 
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